Future of European Defence: an exception on its way to more integration or an endless imbroglio?

In a time where the European integration is seriously under threat, developments in the field of defence policy in order to achieve a strategic autonomy seem to be an exception. The 2016 European Global Strategy stated that it was the “ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union.”[1]And as Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, put it in November 2018, “We have achieved more in these last two years than we achieved in decades on security and defence in the European Union (EU).”[2]But what does this mean exactly? If we look at the White Paper on European defence issued on June, 7^th2017, in realistic terms, how far are we from the second scenario, the “shared defence and security?”

WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY

Over these last few years several factors have been favourable to the development of a closer cooperation in the defence field. Already in 2009, citizens were expecting the EU to give greater attention in peacekeeping (31%) as well as in the fight against terrorism (22%) in its relations with third countries.[3]Likewise in 2017, 95% of respondents regarded terrorism as a key challenge to EU security and also supported EU’s strategy of coordinated action to combat crime and terrorism as well as the sharing of information “across borders to facilitate the tackling of security threats.”[4]Moreover, the support of the population to a common security and defence policy between the EU Member States has been considerably stable around 75% since Maastricht.[5]In December 2011, 81% of Europeans thought the EU was a “secure place to live in” of which 28% agreed totally with this assertion.[6]

Another important “window of opportunity” is the growing unilateralism in American policy. This window will remain open at least until November 2020 – or longer if President Trump is re-elected and/or if his successor also adopts a unilateralist and isolationist position. President Trump’s stubborn unilateralism has plunged international relations into uncertainty. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) own sustainability has faced strong criticisms for some years now[7]and President Trump’s declarations about the lack of financial commitment from European partners at NATO’s last summit in July 2018 has cast greater doubts on U.S. intentions towards the organisation.[8]It also seems that President Trump has raised the possibility of leaving NATO several times in 2018.[9]This “threat” has raised the concern of American experts who consider that this would be a “gift” to Putin who could become even more aggressive towards the Baltic States.[10]

The impetuous character of President Trumps’ decisions is not reassuring for the Nordic and Baltic States, despite the huge military exercise organised by NATO in October 2018 at locations from Iceland to Finland“to keep up with Russia's growing military presence in the Arctic and the Baltic Sea.”[11]A powerful European Union in military terms can only be reassuring, especially if we bear in mind the fact that despite the close cooperation, Sweden and Finland are not NATO members. As Fägersten, Danielson and Håkansson point out, “all of the Nordic states are members of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), as well as the UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)”, but “they differ quite radically in their views on EU defence cooperation.”^[12]Both Finland and Sweden have no opt-out in Defence policy (only Denmark has an opt-out) but while Finland has publicly “acknowledged that EU membership was an element of its security policy,” Sweden “did not join the EU to further its security policy interests.”[13]Now, the U.S. commitment to European security is called into question and the possibility of a British exit of the EU are compelling Sweden to move away from “after years of more or less routinized linking up with the UK’s sceptical position.”[14]Moreover, one has to underline that both Finland and Sweden are also part of the 25 states participating in PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation)[15]and Finland recently joined (November 2018) the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) launched in June, 25, 2018.[16]

French President Macron, whose programme reforms for Europe has encountered severe obstacles, also felt the need to re-centre his reforms around the objective of protection[17]- despite the successful launching of the European Intervention Initiative to boost the construction of a “European strategic culture.” Although his letter “For European renewal” is not limited to the defence aspect, it contains concrete proposals like a “treaty on defence and security”[18]to “define our fundamental obligations in association with NATO and our European allies,” particularly the need to increase defence spending, operationalise the mutual defence clause and to set up a “European Security Council with the United Kingdom on board to prepare [our] collective decisions.”[19]Since his election, the French President has clearly shown too much ambition in his programme of reforms, his “letter to the Europeans” has the merit of provoking a very enterprising response also from the successor of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. Both states have shown their willingness to advance the integration of European defence policy, but this window of opportunity has shown its limits with the German response whose priorities, at least part of them, are different as we will see in the cleavages section. Moreover, the Brexit issue has also proved to have a dual character. In one hand, although the UK and France are protagonists in the birth of the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) with the Saint-Malo Declaration (1998), the UK has also been a major opponent to any of the attempt to move forward in the field.[20]Its exit is therefore considered as an important loss in the “cons camp.” In the other hand, as shown by the UK's decision to participate in the E2I, the UK has realised that defence is an area which would allow it to stay close to its European partners and play a major role. In fact, as rightly emphasised by Federico Santopinto, one of its objective is to continue to have its say in the Defence and Security Policy and since the British cannot send any observer or representative within the decision-making bodies, they suggest these bodies to meet informally so that they cannot send diplomats and soldiers.[21]Therefore, and given the strong criticism surrounding NATO, it is of the UK’s interest to stay as closely associated as possible to the European defence to remain at the heart of the protection of Europe.

