Why is Israel not intervening to counter the Islamic state?

Executive Summary

One year has passed since the formation of the US-led international coalition against the militant forces of the so-called Islamic State. While most Arab countries are participating in the coordinated efforts to uproot the jihadist threat, Israel is still absent from the list of contributing regional powers. Though frequently threatened by the Islamic state, Israel has maintained, since the beginning of the conflict, a consistent non-interventionist policy. Using interviews with three experts, this paper develops an analytical reconstruction of the reasons behind such absence, considers both the national and international factors that could explain Israel’s lack of intervention against one of the most dangerous threats the Middle East has ever faced. 

Introduction

The need to contain effectively the Islamic State’s advance in the Middle East is increasingly urgent. US President Barack Obama’s choice to adopt a strategy mainly focused on ‘airstrikes and training and equipping some of the Islamic State’s (ISIS) adversaries in Iraq and Syria’ has proved to be only partially effective (Stern, 2015: 68). As a matter of fact, despite the 5,948 US strikes in Iraq and Syria carried out since the beginning of the operations in August 2014 (Defense.gov, 2015), the fight against ISIS is still far from being won. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent intervention in Syria has further complicated Obama’s mission, adding the conundrum of how to coordinate operations with the Russian Federation against the jihadists. National interests of single state-powers are becoming increasingly involved in the fight against ISIS, making it even more difficult to identify a common strategy based on cooperation. Retracing the political and military developments that have occurred since the establishment of the self-declared caliphate, the absence of Israel from any official operation against ISIS stands out, raising the issue of why the Jewish state, the strongest military power in the region and the US’ historical ally, continues to be absent from the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and avoids direct intervention. This absence is even more perplexing when one considers the current presence of ISIS militants near Israel’s borders. Since the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission from the Golan, ISIS militants have repeatedly attempted to “expand the extremist group’s territory near the border with Israel” (Winsor, 2015). In parallel, the entrance of ISIS forces into the Northern Sinai and the activity of

locals affiliated with the caliphate have further threatened Israel’s national security. However, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s public recognition of the risks related to the presence of ISIS fighters at Israel’s borders has not resulted in an active policy of intervention. Indeed, the occasional and relatively minor measures adopted by the Israeli Prime Minister to counter ISIS strongly clash with Israel’s traditional assertiveness when its national security is threatened. This apparent contradiction raises a series of questions that must be answered in order to understand Israel’s present policy. Does ISIS actually constitute a threat to Israel? Perhaps Netanyahu is biding his time, waiting for the right moment to uproot the Jihadist advance? Why has Israel not been invited to join the anti-ISIS coalition? 

This analysis adopts a dual perspective to shed light on these controversial issues. First, the reasons that explain Israel’s non-interventionist policy as an individual power-state are examined. Then, the international obstacles to Israel’s participation in the US-led coalition are identified. Both internal considerations and external hindrances will be highlighted as providing the basis for Israel’s absence from official operations against ISIS forces. On the basis of the evidence collected, the study proposes the overall assessment that, under the present circumstances, an Israeli intervention against ISIS is unlikely to occur. However, a fundamental caveat is issued in the conclusive part of the work, stressing how Israel’s present non-interventionism could fast mutate into an aggressive response should the caliphate’s forces make in the future any move perceived as actively endangering Israel’s national security. 

The Caliphate does not (yet) represent a threat to Israel’s national security

In the aftermath of the July 2014 attacks launched by the Islamic State's Egyptian affiliate in Northern Sinai, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly recognized the menace represented by the presence of ISIS forces “operating with unusual brutality” (Middle East Monitor, 2015) “not just opposite the Golan Heights” but “also in Egypt, opposite Rafah” (Sherman, 2015). This acknowledgment notwithstanding, the limited extent of the measures adopted by Netanyahu to counter such apparent danger seems to indicate that ISIS’ operations are not perceived, at present, as a major concern for Israel’s security. Netanyahu’s present strategy clashes with Israel’s traditional assertiveness when national security is threatened. The rationale for Israel’s current non-intervention policy lies in the assessment of the extent to which ISIS can actually represent a threat for the safety of the Jewish state and people. 

