“We are Anonymous”: Can Hacktivism Help in the Fight Against ISIS?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Anonymous, an online collective of international hacktivists, has declared war on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and subsequently has attacked thousands of the terrorist organisation’s social media outlets. Anonymous undoubtedly has had success in disrupting the propaganda disseminated through domains like Twitter, and this contribution has aided the war on ISIS. While the overall value of Anonymous’ contributions is contentious, their participation in the conflict has highlighted the need for anti-ISIS coalition forces to utilise cyber warfare extensively in the struggle against_ISIS.

Introduction: 

Established in 2003, Anonymous is a leaderless international collective of online hackers that partakes in hacktivism, or hacking in pursuit of a politically or socially motivated agenda. Once decentralised, the organisation now is a large online movement that claims to fight for privacy, government transparency, and freedom of expression, among other causes. Anonymous accounts for a significant part of the world’s cybercrime, acting as hell-raisers and Internet trollers (pranksters), but the group also has preformed vigilante-type acts. This paradox between criminal activity and vigilantism has caused controversy, and has sparked unprecedented discussions among policy makers, as cyber security becomes increasingly relevant.  

Anonymous began from an online bout with the Church of Scientology, and has evolved into a community of hacktivists that has targeted entities ranging from government agencies to terrorist organisations (Bartlett, 2014). One of Anonymous’ first targets was a Neo-Nazi, Hal Turner (Bartlett, 2014). After the 2009 re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran, Anonymous started a campaign to help Iran’s activists (Cadwalladr, 2012). In 2010, the hacktivist organisation launched “Operation Payback” which struck back at PayPal for prohibiting payments to WikiLeaks (Brooking, 2015). In 2011, the group attacked the San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) in “OpBART” by releasing the private information of thousands of BART users in response to the transit agency’s shutdown of cell service at its stations to prevent a protest (Krupnick, 2011). 

Also in 2011, LulzSec, an offshoot of Anonymous, took down Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) websites, hacked Sony and PBS, created false headlines for the United Kingdom (UK) news agency, The Sun, and, during the Arab Spring, hacked Tunisian and Egyptian government websites in an attempt to bring down the regimes through what they called “Operation Tunisia” and “Operation Egypt”  (Cadwalladr, 2012; Kushner, 2014). Some have argued that Anonymous’ virtual participation in the Arab Spring had real-world consequences; “It was only when Anonymous started highlighting what was happening in Tunisia, for example, after the government banned Wikileaks in late 2010, that the rest of the world's press started paying attention to what became the Arab spring” (Cadwalladr, 2012). Anonymous also has used YouTube to announce other ‘Freedom Ops’, such as “Operation Libya”, “Operation Bahrain”, and “Operation Morocco” (Kushner, 2014). After the 2014 death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, Anonymous started “Operation Ferguson”. This campaign culminated with the inaccurate naming of the police officer accused of killing Brown. Anonymous also has posed as teenage girls to catch pedophiles online, released hundreds of Ku Klux Klan (KKK) member identities in an act of public shaming (Woolf, 2015), supported the Occupy movement, and attacked the Santa Cruz County government’s website in an attempt to sway the the city’s anti-homelessness policy (Kushner, 2014).

Anonymous could be the most capable nongovernmental hacking group in the world, but the online hacker collective has not yet indicated a will or a means of disrupting vital public infrastructure (Kushner, 2014). While Anonymous is considered unlawful and a potential security threat by many law enforcement agencies, its thus far non-violent behaviour has separated it from terrorist organisations like ISIS. Many experts doubt Anonymous’ ability to carry out an attack against vital public infrastructure, supported by the fact that, to date, Anonymous has not attacked the national security of any government (Kushner, 2014). Others suggest that its roots in the online forum 4chan, a simple imageboard website for posting images and comments anonymously, (hence its eventual name, ‘Anonymous’) where users were out for the “LOLs”, or humorous, maybe offensive but never violent, online behaviour would preclude the organisation from now resorting to violence. 4chan encouraged disjuncture by making messages to other users impossible, and this dissociative nature carried over into Anonymous. To those who doubt Anonymous’ capabilities, it seems unlikely that this group of highly disassociated individuals would be able to engage in any kind of collective action to pose a significant threat to a politically or socially motivated target. 

