Introduction
In the framework of the European Governance project “Divide et compromise: the quest for improved European Governance”, the Centre for Geopolitics &Security in Realism Studies (CGSRS) has launched an interview series with European actors – of different political sensitivities and from various European institutions- to bring together their visions for European Governance reform given the deep cleavages that have progressively undermined the EU’s decision-making capacity.
Methodologically, as primary sources of European Governance, the interviews are semi-structured and the questionnaires vary to a degree. Core questions on cleavages in the main thematic and geographic axis of the project are common. The other questions account for the specificity of the interviewees’ functions. Whenever the interview has been conducted in a language other than English, the original and the version translated by the interviewer are published. Not all posed questions have been answered due to either the interviewees’ personal reasons and/or lack of time. Therefore, the CGSRS has decided to publish only the answered questions.
Ana Gomes, Portuguese Member of the European Parliament for the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, shared her views on the challenges of European Governance on October 17, 2018.
Ana Gomes is a Member of the European Parliament since 2004. She was re-elected in June 2009 and in May 2014 for a third term.
In this mandate (2014-2019), she is a full member of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, and of the Subcommittee for Security and Defence, as well as a full member of the Delegation for the relations with the United States and the Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean. Ms Gomes has been Rapporteur for Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the PCA with Indonesia, as well as a number of other reports across a range of policy areas. In her previous mandate, she was elected as the Socialists & Democrats Group Coordinator for Foreign Affairs. Her main work focuses on foreign affairs, namely, security & defence and human rights, justice and home affairs, fight against tax havens and corruption, and the rule of law.
Ana Gomes'academic background is in law. She was a career diplomat from 1980 until she entered party politics in 2003. She joined the Portuguese Foreign Service in 1980 and served in the Portuguese Missions at the UN (New York and Geneva) and the Embassies in Tokyo and London. Between 1999 and 2003 she was Head of the Portuguese Interests Section and then Ambassador in Jakarta.
Verónica Martins (VM): Thank you so much MEP Ana Gomes for accepting this interview and answering some questions of the Europe programme of the Center for Geopolitics &Security in Realism Studies, London. This interview is embedded in the framework of the ongoing project on the future of European Governance. I thank you again for your availability and let us start.
On September 12, 2018, in his speech about the State of the Union, President Juncker stated that: ”By the elections, we must show that Europe can overcome differences between North and South, East and West, left and right. Europe is too small to let itself be divided into halves or quarters.”
There are deep cleavages between the Member States who stand for more and/or better integration and those who rather prefer a Union as loose as possible. These divisions make it hard to reach consensus. If you had to identify 2 or more significative cleavages in the EU, which would you choose?
Ana Gomes (AG) :Well, first of all, the field of security and defence because the Member States still have the notion of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and cling to it and refuse to accept the reality that results from a globalised and interdependent world in which we live and where we absolutely need the critical mass of the European scale to defend our interests, to defend ourselves. When I say to defend, it is a comprehensive perception, not all the proactive action allows reaching the scale of conflict, it implies that they develop and they reach us. Therefore, in my opinion, the security and defence area continues to be (one cleavage)...despite the rhetoric and despite having moved forward quite relatively, for example, by the end of 2003, despite the division between the “new and old Europe” caused by the Americans with the Iraq crisis, we have moved towards the creation of a European Defence Agency which is after all significant, a European Security Strategy was drafted for the first time and, last year, we started to talk about a “Union of defence”, amazing bearing in mind the resistance of the recent past! But in practice, we have not seen the type of cooperation that a globalised and interdependent world would demand Europe to have in the field of security and defence so as to have diplomatic muscles because without military capabilities it cannot be efficient at the diplomatic level. And this is linked exactly to the foreign policy issues since there is no foreign policy without a security and defence policy. And this is because the States assume this completely obsolete Westphalian notion that they continue not to speak clearly, with one voice, they do not work for solutions that serve the interests of Europe as a whole, thinking that they can defend and promote