Money Matters: Sources of ISIS’ Funding and How to Disrupt Them

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Many attribute the quick success of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to its extensive financial resources, earning it the title of the richest terrorist organization in the world. While ISIS’ funding has fueled its hostile takeover and enabled it to assume a state-like role in its controlled territories, ISIS’ funding also may be its greatest weakness. If the U.S.-led anti-ISIS international coalition can successfully sever the terrorist from its many funding sources, its eventual defeat will become more likely. To successfully starve ISIS of its financial resources, the coalition will need to pressure Turkey and the Kurds to increase border security, form a uniform policy towards kidnapping for ransom, and target ISIS’ internal avenues of transport and sales.

Introduction

The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), also referred to as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and, more recently, as just the Islamic State (IS), is an extremist Sunni Islamism movement (Singh et al., 2014). The organisation has led a campaign of terror and captured territory in both Iraq and Syria in an unprecedented manner and at an extraordinary rate. In June 2014, ISIS captured global attention after its strategic seizure of Mosul, Iraq and its self-proclaimed establishment of a Caliphate. Over a year later, ISIS has sustained the attention of global powers and topped many policy agendas. The United States (U.S.) has since created an international coalition to combat the threat of ISIS.

ISIS has become infamous for its brutality, extensive use of social media, and its ability to attract a record number of Western-born fighters. However, the extraordinary nature of ISIS’ threat to regional and international stability exceeds its violence (Smith, 2014). The sustained control ISIS exerts over contiguous territory and its rapidly expanding capabilities have made it difficult for the U.S.-led coalition to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy’ it. However, ISIS’ greatest strength is derived from its comprehensive financial networks. This income is sourced from local criminal activity, oil revenue, foreign funding, fake charity donations, and kidnapping ransom. While ISIS’ funding has fueled its hostile takeover of territory in Iraq and Syria and enabled the organisation to assume a state-like role in its controlled territories, ISIS’ financial solvency also is its greatest weakness. If ISIS can be severed from its many sources of funding their defeat may become obtainable.

The Origins of Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)

ISIS’ roots trace back to Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad; an organisation established in 2002 by Jordanian Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi (Smith, 2014; BBC News, 2015). Two years later, Zarqawi pledged his organisation’s allegiance to al- Qaeda and renamed it Tanzim Al Qaeda fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (BBC News, 2015; Rabil, 2014). After the death of Zarqawi at the hands of U.S. forces in 2006, al-Qaeda founded the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Like its parent organization, ISI adhered to the Salafi-jihadi ideology that advocates a return to “the authentic beliefs and practices of the al-salaf al-salih (pious ancestors),” and the establishment of an Islamic state, called a caliphate (Rabil, 2014).

Both of Zarqawi’s successors, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omr al-Baghdadi, were killed in 2010. This left Ibrahim Awwad al-Badri, more commonly known as Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, to assume leadership (Rabil, 2014). As leader, Al-Baghdadi worked to rebuild ISI’s capabilities, which had been weakened by the U.S.- inspired Sunni Awakening. The movement attempted to foster the alliance of Sunni tribes with U.S. forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq. ISI was popular with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs because Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki’s pro- Shia sectarian policy had alienated and politically excluded the Sunni population from power in Iraq.

After the onset of the Syrian civil war, al-Baghdadi allied ISI with the Syrian Salafi-jihadi organization, Jabhat al-Nusra. Together, the two terrorist organizations fought against the Syrian regime, although ISI prioritized developing its territorial control in Syria while al-Nusra sought to defeat the Syrian regime (Rabil, 2014). Once ISI had gained sufficient control over Syrian strategic areas in 2013, the group announced a merger with al-Nusra, and adopted the new name - al- Qaeda in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The leaders of al-Nusra and al- Qaeda rejected this merger, forcing all those within al-Nusra who were loyal to al-Baghdadi to defect to ISIS (BBC News, 2015).

