After Lausanne: Perspectives On The New Iran

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The preliminary agreement that was reached in Lausanne, Switzerland between the P5+1 and Iran on Iran'?s nuclear program could potentially disrupt the regional balance of power in the Middle East. The West was too quick to agree on terms and conditions that Iran does not seem to respect. At the same time, it has alienated Israel and the Arab world. The consequences of a “bad deal” with Iran would not only be an increased risk-­??perception by the Arab nations and Israel, but an unprecedented sudden cash flow towards Iranian proxies in the region. The P5+1 should hold the Islamic Republic accountable for the agreement and not give in to the Iranian demand to the immediate lifting of the sanctions regime. The world should only lift the sanctions regime after Iran shows some significant and committed signs of real and honest intent. Even if this happens, Iran will not become the regional stabiliser the West is hoping for. Iran'?s expansive, sectarian ideology is no partner for peace and stability.

ANALYSIS
An Agreement – But Which Agreement?

Many pundits have hailed the signing of the Iran nuclear agreement in Lausanne in April 2015 as a milestone in the continuing conflict between the international community and the Islamic Republic Iran over its nuclear program. Commentators praised it as the “first step towards a resolution” of the nuclear issue. The framework, as US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammed Javad Zarif presented it at the beginning of April 2015, touches on several key issues. It includes the “restriction of enrichment at no more than 3.67 per cent and with no more than 5060 first-­?? generation centrifuges, removal of currently-­??installed next-­??generation centrifuges and their infrastructure, restricted R&D on advanced centrifuges and a cap of 300 kilograms on stocks of low-­??enriched uranium” (Einhorn 2015).

While these preliminary milestones sound very positive, one could not overhear the dissonances that surfaced directly after the agreement had been reached. First, three different parties have voiced at least three interpretations of what the agreement actually means concerning the sanctions regime. After the conference, Russia, the US and Iran each published “factsheets” that differ on one of the central questions. The Iranian factsheet (and subsequent media statements by Iranian authorities) stated that the sanctions would be lifted immediately after a deal is reached. On the other hand, the US factsheet stated specifically, “Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments” (Department of State 2015). Furthermore it specified, “U.S. and E.U. nuclear-­??related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-­??related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfil (sic!) its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place” (ibid.). In contrast, the Iranian Fact Sheet has the following to say regarding sanctions: “According to the reached solutions, after the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan of Joint Action, all of the UN resolutions will be revoked and all of the multilateral economic and financial sanctions by the EU and the unilateral ones by the US will be annulled” (Belfer Center 2015). This sheds a bad light on the agreement. If there is no clear commitment to the central issue of when the sanctions will be lifted, how can there be consensus on what this deal should accomplish and how?

For Iran, the lifting of the sanctions regime was one of its two main goals during the negotiations. Falling short of this, eroding the legitimacy of the US and EU sanctions was a big victory for Iran. Iran achieved this because “no outlier country has ever been able to negotiate its way out of UN charter’s Chapter VII sanctions. Most cases have ended either by war or total surrender” (Vaez 2015). For Iran to achieve what it has during the negotiations is an unprecedented success.

Still, ultra-­??conservatives and moderates (the Rohani camp) in Iran disagree over whether the negotiated agreement can be seen as a success or not. The conservatives are particularly unhappy with what they interpret as “binding agreements” that the moderate negotiators have agreed to (cf. Karami 2015). But for the moment, it looks like the moderate camp has the high ground.

Altogether, it looks like the Iranian side got the best result out of these negotiations. The enrichment program in Natanz remains active and Iran does not have to shut down a single nuclear facility. Even the heavy water reactor in Arak remains functional, albeit with tight restrictions. Also, Iran may continue with its research and development activities (cf. Vaez 2015). It remains to be seen if the latest “success” in the negotiations–a snap-­??back mechanism of UN sanctions should Iran break the deal–is more than a save of face for the P5+1. At the moment, they can sell the fact that they bought time from Tehran as a success in the agreement. Iran’s breakout timeline–the time Tehran needs to acquire enough weapon-­??grade nuclear material to build a nuclear bomb–will be extended to at least one year for the duration of at least ten years. So, according to the US factsheet, the P5+1 bought eight to nine month’s time from Iran.

