Nuclear Iran and the potential threats to the stability of the Middle East

Executive Summary

The nuclear deal reached last July between Iran, the P5+1and the European Union has been hailed by the international community as a significant step toward a higher level of security in the Middle East. Despite strong criticism from countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia over the effectiveness of the accord in preventing Iran from going nuclear, the common opinion is that Iranian nuclear aspirations will be effectively contained through the implementation of the agreement. That said, the provisions of the deal reveal some fundamental flaws that might jeopardize such containment in the long run. In particular, the limited time-extension of the deal’s application raises the issue that, once the established period is over, Iran will newly be a ‘threshold nuclear State’ (PBS NewsHour, 2015). Against this background, this study develops a picture of the potential repercussions that would stem from Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, opposing the view of some eminent Realist doctrinarians who argue that a nuclear Iran would not pose a fundamental threat to the security of the region. By highlighting these risks, the intent here is to prompt international powers to reinforce the deal, with particular reference to the clauses concerning local monitoring activities and the duration of the accord’s application. 

Introduction 

The negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 and the deal reached in July 2015 have highlighted the dangers related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In academic literature, these events have revived the controversial debate over the potential risks associated with the existence of a nuclear Iran. Some noted neorealist doctrinarians have adopted an optimistic view, discrediting the position of those who believe that a nuclear Iran would endanger the entire Middle East. Questioning the neorealist view, this study argues that a nuclear Iran could pose a serious threat to the security of the Middle East. This analysis will present various scenarios that could emerge after Iran acquires nuclear weapons. The paper will be comprised of four sections. The first section will discuss the theory of nuclear deterrence in order to assess whether its assumptions could apply to the Iranian case. The subsequent section will turn to the Middle Eastern states’ reaction to the eventuality of a nuclear Iran, and present the problem of a possible regional nuclear arms race. The third part will evaluate the risks inherent to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, with particular attention to the negative repercussions of the so called stability/instability paradox. Lastly, the close connections between Iran and terrorist groups will lead to a discussion of nuclear terrorism as an additional threat to the stability of the Middle East. On the basis of the evidence collected, the study argues that a nuclear Iran would pose a significant threat to the already strained security in the Middle East and calls for an urgent reinforcement of the nuclear deal’s provision.  

The misleading faith in nuclear deterrence

Many academics believe in the viability of nuclear deterrence theory were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. As per this theory, the effectiveness of deterrence as ‘a way to restrain your opponent’s action by having a credible and adverse consequence’ derives from the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), versus military strategy ‘in which the use of WMD results in the complete devastation of both sides because the aggressor state will experience an inevitable [..] second strike’ (Mehreen, 2013: 10). Born from the experience of nuclear tensions between the US and the USSR, the evidence of ‘the relationship between nuclear proliferation and deterrence’ has instilled the belief that nuclear-balancing is the inevitable outcome of nuclear rivalries (Yoshihara& Holmes, 2012: 17). Accordingly, some academics argue that the same dynamics would apply were Iran to surpass the nuclear threshold. John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz are the main advocates of this argument. In their view, the greatest surprise is not that Iran will acquire nuclear capabilities, but that such balancing behaviour has emerged after forty years of Israel’s uncontested nuclear supremacy in the region (Waltz, 2012). Agreeing that the real cause of instability is the ‘absence, and not the presence’ of a nuclear power able to counterbalance the ‘Israeli nuclear monopoly’ (Idem), Mearsheimer and Waltz conclude that a nuclear Iran would be beneficial for the Middle East. Specifically, Waltz stresses that to date deterrence has worked 100% of the time, and that a nuclear Iran would behave no differently than nuclear states have over the last fifty years (Sagan, Waltz and Betts, 2007). Similarly, Mearsheimer, talking of WMD as ‘weapons of peace’, argues that their acquisition would prompt Iran to act with moderation, reinforcing the possibility of  a ‘more peaceful ’ Middle East (Mearsheimer&Zakheim, 2012). Yet, application of nuclear deterrence theory to the case of a nuclear-armed Iran could be more difficult than is suggested. 

