Rival Claimants: The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Naval Arms Race in East Asia

Executive Summary

The re-emergence of the Japanese defense industry and the establishment of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) as a capable and sizable military should not come as a surprise. The process had been ongoing since the 1950s; however, it has only been until recently that the SDF has acquired the capabilities to do more than just mere self defense. The ability to do more than just self-defense has been a controversial topic for the Japanese public and leadership. Yet, despite this, the National Diet of Japan overwhelmingly voted in favor of changing the way the SDF operates in the field. It has been Prime Minister Abe Shinzo1 who led the effort to reform Japanese security policy. This effort has been undertaken due to the increasing tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan over the disputed Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands.

Introduction

At the end of 2015, it had been reported that Chinese coast guard vessels had entered Japanese waters around the disputed Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. Both sides monitored each other from a distance, and the Chinese vessels eventually returned to the East China Sea (The Japan Times 2016). The potential for one of these incidents to spark a Sino-Japanese conflict is great; as tensions between Japan and the People’s Republic of China have been steadily increasing over the years. There are three primary reasons why tensions between the two nations have been increasing. These are: rival claimants over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, several sensitive historical issues, and the ongoing naval buildup of both nations. While the latter two issues are important, the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands themselves remain at the heart of the issue given their strategic and potentially economic importance.

Looking at the islands from a historical perspective presents one with a whole new range of issues to con- sider when looking at the dispute. Claimed by China during the Ming dynasty, the islands were given to the Japanese after the Qing dynasty was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895; and the islands have been under Japanese control ever since. In order to maintain that control during the contemporary era, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Noda Yo- Yoshihiko bought three of the islands in 2012 (Smith 2015). Despite having strong historical claims to the islands, the Chinese have thus far not been able to establish a foothold on any of the islands.

The Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) was established during the Cold War at a time when the threat from the Soviet Union was at its height. At first, the SDF was regulated to being largely an infantry army. However, that gradually began to change when the U.S. began to supply the SDF with equipment and vessels. Most of the equipment with which the Japanese established the SDF was older models that were being phased out of the U.S. military. Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution ­ which had forbade Japan from possessing any armed forces ­ greatly limited the level of re-armament which both parties were willing to accept. This hesitance not to allow the Japanese to re-arm completely led both the U.S. and Japan to sign the 1954 Treaty of San Francisco which in turn created the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Despite having rebuilt some of their armed forces, the size and limitations placed on the Japanese and the SDF meant that Japan was to be reliant on the U.S. for protection from outside threats. As such, the U.S. military built up a sizable presence, and continues to occupy as well as operate out of bases throughout the country.

The rise and threat that comes from China is very different from the threat that was posed by the Soviet Union in that the Chinese threat directly affects Japanese security and sovereignty. The Soviet threat was seen primarily through a U.S. lens, and as an ally to the U.S., the Japanese complied with Washington’s request to monitor Soviet maritime activities in the Sea of Japan and neighboring waters.

“Despite having strong historical claims to the islands, the Chinese have thus far not been able to establish a foothold on any of the islands”

The Naval Arms Race

Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman Mao Zedong announced the creation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in September 1950. Since then, the Chinese have made significant progress in both naval construction, and in understand- ing the importance of the sea when considering national interests (Cheng 2015). Throughout the Cold War, the Chinese received aid for their naval buildup from the Soviet Union ­ and most of their fleet has been composed primarily of older Soviet surface ships and submarines. Only recently have the Chinese been able to utilize the skills of shipbuilding companies such as the Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Company to churn out more indigenous naval vessels. While highly capable in the building of all types of surface ships and submarines, the Chinese are still struggling with the construction of aircraft carriers (Majumdar 2015). The only aircraft carrier that is currently in service in the PLA Navy is the former Soviet-Varyag ­ which was refurbished into the Liaoning in 2011. This inability to construct indigenous aircraft carriers will eventually be remedied by the Chinese. The surface and submarine components of the PLA Navy are still a formidable and viable fighting force and should not be discounted due to the lack of aircraft carriers.