their interests (of each Member State). This can obviously bring short-term gains, but in the long term it does not lead to anything and makes Europe as a whole vulnerable and states in particular. So this is the first area. The second area, undoubtedly, is the one that concerns the construction of the Eurozone, namely the completion of the Eurozone, of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), because we know that it is incomplete despite the 2008 financial crisis and all that was identified as essential: the joint deposit guarantee, the European Monetary Fund, etc. We moved forward in some aspects, but not enough and we still don’t have a Eurozone effectively equipped to promote convergence for all Member States and not only for some of them to the detriment of the others, and this has dramatic political consequences for the political cohesion of the EU. Here the responsibility is mainly from Germany. And in the first one, let us say that the United Kingdom (UK) was one of the big countries causing the obstruction of progress in the area of security and defence and foreign policy. Except in what it could take advantage of and even lead many times considering its military strength. But for the UK, ideological reasons and that atavism of that special relationship with the United States etc., has always had a negative and impeding role in the European progress in the areas of security and defence and in the area of foreign policy. In relation to the EMU, the big problem is Germany, it has to do with all the German fears and one of the areas in which we see this most clearly are those aspects that I have already mentioned about EMU, but it is not the only aspect. For instance, one of the fields where the UK has had an extremely negative role is also all that has to do with the tax system at European level and the need for minimum harmonisation so as not to jeopardise the internal market. In other words, there are no fair competition rules in the internal market if Member States are allowed to do fiscal dumping and that is exactly what happens today. And at the forefront of promoting tax havens inside and outside the EU, we obviously have the UK which is the mother of all tax havens. The United States may be the “father” (with the creation of Panama...)...but the “mother”, the “mommy” of tax havens is the UK and it is obvious that with Brexit, it is going to get seriously worse. Then, I cannot decouple taxation from the very construction of EMU and from the European budget itself. Because obviously a source of adequate own resources to promote the convergence, the investment etc. and social policies would have to come from taxation. National taxation, organised, and also shared at European level. And therefore, from my point of view, taxation issues are not inseparable from the construction of EMU.
Finally, there is the question of the rule of the law and this is what we see in the particular cases of Hungary and Poland, but also of Malta with different modalities, calling into question the basic principles and values of European integration, which are the rule of law and democracy. In the cases of Hungary and Poland, and here the Commission has a lot of responsibilities concerning the instrumentalisation of the migration factor, but that’s not all. Already before there was a set of measures that undermined the independence of the judiciary, the independence of the academy in the case of Hungary and the media that clearly put European values and principles at the basis of the rule of law; And it is clear that letting Hungary's problem drag on – it was in 2013 that the European Parliament (EP) published the first report on the rule of law in Hungary – whose author was a Portuguese MEP, Rui Tavares – it could have acted already, if it had done it / acted against Hungary, perhaps the situation would not have worsened as it did in the meantime and it would not have occurred what is happening today in Poland. In Malta, we have a different case, but it also goes to the heart of the rule of law. Malta was a tax haven created by the British at the time they were the colonising power and inherited by the European Union since it let Malta enter … not only Malta, there are other cases of tax havens and they flourished within the European Union and they really undermine the most basic principles of the EU's own security and rule of law, in particular through the import of organised crime schemes. And it obviously calls into question everything in the EU, as we are dealing with the revelations about Gold visa schemes or the sale of passports. In my opinion, these are cases where the integrated security of the EU and the rule of law and democracy in the EU are truly at stake.
VM: Thank you. To draw on your last comment on the rule of law issue, as you may have noticed one of the question deals precisely with the need to defend the values and rights enshrined in the Treaties. There has been some controversy in the sense that unanimity is needed to properly sanction the violating states and in this case to apply article 7 and eventually withdraw the right to vote in the Council of Ministers to Hungary and Poland. Given that these two States are mutually supportive - Bulgaria has already shown sympathy for these two States - what would be the solution to act de facto against those two States?