Indeed, the neorealist argument is flawed by its anachronism, manifested in the attempt to apply a theory modeled on Cold War dynamics to a totally different geopolitical situation (Bluth, 2004). Moreover, considering the difficulty of finding regular patterns in international relations, the conviction that predictions about the future can be made on the basis of just thirty years of history further weakens the solidity of this interpretation. However, the biggest difficulties emerge when evaluating the applicability of the neorealist assumption that nuclear states behave rationally. Indeed, the western notion of rationality, as the result of the calculations of the risks and benefits involved in an action, does not necessarily correspond to the Iranian case (Mehreen, 2013: 10). In harmony with the Weberian notion of value-rationality whereby ‘leaders make decisions for achieving a specific value such as an ideological, religious or psychological goal’, the Iranian concept of rationality distinguishes itself for its strong ideological connotation (Idem: 11). Observable in the words of former Iranian president Ali Akbar H?shemi Rafsanjani when, referring to the use of nuclear bombs against Israel, he concluded that ‘such an eventuality’ would ‘not have been irrational’ (Rubin, 2008). This is so because Islamic teachings exert an ideological influence on Iranian rational policy-making. Dividing the world between ‘oppressors and oppressed’, Iran’s leaders consider themselves to be invested by God to redeem ‘the Middle East for the forces of right-eousness’, thus justifying as rational all those acts aimed at accomplishing this mission (Takeyh, 2009: 2). The ideological leverage on politics has further manifested in the adoption of Mahdism as the ‘defining strategy of the Islamic Republic’, whereby believers are called ‘to wage war against unbelievers and prepare the way for the advent of the Mahdi’ (Rubin, 2008). Also, the priority of citizens’ security, another fundamental prerequisite of western-intended rationality, is not reflected in the Iranian Islamic doctrine. Instead, ‘the ambitions and values of ordinary people are subordinated to the will of God as interpreted by the supreme leader’ (Idem). As suggested by Amitai Etzioni (2012), when religious extremists die every day in the name of God,  ‘a religiously fanatical Iranian leader […] may calculate whether to use missiles or bombers […] but not whether to heed God’s command to destroy the infidels’. Though maybe too extremist in his considerations, Etzioni is correct in emphasizing the power of ideology when assessing the risks that could follow Iranian nuclearization. From this perspective, the worst case scenario would be a nuclear degeneration of the rivalry between Iran and Israel. The reiteration by Iranian leaders of their desire to eliminate Israel, intended not just as a ‘regime change’ but as its ‘actual physical destruction’. Rafsanjani’s ‘chants of Death to Israel’ and Ahmadinejad’s promise to ‘wipe Israel of the map’ witness the entrenched Iranian hatred, grounding the fears that words could concretize into catastrophic acts (Rubin, 2008). Moreover, in the case of Israel and Iran’s rivalry, nuclear-balancing could prove ineffective for material reasons. Theorists of deterrence argue that ‘peace and stability [are] possible only when the opposing powers have sufficiently large territories and populations’(Lahav, 2012). Comparing Iran’s 591,000 square miles and 79 million of people with Israel’s 8,000 square miles and 7,6 million people, the viability of deterrence theory seems even more unlikely (Idem). However, recent events suggest that in the hypothetical list of threats generated by a nuclear Iran, a direct nuclear confrontation with Israel is the least probable. Optimism in this regard comes from the latest interventions by ?yatoll?h Seyyed ?Al? ?oseyn? Kamenei. In a nine-step plan to destroy Israel published on the internet, Kamenei has stated that “the elimination of Israel does not mean the massacre of the Jewish people in the Israeli region”. Although a nine-step plan to destroy Israel itself hardly can be deemed proof of mildness, at least there has been no specific reference to nuclear bombing intentions (in Winer&Newman, 2014). 

Overall, if Iran’s ideology and its territorial superiority clash with the postulates of nuclear deterrence theory, it also should be recognized that recent statements by Iranian leaders show an apparent decrease in the willingness to resort to a nuclear confrontation. Yet, considering the ideological radicalism and the ambiguity surrounding Iranian intentions, one should be very cautious when gauging and making predictions about the future. ‘Deterrence works; until it doesn’t’ says Lawrence Friedman, a truth that should not be underestimated (The economist, 2015).

Nuclear arms-race: has it already started? 

