Revitalising Bilateral Diplomacy to Deal With the North Korean Nuclear Problem

Executive Summary

Northeast Asia has been relatively kind to the United States for the past sixty-five years. There has not been a major conflict in the region since the Korean War 1950 – 53, and the region has witnessed unprecedented economic growth. The two nations that could potentially upset the geopolitical order of the region are the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). Of those two nations, North Korea is perhaps the more dangerous due to its unpredictability and highly belligerent posture. In addition to this, the development of the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs have greatly increased regional anxiety over security concerns as a result of testing activity. Because of this, North Korean leadership has been able to garner the attention of world leaders and establish diplomatic clout, where they would otherwise have none. Over the years, there have been many attempts to try to bring North Korea back into the international order as a responsible nation, and for short periods of time it does behave accordingly. However, those periods do not last for very long. The 2018 – 19 DPRK-U.S. Summits will eventually be seen as just another example of failed diplomacy; and the Trump Administration will learn this the hard way, once the DPRK returns to its old routines.

Introduction

For over half a century, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (RoK or South Korea) have been locked in a conflict that has all but been frozen in place since 27 June 1953. The signing of an armistice enabled both sides to enter a period of reconstruction, as an uneasy peace settled over the Korean peninsula. The DPRK utilized this opportunity to rebuild its military – the Korean People’s Army (KPA) – and to become one of the most highly militarized nations on Earth. It was during the latter years of the Cold War when the DPRK began to invest into a ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program. On 9 October 2006, the nuclear program bore fruit when the North Koreans successfully conducted their first nuclear test. Following this initial detonation, both programs saw a rapid acceleration in research and development with the advent of additional testing activity. This testing activity has caused great anxiety throughout the region, and the international community has tried on multiple occasions via diplomacy to get the North Koreans to abandon their programs. The likelihood of the North Koreans giving up their most valuable assets, and a showcase of both national prestige as well as pride, is likely not going to happen. As such, this creates a volatile security dilemma, one in which U.S. leadership as well as presence is required in order to ensure that peace and stability can prevail throughout the region.

The KPA Rocket Program

For the duration of the Korean War, the conventional military of North Korea was based entirely on Soviet weaponry. This continued throughout the Cold War, until the North Koreans began to acquire weapons from the Chinese and other nations. It is widely believed that the Soviet Union was largely responsible for establishing both the Chinese as well as the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. Academics that were interested in the topics of rocketry and nuclear science took part in an exchange between all three nations (Albert, 2017). This was an important step forward for the North Koreans, because the educational exchange gave them a valuable new resource: a generation of trained technocrats who would be able to work independently of Chinese or Soviet experts. In addition to this training, the Soviets also gave their allies valuable components as well as infrastructure assets that could be utilized in the development of their respective programs (Oh and Hassig, 1995). From this, it can be seen that the Soviets were instrumental in laying the foundations for the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs.

“It is widely believed that the Soviet Union was largely responsible for establishing both the Chinese as well as the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs”

The research and development of the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs continued through the Cold War and into the contemporary era. While the researching of these systems is an important step, the procurement of the materials required to ensure their success is equally important, as well as a highly difficult one. The infrastructure and resources needed for such programs is immense, and for a nation such as North Korea (which is not economically wealthy) to acquire them is an impressive feat. For the ballistic missile program, everything from industrial-grade metals, electronic parts, and solid propellants are required. While for the nuclear weapons program, centrifuge technology, either uranium or plutonium stockpiles, and hard water are the prerequisites for that particular program. Another crucial component for these programs is time. All of these programs require a long duration of time so that the required infrastructure can be built, as well as the conduction of testing activity, so that both programs can be relatively established.

As mentioned earlier, Soviet assistance in the development of the North Korean missile and nuclear weapons programs was critical. In fact, most of the Hwasong family of missiles is of Soviet origin. Most of these missiles are of either short (SRBM) or medium (MRBM) range designs whose area of operations are limited to the Korean peninsula, and the Japanese home islands. In recent years, the North Korean arsenal of ballistic missiles has expanded to include an intercontinental (ICBM) design whose range (in theory) reaches the Pacific Coast of the Continental United States. While Soviet assistance was important for the early stages of the ballistic missile program, Iran and the PRC were crucial in the development of heavier MRBMs and ICBMs (Niksch, 2010). It is suspected that the DPRK is currently testing even a heavier design of ICBM whose range could extend to all of the United States and parts of Europe. The ability to strike at the Continental United States with a nuclear armed missile has been a long-time dream of North Korean leadership (Alcaro and Greco, 2017). This is an explicit threat to the United States, and one of the main reasons why the U.S. maintains its involvement in region.

The Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

While the North Korean ballistic missile program was making important strides in its overall development throughout much of the Cold War era, the nuclear program was also making progress, albeit at a much slower rate. This is likely due to the limitations imposed on it by the minimal level of infrastructure that the program has at its disposal. Since the 1960s, the DPRK has operated two nuclear reactors (Oh and Hassig, 1995). Surprisingly, the nation of Pakistan became a willing partner of the North Koreans at the end of the Cold War, and actively aided in the development of its nuclear program. The Pakistani nuclear scientists A. Q. Khan reportedly invited North Korean nuclear scientists to a Pakistani nuclear lab where a vital exchange occurred between the two nations (Niksch, 2010). This Pakistani nuclear aid added onto the existing Soviet infrastructure that had been given to the North Koreans in the early 1950s. And yet, this limited infrastructure may not be capable of meeting the demands of the KPA or regime leadership. So far, six nuclear tests have been conducted since October 2006, the majority of them taking place during the reign of Kim Jong-un. It has yet to be determined as to whether or not the DPRK has any remaining stockpiles of the required fissile materials to conduct more tests, or if it is in the process of acquiring more.

The testing activity of both programs has occurred in waves; with periods of inactivity in between. The majority of this testing activity has occurred in the last twenty years. During the periods of activity, both programs witnessed failures as well as successes. This shows that DPRK scientists are capable of learning from past mistakes, and making improvements to the technologies that are available to them. This is troubling, because each success brings the DPRK much closer to being able to strike not only the Continental United States, but most of Europe also.

The Trump-Kim Era

On 12 February 2017, the DPRK launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile – the first of many tests that would take place during the year. All of these tests led to a dramatic increase of international pressure on North Korea. First, the PRC temporarily abandoned its ally by halting economic aid to the country. This was then followed by sanctions that were organized by the U.S. in order to put additional pressure on North Korea. Despite these economic hardships, the North Koreans continued to launch ballistic missiles. The multitude of tests conducted throughout 2017 led U.S. President Trump to christen Kim Jong-un as “Rocket Man” during a United Nations General Assembly. Throughout the remainder of the year, both President Trump and Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un lambasted each other via Twitter, thereby exacerbating tensions even further. Towards the end of 2017, a major diplomatic breakthrough occurred, when Kim Jong-un publicly announced that he wanted to discuss the possibility of ending both programs. Any reasonable individual could see that this was merely a ploy conducted by the North Koreans in order to acquire more time to develop their weapons programs.

This eventually led to an unprecedented diplomatic exchange between the DPRK, RoK, and the U.S. The warming of relations began when a meeting between the two Koreas took place at Panmunjom on 27 April 2018. During the exchange, both Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and President Moon Jae-in talked at length amongst each other – the first time that Korean leadership had done so in years. The primary talking points included denuclearization, national unity, and peace (Snyder, 2018). While an armistice exists between both Koreas, tensions have constantly ebbed back and forth throughout history, making a permanent peace elusive. The 2010 bombardment of Yenpyong Island by the North Koreans is one example of the sporadic skirmishes that have taken place along the border which threatens to reignite the conflict. However, leadership from both nations have been able to show considerable restraint, thereby enabling peace to prevail despite such blatant acts of aggression. Discussions about denuclearization and a permanent peace were apparently a way to entice United States leadership to return to the negotiating table as well.

In the past, American leadership has attempted on multiple occasions to negotiate with the North Koreans about their programs. Almost every U.S. president since President Carter (1977 – 81), has tried in his own way to defuse the crisis on the Korean peninsula, and perhaps due to the loftiness of that goal, has failed. The failure to reach that goal does not entirely fall onto the shoulders of U.S. presidents; the North Koreans are also to blame for either simply refusing to meet or talk; or by having some objection for the proposed meetings. President Clinton (1993 – 2001) attempted to lure the North Koreans to the negotiating table with economic incentives, which ultimately failed to produce any tangible results. President Bush (2001 – 09) established the Six Party Talks and utilized the highly astute and tough Ambassador John Bolton (the former national security advisor to President Trump) to keep the idea of brinkmanship afloat. Despite the elation for the Six Party Talks amongst member parties, the eventual pull-out of DPRK diplomats led to their collapse. Under President Obama (2009 – 2016), the “Pivot to East Asia” did in fact very little to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and the issues surrounding the region were largely ignored. Upon assuming office, President Trump made dealing with North Korea a major U.S. policy issue once again. At first, President Trump was only able to initiate contact with the North Koreans through Chinese President Xi Jinping. However, once relations with the DPRK began to improve, U.S. officials like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo became more prominent in establishing communications with their respective North Korean counterparts.