CREDIBLE ADVANCEMENT IN THE FIELD OF DEFENCE?

If we look at the White Paper on European defence issued in June, 7^th2017, and given a probable Brexit without agreement, in realistic terms, how far are we from the second scenario, the “shared defence and security” in 2025? According to the European Commission, this would imply “that the EU supplements Member State efforts” and “operational and financial solidarity between Member States becomes the norm”. In terms of action, “the EU would significantly step up its ability to project military force externally, enabling it to conduct high intensity operations in the fight against terrorism and hybrid threats”[22]and the EU would also improve its capacity-building missions, either civilian or military, helping to make neighbourhood countries and more distant regions more resilient.[23]As far as capabilities are concerned, there would be joint financing of key capabilities and joint purchase of multinational capabilities supported by the European defence fund.”[24]In addition, the Member States would fight hybrid threats together as they “assist each other on cyber issues and share intel” and the European Border and Coast Guards would be “utilised to its maximum” to monitor and protect external borders.[25]The EU would also be able to coordinate itself with NATO “on full spectrum of hard/soft security areas” but the EU’s efficiency would have to grow considerably with a “more rational use of resources” through the economies of scale in defence market boosted by “favourable financing conditions across the supply chain towards small and medium sized enterprises.”[26]

Since the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the EU has created several instruments to facilitate military capability development in order to reach the “strategic autonomy” in crisis management and “step up its contribution to Europe’s collective security,” namely in the framework of NATO[27], as it is the case for the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). However, as the conclusions of several scenarios for 2030 in a context of Brexit[28]advanced by the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the German Council on Foreign Relations point out, in terms of action, capabilities and efficiency, the EU will not be able to meet its objectives and to live up to its ambitions.[29]In fact, as the authors emphasised, the EU would like to be able to conduct several operations at the same time in the CSDP framework but this “concurrency of operations that will create real stress on capabilities” and sustainability is also a problem when considering medium and long term operations[30]. Likewise, more important peace-enforcement and stabilisation and support to capacity-building operations emphasise “the scarcity of non-NATO HQs for higher echelons (corps level, large air and maritime commands).”[31]As the authors also rightly point out, some improvements are possible by 2030 with the plans of procurement in the maritime domain (destroyers, frigates, and heavy transport helicopters), nevertheless the current procurement plans of the EU 28, “to the extent that they are visible at this point, will not close the identified capability shortfalls and ageing equipment will increasingly become a problem.”[32]Though Brexit can become an opportunity to find further “European partnerships and transatlantic engagement.”[33]

Also in terms of capabilities, the EDF’s own legitimacy has been questioned since its creation was based on Article 41, Paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) but Article 41, Paragraph 2 excludes it from the budget of the European Union in that “such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications,”[34]“and thus armaments programmes.”[35]On the contrary, Articles 173 and 182 of TFEU allow for the Community funding of Research and Development activities in the field of defence.[36]Though the provisional agreement on the establishment of a European Defence Fund was reached in February and was voted by the MEPs in Strasbourg in April, the financial endowment of the fund will only be voted upon the approval of the multiannual budget 2021-2027 by the Parliament in Autumn.[37]In the meantime, and until the EDF is not implemented, the Commission is boosting European defence plans with a roadmap for spending €525 million under the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP).[38]But given the horizon of 2025 will it be enough to create a European Defence Industry and allow for a more integrated military Europe?