Of course, the litmus test remains: was Iran ever, and is it currently, working towards building a nuclear bomb?

Iran and the Bomb

Iran has always emphasised that its programme is civil in nature and dismissed accusations that it is trying to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

Iran’s assertions have not stopped the IAEA from issuing various reports warning the international community about the sinister nature of the Iranian nuclear program. The heavy water reactor in Arak, the plant in Natanz and the secrecy with which Iran went about its nuclear business was enough to convince the Atomic Agency that foul play might be involved. The UN’s sanctions regime is a reflection of this. Iran has undertaken several steps necessary to build a nuclear weapon, and while it might have stopped these activities since the economic sanctions started to hit the country hard, it is unclear whether Iran will stop these activities entirely, if ever.

But why would Iran want to build a bomb? Kenneth Waltz, the founding father of neo-­?? realism, outlined one possible rationale behind the Iranian nuclear program in 2012 in Foreign Affairs. An Iranian nuclear bomb would create a balance of power in the Middle East, particularly between Iran and Israel (cf. Waltz 2012). Thus, Iran wants the bomb for security reasons. It would give it the means to counter Israel’s “assumed” nuclear arsenal and deter possible Sunni adversaries. Indeed, Iran has every right to be worried. Radical Sunni terrorist groups roam freely in Syria, Iran’s only Arab ally, and have committed atrocities against other groups that they consider to be “infidels”, including Shiites. The West has built close ties with Iran’s primary competitor for regional hegemony, Saudi Arabia.

But is Waltz’s argument convincing? His argument assumes a lot. Deterrence only works if all actors involved are acting rationally and share the same needs. Waltz’s neo-­??realism assumes that these needs include survival, which in turn entails a desire for security and capabilities to ensure survival. States tend to act rationally and would not, therefore actually use a nuclear bomb even if they had one. History seems to prove that Waltz is correct to assume this. After the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no country with nuclear weapons has ever used them in war. This includes India and Pakistan during their numerous wars. All nuclear powers have used their weapons for deterrence only.

Here lies the crux of the matter: will Iran act rationally once it has the bomb? Or will it act according to its ideology, a radical version of Shia Islam with an expansionist core and a deeply engraved anti-­??Semitism? The world cannot wait to find out because the consequences would be devastating. The P5+1 have to judge Iran by its words and by its actions so far. Tel Aviv and the international community cannot shrug off Tehran’s yearly threats against Israel (during the Al-­??Quds-­??Day). After all, Israel has experienced time and time again that it has to take existential threats very seriously. Iran, although not engaging in war against Israel directly, funds its proxies to fight Israel on its behalf. The world cannot allow Iran to fulfil its promise of “wiping Israel off the map”. Therefore, while Iran may very well act rationally, there is no guarantee that the Mullahs and the religious establishment won’t hijack the nuclear issue once again to fulfil their supreme leader’s wishes and desires. There is no possible scenario in which a nuclear bomb in Iranian hands can be tolerated. If not for the sake of Israel’s survival, then for the sake of containing Shia expansionism. The Iranian nuclear program has to be stopped or limited to the point where breakout is too costly to try.

Furthermore, a Shiite nuclear bomb would trigger fears on the Arab-­??Sunni side of the on-­??going struggle for power in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other powers might be challenged to pursue a nuclear program of their own if they feel that Iran is moving closer towards attaining the bomb. A Middle East full of nuclear weapons would result in the exact opposite of what Kenneth Waltz imagines the region would be. With anarchy and chaos across the region, the plethora of weapons of mass destruction would not bring stability and balance. It would instead mean more risk, more conflict and the threat of a nuclear device in the hands of religious radicals. In a nutshell, it does not matter if the world believes the Iranian version or not. To be wrong in this matter would be potentially catastrophic. Therefore, the worst-­??case scenario has to be the guiding red line.

Will a permanent deal be reached?

While some of the major questions seem to be agreed upon, some important issues remain. These include the structure of the deal and when the sanctions will end. Here are some others. Ayatollah Khamenei has already dismissed the possibility of IAEA inspections of Iranian military sites (cf. Rome 2015). This would mean a considerable obstacle for any permanent deal, as the military aspect of the program is exactly what the inspections have to uncover, if it exists. To close the doors of all military sites for inspections and prohibit leading scientists from talking freely to the inspectors would mean reducing any “nuclear deal” to absurdity.