To the dismay of al-Qaeda, ISIS moved quickly to create a transnational state by taking control of large swaths of contiguous territory in Syria and Iraq. Al-Qaeda officially renounced any affiliation with ISIS in early 2014. The decision was in reaction to ISIS’ disregard for al-Qaeda’s authority, and ISIS’ battlefield clashes and refusal to share control of Syrian territory with al-Nusra (Sly, 2014). Since then, ISIS and al- Qaeda have been rivals, competing for the same recruits, territorial control, and status as supreme authority within Jihadism.

The ISIS takeover

In June 2014, Iraq’s second 2014). ISIS’ loot was quite substantial: the captured Humeevs alone were worth over $1 billion USD (Newman, 2015).

The failure of the Iraqi army to defend Mosul and greater Iraq, particularly given the training and equipment received from the United States, is often blamed on a “general lack of morale and cohesion” (RT, 2014). Furthermore, many Iraqi generals received their titles because of their sworn loyalty to former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who constantly feared a coup, rather than for their competency (Jeffrey, 2014). Because ISIS had the support of the local disenfranchised Sunni population and capitalized on the residual resentment by providing the services that the Shia-majority government did not, maintaining control of these cities was not difficult. Local Shiite tribes were similarly won over via negotiations to exchange allegiance for economic and political benefits; two privileges not provided by the Iraqi government to northern rural Iraq (Rabil, 2014).

Following ISIS’ ‘big win’ in Mosul, many other Sunni majority cities quickly fell, including strategic locations like Tal Afar and Tikrit (RT, 2014). ISIS currently controls contiguous territory from the largest city, Mosul, fell to ISIS Despite the presence of roughly 30,000 U.S.-trained Iraqi military forces in the surrounding region, Mosul collapsed with little to no resistance (RT, 2014). Most Iraqi soldiers fled, shedding their uniforms and weapons in haste. These U.S. trained forces were outfitted with billions of U.S. dollars worth of sophisticated weapons and hardware as military aid from Washington, all of which ISIS recovered upon seizing Mosul (RT, 2014). From Mosul and other Iraqi cities, ISIS has reportedly recovered around 2,300 U.S.-made Humvees (Bacevich, 2015), over 100 tanks (Sisk, 2015), 74,000 machine guns (Pianin, 2015), 2,000 rockets (Pianin, 2015), countless small arms and ammunition, and even a Black Hawk helicopter (RT, its pseudo capital of Raqqa, Syria to the outskirts of Baghdad (RT, 2014). This stretch of land covers over 500 square kilometers, although importantly, ISIS lacks “comprehensive oversight of the roads and settlements between them” (RT, 2014).

Soon after the capture of Mosul, al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself Caliph Ibrahim and established the Islamic Caliphate, shortening the organization’s name to the Islamic State (IS). As Caliph, al-Baghdadi “...called on Muslims to ‘support the religion of Allah through jihad’ and to emigrate to the Islamic State because emigration to the land of Islam is obligatory” (Rabil, 2014). Many al- Qaeda’s affiliated organizations, such as Ansar al-Shari’a and al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have created splinter groups composed of defectors who support ISIS (Pandey, 2014; Rabil, 2014). Other terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram and Ansar al-Islam, have pledged allegiance to al- Baghdadi (Intelcenter.com, 2015; Pandey, 2014). As of May 2015, 35 different jihadi groups had pledged either support or alliance to ISIS (Intelcenter.com, 2015). This terrorist group also has attracted thousands of foreign fighters. While a majority of these foreigners originate from neighboring states, many fighters have come from Western countries. Between local and foreign fighters, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that ISIS commands approximately 20,000 to 31,500 fighters (Nytimes.com, 2015) Sources of ISIS Funding In the almost year and a half since ISIS shocked the global community with its swift and brutal takeover, the group has successfully managed to increase its territorial control and capabilities, effectively functioning more like a military than a terrorist organization. Although ISIS participates in terrorist activities that are arguably more violent and indiscriminate than competing organizations like al-Qaeda, ISIS also is assuming state-like responsibilities and garnering unprecedented funds. ISIS is the wealthiest terrorist organization in history, valued at about $2 billion USD (Aboites, 2015). ISIS’ rate of wealth accumulation is unparalleled and its numerous sources of funding exceed those of any other terrorist group. According to a Kurdish intelligence official, “ISIS is currently receiving enough steady supplies of funds to sustain itself for the foreseeable future” (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014).