In order to deconstruct the apparent contradiction between Netanyahu’s statement and Israel’s lack of military engagement against ISIS one has to recognize that the Islamic State possesses neither the strength nor the military capability to engage in a conflict with a state endowed with strong political power and professional armed forces such as Israel. Past experience has indeed suggested that “ISIS is primarily successful where there is a political void” (Efraim, 2015). As explained by Amos Yadlin, former head of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) intelligence, “their [ISIS militias’] only successes have been in areas that no one is interested in, and hence where no one will fight them. These include the Sunni areas of northeast Syria and the less developed areas of Iraq” (in Levi, 2014). The same can be said for the recent attacks led by the ISIS affiliate group in Egypt, Ansar Beit al Maqdis. For years, the Egyptian government has faced grave difficulties in ‘enforcing state sovereignty’ in the Sinai region (Efraim. 2015). This allowed the Islamic State to take advantage of local instabilities to gain a foothold. As highlighted by Paolo Luigi Branca (2015), Professor and Researcher in Islamic Studies at Milan’s Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore:

“No matter how dangerous and embarrassing (as it clearly reveals Cairo’s inability to keep the entire Egyptian territory under control), the Sinai’s issue can be considered as quite marginal. After all, the presence of semi-nomadic tribes in the area has often contributed to increase the area’s instability even in the absence of those ideological motives that are now presented as legitimating the revolt.” 

On the contrary, when confronted by ‘well organized opposition’ ISIS militias have proved to be ineffective (Efraim, 2015), as demonstrated by the numerous defeats inflicted on ISIS by Kurdish fighters. With “veteran commanders on the field”, the combination of guerrilla gambits - such as the hit and run and the Mishtenur Hill tactics - with unconventional-warfare tactics and the recourse to covert guerrilla warfighters, has caught ISIS fighters unprepared, allowing the Kurds to deprive the Islamic state of some of its most strategic strongholds (Civiroglu, 2015). Clearly, professional military strength and political cohesion are major obstacles for ISIS militias’ operations (Idem). For this reason, it is highly unlikely that ISIS would engage in direct action against the strongest power in the Middle East. 

True, Egyptian ISIS affiliates have launched rocket-attacks against Israel’s southern region. But, can this be considered a real provocation or, better, a first signal of an ISIS plan to advance into Israel? In this regard, Ronald Tiersky, Professor at Amherst College, has stressed the need to distinguish whether “the strategy was still being formulated in Raqqa or was an effort by local commanders to go it alone without any coordination with Al Baghadi”. Using this logic, he highlighted how the rocket-attacks were most likely “isolated incidents”, and therefore a tactic, but not part of ISIS’ overall strategy (Charlaff, 2015). Although ISIS’s Wilayat Sinai branch has newly threatened Israel in a recent video by referring to the Sinai as “an opening to fight a war against the Jews” (Lieber, 2015), the likelihood that such words will turn into actions and that ISIS will launch a large scale attack against Israel from Egypt is remote. As explained by security analyst Michael Horowitz, the menaces to Israel contained in the video did not mirror ISIS’ actual intentions, but were rather aimed at “delegitimizing the Egyptian military […] by depicting [it] as Israel’s watchdogs” in order to justify “the fact that the group is fighting the Egyptian army rather than Israel” (Lieber, 2015). Moreover, even if the Islamic State actually was willing to carry out direct military action against Israel from the Sinai, the fact that the Egyptian army will likely succeed in stemming the advance of ISIS in the region, further limits the chances that a significant attack against the Jewish state could occur in the near future (Efraim, 2015). 

Shifting the focus to Israel’s eastern borders, a similar assessment can be drawn. Currently, no serious threat to Israel’s national security is likely to originate from the Jordanian region. This possibility should be excluded not only because ‘Jordan has the military capability to withstand an ISIS onslaught’ and to ‘manage for the time being the radical Islamist threat from within’ (Idem), but also because, quoting Jonathan Fine, “If they tried to overthrow Jordan, Israel would not allow that and neither would the US or the UK because if the Hashemite kingdom falls, the area would be in a bad situation” (Ain, 2014). In other words, ISIS would never have the time to reach Israel from Jordan as the jihadists’ advance in the kingdom would be halted well before they reached the Israeli-Jordanian borders. Arguably, the presence of ISIS forces at Israel’s northern border in the Golan region represents a far more alarming situation than Ansar Beit al Maqdis’ operations in Northern Sinai. The vacuum left by the withdrawal of most UN peacekeeping forces from the Golan Heights, coupled with the growing Syrian fragmentation, has paved the way for the caliphate’s militias to creep toward the Northern Israeli borders. Sources attest to the presence of ‘around 500-700 Islamic State fighters currently active in the Syrian Golan Heights towns of Jamlah and Ash-Shajarah’ (JNS, 2015). Despite the objective danger of ISIS close proximity to Israel, there is little chance that a significant offensive against Israel will be launched from the region. In this regard, Amos Yadlin, has commented (in Winsor, 2015): 

