Background
On April 13, 2015 Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree lifting the 2010 ban by then-President Dmitry Medvedev on deliveries of S-300 missile systems to Iran. Subsequently most commentators have assumed that Moscow will begin supplying the advanced weapons systems to Tehran forthwith. However, such an outcome is far from a foregone conclusion as many aspects of the deal remain murky. Unresolved issues include; concluding a contract governing the export, the Kremlin deciding in fact to sell the S-300 missile systems to Iran, and determining with certainty whether “Iran even wants to purchase Russian air defense systems, or any Russian weapons for that matter.” These factors, combined with the harsh U.S. and Israeli response to Putin’s decree, render unlikely an actual sale of the S-300 missile systems by Moscow to Tehran.
No Contract, No Missile Systems
In 2007 Russia was contracted to sell five divisions of S-300 medium-range missile systems to Iran, in an accord worth more than $800 million USD. Despite receiving a 166.8 million USD advance payment, Moscow failed to deliver any weapons systems until mid-2010 when the deal was scrapped by then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Ostensibly Medvedev’s 2010 decree, which in part banned the export of the S-300 systems, sought to comply with United Nations (UN) Resolution 1929. Other explanations for his motivations exist, as well. Regardless, as a consequence, the deal was scuttled, the corresponding contract was canceled, and the advance payment was returned to Iran.
Currently there is no contract which would govern the export of the S-300 missile systems to Tehran, making such transfers impossible. The most relevant recent development in this sphere is the conclusion of a cooperation agreement between Almaz-Antey, the Russian manufacturer of the S-300 air-defense system, and Iran’s Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation. However, this accord is aimed at “promoting Russian innovative products of civilian designation on the Iranian market and organizing joint production of these products at Russian and Iranian industrial enterprises.” Thus the document excludes missile systems, items of military designation. Russian officials also are ambivalent in committing to transfer the S-300 missile systems to Iran.
To Sell, or Not to Sell?
Despite the April 13 Presidential decree which lifted the ban on deliveries of weapons to Iran, Russian authorities have been far from unanimous in supporting the transfer of the missile systems. In the most explicit rebuttal, a senior Russian diplomat stated that “Russia will not deliver S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran any time soon despite a lift of the ban.” More obliquely, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov could not confirm the delivery timeframe of the missile systems to Tehran, and Andrey Klimov, a member of the Russian Duma, stated “the missiles that we promised to give [the Iranians] we didn’t give them, we just promised them.” Russian analyst Ruslan Pukhov suggested that Putin’s decision to lift the decree is aimed at “securing geopolitical leverage for Russia, [and] ...does not mean that the missiles will actually be sold.” Such an equivocal Russian stance is unlikely to facilitate the timely (or otherwise) transfer of the S-300 missile systems to Tehran.
To Risk Being Burned Again?
Reservations about a possible S-300 missile accord should not lie solely with Russia. Tehran, too, would be well-advised to consider whether such a deal would be in its interests. Past attempts to procure such systems from Moscow have been unsuccessful. Alternatives to Russian weapons that are far more attractive both politically and technologically have appeared recently. These also would arouse less international ire. Especially in light of the pending nuclear accord with the West which could lift long-standing sanctions against Iran and open the country to foreign direct investment, Tehran should proceed with care.
The International Response
Putin’s decision to lift the ban on deliveries of S-300 missile systems to Iran has met with international opposition. For the United States the development was yet another sign that “the growing acrimony between Moscow and Washington was not easing - even with [the Iranian] nuclear deal on the line.” In fact, White House spokesman Josh Earnest suggested that Putin’s decision “could risk the removal of sanctions against Iran as part of a possible final deal on Tehran’s nuclear program.” Furthermore, leaders of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, conflating Putin’s decision with an actual transfer of the S-300 missile systems to Tehran, urged President Obama in a letter to “consider using sanctions to stop Russia from delivering missile systems to Iran.” The sanctions currently in effect against Russia do not prohibit weapons transfers. However, the request was indicative of the level of concern elicited by such a scenario. Nor was Washington alone in its opprobrium.
Upon learning of the decision, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called Russian President Putin to express concern that, if transferred, the Russian-origin S-300 missiles “could take away Israel’s ability to easily strike nuclear targets in Iran... and make their way to Hezbollah.” All of the above worries probably are unwarranted as Moscow is unlikely to transfer the S-300 missile systems to Iran.
Conclusion
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s April 13 decision to lift the ban on deliveries of S-300 missile systems to Iran has prompted international concerns, most notably in Washington and Tel-Aviv. However, there are reasons to doubt that Moscow actually will sell the S-300 missile systems to Tehran. First, there is no contract governing the export. Second, Russian officials have yet to decide in fact to sell the S-300 missile systems to Iran. Finally, Tehran has not yet determined that they want to purchase Russian air defense systems. While these uncertainties persists on both sides, Moscow is unlikely to transfer the S-300 missile systems to Iran.
Elizabeth Zolotukhina is a Senior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. She may be contacted at elizabeth.zolotukhina@cgsrs.org
Follow The CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies on Facebook and Twitter (@CGSRS_UKCGSRS )