Among the possible consequence of Iran’s nuclearization, proliferation among other Middle Eastern states is by far the most plausible. While some scholars marginalize this risk (Waltz, 2012), the prevailing opinion is that a nuclear arms-race is already underway. This shifts the debate from how to avoid nuclear proliferation to how to cope with its actual development (Vick, 2015; Henderson&Heinonen, 2014). As specified by Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov, analysts who exclude the possibility of an arms race err because they adopt an ‘approach suited to the old Middle East’, offering an ‘inadequate analysis of the countries and their ability to acquire nuclear weapons once Iran has obtained them’ (Yadlin&Golov, 2012). In fact, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE appear to have already committed to nuclear plans (Vick, 2015). This development discredits the argument that high costs, lack of infrastructure, and the long time required to ‘build nuclear reactors and acquire fuels’ would somehow keep countries from endeavoring to go nuclear (Lindsay&Takeyh, 2010: 39-40). ‘Strategic stability’ as the acquisition of WMD so as ‘to deter a nuclear attack’, the ‘belief that nuclear deterrence limits conventional wars’ (Mehreen, 2013: 17), and the fear of an ‘Iranian nuclear blackmail’ (Mearsheimer&Zakheim, 2012) are the major triggering factors of the nuclear race. Additionally, one should consider the relevance of a ‘prestige factor’, demanding states to ‘keep up with the neighbors’ in order to maintain their reputation and political stature in the region (Vick, 2015). A look at Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey will show the actuality of this issue. In a 2009 public statement by King Abdullah,  the intention of Saudi Arabia to obtain nuclear weapons if Iran did was announced and later reinforced by a declaration of ‘former intelligence chief al-Faisal’ who, stressing how proliferation would not be just a Saudi manifestation, warned that ‘whatever Tehran gets, the Gulf States will want’ (Henderson&Heinonen, 2014). These intentions have concretized in several accords. Most recently, Saudi Arabia has embarked on negotiations with South Korea concerning the ‘feasibility of building two nuclear reactors in the kingdom’, and with China, France, and Argentina for the construction of 16 nuclear reactors (Plett Usher, 2015). Considering the tense relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, due both to the ideological clash ‘between Shiites and Sunnis’ and to their conflicting aspiration to ‘expand their influence in the region’, the Saudi precautionary behavior is consistent with the threat that a nuclear Iran could represent (Yadlin& Golov, 2012). Similarly, the Republic of Turkey has aligned with Saudi Arabia publicly stating that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, Turkey will do the same (Idem). Aiming to restore itself as a regional hegemon, Turkey challenges Iran not only from an ideological perspective but also economically, competing for ‘energy markets and trade routes in the Middle East and the Caspian Sea basin’. Considering Turkey’s strong economy, developing a nuclear arsenal would not be particularly difficult (Idem). Accordingly, there have been several signs of a nuclear commitment with the most recent being in 2014, when an accord with Japan was signed allowing Turkey to ‘enrich uranium and extract plutonium’ (NTI, 2014). Egypt instead, because of its poor economic conditions, appears to be the least likely to get a nuclear endowment in the near future (Vick, 2015). Yet, Egypt has advantages that Arabia and Turkey do not possess, viz. a ‘most advanced infrastructure for a civilian and military nuclear program […] with two research nuclear reactors and […] considerable nuclear knowledge and experience’ (Yadlin&Golov, 2012). For this reason, Egypt’s declared intention to carry out a nuclear plan should not be under-estimated. The Egyptian intention could indeed be realized if Egypt manages to get financial support from its allies. This possibility could occur, for example, if China accepted former Egyptian president Mu?ammad Murs? ??s? al-?Ayy??’s recent request to assist Egypt economically in building nuclear reactors (Idem). Overall, all major Middle Eastern countries have manifested, if not actually concretized, their desire to improve their nuclear potential, making it difficult to believe in the absence of a concrete proliferation risk in the region. Rather, the states’ willingness to go nuclear combined with the economic, diplomatic, and political networks they are cultivating, confirm the view that the stability of the Middle East is already being compromised; and that, ‘whether it gets the bomb or not, Iran is causing a regional nuclear arms race’ (Henderson&Heinonen, 2014). 