“Almost every U.S. President since President Jimmy Carter (1977 – 81) has tried in his own way to defuse the crisis on the Korean peninsula, and perhaps due to the loftiness of that goal, has failed”

From the beginning, the Trump Administration wanted to handle the crisis on the Korean peninsula differently from how past administrations had done so. This can be seen when in the spring of 2018, President Trump cancelled a proposed summit between him and Kim Jong-un. It was cancelled over derogatory remarks that North Korean officials had made towards the United States. Following this, National Security adviser John Bolton likened the situation on the Korean peninsula to the “Libyan model of December 2003,” where Muammar Gaddafi ended his weapons programs peacefully (Dobbins, 2018). North Korea took umbrage with this, and bickering between the leadership of both nations lasted for weeks. Eventually, leadership from both nations were able to overcome their differences, and relaunch the proposed summit.

The Failure of Diplomacy

The idea that the DPRK could potentially abandon its programs was met with enthusiasm by the United States, as well as the RoK. Following the initial hype of the announcement that there would in fact be a Trump-Kim Summit, many policy experts began to speculate as to what might result from such a meeting (Heinrichs, 2018). One group tended to express the idea that due to his inexperience in foreign affairs that the North Koreans would force President Trump’s hand and abandon decades of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia in order to achieve a diplomatic victory. Another group quietly expressed optimism that the president and his team would be able to finally get the North Koreans to peacefully abandon their weapons programs. On 12 June 2018, a carefully choreographed meeting between the two leaders took place at Singapore. What transpired between the two was an exchange of pleasantries, and vague assurances that there would be policy changes. This 2018 DPRK-US Singapore Summit is largely viewed as a success, and led to a second summit which was hosted in Hanoi, Vietnam in 2019.

Unlike the earlier summit at Singapore, the summit at Hanoi was a brief affair. The North Koreans seemed to be emboldened, and began to amend their initial stances towards the issues at hand. With the summit deadlocked, President Trump initiated a bold manoeuvre: he walked away from the negotiating table. The president clearly felt that negotiations with the North Koreans were heading south, and rather than sign a bad deal simply for the sake of acquiring something, President Trump did the next best thing. This also reaffirms the notion that President Trump does in fact understand the nuances of deal making.

“What transpired between the two was an exchange of pleasantries and vague assurances that there would be policy changes”

The continuing existence of North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs is the main reason why the United States has maintained such a formidable military presence on the Korean peninsula. It is hoped that the United States’ own missile defence system and nuclear umbrella would be enough to dissuade the DPRK from launching an attack on either the RoK or Japan. There can be no denying that while under the leadership of Kim Jong-un, there has been a steady increase in both ballistic missile as well as nuclear weapons testing. Exactly how the international community resolves this growing security crisis is a colossal challenge. Many have pondered about the possibility of either regime change or regime collapse as two likely scenarios for the future of the DPRK. How the international community accomplishes that is up for debate. Surprisingly however, Kim Jong-un has shown to be capable of self-preservation. The two weapons programs at his disposal obviously provide immeasurable amounts of assistance in that regard. And so, the problem persists, with no real clear solution to it.

Conclusion

In the end, the two DPRK-U.S. summits did not bring about any significant change to the crisis at hand. The DPRK is still in possession of its programs and can easily reactivate them at will (it has recently test fired a ballistic missile). For the North Koreans, failure to reach an accord with the U.S. over its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs is actually beneficial for the regime. Not only will it not be hamstrung by being forced to give up its programs, it can restore them to the point where they were at months before the diplomatic talks had begun. The resumption of testing activity of its two most prominent weapons programs will be essential to remind the international community of its potential virulent capabilities, as well as a showcase for the failure that was diplomacy. In order to keep pressure on the DPRK, the Trump Administration should maintain all sanctions enforced against the DPRK; maintain a minimal diplomatic presence with DPRK leadership; and strengthen all military capabilities in the region in order to deter the DPRK from resuming its nefarious activities. By following these suggestions, the administration might be able to one day salvage diplomatic talks, and bring about a peaceful end to Northeast Asia’s gravest security crisis.

Policy Recommendations

1. By maintaining economic sanctions on the DPRK, the U.S. will continue to pressure the regime economically. In possession of an already paltry economy, sanctions will put domestic strains on the regime, forcing them to eventually return to the negotiating table in order to receive economic relief.
2. Minimal diplomacy. Maintaining minimal diplomatic presence with DPRK leadership is paramount in order to keep relations afloat with the nation. Only top level administration officials (the Secretary of State / Vice President) should be in direct contact with DPRK officials. Furthermore, the limited number of officials should eliminate any confusion in regards to the U.S. position when dealing with policy issues relating to the DPRK and the region overall.
3. President Trump and the administration should reconsider its stance towards the military presence on the peninsula. This includes not only its deployment, but also the conduction of training exercises with the military forces of the RoK. The deployment of forward units is important in order to deter any potential North Korean provocation. In addition this, joint training exercises is important in order to improve cohesion between the U.S. and ROK militaries in terms of fighting capabilities as well as doctrine.

Shane Vrabel is Editor and Junior Researcher at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. She may be contacted at shane.vrabel@cgsrs.org 

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