But, providing the services of a state and fighting battles on multiple fronts are costly endeavors. Aboites (2015) describes ISIS’ costs to include, “...military equipment, training, safe houses, surveillance equipment, roads, civilian bus services, food, technology...It pays salaries, rent and medical expenses to its members, and always has to guard against internal corruption.” To sustain these costs, ISIS must source its funds from multiple avenues, including oil revenue, local criminal and terrorist activity, kidnapping, foreign funding, and donations.

Oil

One of ISIS’s greatest sources of funds stems from oil. The terrorist organization controls dozens of oil fields in both Iraq and Syria. In September 2015, ISIS captured the last oil field under Syrian President Assad’s control (CBS News, 2015). Activist organizations such as Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently (RBSS), which covertly reports on the violent and oppressive behavior of ISIS in the Syrian city, claims that the sale of ISIS’ captured energy resources, such as electricity and gas to the ruling regime of Syria is one of ISIS’ greatest sources of revenue (Malm, 2015). According to the U.S. Treasury Department, as of 2014, ISIS made between 1-2 million USD per day in oil smuggling revenue (Aboites, 2015). Some 2015 estimates place ISIS’ monthly income at $40 million USD (Nytimes.com, 2015).

At $40 USD per barrel, ISIS sells its oil below market rate, compared to the world price average of $80 USD per barrel. According to IHS, a data- driven analytical firm that monitors ongoing conflicts, the U.S.-led coalition’s airstrikes targeting ISIS- controlled oil wells have caused the price of its oil to fluctuate between $25-$60 USD per barrel (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). “In other words,” di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov (2014) explain, “depending on whether it’s a good or bad day, ISIS’s oil revenues can vary between $1.5 million and $3.6 million a day...Even though its oil is of a poorer quality than much of what is on sale in the rest of the world.”

According to di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov (2014), “ISIS’s oil empire stretches across a landmass roughly the size of the U.K. (a quarter of a million square miles) and contains around 300 oil wells in Iraq alone...By contrast, ISIS possesses about 60 percent of Syria’s total production capacity, which, before the civil war kicked into high gear, produced around 385,000 barrels a day, according to the Iraq Energy Institute.” In total, ISIS produced roughly 3 million barrels of oil per day in 2014 (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014).

ISIS smuggles oil (and fuel from energy facilities in its captured cities) into neighboring countries such as; Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey. Southern Turkey, in particular, where oil is expensive, has a large market for ISIS’ low price per barrel (Bronstein and Griffin, 2014). Some within Iraqi Kurdistan have been accused of and arrested for facilitating the smuggling of oil and fuel into Turkey (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). Bribery, greed, and desperation allow ISIS’ smuggling networks to thrive.

Local Criminal and Terrorist Activities

Potentially more profitable than oil revenue is ISIS’ local criminal and terrorist activities in and around its controlled territories. Such activities include; robbing banks, selling illegal drugs, looting, illegally selling stolen artifacts, and extorting local civilians and businesses through imposed taxes (Malm, 2015). According to Bronstein and Griffin (2014), under its former guise as ISI, the organization was “primarily financed through domestic criminal activity within the borders of Iraq.” ISIS now exploits these existing criminal networks to finance its Caliphate. For example, Mosul was a source of income to ISIS long before its takeover of the city in 2014. Lister (2014) writes that, “Prior to capturing Mosul, ISIS was already earning $12 million a month in the city alone.” The pillage of Mosul’s central bank purportedly provided ISIS with an additional $425 million USD (Almukhtar, 2015). “When ISIS overran Mosul last June, they literally took necklaces off women—earrings off their ears. They also went after livestock, furniture, cars” (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014).