The stability/instability paradox 

In war studies, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is often correlated with a phenomenon known as the stability/instability paradox. First conceptualized by Liddle Hart, the stability/instability paradox has been identified from the verification that “to the extent that the Hydrogen bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibility of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression” (Krepon, 2003: 1). Adherents of this view reject the general optimism of deterrence theorists, stressing that deterrence does not result in ‘deterrence in general’, but rather prevents peace by stimulating the growth of other kinds of aggression (Mehreen, 2013: 12). After Liddle Hart, other academics have adopted this stance: among them Scott Sagan, who argues that the feeling of security from retaliation of other nuclear countries generated by the possession of nuclear weapons emboldens emergent nuclear states and prompts them to engage in conventional or sub-conventional conflicts to pursue their goals (Sagan, Waltz, and Betts, 2007). Similarly, Rauchhaus and Horowitz have stressed the tendency of “inexperienced nuclear powers to be more conflict-prone” (Kahl&Waltz, 2012). To clarify, the stability/instability paradox mirrors the situation wherein the fear of nuclear confrontations ‘creates stability at the nuclear war level’ while, being the states ‘complacent in the fact that their aggression will not escalate to a nuclear war’,  induces ‘instability at the lower level through mechanisms of conventional and unconventional warfare’ (Mehreen, 2013: 14). Explained from a cost-benefit perspective, the ‘low likelihood that a conventional war will escalate to the nuclear level’ leads nuclear-states to take advantage of the lowered potential costs of conventional conflicts, adopting more aggressive policies towards their rivals (Powell, 2014: 10). Historical evidence strengthens the belief that the effects of the stability/instability paradox would emerge in case of Iran going nuclear, especially at first. Precedent cases have shown that aggressive and risk-taking attitudes arise in the early stages of nuclear development. Defined ‘adventurism’, this represents the essence of the peril produced by the stability/instability paradox (Krepon, 2003: 9). The evidencethat emergent nuclear powers tend to engage in ‘coercive tactics […] such as displays of force, small-scale attacks, and proxy warfare’ can be found in different cases (Meyerle, 2014: 12). For example, during the Cold War both the US and the USSR engaged in sub-conventional conflicts and supported proxies in Latin America and the Middle East to ‘achieve their foreign policy goals’ (Mehreen, 2013: 17). Likewise, in 1969, Zedong’s confidence in strategic stability prompted him to authorize an attack against Soviet forces ‘to warn Moscow against border provocations and to mobilize domestic Chinese support for Mao's revolution’ (Kahl, Dalton, and Irvine, 2012: 20). More recently, the rivalry between Pakistan and India has been exacerbated since both countries obtained nuclear weapons. Pakistan has been ‘engaging in low-intensity conflicts’, backing terrorism, and launching unconventional attacks against India (Idem). Considering the Iranian willingness to ‘advance its revisionist agenda’ (Idem), the euphoria and the feeling of security that a nuclear arsenal would provide Tehran could dangerously lead to a first phase of military aggression. If nuclear weapons provide countries with ‘considerably greater bargaining power in regional confrontations’ (Meyerle, 2014: 11), then there is a high likelihood that Iran, once nuclear-armed, will blackmail or attack non-nuclear powers in the region and then use its ‘nuclear arsenal to intimidate foreign powers from intervening’ (Bell&Miller, 2013). To hypothesize, Iran could attack pro-American regimes in the Middle East with the intent to eliminate the US presence from the region (Nader, 2013: 11). Also, Tehran could develop strategies to support Libyan opposition groups so as to punish Libya for having cooperated with the US and Britain, or exercise its leverage on Syria, strengthen its ties with Assad’s state and use it to ‘arm Hezbollah in Lebanon for stepped up attacks on Israel’ (Timmerman, 2015). The will to strengthen its clout in the region also could manifest in the instigation of ‘Shiite uprisings against the Arab sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf’ or in challenges to the countries of the Gulf to reduce their oil production (Lindsay&Takeyh, 2010: 36). The fact that Iran already is ‘providing substantial support and encouragement to proxies and sponsoring terroristic activities’ in the region makes this eventuality even more likely. Iran could decide to supply both Hezbollah and the Palestinians with “[…] more accurate conventional weaponry for use against Israel’, or possibly ‘increase frequency and scale of terroristic attacks” (Kahl, Dalton, and Irvine, 2012: 21). While a nuclear Iran could adopt many possible strategies to strengthen its dominance in the Middle East, at least initially there are a few hopes it would not take advantage of the blackmailing and intimidating power generated by its nuclear endowment. Taking this reasoning to hypothetical extremes, the worst consequence of the stability/instability paradox could be the risk of unintended escalation. Unintended escalation, defined as the risk that an ongoing crisis ‘ends in a large, counter-value, nuclear exchange without any national authority ordering such an attack’ (Powell, 2014: 8) arises in connection with the belligerent approach Iran could adopt being a nuclear power. In particular, escalation might occur as a result of Iranian attempts to undermine Israeli stability. The progressive ‘erosion of Israeli freedom of action to respond to advanced weapons transfers, provocations, proxy attacks or terrorism abroad’ (Kahl, Dalton, and Irvine, 2012: 22), combined with the general tensions arising from ‘offensive posturing or limited conventional conflict’ could indeed prompt Israel and Iran to adopt a ‘launch on warning doctrine for their nuclear arsenal’ (Warren, 2013). Were this eventuality to occur, the ‘absence of direct lines of communication’ and the high possibility of ‘organizational mistakes’ (Kahl&Waltz, 2012) could fatally turn ‘false warnings of an impending attack’ into strategic miscalculations, possibly degenerating into an unintended nuclear confrontation (Warren, 2013). Even though these are only speculations, the prospect of a nuclear-Iran adopting a more assertive foreign policy, and the related risk of nuclear escalation should lead one to question, if not reject, the confidence in a peaceful nuclear Middle East.