In addition, the latest good news in institutional terms is the designation of Ursula Von der Leyen, the German Defence Minister as the successor of Jean-Claude Juncker to the head of the Commission.[39]She is a “convinced European” and she stands for a “more assertive role for German foreign and security policy within the EU.” [40]Nevertheless, her confirmation by the European Parliament, by a short majority of 383 votes[41], was far from certain – the German Social Democrats MEPs had stated that they were not going to vote in favour of Von der Leyen and the Socialist group had also shown its dissatisfaction although it was willing to listen to its program which was expected to be more progressive.[42]Consequently, “Vertical tensions” may come from future changes at the Commission since the question of whether the EU should pool its military resources has gained political momentum these last two years. Namely, through the creation of the EDF and the French and German defence proposals. Jean-Claude Juncker has actively promoted the idea of a common European defence and announced a very ambitious programme.[43]Without a clear support of the European Commission and a high priority on the agenda, progresses in this field will probably slowdown serving the cause of the opponents to greater integration of this policy.

MAIN OBSTACLES AND CLEAVAGES TO A EUROPEAN DEFENCE

Since the very beginning of the European integration, the field of defence has been a motive of discord and tension. Although the Petersberg tasks adopted in 1992 represented a first step in the military field, the Franco-British Saint-Malo declaration has set up the main objectives of the future ESDP launched in 1999.[44]And more than 20 years later, where do we stand? All in all, the realisation of a European defence is still struggling with essentially the same problems of “duplication, fragmentation, industrial overcapacities and highly inefficient procedures” in European defence markets[45]and the unreasonable fear of the most “Atlanticist” European states to compete with NATO.

Although, it has to be underlined that, since France’s “Atlanticist shift” in 2009, the Franco-British disagreement on EU’s strategic autonomy vis-à-vis NATO and the United States has lessened but not disappeared. Somehow in a Brexit context, the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) has become an additional bridge between an “exiting” UK without any negotiated “framework agreement as third party” (at least for now) and some of its European partners. Now, if France has contributed to keep the UK on board, some distance would pop up with Germany as mentioned before. Franco-German relations have been strained since the September 2017 legislative elections and despite the Treaty of Aachen signed by both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel on January 22, 2019 to renew their cooperation. Angela Merkel’s departure from the Chancery will not work for lowering tensions and her successor at the head of the CDU, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, has already communicated on her vision of a reformed Europe whose priorities in the Defence field are different, namely on the recurrent question of a permanent seat for the EU at the UN Security Council.[46]

Germany has joined the E2I but the difference of strategic culture has become more visible since Germany is part of the European countries that share the notion of the EU as a “civilian power,” with the military being a defensive instrument, while France has a more offensive notion of the military instrument in its foreign policy toolbox.[47]Moreover, for Germany, the defence of Europe remains by and large NATO’s business as recalled by the German defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen last September in Paris.[48]Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain all see the exclusivity of E2I as well as its position outside of both NATO and EU frameworks as problematic because it explicitly undermines the idea of European unity and cause tensions with countries outside E2I.[49]It is difficult then to truly talk about a Franco-German tandem in the field of defence – namely through the signature of the Aix-la-Chapelle Treaty last January- as underlying tensions put them directly into competition. Both have political and industrial interests to defend even if this causes divisions among Member States who will choose side instead of mobilising all states around the cause of a European defence.

Like Germany, which does not yet have a culture of strategic autonomy, many countries do not have any case of conscience to “subcontract” their security to the United States.[50]As Michel Cabirol puts it, “toEurope of defence, they prefer the defence of Europe, via NATO” which have implications, for instance, on choices on major national sovereignty programs in Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom in favour of the F-35 as well as in Sweden, Poland and Romania that have chosen the Patriot air defence system in detriment of a European offer (Franco-Italian) although less expensive.[51]Therefore, one should also point out to the fact that, in a context of BREXIT - the UK being the member state that spend the most on defence (€47 billion in 2016, i.e. 24% of the total EU public expenditure on defence) and that possess a considerable expertise in terms of crisis management and operational foreign policy - the remaining “willing” member states led by France and Germany have to quickly strengthen their cooperation therefore taking advantage of the latest developments in defence and of the absence of British resistance.