AG: Here in the EP we have shown what the solution is: to have a clear majority that points in the direction of sanctions and apply them, and makes them apply and decide to apply them. In the EP it took a long time too because the political forces of each of the member states are represented. It was difficult to reach a decision about the application of article 7. Basically, we also hoped that the Commission would bear the burden. This is the reason why the Commission is the Guardian of the Treaties, this is why the Commission has a duty to make proposals to the Member States, but the Commission refused the responsibility...and I am saying this with full background knowledge, for several times we have had discussions here namely with the Vice-President Timmermanssaying there is more than enough elements on the basis of the report made by Rui Tavares in 2013 for this Commission to act against Hungary and the Commission has never wanted to take on this burden and waited for the European Parliament to adopt a resolution. As a matter of fact, Mr. Timmermans has recently said to us: "you deal with Hungary and I deal with Poland", and that’s what he did in the meantime. I think this is regrettable because we would never have gotten to this situation had the committee acted earlier as it was its duty considering the elements it already had. Nevertheless, here in the EP there is the same division...because they protect each other within political families, namely in European Popular Party (EPP) that protected Mr. Orbán for a long time although many EPP MEPs declared, with few exceptions, given what is at stake: “we cannot support this”.
But it took time and the role of the German EPP, from Bavaria in particular, was particularly serious from my point of view; and, finally, we were able to move towards a resolution with the situation in Hungary worsening blatantly and having repercussions on Poland itself. There was a majority in favour of triggering article 7. Of course, this is a political decision, it is not decisive, it will have to pass by a Council decision and there in the Council, we will watch the same cover-up game etc. But I think here that, each one of us must demand from our governments, whatever political color they may be, that they remain faithful to European principles and values because if they are not, they are betraying the European Union, they are perverting the European Union, they are co-responsible for the liquefaction of these essential values of European integration.
VM: Thank you. Do you consider that the enhanced cooperation and/or structured cooperation represent the mode of governance for the future of the EU under scenario 3 of the “White Paper on the future of Europe” issued by the Commission?
AG: I consider that it is not only the future, it is the present and also the past. What is the Eurozone but enhanced cooperation? Although incomplete as I was saying earlier. Or what is Schengen but an enhanced or a permanent structured cooperation? We have already moved forward like this in the past, in the present and therefore I guess PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation)– a permanent structured cooperation in the field of security and defence policy – is entirely legitime and necessary, it is in fact, the only way to move forward. It is proven, moreover in an enlarged Europe – when Portugal became a member, we were twelve and it was obviously easier to take decisions than now with 28 states – in this context, with so many different perceptions, I guess this is the only way to move on. What is fundamental, I do not see anything wrong with this, even in the area of security and defence, is that you do not exclude anybody who wants to enter at any moment, as long as it meets the criteria to participate actively in the above mentioned enhanced cooperation...a group of countries can move forward, staying open to others when they see that they have the conditions or the time has come to join them in the area of security and defence as well.
VM: So given what was an exception before to move forward and progress in terms of integration, may become a generality in a number of areas. Will Europe be condemned to move forward divided in the fields which require unanimity?
AG: Yes I think that at present, this is a reality that must be noted and assumed without complexes and without problems. There is a group of countries moving forward in a certain direction. If this progress is correct and necessary, cooperation inevitably goes on. It has always been so in the history of the European construction, so it is nothing new and we must assume it without complexes. And yes, it shows different levels of perception, different levels of development perhaps in some areas but we need to assume this distribution, above all, it is about not to impede what must advance for the good of all. Although some are still not able to participate or willing to.
VM: In the last years, there has been considerable progress in Eurosceptic movements and parties in several EU countries. According to the leader of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (ALDE), Guy Verhofstadt, his group wants to form a common movement for the European Parliament’s elections in May 2019 (Ouest France, 09/09/2018). Together with Emmanuel Macron’s party –République En Marche- to stand for a “progressive” Europe in opposition to the anti-European and populist group “Europe of Nations and Freedom”. Do you consider that this coalition can curb the Eurosceptic and populist progression within the European Parliament?