Nuclear terrorism 

When talking about nuclear proliferation scholars generally refer to the emergence of new nuclear states. However, a wider significance must be attributed to the concept of proliferation. Indeed, the major concern at the present is not the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new states, but the risk of diffusion and acquisition of these lethal weapons by the various terrorist groups throughout the Middle East. For this reason, another eventuality, viz. the risk of nuclear terrorism, must be discussed. The close connection between Iran and Middle Eastern terrorist groups grounds this additional fear. Widely recognized as the ‘world’s most active sponsor of terrorism’ (Ayubi, 2010: 5), Iran is the main supporter of Hezbollah’s operations against Israel, but Tehran is also tied to Al Qaeda, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas, and the Iraqi Shiite radicals of southern Iraq (Idem: 6). Initially driven by ideological concerns, the cooperation with terrorist groups  has over time turned into an ‘effective and financially and politically inexpensive’ tool for the achievement of Iranian foreign policy goals (Levitt, 2014). For instance, Iran’s implication in the plan to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in Washington D.C in 2011 resulted from both the imposition of ‘unprecedented sanctions’ by the US and the sabotage’ of its nuclear program and ‘Saudi Arabia’s increase in oil exports to traditional Iranian energy customers’, events that had caused the Iranian economy to ‘find itself cut off the global oil market’(Nader, 2013: 27). In addition to Iranian support of terrorism, the risk of nuclear terrorism is further enhanced by the fact that Al Qaeda has attempted to acquire nuclear weapons (U.S. Department of State, 2010). The combination of these two factors does not bode well for the security of the Middle East. Notwithstanding these considerations, the majority of scholars have minimized the importance of nuclear terrorism. Kenneth Waltz, among the others,  argues that the possibility of Iran smuggling nuclear weapons to terrorists contrasts with historical evidence. Discussing the Iranian case, Waltz argues that the unpredictability of terrorist groups would lead Iran to develop a sharp sense of vulnerability and, consequentially, caution. Also, highlighting the high cost and danger of building a nuclear bomb, Waltz excludes the possibility of nuclear terrorism on the conviction that Iran would have every reason to keep the arsenal under its direct control and few ‘to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed’ (Waltz, 2012). Similarly, Lindsay and Takeyh recall past Iranian behavior to support their claim (2010: 37). They argue that ‘despite its messianic pretensions’, Iran has acted cautiously when  dealing with ‘militias and terroristic groups’, mostly because of the awareness of inevitable US retaliation. However, a close look at the complex structure of the Iranian political framework could lead to the opposite conclusion. The main question is: ‘who controls the nuclear programs in Iran?’ (Rubin, 2008). When presenting their views, Waltz and the other academics assume that the state is the hypothetical provider of weapons to terrorists. Yet, the Iranian reality appears to be different.  Iran is not a ‘unitary actor’ (Kahl, Dalton, and Irvine, 2012: 16). Alongside the supreme leadership, the Islamic constitution legitimizes the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as an apparatus ‘to be maintained so that it may continue in its role of guarding the revolution and its achievements’ (Alfoneh, 2008). Despite the absence of a constitutional attribution of political power, the IRGC has over time infiltrated political life in Iran (Idem), acquiring a high level of leverage on policy-making and diffusing  its radical ideology over the country’s apparatus, with ‘ministers of energy, welfare and social security, justice culture, petroleum, defense and commerce’ being all ‘war veterans and former IRGC officers’ (Idem). Permeated by religious and anti-semitic zealotry,  the radicalism of this group manifested in public statements but also in concrete facts. It is sufficient to recall the following words of IRGC’s chief, Yahya Safavi: ‘I am after uprooting anti-revolutionaries everywhere. We must behead some and cut out the tongues of others’ (Idem). IRGC has displayed its radicalism when in May 1996, in order to fight opponents ofits political involvement, it launched a series of attacks on Iranian cinemas and universities (Idem),  defending these acts as necessary to challenge the counterrevolutionary forces (Alfoneh, 2013: 27). If it is able to attack its own people to achieve its goals, there is little doubt that the IRGC would act unscrupulously toward those considered the enemies of Islam. Two additional factors increase the risks of nuclear terrorism: first, the fact that the IRGC is ‘the head of the control of Iran’s missile forces’ makes the unauthorized use and management of nuclear devices more likely (Kahl, Dalton, and Irvine, 2012: 16). Answering the interrogative above, this verification provides a rebuttal of the view claiming that once Iran will go nuclear the state will behave moderately and warily. Consequentially, a new interrogative emerges: what assures us that those who control the weapons will act rationally? The second factor helps to answer this question. Iranian involvement in terrorist activities has developed not only through the indirect support of terrorist groups, but also through direct interventions planned and directed by the IRGC. Through the creation of a special division, named unit 400, IRGC has concretized its will to ‘deploy Qods Forces’, abandoning the role of mere ‘logisticians supporting’ terrorist hit men (Levitt, 2014). Events such as the recent offensive launched against the rebels of southern Syria by Syrian government groups, Hezbollah, and IRGC officers(Now.mmedia.me, 2015), suggest that the Revolutionary Guard Corps plays an active role in international terrorism. To answer the second question, facts make it difficult to believe in the IRGC’s rationality. From this perspective, it turns out to be difficult to share the optimism diffused among scholars. As stressed by Ayubi, this optimism is based on overly simplistic assumptions. Namely, ‘the reason why Iran has not transferred WMDs to terrorists group so far is because they are waiting for the right time and moment’ (Ayubi, 2010). Interestingly, Ayubi adds how the concept of ‘taqqiyah in the Shia faith’, which in a political context means ‘the concealment of one’s belief and actions in order to prevent the infidel from knowing the believer true intentions’, should not be disregarded (Idem: 7). Given Iran’s history as a past and present sponsor of terrorism, and  its ‘pan-Islamist agenda’ actively supported by the IRGC (Idem: 8), optimism over nuclear terrorism could turn out to be a fatal naïveté.  

