Why always France? The logic behind the surge of islamist terrorist attacks on its territory and possible policy implications

July 16, 2016

Red and white tape used by the French national police secures a zone from traffic in Paris, France @ Reuters
Report

After a long period of peace on the continent, terrorism has brought back the perspective of making the lives of Europeans “nasty, brutish, and short”, as Thomas Hobbes put it. In France and across Europe, terrorism is now one of the main concerns of citizens and policy-makers who have previously focused on more traditional security threats. A recent Pew Research Centre survey found that roughly seven in ten Europeans think ISIS is a major security threat, with 91% of French respondents being worried about the group.[1]

Unfortunately, the July 14 terrorist attack in Nice which killed at least 84 people is merely the last of a long series of deadly Islamist attacks in France. These attacks intensified in the past two years and included the mass shootings at the Charlie Hebdo headquarters and Bataclan concert hall. While other European countries have also experienced terrorism, a clear pattern is emerging in France, which, albeit a large, strategically significant state, has been disproportionately affected. Furthermore, despite claims of allegiance to ISIS and transnational Jihadist networks, the majority of the perpetrators, including the Nice attacker, were young French citizens of Maghreban origin working in small groups. The question that needs to be asked is why has France become such a prominent target for home-grown Islamist terrorism? France is a specific case and the choice of so many violent Islamists due to a mix of toxic ingredients, both domestic and external, related to the country’s relationship with Muslims and the Muslim world.

First of all, in terms of foreign policy, Islamists often claim that France is a legitimate target due to its long history of interventions in the Muslim world, particularly the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. France has historically seen the Mediterranean as a region of strategic importance in its struggle against other European states. From the late 18th to the early 20th century, France lost a war with Britain over Egypt, colonised Algeria after a bloody military campaign and Tunisia despite Italian protests, and partitioned Morocco together with Spain to the detriment of Germany. After World War I, France gained a further foothold in the Middle East by obtaining a League of Nation mandate to govern what is now Syria and Lebanon. French interventionism continued as the decolonisation process ensued during the Cold War. Most notably, it tried to prevent Algerian independence, fighting a seven-year war against nationalist forces which killed hundreds of thousands of people and was eventually lost by France. While France was against the 2003 invasion of Iraq, interference in the Muslim world also continued after the Cold War when perceived national interests were at stake. In 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Foreign Minister Alain Juppé were two of the main proponents of the NATO military intervention in Libya which overthrew Muammar Gaddafi but paved the way for instability and a surge of refugees towards Europe. France also intervened militarily in Mali, its former colony, in 2013, in order to counter a rebellion initiated by Islamist militias. France has also been involved in air strikes in Syria since September 2015, intensifying its efforts after the November 2015 terror attacks. This sustained interference in the Muslim world fuelled the notion of the Western world attacking Islam and France being one of the main perpetrators.

Islamists often claim that France is a legitimate target due to its long history of interventions in the Muslim world, particularly the Middle East and North Africa.

Secondly, the composition of the French population increases the probability of Islamist terrorist attacks. While its foreign policy in the MENA region has been belligerent and often violent, France has, especially in the era of decolonisation, received migrants from the region. Because of French laws, there is no official data on the population’s ethnicity and religion. However, in 2004, an estimated 5.5 million people, or 9% of the population, were from the Maghreb area.[2] In terms of religion, an estimated 7 to 9% of the population is Muslim, considerably more than in other large European states such as Germany or the UK.[3] Furthermore, France is becoming more and more multicultural, especially in metropolitan areas, where, according to the Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, 24% of newborns in 2010 had at least one parent born outside of Europe.[4]

However, France’s interventionist foreign policy and the composition of its domestic population are not enough to explain the surge in Islamist terrorist attacks. The structure of the French society and economy also needs to be taken into account when analysing the radicalisation of young French Muslims. The failed, or rather non-existent integration policy of the numerous Muslim migrants is an important explanation of the recent years’ attacks. As migration from the MENA region flocked to France after World War II, they usually settled in poor suburbs around large cities called banlieues in order to work in factories, many of which have been shut down in the post-industrial age. In time, immigrants became the majority in some banlieues, where many still live caught in a poverty trap and lacking real possibilities for social mobility. France has generally had a high unemployment rate compared to countries such as Germany or the UK, and the problem is exacerbated at the youth level. Levels of crime and juvenile delinquency in particular are higher in banlieues than in urban areas, a fact that has traditionally attracted a lot of attention from far-right politicians who have built their discourse on a tougher attitude towards migrants. Inhabitants of banlieues have a long history of riots triggered by exclusion and the lack of opportunities, the most notable of which took place in 2005. Additionally, mistrust and hatred towards native French people and French institutions are widespread.