AG: To my colleague, who I appreciate, Guy Verhofstadt, and his group - Liberal - and to President Macron and his party En Marche, all I have to say is bonne chance if they really want to combine efforts and they actually need to. But I am sorry to say that it is not the liberal alternative that will make the difference in Europe, namely to curb in particular to stop the populist and fascist and anti-European forces that are on the loose. Because it was precisely the neoliberal ideology – and I make the distinction because it is an ideology of the economic field that, from my point of view, has even compromised the European project these last decades. The deregulatory neoliberal ideology was the one that allowed the capture of the various Member States and governments and institutions by corrupt interest groups that, with sectoral agendas, have ruined destroyed what should be common European interests and public interests in each of the member states. From my point of view, the financial crisis of 2008 was not exclusively imported from the United States. It was much the result of these neo-liberal policies, of decades of deregulation and therefore of the application of neo-liberal economic ideology that, destroying jobs, destroying wealth in various Member-States, have shaken the citizens, the citizens' confidence in their rulers who then realised how many of the goals of governance at national and European level were being perverted, were not being achieved, were serving the rich to become richer against the majority of citizens to feel increasingly poor and insecure. Even there were jobs as in the case of the UK or Germany, with increasingly precarious jobs and therefore fears to increase and it is on this basis that the populist, Eurosceptic and fascist movements today are seeking to capitalise on the insecurity and distrust of citizens in the rulers. Any political family, and here I include my own political family that allowed itself to be contaminated by all this neoliberal nonsense, so negative, so perverse, namely through the thesis of this third way …Tony Blair in Great Britain, and all the parties of the socialist and social democrat family.
So, today, we have a tremendous problem in Europe because no political family has credibility. If a political family like my own ends up buying a more moderate, more presentable version of neoliberal theses whether defended by liberals or defended by the conservatives of the PPE, voters prefer the original. Therefore, we are in a very, very difficult situation in which Europe itself is being questioned by the citizens. In my opinion, the problem is not Europe, it is the way we let the Member States be captured by these sectoral and private interests and how neither governments at national level nor governance at European level is seen as capable of projecting the public interest. And this is associated to the distrust of the citizens towards politicians and governments, we have here in fact an ideal culture site for fascism and for all types of populists. I am here without knowing what to do, but one thing I know, it is not by the neoliberal ideology that we are going to save Europe and we will save each one of our countries from these forces of obscurantism, regression, prejudice that, moreover, have been generated within the EU countries and are also it is not by the neoliberal ideology that we are going to save Europe and we will save each one of our countries from these forces of obscurantism, regression, prejudice that, not only, have been generated within the EU countries and but are also being fostered and financed from abroad by those who want to destroy us, whether Mr. Putin, with an EU destruction agenda, or Mr. Trump with an agenda of total neglect of the importance of the alliance between the United States and Europe which for him is embodied in NATO and which we have known since the end of the Second World War; and he devalues the strategic importance of the overall importance of the global stability of the construction of the EU by throwing in the bin the investment of decades of diplomatic construction, also American diplomacy.
VM: Very good. Going back to the cleavages that you mentioned in your first answer, namely in the field of security and defence. There are differences in the threats-perceiving between the EU regions - with the Eastern regions fearing a more assertive Russia and a US disentanglement from EU security and the Southern region looking at North Africa- this is not new, but it has tended to accentuate-and to the phenomenon of the migrations especially since 2015. Does the EU have the capability to answer to these different perceptions in terms of security threats? You also referred to the drafting of the European Security Strategies, since 2003 we have had several versions…the last version is from 2016, how this updated strategy is dealing with the different security and threat perceptions of these regions?