Their pillage of high value items extends well beyond local banks and citizens. ISIS has notoriously looted and destroyed high value archaeological sites. The terrorist group controls over 4,000 of Iraq’s 12,000 important archaeological sites (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). Once under their control, ISIS has either symbolically destroyed or peddled off these priceless artifacts. Aymen Jawad, head of Iraq Heritage, described ISIS’ illegal sale of ancient artifacts; “By some estimates, these sales now represent ISIS’s second largest source of funding. One of its biggest paydays recently came from looting the ninth century B.C. grand palace of the Assyrian king Ashurnasirpal II at Kalhu...Tablets, manuscripts and cuneiforms are the most common artifacts being traded...Hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of irreplaceable pieces are being sold to fund terrorists” (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014).

Taxation of the local population also brings in hundreds of millions of dollars. Citizens are taxed for operating businesses, importing or exporting goods, using Internet cafes, or for using public goods like highways, phones, and electricity (Malm, 2015). “ISIS even “taxes” groups providing genuine humanitarian aid in its own war zone,” (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014) and Iraqi government employees are taxed at a rate of roughly 50 percent of their salary (Almukhtar, 2015). In total, ISIS makes approximately $1 million USD per day from taxes and extortion (Almukhtar, 2015).

Iraq is also agriculturally rich. “The United Nations estimates that land in Iraq under ISIS control accounts for up to 40 percent of the country’s annual production of wheat” (Bajekal, 2014). This means that ISIS has access to revenue from wheat sales. This allows the organization to reward supporters with food and punish dissenters with starvation. Furthermore, ISIS’ sweeping campaign has allowed it to seize control of key resources like dams and granaries, also controlling their distribution to the locals (Aboites, 2015).

Kidnapping for Ransom

Another activity that provides ISIS with considerable revenue is kidnapping for profit. By 2014, kidnapping ransoms accounted for roughly 20 percent of ISIS’ funding, with the U.S. Treasury Department quoting an annual income of $20 million USD (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). While both the United States and United Kingdom refuse to pay ISIS ransom money for captured citizens, notable among these were American journalists Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff, many European governments are known to pay, even if that fact is not publicly admitted (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). Di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov (2014), estimate that France has paid $14 million USD for the release of its citizens and that “Spain is also believed to have paid ISIS ransoms for its journalists.” Those victims whose ransoms are not paid are executed, often publicly, and their murders are recorded in ISIS’ infamous execution videos. However, payment of the ransom is not a guarantee of release, either. This allows for additional unwelcome ambiguity for victims and their families.

Foreign Funding

According to the latest estimate, foreign funding has contributed $40 million USD to ISIS (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). These funds came from both the governments and private donors in countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Aboites, 2015; Almukhtar, 2015). Until the international community criticized and demanded a stop to the public funding of ISIS, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar were openly providing the terrorist organization with financial support (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). Facing international pressure, in 2013 Saudi Arabia criminalised all financial support of terrorist organizations including ISIS, the country’s most senior Islamic cleric denounced ISIS as ‘public enemy number one’, and Riyadh joined the U.S.-led coalition’s airstrikes against ISIS (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). As of 2014, the governments of Qatar and Kuwait have not taken the same measures to counter the ISIS threat. The U.S. Treasury has placed economic sanctions on both Kuwait and Qatar for their continued financing of terrorism. The United States has even called Qatar a “permissive environment for financing terrorist groups” (Aboites, 2015). Lori Plotkin Boghardt at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy explains the struggle behind curbing terrorism financing in Kuwait and Qatar:

The U.S. government continues to be concerned about spotty, to say the least, Kuwaiti and Qatari enforcement of their counterterrorist financing laws. A couple of factors are frustrating attempts to dam these rivers of cash. First, the relatively open banking systems of Qatar and Kuwait are being skillfully exploited by ISIS, since, unlike Saudi banks, they do not automatically raise red flags when money is siphoned to Islamist causes. Second, Qatar and Kuwait are loath to limit the activities of highly influential ISIS donors due to the political fallout such intervention may cause...Cracking down on some ISIS financiers is politically complicated for these countries’ leaderships... (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014).