“Those Sunni elements who control some two-thirds to 90 percent of the border on the Golan aren’t attacking Israel. This gives you some basis to think that they understand who is their real enemy- maybe it isn’t Israel.” 

Five months have passed since this declaration was made and, despite the growth in the number of jihadist militias in the Golan, the situation has not changed essentially. Rather, now more than ever, one could argue that Israel is not ISIS’ prime enemy. While Obama’s Operation Inherent Resolve hardly can be defined as a success, the same appraisal emerges when considering ISIS’ current position. Above all, the fact remains that, to secure its strongholds, ISIS is being forced to shift its strategy from offensive to defensive (Nance, 2015). Malcolm Nance (2015), a counterterrorism and intelligence consultant for the U.S. government’s special operations, has recently outlined the importance of this point (Idem):

“For all its bluster and allegiances, ISIS is showing signs of weakness. It is on the defensive throughout the entire Middle East and Africa, and that spells doom for a group designed to exist only on the attack. While it is not losing large areas of terrain, ISIS is certainly not winning in the way its videos portray.”

Weakened by repeated airstrikes carried out by the US-led coalition and now also targeted by the Russian air force, Lawrence Saez, Professor at SOAS University’s Department of Politics, says: “it appears that ISIS faces what other combatants face…that you can make very strong quick moves across different parts of a territory but then the problem is trying to sustain the territory that you have held” (Saez, 2015). He adds: “ISIS, in a sense, has a blitzkrieg approach: now they have to supply themselves with weapons and food etc. and that creates a lot of problems for them in terms of being capable of maintaining the level of movement for long” (Idem). Under such circumstances, directing an attack against Israel would equate to an act of self-destruction, a fact that does not escape the notice of Islamic State militants. 

A military operation by ISIS against Israel has a probable success rate of below zero. As Michael Peck (2014) explains, were ISIS to go ‘for a stand up fight instead of terrorism’, Israel’s military would be quick to inflict a devastating strike against the caliphate’s forces. Through a comparison of ISIS’ and Israel’s military endowments,  Peck points out how, despite ISIS’ capture of American and Russian artillery, Israel’s possession of Merkava Mark IVs certainly would “give Israel a major advantage in a ground war” and would lead to a most probable victory. The same result also can be predicted on the basis of the combination of ISIS’ lack of air power and the IDF’s increased “training and readiness”. He adds that “Spike Missiles, F-161 Sufa Fighters and Super Heron Drones” together with Israel’s “Unit 8200 signals intelligence” further will ensure Israel’s certain victory and, consequently, the jihadist militants’ inevitable defeat (Idem). For these reasons, though close to its border in the Golan, ISIS is not perceived by Israel as a major threat. However, this does not mean that Netanyahu underestimates the potential dangers of ISIS’ maneuvers (Branca, 2015). As explained by Daniel Pipes (2015), President of the Middle East Forum and publisher of its Middle East Quarterly journal:

“The Israeli government is trying to stay out of the fights going on around it. It intervenes occasionally, prepares itself for the worst, but keeps its head down. That will change should ISIS or another group regularly start attacking Israel […] I don't think Netanyahu is biding his time to wait for an opportunity but is hoping to keep out for as long as possible.”

Dr. Lorenzo Vidino (2015), Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University’s Center for Cyber & Homeland Security, agrees with this logic: 

“I believe Israel has adopted a strategy of non-intervention beyond its borders, keeping a defensive position of the borders and not tolerating any incursion. Of course, there are intelligence exchanges with the allies, and I refer to Egypt, Jordan and the Kurds, but beyond this I cannot imagine the situation to develop into a direct Israeli intervention. Except in hypothetical extreme situations, I do not think it is possible.”