To these « horizontal tensions » originating cleavages, vertical tensionsare also undermining further efforts of integration in the field of defence. By vertical tensions, Jan Frederik Braun and Reinier Bergema mean “tensions between national and European levels of government — i.e., between the collective European interests — represented by the European Parliament (EP) and the European Commission (EC), and the national interests of individual EU Member States” (Council of Ministers and European Council).[52]Theoretically, the EDF is supposed to receive €13 billion for the period 2021 - 2027. The finality and the funding of the EDF - objectives of the fund, ethical control of the actions and the eligibility criteria of the entities and actions financed[53]as well as the direct or indirect management of the fund- has raised cleavages between the European Parliament and the Council of the EU.[54]Nevertheless, in April 18, 2019, the EDF that will fund research projects was voted by the Parliament and this one has given up its right of veto on the use of the fund.[55]The Council seems to have won this arm wrestling, especially because the vote took place before the elections of the new European Parliament and the uncertainty about its new composition. And indeed, looking at the results, some changes occurred and alliances have to move. Although the European Popular Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) still remain the principal forces of the Parliament, they no longer have the majority and the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe + Renaissance + USR PLUS (ALDE&R) and the Greens/EFA will play an important role in the new alliances.[56]Moreover the sovereigntists and the Eurosceptics parties (European Conservatives and Reformists Group,Europe of Nations and Freedom Group and the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group) represent now 23%, i.e., 176 MEPs.[57]Although the new Identity and Democracy group only gathers 73 MPs and is the fifth major political group while Nigel Farage’s Brexit party and its 29 MEPs refused to join. Anyway, this high representation can still cause problems for the approval of the envelope dedicated to the EDF given the oppositions that this sovereign sensitive area raises.

CONCLUSION

The awareness of the instability of the southern and eastern neighbourhoods, the entanglement of internal and external threats, the general popular support to a common security and defence policy and the isolationist trend of American foreign policy should be reasons for a strong enough yearning for a “shared defence and security” policy to emerge. But realism continues to dominate the field of defence and horizontal and vertical tensions originating cleavages are still numerous and they all constitute potential obstacles to the realization of the second scenario of the White Paper on European defence. Many uncertainties remain with a particular emphasis on the adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021 - 2027 which will determine the dotation of the EFD and the programme of President Juncker’s successor as head of the Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen in the field of defence. The last negotiations for top jobs have largely favoured Western politicians and if some leaders of Eastern Europe weighed in the results.[58]

Furthermore, the Brexit has been greatly time and energy consuming and although the 27 has been acting as a block, the “no deal scenario” is getting closer - if we take into account that Boris Johnson is the favourite candidate to become the next Prime Minister - and with it the impossibility to conclude a Framework Participation Agreement as third party[59]with the UK to guarantee a close cooperation after BREXIT. How credible can a “shared defence and security” be as a permanent structured cooperation and no close cooperation with the UK?

Policy recommendations

• Three years after the popular decision to leave the EU, a BREXIT “with a deal” is still not a reality and regardless of the outcome of this process, the Council and the Commission have to push for a Framework Participation Agreement as third party with the UK to guarantee a close cooperation after BREXIT and strengthen EU’s credibility in the field of defence;

• Negotiations for the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021 - 2027 are slowly progressing and it is paramount for the future of a European defence that the leading States in the field secure the 13 billion euros planned for EDF so that a truly European defence industry can take shape;

• Concentration in terms of military and civil action in its neighbourhood. If the EU is clearly a global player in the field of cooperation, with the possible departure of the United Kingdom its "global Britain" (Malcom Chamber, RUSI), it must refocus its ambitions on its neighbourhood. A credible presence in a limited geographical area is one way of consolidating one's role as a defence player.

Verónica Martins is a Senior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. She may be contacted at Veronica.martins@cgsrs.org 

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