Although some overt government support of ISIS has diminished in Saudi Arabia, private sponsors continue to fund the group in the Persian Gulf and beyond. Their money is not intended just for ISIS. These funds are finding their way into the pockets of many other Syrian rebels fighting the al-Assad regime. Director Günter Meyer of the Center for Research into the Arabic World at the University of Mainz, argues that funds from the Gulf States is ISIS’s “most important” source of funding (Aboites, 2015).

Donations from Fake Humanitarian Aid

Donations from private donors and governments sometimes are laundered through feigned humanitarian aid organizations and unregistered charities. Labeled as humanitarian aid to war-torn areas in Syria and Iraq, many of these difficult to track funds go directly to ISIS (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). ISIS utilises social media to spread propaganda to raise funds. Many of these social media channels are in English. According to Aboites (2015), “Israeli cyber intelligence has acknowledged that IS is using the digital currency bitcoin for fundraising from US territories.” Former Under Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Jimmy Gurule, explains that Bitcoin is not regulated in the United States so, unsurprisingly, many donors using Bitcoin are from the United States (Aboites, 2015).

Some fundraisers in Kuwait operate under the disguise of raising funds for orphans and refugees. Such a strategy makes it difficult to distinguish between legitimate funds to those in need and fake donations destined for groups like ISIS (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). In 2014, Kuwait provided the most “uncommitted aid” to Syria (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). Uncommitted aid is funds that do not have a guaranteed recipient. Qatar is also guilty of uncommitted aid. The Financial Tracking Service (FTS) reported the nation sent $11 million USD in charitable donations to unspecified locations (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). Di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov (2014) cite that “Few established worldwide humanitarian agencies have genuine links to the region...As a result, any donations to smaller ‘humanitarian aid’ groups provide no guarantee that they will actually reach genuine aid workers in the region”. Therefore, a majority of these uncommitted aid funds are going to groups like ISIS, al-Nusra, or other criminal organisations that would be inappropriate or illegal to support overtly. Some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have banned all unauthorised donations to Syria to prevent groups like ISIS from exploiting the confusion and desperate humanitarian needs of the country to amass funds (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014).

Conclusions for Policy: Severing ISIS’ funding sources

It is undeniable that ISIS is a threat to regional and global security. It is difficult to dismantle any terrorist organization, and particularly one as advanced, well-equipped, and unique as ISIS. However, many experts suggest that the best way to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy’ ISIS is to remove its access to financial and military resources (Aboites, 2015). David Cohen of the U.S. Department of Treasury’s terrorism and financial intelligence department says that ISIS is the richest terrorist organisation the U.S has ever confronted (Lister, 2014). But the financial success that allowed their growth also makes ISIS increasingly dependent on securing more and more funds to sustain their growing empire. Running a Caliphate is expensive, but ISIS has the advantage of not being an internationally recognised sovereign state. This means that economic sanctions and other traditional forms of economic destabilisation cannot be used in their defeat. ISIS’ advanced financial strategy means that it has numerous sources of income, all of which must be shut down. Unfortunately, even the U.S. Treasury does not fully understand all of ISIS’ revenue sources (Nytimes.com, 2015). Bajekal (2014) describes the difficulty in “following this train of money” due to a “lack of independent researchers and journalist in the area.” Given the extreme violence in the region and ISIS’ targeting of Westerns for kidnapping ransom, it is unsurprising that few find the risk worthwhile.