After all, the fact that the current non-interventionist policy would turn into an aggressive and irreversible offensive - if the Islamic State’s forces were to manifest a serious intent to attack Israel - has not been kept secret. Various statements by Israeli political and intelligence representatives have confirmed Israel’s awareness of ISIS’ military weaknesses and of the ease with which the IDF would uproot a jihadist attack against Israel. Ehud Barak, former Israeli special forces commando, IDF Chief of Staff and Israeli government minister, has diminished ISIS’ successes, asserting that they occurred only because the militants have not yet been engaged in a “real kind of battle" (RT English, 2015).Yadlin has expressed his convictionsregarding the consequences of a hypothetical Jihadist attack against Israel and its outcomes more directly. In a recent speech, the Former head of IDF Intelligence outlined how “the IDF would have no problem taking on ISIS” and that “it would be easy to eliminate them” (Levi, 2014). Should the jihadist threats turn into actions, Israel would undoubtedly counterattack. However, this is not the case at the moment. For now, as declared by Netanyahu, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic of Iran constitutes the main concern for Israel and its national security. This danger is objectively far greater than ISIS’ posturing (Soffer, 2015). The other half of the story

Although Israel is in fact trying to keep itself away from the fight by adopting a ‘“wait and see” attitude (Tiersky, 2015), this is not the only factor explaining Israel’s non-interventionism. In reality, Israel most likely would be prevented from joining the coordinated anti-ISIS operations. Since now more than ever, cooperation among the Western and Arab allies is essential to counter the IS threat, admitting Israel into the coalition undoubtedly would be strategically counterproductive. Why? Because “no Arab country would align itself or join a coalition together with Israel” remarks Vidino, explaining that Israel’s involvement in any operation would jeopardize the cohesiveness of the current coalition of Arab forces (Vidino, 2015). This is only in part due to the historic, entrenched enmity which exists between Israel and most of the Arab members of the anti-ISIS coalition. Mostly, the Arab states’ reluctance is attributable to Israel’s continuing unwillingness to commit to a dialogue with the Palestinians. Accordingly, Israeli opposition leader Yitzhak Herzog has stated publicly that Netanyahu’s inability to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue had caused Israel’s exclusion from the American-led efforts against ISIS. In his words: “Had Netanyahu and his minister behaved differently […] Israel would be a part of the coalition” (Cohen, 2014). This declaration dates back to November 2014, in the aftermath of the execution by Israel of Operation Protective Edge, a military operation carried out by the IDF against Hamas’ forces in the Gaza Strip as a response to the ‘serious escalation in rocket fire directed at Israel from Gaza by Palestinian terrorist organizations led by Hamas’(Ganor, 2014). The most recent Israeli-Palestinian developments have further exacerbated the Arab countries’ stance toward Israel’s policy.The sharp increase in deadly violence between Israelis and Palestinians in October 2015 has indeed instigated the wrathful reaction of the Arab League foreign ministers, with League chief Nabil al-Arabi intending to involve the UN Security Council to prosecute “terrorist crimes by Israeli settler groups against the Palestinian people" (Ariel, 2015). Most experts agree on the pull-away effect that would spread among Arab allies if Israel joined the coalition. According to Professor Lawrence Saez:

“It is a fact that some countries would probably pull away or not get involved. If you consider that the US is enabling the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Yemen in coalition against the common threat as they perceive it, you will find that they do not want to jeopardize that by having Israel in it. I think it would be a catastrophe, the support from Saudi Arabia would be declined, who knows Turkey would probably do the same. People get very concerned when Israel is…linked to any operation.”