By contrast, others fear that Anonymous’ disjuncture is what makes it dangerous.  Norton (2012) explains:

Anonymous is a classic “do-ocracy,” to use a phrase that’s popular in the open source movement. As the term implies, that means rule by sheer doing: Individuals propose actions, others join in (or not), and then the Anonymous flag is flown over the result. There’s no one to grant permission, no promise of praise or credit, so every action must be its own reward…[Anonymous] grew up to become a sort of self-appointed immune system for the Internet, striking back at anyone the hive mind perceived as an enemy of freedom, online or offline.

The group of hacktivists claims that cutting the head off the snake cannot dismantle its leaderless, global organisation. Anonymous has not one head, but an infinite number of heads. Every member could be a leader if he or she proposed a cause that piqued other members’ interests. Anonymous’ operations can be selected and pursued by anyone. Of course, some members are more skilled than others, and members who participate in more high profile hacks than others, but these individuals are still not considered the default leadership. Hacktivists come from all walks of life, ranging from ex-military personnel to antisocial teenagers, but, for better or worse, all are equal in the cyber world and in the faceless organisation of Anonymous. 

Thus far, Anonymous’ operations have reflected the organisation’s values, which is a testimony to the conviction of its members. However, without oversight, it is possible that a member (or members) will utilise the organisation’s resources to further an independent cause beyond the parameters of what Anonymous claims to stand for. Anonymous is undoubtedly morally ambiguous, and is a cause for concern to governments and international agencies. Although Anonymous has targeted individuals or organisations that many would agree are unsavoury, the online hacktivist collective also has targeted innocent people in pursuit of what it considers to be a greater justice. Anonymous is also both internally and externally unregulated, as is most activity in cyberspace. There is no international standard for how to penalise cybercrime, making external regulation by law enforcement agencies difficult. And, due to the nature of Anonymous, internal regulation is nonexistent. However, Anonymous has, on more than one occasion, aligned its interests with those of these same governments and international agencies. Defeating ISIS is but the newest of these aligned interests. A partnership between hacktivists and law enforcement agencies likely is excessive. However, that mutual goal and any perception of Anonymous’ usefulness may be enough to stay attempts to shutter the group, if only until the threat of ISIS has been eliminated. This begs the question; does Anonymous’ ‘war on ISIS’ significantly contribute to the greater international fight against ISIS?

 The Cyber ‘War on ISIS’

Anonymous has declared a multi-front social media war on ISIS. This cyber war aims to target and shut down ISIS’ social media accounts and websites, including platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram. Beginning in 2014, Anonymous used Twitter to announce a “full scale cyber war” against ISIS (Cottee, 2015). After the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack, Anonymous uploaded a video to YouTube that promised revenge for the 12 people killed, naming al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist groups as targets in its “war on you, the terrorists” (Thompson, 2015). This new operation often has been referred to using the hashtag, “#OpCharlieHebdo”. 

After ISIS took credit for the November 2015 Paris attacks, Anonymous once again took to Twitter and YouTube. Garbed in its iconic Guy Fox mask, a member of Anonymous released a statement in French that again declared war on ISIS, calling it a “total war”. In the video, the masked individual said, “Expect massive cyber attacks. War is declared. Get prepared. Anonymous from all over the world will hunt you down" (Cohen, 2015). The cyber war campaign, referred to as both “OpISIS” and “OpParis”, is going to be Anonymous’ biggest operation ever, or so the group claims.

“OpISIS” includes; overwhelming ISIS’ social media accounts with images of goats, demonstrations on an Anonymous-led “Day of Rage” set for December 11, 2015, and a continued effort to take down ISIS’ Twitter and other social media accounts. A member of Anonymous defended the group’s approach by explaining his or her understanding of what the member considers (and presumably what many other Anonymous members  believe) to be ISIS’ simple strategy for success. In the words of that Anonymous source, "They thrive off fear and hope that by their actions they can silence all of us and get us to just lay low and hide in fear. We will show them that we are not afraid, we will not just hide in our fear, we are the majority and with our strength in numbers we can make a real difference. We will mock them for the idiots they are…“ (Arvinth, 2015). 