Despite not knowing the full extent of ISIS’s funding capability, the U.S. and its coalition partners are working to disrupt ISIS’ trade routes, target foreign states and individuals that finance ISIS, and destroy ISIS’ oil fields by bombing pipelines and refineries (Nytimes.com, 2015). A report by the International Energy Agency in Paris found that coalition airstrikes have reduced ISIS’s oil production from 70,000 to 20,000 barrels a day (Bajekal, 2014). Yet, while these strategies are a significant deterrent to ISIS, such actions should be sustained and adjusted as ISIS adapts to the resultant setbacks. The U.S. and coalition forces should increase pressure on both Turkey and the Kurds to reign in cross-border smuggling. At the same time, the focus on fixing lax security practices should not overshadow the need to address ISIS’ large internal market for its oil in its controlled territories. While 

foreign states account for some of its revenue, ISIS has focused more attention on building an internal market where its “citizens” are increasingly reliant upon ISIS-provided fuel (Lister, 2014). Therefore, the coalition should place a proportionate emphasis on disrupting this internal market.

While destroying refineries surely will disrupt ISIS’ oil production and impede the organization’s ability to sustain its terror campaign, it also makes oil and necessary resources scarcer for the local population. According to Bajekal (2014), ”if the ISIS economy is “degraded” by the bombings, there is likely to be a nationwide fuel and electricity crisis, as well as agricultural shortages...” If the 6 to 8 million locals under ISIS’ control do not have access to diesel fuel for heating, businesses operations, and agricultural machinery, to name but a few necessities, they will become more reliant upon the oil disruption of their subjugators (Lister, 2014; Bajekal, 2014). As long as ISIS has the support of the local population, whether by choice, force, or necessity, the group cannot be wholly overcome. In order to destroy ISIS’s internal market, coalition forces should aim to target ISIS’ avenues of transport and sales. If ISIS can no longer move its oil for sale, or if ISIS loses the local demand for its supply, one large source of ISIS’ funding will be effectively degraded. 

Ordinarily, the U.S. would pressure banks to reveal their criminal clients (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). However, since ISIS does not operate in the established international financial system, this traditional avenue to attack organised crime is obsolete. According to the New York Times (2015) in its conversations with representatives from the U.S. Treasury Department, “The top priority now seems to be the blocking of the Islamic State’s use of banks and financial exchanges in Iraq, so the group won’t be able to buy weapons and other supplies.” However, part of the coalition forces’ strategy to disrupt ISIS’ funding sources it may be a waiting game. Once ISIS creates affiliate groups in other countries, unearthing their local financial markets through intercepted long distance communication may be the key to their downfall (Nytimes.com, 2015),

Since the start of coalition airstrikes against ISIS-held oil refineries, the group has switched from predominately using mobile refineries to utilising homegrown operations (Nytimes.com, 2015). Homegrown operations are difficult to monitor. Even those that have been identified are difficult to target. Coalition forces must take into consideration the potential for collateral damage of local citizens from a sustained aerial campaign in populated areas (Nytimes.com, 2015). Furthermore, the international community needs to create a uniform policy for dealing with civilians captured for ransom. As long as there is money to be gained, ISIS (as well as other terrorist organisations) will continue to kidnap for ransom.

ISIS’s economy in its pseudo state is slowly degrading (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). Some argue that ISIS does not have a sustainable economic plan, and that cities under its control are experiencing resource shortages, leaving its economy at near collapse (di Giovanni, Goodman and Sharkov, 2014). Others cite ISIS’ numerous avenues of funding to be its iron shield from defeat. Regardless of the conflicting opinions on ISIS’ potential for self-destruction or self-realisation, both camps can agree that cutting off ISIS sources of income will help degrade the organisation. Ultimately, “...as long as ISIS controls any ground where civilians can be taxed, extorted and robbed...ISIS will remain self-financing” (Bronstein and Griffin, 2014). If local governments, with the aid of the international community, can take back the resources under ISIS’ control and disrupt those financial avenues, al-Baghdadi’s Caliphate will not withstand the test of time.