AG: If it is not the EU, who will be able to answer to these different threats? That are here, they are real! The perception corresponds to the proximity to these threats. It is natural that in the East there is more concern for Russia than in the West and it is natural that there is more concern in the West and the South for what is happening in Africa than in the countries in North and Central Europe. These distinct perceptions are all European and we can not deal with them at all if we do not have a European instrument because, in fact, in a globalised and interdependent world in which we live, no country alone- may it be Portugal, a medium country, or big Germany – is going to address the challenges and threats we are facing that are in most cases absolutely transnational, such as terrorism or pandemics. So we absolutely need the dimension, the European scale. And the variations of perceptions according to whether we are more to the East or more to the West, more to the North or more to the South do not exclude themselves, they must be added, it is the advantage to have these perceptions. Now it is necessary that Member States understand and allow Europe-wide functioning and that they speed up the operation at European level that must obviously be made of the bisector and the moment-by-moment measurement of what emerges from the correlation of all those interests and forces and challenges and threats. And I ask again if it isn’t the EU who can it be? NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)? No, poor NATO. When one of the main NATO partners, structuring like the United States, through the President's mouth comes to say that NATO is obsolete, it has already greatly undermined NATO. Even if he now says he did not say anything, etc. Moreover, it was already limited at first because NATO is a military alliance and we are talking about a type of intervention that goes far beyond a military alliance, which requires a soft power and more economic power, allied to other powers including the military that, from my point of view, we will only be able to mobilise at the European level.
And I am not making any opposition between NATO and the EU because, in the first place, the members do not coincide, but there are many who are members of both organisations and I am more than convinced that either we work to strengthen European and NATO military and security capabilities within the European framework or we will never have them…and we don’t have them in NATO. Despite all these headline goals that Member States have set for years. It is therefore within the European framework that we have to identify those needs, work for them, put them at the service of NATO when it suits us or the United Nations or the European missions. For me, and increasingly in this context in which the United States is in the hands of a madman and when I say crazy it is in all its dimensions, I think the most important is that Europe has the capacity for strategic autonomy. To develop its capacities and determine when, where and how to use them by itself. And this is obviously not going to be done within the framework of NATO, it is done within the European framework. It serves NATO occasionally because the member states have such capabilities and can put them in the service of NATO, the United Nations or another framework, the African Union, for example. But it doesn’t have them, they can not be useful to anybody.
So from my point of view it is in Europe that we need these capacities and for this we need to understand that the different perceptions that we have in the East and the West, North and South are vital for us to develop the capacities, so that we can respond the threats and challenges that come from these diverse sources.
VM: The French proposal for a European Intervention Initiative (E2I), according to what you have now mentioned, will not be a way of diminishing the role of the EU as a provider of security for its members? Because this initiative will be developed outside the EU, isn’t it?
AG: No, I suppose it is an initiative that will not be developed outside the EU, on the sidelines of the EU. It requires capacities that will only be obtained in the EU. For instance, today it is not possible to speak of security and defence capabilities, whether it is internal or external security, without a cybernetic dimension, without a computer dimension. There is no cyber-security or cyber-defence if we do not work at European level, there is no Member State that can guarantee its security and the security of its critical infrastructures and critical civil and military sectors without the cyber dimension. And we will only be able to face the challenges and the threats if we work at the European level. This is true in the context of a European Intervention Initiative, military or not, whether in a PESCO or other framework, it must have a cyber dimension and this cyber dimension is at the European level. So I do not see this as being possible outside the EU. It can be done in a more limited framework than the European Union, but it will have to use resources, resources and capabilities that will only be achieved at the European level.
VM: And in the case of NATO and the states that are members of NATO but not members of the EU or part of the nine States that joined the initiative? They can consider the EII as a competitor, let us say a threat, even though it has not the same means or the same size, but can negatively influence NATO's perception of the role of the EU.