While Anonymous as a collective announced its war on ISIS, its breakaway groups seem to be slated to do most of the heavy lifting. One such organisation is GhostSec: a collective of former and current Anonymous members that have broken away in order to pursue Islamic extremist content online. GhostSec claim they have taken down or disrupted over 130 ISIS-affiliated websites. It has been confirmed that the group helped prevent a terrorist attack planned for July 2015 on a Tunisian market by relaying intelligence to a private security company, Kronos Advisor, which in turn transmitted the information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Cottee, 2015).

One member of GhostSec under the pseudonym, ‘Mikro’, founded another group called CtrlSec, which is entirely independent of Anonymous. And, unlike Anonymous, which prides itself on being a leaderless mass of like-minded hacktivists who do not accept compensation, this splinter group has a defined leadership structure and accepts funds. CtrlSec aims to terminate pro-ISIS Twitter accounts by placing on a blacklist those accounts which they determine promote pro-ISIS propaganda. Then Twitter users are invited to report to Twitter any accounts from this blacklist that they find to be in contravention of company policy. CtrlSec, itself, does not directly report any accounts to Twitter or hack to remove the accounts from the website. CtrlSec seems to be trying to act within legal parameters and avoid behaviour for which Anonymous has been criticised - acting as judge, jury, and executioner. 

 According to Brookings Institution fellow J.M. Berger and technologist Jonathon Morgan, there were over 46,000 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts by the end of 2014. Each account had garnered around 1,000 followers (Cottee, 2015). CtrlSec claims that, by early 2015, their organisation was responsible for the takedown of 60,000-70,000 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts (Cottee, 2015). CtrlSec’s claims cannot be verified, and a spokesperson for Twitter reportedly called Anonymous’ (grouping CtrlSec and GhostSec with them) estimates of its contributions "wildly inaccurate" (Schatz, 2015). Moreover, new pro-ISIS Twitter accounts are created to replace those removed. Success becomes a matter of whether ISIS can replace these accounts fast enough to keep up with the rate at which CtrlSec’s blacklist gets them taken down. 

In this cyber war, the hacktivists have predominately focused their efforts on Twitter. Anonymous also has targeted Facebook pages spewing pro-ISIS propaganda. Thus far, the group has had significantly greater success on Twitter. Many reasons could explain the unbalance in efforts as well as Anonymous’ success. Most likely, Anonymous is reflecting the social media habits of ISIS. Twitter is a more efficient means for reaching a large audience. Twitter accounts can quickly pick up thousands of followers, while the Facebook ‘friending’ process requires the account holder to send out individualised requests and wait for a reply. It is a slow and also a more personal process, referring to everyone you accept an invite from as a “friend”. On Facebook, an individual is less likely to accept a request from somebody they do not know than they are to follow a stranger on Twitter. Because individuals can adjust their settings to prevent posts and messages from non-friends, there is simply less exposure on Facebook than on Twitter. However, Facebook group pages do function more like Twitter since their settings can be adjusted to reach an unlimited audience. Therefore, ISIS and its supporters still have a significant platform for exposure on Facebook. But, considering the more personalised nature and slower process to exposure for Facebook and the race against time as Anonymous rapidly takes down ISIS-affiliated accounts, utilising Twitter simply may be more efficient. 

Both Facebook and Twitter have policies against posts that threaten or promote violence, and yet both companies have been criticised for not doing enough to take down pro-ISIS propaganda accounts (Facebook.com, 2015; Twitter Help Center, 2015). Regardless of whether the lag in pro-ISIS account removal by Twitter and Facebook is due to user volume, or to a reluctance to walk a fine line between upholding community standards and violating free speech, Anonymous has filled the void and continues to make it its mission to limit ISIS’ online presence. 

A Help or Hindrance?  

There is no consensus whether Anonymous’ current approach of attacking ISIS’ social media outlets is effective in the larger fight against ISIS. While targeting social media outlets will not stop ISIS, it is debatably a key component in a multi-pronged approach to dismantling the terrorist organisation. The value of Anonymous’ contributions to the fight against ISIS can be measured in three ways. The first is straightforward; has Anonymous succeeded in reducing ISIS’ online footprint? Author Gabriella Coleman believes that Anonymous will make only a “small dent” (Schatz, 2015). She bases this claim on evidence that ISIS’ online presence has not changed since the start of Anonymous’ campaign (Schatz, 2015). Some national security officials have called Anonymous’ actions a game of ‘Whack-a-mole’ with removed accounts being replaced almost instantly (Berger, 2015). 