Conclusion

This analysis sought to evaluate the threats that a nuclear Iran could pose to the security of the Middle East. With this intent in mind, the arguments advocated by deterrence theorists, the possibility of an arms race among Middle Eastern states, the risks of a more assertive Iranian foreign policy, and nuclear terrorism have been analyzed through a comparative assessment of different doctrinarian interpretations and through the observation of historical happenings and objective data. Overall, despite recent signs of relative moderation displayed by the Iranian leadership, the leverage of radical-religious groups combined with Iran’s revisionist stance and its direct and indirect involvement in terrorist activities make it difficult to believe that the eventuality of Iran going nuclear would not impinge on regional security. Though it is difficult to predict the future development of Iranian intentions and policies, one thing is sure: were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, the stability of the Middle East would be highly jeopardized.

Conclusions for policy

• The operative framework established by the nuclear deal reached last July should be complemented with a non-proliferation plan to enter into action after the expiration of the agreement (Sachs, 2015).
• To ensure the effectiveness of the deal, the procedure for the access of UN inspectors to sites should be simplified and the principle ‘anytime, anywhere’ should inform the regulation of inspections (Moore, 2015). 
• The international community should give credit to the IAEA’s former representatives’ denunciation of the inspectors assigned to the monitoring of Iran’s sites for lack of competence. Deep knowledge to ‘understand when nuclear sites are being used for military purposes’ is a requirement to be met by all designated inspectors (Banco, 2015).
• International powers should meet the IAEA’s need for additional funding. If such additional resources are not provided soon, the objectives of the deal will be compromised. 
• Small violations of the agreement’s provisions should not be neglected. Overlooking them could enable Iran to pursue the so-called ‘Salami tactic’, viz. a series of seemingly small violations that ‘gradually bring Iran to a bomb without any significant infraction’ (Mandelbaum, 2015). 
• The deal should be amended by clauses imposing higher levels of transparency and accountability. Stronger deterrence measures against non-fulfillment and negligence should be devised.