AG: I do not have this attitude and I do not want to put the EU at all, particularly in the area of security and defence where we need to invest, as contradictory to the NATO dimension and to the participation of EU members who are NATO members. On the contrary, I think that it is by strengthening the EU defence and security pilar that we will strengthen NATO’s European pilar. And so I do not accept the point of view of those who do not accept that we need to have capabilities either at European level or at NATO level and use the excuse of overlap, duplication, and so on. this speech is completely sterile and leads to nothing. I do not see any contradiction between the European Union working for its strategic autonomy, for strengthening its security and defence capabilities, and for these capabilities, once acquired by each of the Member States, and by the Union as a whole, to be put at the service of NATO’s missions or elsewhere as long as this obviously interests the Member States and there is no conflict of interest with other States that are part of the acquisition of such capabilities. I do not want to feed those kinds of polemics that are completely sterile and have hitherto prevented the EU from acquiring essential capabilities to its strategic autonomy within or outside the framework of NATO.
VM: You mentioned that what is necessary is to move forward as a whole, as the EU, especially in the European security issues...
AG: I say move forward together those who are able to advance, who want to move forward and who have the political will to move forward because it is absolutely decisive. I admit that, for many reasons, there are some who are not prepared to follow this path at the moment but do not stop them from joining when or if they feel they should join in order to move forward. Now I do not advocate that the EU should go all in a block. On the contrary, being realistic, we have to admit that there are different levels of development, of perceptions, and that enhanced cooperation is a desirable and advantageous instrument for progressing and those who do not want to move forward should not impede the progression of those who want to move forward.
VM: In his speech on the State of the Union, President Juncker called for the application of qualified majority in certain fields of Foreign Policy such as Human rights and civilian mission. Given that unanimity is needed in order to set up the passerelle-clause included in the Lisbon Treaty (article 48), it will not cover alll the Member States –because it is precisely the possibility to move forward with only some Member States- the EU will not be truly speaking with one voice...
AG: But this is a political fight that we have to undertake with the European citizens. For example, one of the fields where President Juncker proposed using the passerelle-clause was precisely the tax-system, to remedy the fact that we can not always change the treaties. Today this area is out of the Treaties, it is an exclusive competence of the Member States, it is not a European one. But every day we see the terrible implications, in particular in the area of the internal market that result from fiscal dumping and the lack of tax harmonisation; and even the security implications because it is an area that lends itself to all kinds of practices for crime purposes including the financing of terrorism, by the way. The Member States can only decide unanimously on this matter, but they can decide through the passerelle that they do not need unanimity and do not need an amendment of the treaties. You can say “ok, from now on we will decide by the majority” and this can be done through a unanimous decision, the so-called passerelle-clause. This has already happened in other areas and yes, no doubt, unanimity is needed to decide by qualified majority. But this is a political fight. We will have to explain to the citizens why we absolutely need to progress in the tax area and those who boycott unanimity have to pay the price of this measure in the face of their public opinions. So this does not happen without a political fight. And the governments that prevent unanimity will be exposed and have to be denounced before their citizens to explain why they oppose the political fight in the area of taxation and I want to see which is the country that will defend that it continues quietly to be a great tax haven for its citizens to benefit and too bad for the others.
VM: Let’s finish with a topical issue. A decisive European Council is now taking place in which either a decision is taken - and it does not seem very well-oriented - as far as Brexit is concerned, or it may be decided to organise a special European Council in November in order to finalise an agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU. This is a very general question: what is your vision of the EU after the Brexit, with or without an agreement?