In contrast, Berger and Morgan use data collected from millions of Twitter accounts to argue that the suspended or removed accounts exceed the number of replacement accounts (Berger, 2015).  A report by the Brookings Institution, found that suspended Twitter accounts “seriously limit the group’s reach, given how effective Twitter is as an instrument for disseminating information to vast audiences across the globe” (Cottee, 2015). Stern and Berger (2015) call ISIS’ propaganda messaging one of the most important fronts of the terror group’s war. 

The second measure of the value of Anonymous’ contributions can be determined by the international community’s relative value of cyber warfare in the overall war against ISIS. Cyber warfare is a relatively new form of warfare, and it is receiving increasing attention from governments and security professionals. However, it is still secondary to conventional warfare. In this view, Anonymous is nothing more than an illegal entity whose operations are of little consequence and, at the far end of the spectrum, a threat to conventional warfare operations. Social media provides intelligence for law enforcement, and the removal of intelligence sources may hinder the war on ISIS. To date, intelligence agencies have focused on intercepting and deciphering communication between ISIS members of potential attacks or locations of key leaders, and have limited their use of cyberspace for surveillance of potential foreign fighters before they journey to Syria and Iraq. The U.S. government has unsuccessfully attempted to promote counter narratives to ISIS propaganda, but Washington has not actively tried to take down or dismantle pro-ISIS social media accounts. Unlike Anonymous, intelligence and law enforcement agencies do not yet consider cyberspace as a frontier for this conflict, and therefore have not employed cyber warfare in the war against ISIS. 

Without an official cyber war against terrorism let by anti-ISIS coalition forces, Anonymous is trying to fill the void. Their Twitter war is unprecedented, but Anonymous’ potential capabilities may hold more value than its current contributions. Thus far, Anonymous has targeted only social media accounts. But, many speculate whether it is within the capability and desire of this online collective of hacktivists to escalate. If Anonymous could successfully target ISIS’ funding sources like Bitcoin donations, disrupt its extensive criminal network communications, dismantle its military hardware, or even identify foreign fighters that have evaded law enforcement, then the gap between cyber warfare and conventional warfare will narrow, making Anonymous a defined entity in the war on ISIS. 

It is possible that all those who will make a significant difference in the war on ISIS will break away from Anonymous (like GhostSec and CtrlSec). Breaking away allows for a disassociation from the illegal nature of hacktivism that Anonymous epitomises. It also opens up the possibility of working directly with law enforcement. Individuals that have broken away from Anonymous to work with GhostSec blame Anonymous’ lack of a central authority on its inability to regulate the activities of its members (Schatz, 2015). This lack of central control leads to erroneous actions, such as innocent Twitter accounts and websites being taken down solely based on the judgment of a few (likely unqualified) individuals (Schatz, 2015). Fragmentation also leads to weak movements, or fleeting interest. Any fight against ISIS, whether traditional or hybrid, must be sustained if it is to be successful.

Regardless of the degree of success Anonymous is having, if they are pursuing a frivolous endeavour then it would suffice to conclude that their contributions are negligible. The third and, perhaps, most relevant measure values Anonymous’ contributions relative to the value of recruitment in ISIS’ campaign to establish, maintain, and expand its territory and influence. It can be quickly surmised that ISIS’ extraordinary recruitment numbers are part of its success. Like any military, and ISIS often behaves like a state with military capabilities, boots on the ground are a symbol of strength. FBI director James Comey has called ISIS both larger and more dangerous than al-Qaeda (Fox News, 2015). Numbers are not enough: the type of recruits ISIS is attracting should be referenced when considering the value of ISIS’ recruitment. ISIS has become infamous for many reasons, but perhaps its most concerning feature is its ability to attract an unprecedented number of foreign fighters. Foreign fighters are not a new concept, but never have so many joined a conflict in such a short amount of time. 

As demonstrated above, ISIS uses social media to attract recruits and to extend its influence beyond its Caliphate. Although an exact number can never be known, an estimate by the deputy head of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), Yevgeny Sysoyev, claims that ISIS commands as many as 80,000 militants (Prince, 2015). Of those, the CIA estimates that 30,000  (Diamond, 2015) are foreign fighters from over 40 countries (Masi, 2015). Based on these numbers, foreign fighters make up nearly 40 percent of ISIS’ capability. This is a significant percentage. It is impossible to know how many of these foreign fighters were recruited through social media. However, empirical studies of insurgent recruitment can shed light on the likelihood of augmented foreign fighter recruitment through increased use of social media. 