On August 27, 2015, the Japanese defense company IHI Marine United completed its second 24,000 ton Izumo-class helicopter carrier ­ expanding the carrier fleet of the SDF to two additional ships. As can be seen with the completion of their second helicopter carrier, the Japanese have made impressive progress in naval construction. This is in stark contrast to the Chinese, who have yet to complete an indigenous aircraft carrier design. Despite having a weak economy, the Japanese have been able not only to increase their defense budget to 5 trillion yen, but to also rebuild some of their indigenous defense companies. While largely dependent on the U.S. for equipment and vessels during the Cold War, the successful resurgence of Japanese defense companies in recent years is highly significant. First, it means that the Japanese are no longer dependent on the U.S. for supplying the SDF. The SDF will be able to convey its specifications for equipment and vessels directly to relevant companies. There is also the possibility that these companies may have a positive impact on the Japanese economy, which has been struggling for years.

Reforming the security policies of Japan has been a top priority for Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. In December 2013, Prime Minister Abe announced that a new National Security Council (NSC) and Security Strategy documents were to be established. The primary goal of the new system was to streamline governmental operations and increase efficiency by replacing the old bureaucratic system that had supported the Security Council of Japan (Sakaki 2015). The NSC will enable the Japanese to increase direct communication with other countries on foreign and military affairs as well (Sakaki 2015). The Abe cabinet has also stressed cooperation with other countries. While the U.S. remains the main ally of Japan in foreign policy, the Japanese have begun to look elsewhere for other viable partners in military affairs. The Japanese have thus far been able make successful diplomatic overtures to both Australia and India.

“While the U.S. remains the main ally of Japan in foreign policy, the Japanese have begun to look elsewhere for other viable partners in military affairs”

Perhaps the most controversial of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s security reforms has been the policy of collective self-defense. During the summer of 2015, Prime Minister Abe announced that he and his political allies were looking into reinterpreting Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution in order to change the way the SDF oper- ates in the field (Smith 2015). Large segments of the Japanese public and the opposition parties protested against the newly proposed policy. Despite this, in September 2015, Prime Minister Abe was able to get the security bills that proposed collective self-defense passed in the Diet (Borah 2015). With collective self- defence now official Japanese policy, the chance that the SDF will see combat in the future is high, since the SDF is now capable of accompanying allied militaries in overseas operations. Collective self-defense will enable the Japanese to bring their new allies of Australia and India closer together since the SDF will be able to assist with both training exercises as well as security missions.

Conclusion

The likelihood that a diplomatic rapprochement could occur between Japan and the People’s Republic of China in the near future will not happen. Tensions between the two nations are simply too high. As such, the re-emergence of the Japanese defense industry and the security reforms enacted by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo are necessary for protecting Japanese citizens and sovereignty. For the Japanese, the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands represent a strategic buffer between the East China Sea and the Ryukyu Islands; while for the Chinese, the islands represent one step closer to being able to break out of the East China Sea and gain access to the Pacific. Whether the Japanese would be able to fend off a Chinese invasion is debata- ble; what is not up for debate is the fact that despite all the odds, the Japanese are preparing for an armed confrontation as best as they can.

Recommendations for Policy

1. Before any additional increases in the defense budget can occur, the Japanese must address the weakness of their economy. Throughout history, the Japanese yen has always struggled to be a strong currency. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo sought to fix this with his “Abenomics” but the Japanese economy is still struggling despite these economic reforms. It is clear that more work needs to be accomplished in this area. A strong yen and a prosperous economy could further strengthen the SDF by allowing future Japanese leaders to increase the defense budget.
2. While the Japanese have certainly made substantial progress over the years, one thing is certain: they will not be able to surpass the Chinese numerically in the future. As such, the Japanese should consider mastering naval construction in order to not only rebuild losses, but to also be able to efficiently and quickly repair and refurbish ships. This ability will give the Japanese the chance to replenish their forces with new vessels quickly during an armed confrontation.
3. Ultimately, collective self-defense and cooperation with other countries could prove to be the key to the future of Japan. Building strong relationships with other regional powers, and giving the SDF more experience through joint training exercises and se- curity missions could be enough to deter the Chinese from acting aggressively to- wards the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands.

Shane Vrabel is Editor and Junior Researcher at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. She may be contacted at shane.vrabel@cgsrs.org 

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