Additionally, irrespective of the present exacerbation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the strained state of political and diplomatic relations between Israel and many of the countries participating in the anti-ISIS alliance undoubtedly would prompt some of them to abandon the coordinated efforts, were Israel to participate in the fight. Arguably Turkey could be one of these states. Since 2009 the once prospering Israeli-Turkish ties have progressively deteriorated and turned into open rivalry, with both countries’ presidents attacking each other and denouncing the other’s policies. Putting an end to the friendly relationship between the two countries, the harsh exchange that occurred between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and former Israeli president, Shimon Peres, during the January 2009 World Economic Forum, marked the beginning of a series of incidents that have contributed to lengthening the distance between Israel and Turkey (Kirisci and Sinan, 2015). The Israel Defense Forces' deadly raid on a Turkish-flagged aid ship headed for Gaza in May 2010 (DPA, 2015), and more recently, the accusations launched by Erdogan against Netanyahu on the occasion of last January’s anti-terrorism rally in Paris, have fueled additional tensions between Turkey and Israel (Al-Monitor, 2015). While Erdogan accuses Netanyahu of “crimes against humanity” (Arango, 2015), the latter denounces Erdogan as an “anti-Semitic bully” (RT English, 2015). 

Would Turkey ever agree to cooperate with Israel? Considering the aforementioned tensions, it is hard to imagine how this would happen even if the Palestinian-Israeli situation had not precipitated. A condemnatory statement issued by the Turkish Foreign Ministry in the aftermath of the most recent Israeli attacks against Palestinians has offered further proof of the fact that, at least for the moment, relations between the two states are likely to worsen or, at least, to remain stalled (Wootliff 2015). Furthermore, as indicated by Professor Branca (2015), the current cooling in relations between Obama and Netanyahu also can be considered among the reasons for the US’ decision to exclude Israel. The relationship between the US President and the Israeli Prime Minister indeed has been quite tense in the last few months, especially since last July when the Iranian nuclear deal was finalized. In a speech delivered last September at the United Nations, Netanyahu fervently criticized the US’ openness to dialogue with Iran since the beginning of the negotiations and condemned the agreement.The Israeli Prime Minister remarked that “by fueling Iran’s aggression with billions of dollars in sanctions relief” (McGreal 2015), the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons inevitably will accelerate and Iran’s regional assertiveness against moderate and pro-Western Middle Eastern regimes will be fueled (Shalom 2015). He added that the abolition of sanctions against Iran would not only prompt an inevitable nuclear arms race but also, and most dangerously, a deleterious increase in the spread of terrorism in the region (Idem). Netanyahu’s major concerns obviously relate to Israel’s national security. Accordingly, when the Iranian deal was signed a few months ago, he characterized it as a “stunning, historic mistake” and specified that "Israel is not bound by this deal with Iran, because Iran continues to seek our destruction” (Ravid 2015). The accord doubtlessly has created a fracture between the US and Israel. As explained by Chemi Shalev (2015), suspicion and mistrust have increased in the last months. While Obama’s policy has somehow strengthened the Israeli perception that “Obama’s very willingness to engage with Iran [is not] simply an expression of American interests…but concrete proof of sinister intent”, the combination of the Jewish lobby’s pressure over the Iran deal and Netanyahu’s stance on the Palestinian issue, both have marred the Israeli Prime Minister’s reputation among Americans (Idem). 

Though these disagreements arguably have contributed, the main factor in determining Israel’s exclusion from the anti-ISIS coalition, as mentioned above, is the fear of a probable crumbling of the same if Israel was included. After all, the US has implemented a similar strategy in the past. The 1990-1991 Gulf War is most emblematic in this regard. Like today, the US administration then opted for a policy of “friendly restraint” regarding Israeli intervention in the Gulf crisis. A close look at the dynamics of the events reveals many parallels between the motives inspiring this strategy then and now. First among them is the conviction that “any direct Israeli action […] or indirect participation with US-led forces would likely fray the multinational coalition” (Lasenksy 1999). Secondly, the fear of a “further escalation of the overall conflict” which historically inspired President George H. W. Bush’s decision to keep Israel out of the conflict still exists today. Lastly, the erosion of US “diplomatic and political clout in the region” that would likely follow the contingent decision to involve Israel in the war, is another factor behind this decision (Idem). Arguably, the need to safeguard the cohesiveness of the US-led coalition constitutes, among the three factors presented above, the most decisive determiner of the American choice not to involve Israel in the fight. Taking into account the manifested difficulties in countering the Islamic State, it is absolutely necessary that the anti-ISIS coalition remain united and intact. Cooperation “by nations that surround the Islamist militant group's self-declared caliphate” is, now more than ever, essential to ensure success against the ISIS threat (Levs, 2014). As Fawaz Gerges argued a year ago when discussing Obama’s decision to create a union of forces to fight the jihadists: "The most important element of this coalition is the local and the regional" (Levs, 2014). The situation has not changed. Obama needs local and influential regional powers to cooperate with the mission to contain the expansion of the so-called caliphate. Admitting Israel into the US-led group of forces would most likely upset some of the Arab allies, a risk that the US cannot afford to take. In light of this danger, Obama’s opposition to any Israeli interference is wise, strategic, and forward-looking decision. However, this consideration must be coupled with the reasoning developed in the previous section. As argued, Israel’s absence from the fight is also attributable to internal, national considerations. In other words, exclusion from the coalition is just part of the bigger picture of Israel’s intentional non-interventionist policy. According to Daniel Pipes (2015): 