There are many theories on why foreign fighters join conflicts ranging from the prospect of financial spoils (greed) to ethnic diasporas that face a moral obligation. David Malet (2013) studied the use of recruitment messaging to enlist foreigners into a civil conflict. He found that the manipulation of identity and the framing of a conflict as an existential threat to all individuals internationalises a conflict, attracting more foreign fighters. When applied to ISIS, an organisation that has utilised both identity manipulation and conflict framing to “sell” their insurgency against the Iraqi and Syrian Governments to establish a Caliphate, social media outlets like Twitter are a very effective tool for propagating such messages. With around 46,000 Twitter accounts that each has roughly 1,000 followers at any time, it is unsurprising that such a large percentage of ISIS’ militants are from abroad. Malet (2013) also found that internationalised conflicts are more likely to win civil conflicts than non-internationalised conflicts. Since ISIS has used social media as its primary vehicle for recruitment messaging, anti-ISIS forces should aim to diminish the internalisation of the conflict. Anonymous’ strategically chosen battle in the war on ISIS may prove to be an effective tool for ending ISIS’ reign of terror. 

Conclusion

Given the number of pro-ISIS Twitter accounts and websites that the group has dismantled, it is evident that Anonymous is contributing to the war on ISIS. However, it is unclear how helpful their efforts are. In terms of recruitment, Anonymous is leading a campaign to disrupt ISIS’ recruitment messaging. Recruitment is key to ISIS’ success, particularly in the domain of foreign fighters. In this respect, Anonymous is filling a gap in the coalition’s strategy. Recruitment also is only one part of the ISIS enigma. Although Anonymous may be successful in impacting ISIS recruitment through targeting its social media accounts, their efforts alone are not enough to win the war on ISIS. 

Anti-ISIS coalition forces should employ cyber warfare as a strategic tool for dismantling ISIS. In particular, coalition forces should target ISIS’ sources of funding. ISIS is the richest terrorist organisation in history, valued at over $2 billion USD (Aboites, 2015). Like insurgent recruitment, ISIS’ financial strength is a key component of its growing success. If coalition members do not collectively have the capability to outplay ISIS in cyberspace, law enforcement and intelligence agencies should consider working with legal entities (such as CtrlSec) to attack ISIS on all fronts.

There is an overall lack of precedent in this war on ISIS that is producing a myriad of speculation. Never before has a terrorist organisation utilised social media to the extent of ISIS. Never has a terrorist organisation strived to establish an independent state and, seemingly at present, experienced enormous success. Never before has a terrorist organisation been condemned by a vigilante-esque organisation that partakes in criminal activities itself. While one can speculate, it remains unknown if a social media war in cyberspace eventually will produce any real world consequences.  

After Anonymous announced its “total war” on ISIS, many have questioned how Anonymous intends to achieve such a defeat when governments struggle to gain small victories despite dedicating mass amounts of energy and resources to the fight. Undoubtedly, Anonymous will never be able to claim to defeat ISIS, particularly not single handedly. But maybe Anonymous does not need to do so. This online collective of hacktivists may never free Iraq and Syria from ISIS’ reign, but it is possible that the purpose of an Internet war is to disrupt the dissemination of and to provide a counter narrative to ISIS propaganda. Maybe, Anonymous’ role is to dismantle the invincible façade of ISIS, and to dissipate some of the fear ISIS’ recent acts of international terrorism have inspired. Then again, maybe Anonymous has no role_at_all.

Conclusions for Policy

1. Anti-ISIS coalition forces should attempt to diminish the internalisation of the ISIS conflict by disrupting ISIS’ use of social media, currently its primary vehicle for recruitment messaging.
2. Coalition forces should employ cyber warfare as a strategic tool to dismantle ISIS. 
3. Coalition forces should target ISIS’ sources of funding.
4. If coalition members do not collectively have the capability to outplay ISIS in cyberspace, law enforcement and intelligence agencies should consider working with legal entities (such as CtrlSec) to attack ISIS on all fronts.