Another question mark remains regarding Iran’s ballistic missile program, which was mentioned in the US factsheet, but not in the joint statement of Lausanne. While not part of a nuclear deal per se, the Iranian missile program has advanced considerably in past years, with rumours surfacing that Iran has developed missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead or even ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). This last rumour is most likely exaggerated (cf. Binnie/O’Connor 2015). Another possible banana skin en route to a lasting agreement is the question of what to do if Iran deceives the world and breaches the deal. At the end of May, this “snapback mechanism” was the topic of debate in Geneva, Switzerland. And, again, no agreement could be reached. On the topic of IAEA inspections of military sites, the Iranian camp snubbed the six powers and remained true to the Ayatollah’s demand. The P5+1 and Iran are both working towards a deal. But it seems that their respective interests lie far apart. While Iran’s prime goal is the lifting of the sanctions regime without giving away too much to the P5+1 in terms of their nuclear program, the world powers want to limit the Iranian nuclear program to a point where a bomb is off the table for the foreseeable future. The Iranian people want an end to the sanctions and an end to Iranian isolationism on the world stage. But this is not what the political-­??religious establishment desires. And the world powers do not seem to know exactly what they want. One thing seems to be clear though: In the poker game for a permanent deal, Iran seems to have the better hand.

What the agreement means for Iran’s Regional Ambitions

Iran has suffered greatly from the EU, US and UN sanctions. The economy has struggled with the situation for the past few years. Furthermore, hundreds of millions of US dollars have been frozen on international bank accounts that belonged to Iran, the Revolutionary Guard and its proxies. There is great potential in an internationally accepted Iran, both for business and politics. A reinstated Iran would instantly become one of the most important economies in the region, perhaps even the single most important one. Furthermore, the US could rely even more on Iran and its proxies than it does already in the fight against the Islamic State. The Shiite powerhouse would become a strategic ally for the West in Iraq.

So, for the West, there are real incentives for a deal with Iran. But they should never forget that Iran has its own mind-­??set for its future in the region and its way towards its goal. Without the burden of sanctions, Iran would be able to expand its sphere of influence deep into the Arab world, making it a potential hegemon in this anarchic region. It already aspires a dominant position in the Middle East’s contemporary power game and will be able to reach its goals much faster once a deal is agreed. This will escalate the struggle for power and influence in the region between the Sunni Saudi Arabia and the Shiite Iran, a struggle that has turned Syria into a sectarian battleground and is about to drag the rest of the region down with it. There is no way that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt or Turkey would be a simple bystander to the Islamic Republic’s rise to domination.

And Iran would be able to move on another front as well. In past years, the burden of sanctions has limited Iran’s scope in financing, training and supporting its proxies on the Israeli frontline. Once the sanctions are lifted, the so called “Iran Threat Network”–the network of companies and proxies tied to the Revolutionary Guard–would receive an unprecedented cash flow. “By most accounts, Iran stands to gain access to nearly $100 billion dollars frozen in foreign banks, as well as billions more as oil export restrictions are lifted” (Modell 2014). Some of this money could and most likely will be used to arm anti-­??Israeli terrorists such as Hamas and Hezbollah and finance other operations against Israel abroad and on the front. Furthermore, it could tip the civil war in Syria in favor of the Assad regime, or finance anti-­??Saudi uprisings in Yemen or Bahrain.

With a signed deal, Iran would be catapulted into the position of first contender for regional hegemony. It would become a country of interest for investors around the world and earn billions from oil and unfrozen assets. While a re-­??integration of Iran into the international community will most likely give the world a strategic advantage in the war against ISIS, the illiberal and anti-­??Semitic ideology of the Islamic Republic will not go away that easily. The money Iran will earn from a deal will most likely be used in its proxy-­?? war against Israel. Further, it will most likely aspire regional hegemony in the Middle East. In the long run, a deal without a long-­??term plan for these developments will lead to a strengthened ideological and expansive Iran in a region that is already drowning as a result of ideologically fuelled anarchy.

CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY

No Deal is better than a bad deal

The international community is in a quagmire regarding Iran. It cannot freeze it out any longer, and it should not agree to a deal that is favourable towards Iranian expansionism.

The West needs Iran in Iraq. It is clear that the Iraqi army is neither capable nor willing to fight the barbaric Islamic State by itself. The Shiite militias, who do a lot of the fighting, are controlled, trained and equipped by Iran. As long as the international community is unwilling to invest more into the fight against ISIS than symbolic air strikes, Iran is perceived as a necessary evil. But this does not stand up against a realistic assessment of the situation. You cannot fight fire with fire. Fighting a radical Sunni group with radicalised Shiites will only end in disaster. Iran should never occupy a leading role in an international coalition against ISIS. Arab nations or the West must lead this war. At the moment, it seems like the US wants to reinstate Iran as a regional power to share responsibility in Iraq and eventually even hand over full responsibility. The US does not want to engage in Iraq again. Using a rehabilitated Iran as a regional hub sounds like a good idea, but only in the short-­??term. Long-­??term, it will lead to more chaos, an escalating struggle for power and hegemony between Sunni and Shia and more armed conflict, terror and chaos.

A deal for the sake of making a deal is not a desirable option. This would mean that Iran profits more than the international community. As things stand now, a deal with Iran should not be signed. Iran’s blunt rebuff regarding inspections of its military sites contradicts the very heart of the negotiations. It looks like Iran is once again testing out how much the P5+1 states are willing to give up for a deal. It seems like the time is ripe. With chaos in the Middle East and the US pulling out of the region, the Iranian negotiators can realistically assume that the US and the EU need a strong Iran more than they fear their nuclear program. In this situation, Iran can give up minor aspects of its program (or even larger, but irrelevant aspects), and the West will give them what they need and want: an end to the UN sanctions regime, and, as a consequence, the de-­??legitimisation of the US and EU sanctions.

What should the P 5+1 do to prevent a strengthened and more determined Iran? First, they should not agree to any deal that does not include the inspection of military sites and interviewing of Iranian personnel. If Iran does not change its stand on this matter, it should be considered a deal breaker. After all, the military aspect is what this is all about. The international community must not fall for Ayatollah Khamenei’s games, or it risks getting played by him.

Second, any permanent deal must be accompanied by full IAEA inspections. There must not be any sanctions relief without the IAEA confirming that the Iranian nuclear program does not have a military component. As long as this is not assured, the sanctions must be upheld.

Third, the international community must be aware that a nuclear deal does not solve the Iranian issue as a whole. Iran’s conventional weapons program, its plethora of proxies and its funding of terrorist groups have to remain on the agenda. Make no mistake; Iran is not harmless. On the contrary, a nuclear deal could allow it to easily progress on its road to regional hegemony if the international community does not keep a close eye on the situation.

Fourth, do not be fooled into thinking Iran could become a stable partner for the West or an anchor for stability in the region. The Islamic Republic’s ideology is expansive by nature, anti-­??Semitic to the core and a threat to the region’s stability. A strengthened Iran would mean a short-­??term relief on the Iraqi front, maybe resulting in a defeat of ISIS, but the struggle for power in the region would only escalate. The West is still needed as an ordering power in the region. As long as Wahhabism stands against Iranian Shia Islam, there is no end to the conflict in the region.

Fifth, rely on the Iranian people, not the Iranian regime. The Iranian regime is conservative and ideological, its people are not. In a make-­??or-­??break situation, the international community must make sure that the Iranian people understand that the fault lies entirely with its own regime. Do not let the regime hijack a potential failure of talks for its own benefit. Its status is weak within the Iranian society, but it will be strengthened if they can use a failure on the nuclear front for their propaganda. A nuclear deal will not decrease the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Any deal is only one small step towards a safer and more stable Middle East.

Solving the nuclear issue will not end any conflict in the region. It is more likely that a fast, crude deal will cause more harm than good. The international community should give Iran a good and reasonable offer, but it should not let itself get played by the regime in Tehran. This might very well mean that the deadline for an agreement (June 30, 2015) will fail. But no deal at the end of June is better than a deal that only strengthens a destabilising power.