“Not wanting to bring Israel into the coalition is half of the story; the other half is that the Israelis are reluctant to join it, they prefer to stay out.”

Conclusion

Since the self-declaration of the so-called Islamic caliphate in June 2014, the campaign against ISIS has brought together an increasing number of Western and Middle Eastern countries. Surprisingly, Israel, the strongest military power in the region, has not directly intervened to counter the ISIS threat. In order to clarify such a puzzling absence, this study has provided a picture of the reasons behind Israel’s non-intervention against one of the most dangerous threats the Middle East has ever faced. To this end, the scrutiny has adopted a dual perspective, looking for national and international factors that can plausibly explain Israel’s present stance. In doing so, the first conclusion is that from the Israeli point of view, ISIS does  not yet pose an actual danger to Israel’s national security. Secondly, attention has focused on Obama’s choice not to invite Israel to join the US-led anti-ISIS coalition, and on whether this could change in the near future. Stressing the fact that Israel’s participation in the coordinated international efforts likely would cause the withdrawal of most of the Arab allies, the US intention in excluding Israel from the joint effort is to safeguard the coalition from fragmentation. Overall, Israel being unwilling to act to repel ISIS, and the unlikelihood that its intervention would be welcomed, suggest that direct action of the Israeli military against the Islamic State is unlikely to occur in the near future. However, the fast pace with which events are evolving should lead one not to underestimate Israel’s intentions. Even though ISIS has so far not been considered a priority by Israel, that assessment could change very quickly. With ISIS at its borders, a single move by the group can be perceived as actively endangering Israel’s national security. Such a development undoubtedly would  prompt Netanyahu to react, possibly even without US approval. History speaks for itself, and when it comes to state security, there is no stopping Israel. 

Conclusions for policy

• Cooperation is a key-priority in the fight against the expansion of the Islamic state. The military efforts by the Western allies alone cannot secure the success of the operations to eradicate ISIS’ presence in the Middle East. To be effective, Western cooperation must be complemented by regional cooperation from Arab countries. Such concentrated effort must include intelligence cooperation, security support, vigorous regional and international diplomacy, and  strategic communications between the US-led forces and the Arab partners (Katulis, Singh and Lang, 2014). 

• Keeping Israel away from the fight is a necessary condition for the conservation of a solid and united Western-Arab allies cooperation and, consequentially, for the effectiveness of the multinational efforts. Although Israel is unarguably the strongest military power in the Middle East, its involvement in the anti-ISIS operations would be a strategic misstep. Outsiders’ interventions alone will not be enough, this implying that ‘the main impetus for defensive political action against ISIS must come from the Arab states themselves’ (Harrison 2014). Clashing with this necessity, allowing Israel to participate in the coalition would prompt a withdrawal effect among the Arab partners, endangering the whole cooperative framework that has been developed since September 2014.

• The US’ choice to adopt a policy of restraint toward a possible Israeli involvement is a safe and cautious strategy. A change in such stance would not only cause the derailment of the US-led coalition but it would also increase the level of hostility in the region with the consequent risk of a degeneration of the already strained Israeli-Arab relations into a wider, large-scale conflict.

• Despite many difficulties are still being encountered in containing the ISIS’ forces, the only certainty is that regional cooperation must remain a pivotal linchpin of the strategic efforts led by the US. Any move that could potentially jeopardize the present coordinated activities must be fend off. In light of the mentioned repercussion that would follow a direct Israeli intervention, the participation of the Jewish State is to be avoided.