Reaching a Nuclear Agreement with Iran

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United States (U.S.), the United Kingdom (UK), France, China and Russia, plus Germany, known as the P5+1, and Iran have been working toward a deal that would stem Tehran’s nuclear manufacturing capability. Specifically, the accord would lift debilitating sanctions from Iran, while preventing Tehran from continuing the enrichment processes needed to build nuclear weapons. These talks have been ongoing since March 2013 with a formal deal reached, but still unsigned by the U.S. and Iranian leadership (Lyons). Will these two nations’ agreement be acceptable to their respective leaderships?

Brief history of the U.S.-­??Iran relationship

During the Truman administration (1945 – 1953), the U.S. was a strong supporter of the democratically elected Iranian president, Mohammad Mosaddegh. This changed in 1953 when President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office. He, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency and the British Secret Intelligence Service, overthrew the democratically elected government and installed a Western-­??controlled Shah as leader of Iran. This arrangement lasted until the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis. Subsequently, Iran and the U.S. ceased all formal diplomatic relations (Bergamann).

Background on Iran’s nuclear program and subsequent sanctions

In August 2002, an exiled Iranian opposition group released details of nuclear activity in Iran. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requested to visit these nuclear sites in February 2003, to which, Iran promised to submit. In May 2003, the IAEA was allowed to visit, but was not allowed to take any uranium samples, causing the delegation to report that Iran had failed to meet its monitoring obligations in June 2003. That same year, the UK, Germany, and France (EU-­??3) entered into talks to address Iran’s nuclear policy. The U.S. was invited to attend, but refused to be involved. In October 2003, the “Tehran Declaration” was reached, in which, Tehran promised to allow the IAEA to monitor its nuclear facilities and utilise its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (News.bbc.co.uk). After Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran in August 2005, the deal fell apart (Lyons).

In July 2006, the UNSC passed its first resolution demanding Iran stop its uranium enrichment and processing. Between 2006 and 2010, six resolutions imposed gradual sanctions on Iran. These included freezing assets of individuals and companies related to the nuclear program and banning the import of nuclear-­??related technologies to the country (Lyons).

Background on negotiations between Iran and P5+1

In June 2013, Hassan Rouhani, a moderate and pragmatic cleric, was unexpectedly elected president of Iran. From the beginning of his presidency, Rouhani made it clear that finding a resolution to the nuclear standoff with the West so that sanctions could be lifted was going to be the main focus of his foreign policy. In September 2013, he held the first telephone conversation between a U.S. President and an Iranian leader since 1979.

This was a result of maneuverings by Rouhani on the sidelines at the UN General Assembly, where all foreign ministers of the P5+1 met with Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister. Before this, most Western countries “refused to hold high-­?? ranking meetings with Iranian officials during Ahmadinejad’s presidency” (Giles, page 8-­??9). The Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has stressed that nuclear issues and only nuclear issues are on the table (Giles, page 17).

In November 2013, real progress was made when a six-­??month deal entitled the “Joint Plan of Action” was agreed upon. This accord, which curbed select aspects of Iran’s nuclear program in return for some relief from sanctions, went into effect on 20 January 2014. 20 July 2014 was chosen as the deadline to reach a final deal, but talks were extended to November 2014, then to 30 June 2015, and now to 7 July 2015 (Giles, page 10-­??11). While the self-­??imposed 7 July deadline passed, the P5+1 and Iran finally reached a deal on 14 July 2015.

Current round of negotiations

There are six key elements to the deal reached on 14 July 2015, the first being reduction of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities. The U.S. sees Tehran’s enrichment program as the largest security threat. Washington wants Iran to cut the number of centrifuges to 6,000, with only 5,000 operational at any given time and require that they be the basic, least efficient models. (Klapper) The deal halts any uranium enrichment above 3.67% and Iran’s uranium stockpile is capped at 300 kilograms for 15 years (The White House).