AG: First of all, let me tell you that I would not be surprised if there was an extraordinary European Council in November and another one in December and another one in January, February and maybe even March because I think everything will be done to avoid a Brexit without agreement, out of control; it would be a disaster for the United States and for Europe. We are now dealing with a very incompetent and greatly constrained British government by the self-supporting forces of the government itself, which has completely contradictory positions, namely within the conservative party itself, and by the particular contradictions now arising with the IUP in Ireland and the most important issues on the agenda. The rest seems to be more or less settled - more than less, it is settled - for us in the European Parliament, the issue of citizens' rights: UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens residing in the UK, but we are currently blocked on the issue of avoiding the hard border in Ireland and what are the solutions which, without undermining the Good Friday peace agreements, could allow Northern Ireland to stay in a unified space with the Republic of Ireland within the framework of the Internal Market without creating at the same time a hard border between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom itself. We are deciding if what is on the table is acceptable or not and the possibility of Northern Ireland staying in the Common Market if there is no agreement, a solution that apparently a good part of the Tory party would accept, but that the intransigent Brexiters do not want and prevent Mrs May from accepting this solution - it seems to me that she could accept it, and would want this solution what is stupid because, in the end, it is putting Ireland in the same position than Norway. I recently went to Norway and the Norwegians were telling me: we do not understand, we are not in the European Union, we accept everything that comes from the Union, we are all bound by EU rules, we only have nothing to say in the making of these rules. The UK wants to put itself in this position and it is absurd, it wants to give up the right to say and to be able to build those rules that govern the EU and that in one way or another will inevitably be applied in Norway and, in the same way, in the UK, even after Brexit.
What is my position? My position is that I am against the Brexit, I helped some British colleagues for the campaign, without success, unfortunately. I didn't lose the hope of a second referendum. I think there are a lot of people who take it for granted that the Brexit will happen given the present situation. I did not exclude the possibility that there will be no Brexit because the same British people who voted in favor of Brexit in the referendum organised under the conditions in which it was - with the prejudices and the false and manipulated propaganda, as we know, from the outside - that these same British people in the face of the consciousness of the collapse that this will imply for Great Britain, for the power of Great Britain, for its role in the world, for the economy of Great Britain, will strengthen the possibility of a second referendum. We cannot exclude this hypothesis. I think that the polls in Great Britain indicate that there are more and more people considering that Brexit would indeed be nonsense and therefore I cannot exclude that this hypothesis would be feasible. It seems like two days ago, Mrs. May considered the possibility, that was denied until now, of a second referendum. So let's see, it looks like things are still changing. This summit of today and an extraordinary one that can be scheduled for November will not be the determinants.
VM: Of course, you are putting the hypothesis of the United Kingdom not leaving after all if a new referendum is organised, but if Brexit occurs ...
AG: If it does happen, I hope there will be an agreement that regulates the exit and that prevents the debacle for Great Britain and for all of us. I am thinking of a debacle, that I am sure is in the minds of many Brexiters, that is to transform Great Britain into a giant tax haven, it already is...but admittedly! On the other hand, Britain cannot escape the impact of continental Europe. What are the frontiers of Britain if they are not defended on the European continent? And bilateral agreements are not enough to solve the problems the UK will have to face. On top of that, it is ridiculous, even on those issues which are absurd and which were at the heart of the Brexiters' lying propaganda ... defence against an invading order ... If Europe does not cooperate, it is very easy to let the UK be invaded by whatever. Of course, all kinds of people from all over the world, also because they have family in England, want to have access to the United Kingdom. Therefore, I hope it is a regulated Brexit, that allows us to maintain dialogue, cooperation. I hope, for instance, in the area of security and defence, although ironic, that Great Britain will be forced more than ever to collaborate with Europe without having a say, that it has to conform to European design, but Britain will absolutely need it and Europe also needs the wisdom and knowledge that the British have in this field. So I think that, ironically, it may even be that Brexit will, in some areas, eventually produce even more synergy and harmony between the UK and the EU and that, sooner or later, we will see the United Kingdom knock again on the EU door to re-enter. And in many ways, by many enhanced cooperations, we end up cooperating, more maybe than with the UK within the European Union and with an effective decision-making power, sometimes used for good and other times for evil, namely to prevent the European Union from moving forward.
VM: Thank you very much for accepting our invitation, Ms. Ana Gomes, MEP. It was indeed a very rich interview and once again I thank you for your cooperation.
Verónica Martins is a Senior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. She may be contacted at Veronica.martins@cgsrs.org
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