Another explanation revolves around the nature of French society in general. France has also differed from the rest of Europe in its approach towards religion. Since the French Revolution and up to the current Fifth Republic, France has had a long tradition of secularism and many of its citizens have held a very negative view of any form of religion. While historically this has been directed against the Catholic Church, secularism also meant that the Muslim community, which has not always learned to adapt to the values of the host state, felt that its freedom of religion was under attack. Measures such as the 2010 ban on wearing face-veils in public sparked heated debates and angered many Muslims. The Charlie Hebdo cartoons are another case in point. In addition, France’s broader approach to identity is also making some Muslims feel under attack. Nationality, as defined by French citizenship law, is awarded based on birth on French soil rather than ethnic origin, facilitating the de facto multiculturalism of French society. However, at the same time, the concept of identity is solidly grounded in a state-centered approach, with issues such as the decolonisation process and the history of former colonies being left out of the education system underpinning French identity. This creates a discrepancy between nationality and identity, particularly in the case of the children of poor immigrants in banlieues. Such a discrepancy can be easily speculated by Islamist propaganda, both online and in the numerous mosques funded by Gulf States which spread extremist views.  

France is a country with a large, poor, unintegrated Muslim population that feels that its identity and religion are under attack by its host state. The circumstances described above, both domestic and external, provide a comprehensive explanation for the radicalisation of young Muslims and the surge in Islamist terrorist attacks in the country.

Due to the complexity and the depth of the problem, France will likely face more terrorist attacks in the future.

However, French policy-makers will have to take some important decisions in the future in order to tackle this ubiquitous threat. France will likely take a hard-line approach in the short term. After the Nice attack, President François Hollande already declared that France will further strengthen its actions in Iraq and Syria, despite no proof of foreign involvement at the time of the speech. Indeed, support is definitely needed in the fight against Jihadist organizations and the West must stay involved in order to contain the phenomenon. However, statements creating an “us versus them” mentality can only serve domestic political purposes and divert responsibility for a weak security context. Domestically, a hard-line approach would entail harsher counter-terrorist measures and the targeting of certain minorities and neighbourhoods by police and security forces. The downside is that, if sustained over a long time, such policies risk the widening of the chasm between the native French population and minorities, not to mention the erosion of the basic freedoms French citizens have been used to.

The real challenge is devising a strategy to integrate France’s large Muslim population. Such a strategy would be a politically difficult decision to take and an onerous task to implement, given the state of radicalisation of many Muslims and the fear and discontent of native French citizens, who have increasingly turned to the extreme right in recent elections. Nonetheless, a broader discussion should be held on whether the insistence on secularism and the state-centred approach to identity pay off or if cultural differences should be acknowledged and tolerated to a certain extent. Furthermore, some unpopular and even painful economic and social decisions would have to be taken to foster integration, such as reducing welfare benefits and making labour laws more lax in order to facilitate wider employment, or reforming the education system in order to facilitate the inclusion of minorities. However difficult, I believe that such measures are needed and that, if they are not implemented in a timely manner, France will have a much larger problem that it already has today.

Iulian Mihalache is a Junior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. He may be contacted at  lulian.mihalache@cgsrs.org.

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Resources

[1] “Key findings on how Europeans see their place in the world”, by Bruce Stokes in Pew Research Center, June 13, 2016. Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/13/key-findings-europe/ (accessed on July 15, 2016

[2] “France's ethnic minorities: To count or not to count”, in The Economist, March 26, 2009. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/13377324 (accessed on July 15, 2016)

[3] “France Country Profile” in The CIA World Factbook. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html (accessed on July 15, 2016)

[4] “Données détaillées des statistiques d'état civil sur les naissances en 2010”, in L'Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques. Available at: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/detail.asp?ref_id=ir-sd20101 (accessed on July 15, 2016)