The second issue is the underground enrichment facility in Fordo, which is dug deep into a mountainside. The U.S. and Israel fear that the installation is impenetrable to air strikes, should Iran use the facility to build nuclear weapons (Klapper). Under the deal, no enrichment can take place there for 15 years (The White House).

Third, the P5+1 is most concerned with the so called “break out” time, or the length of time it would take Iran to enrich uranium to weapons-­??grade levels. Currently, that period is approximately 2 months, but negotiations hinged on lengthening that timeframe to a year. This is necessary so that the P5+1 can ensure that they have ample time to plan retaliatory strikes should Iran re-­??start the enrichment program. Experts disagree about the length of time that it would take Iran to make nuclear weapons. They insist that additional information about Iran’s current designs is necessary to predict this timeline more accurately (Sanger and Gordon).

Fourth, the current core of the heavy water reactor in Arak, which is capable of producing plutonium, must be either destroyed or exported (Klapper). Under the deal, Iran can build no new heavy water reactors or accumulate any heavy water for 15 years. The Arak reactor must be redesigned and the spent fuel must be shipped out of the country indefinitely (The White House).

Fifth, the IAEA must be able to have access to the program’s entire supply chain and monitor suspicious sites or alleged covert nuclear work. Under the deal, the IAEA will monitor and contain production, assembly, and storage of Iran’s centrifuges for 20 years. They will access and monitor all uranium mines and mills to ensure Iran does not engage in overt diversions of weapons-­??grade materials for 25 years. The IAEA will be able to contain and survey production, supply, and storage of Iran’s centrifuges forever (The White House). Finally, and most importantly for Iran, is the lifting of sanctions. Both sides could not agree on when the current sanctions should be lifted. Iran insisted they be lifted as soon as a deal is reached, while the U.S. has insisted that it will not remove them until the stipulations of the agreement are met. The U.S. also is concerned with what sanctions to suspend and which to keep. The U.S. is likely to maintain sanctions countering ballistic missiles, Iran’s human rights record, and Tehran’s sponsorship of terrorism. The P5+1 wants to create a separate committee to monitor Iran so that, should Tehran cease to fulfill its obligations under the accord, sanctions would immediately ‘snap back’ into place. Russia and China do not want to make any deals creating committees that would cause them to lose their veto power on the UNSC (Klapper). The deal provides for the incremental lifting of sanctions. As Iran meets key components, additional sanctions will be lifted. Should Iran violate the agreement, UN sanctions will snap back into place for 10 years with an option to extend them for 5 more years if necessary. The U.S. and EU retain the option of snapping back sanctions indefinitely (The White House).

Other countries also impede a final agreement. Israel has been actively lobbying, mainly in the U.S., against the deal. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thinks that ending talks with Iran and imposing additional sanctions would be best. He believes that the current negotiations will guarantee that Tehran acquires nuclear weapons. Some Israeli officials even suggest that intermittent air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities are the only way to ensure that Tehran cannot build a nuclear weapon (Calabresi, page 34). Saudi Arabia is concerned that the $100 billion USD in blocked assets that will be returned to Iran, should an accord be reached, will be used to support insurgencies and terrorism in the region. Riyadh may feel the need to start their own nuclear program. Finally, France has been even tougher than the U.S. on Iranian proliferation. Paris delayed the 2013 interim agreement and threatened to block P5+1 consensus if their weapon’s concerns are not addressed (Lee and Klapper). Paris has supported the pending deal (Reuters). This deal may be between Iran and the P5+1, but it is nevertheless important to take into consideration the domino effect that an unsavoury accord may have on foreign policy and regional security. However, there is no workable option that would allow U.S. military ‘boots on the ground.’ A nuclear Iran may bother some American regional allies, but if it is not a threat to U.S. domestic stability, it can still be seen as a viable option (Drotar, page 24-­?? 25).

The Marriam-­??Webster dictionary defines ‘negotiate’ as “to arrange for or bring about through conference, discussion, and compromise ” (‘Negotiate’). Both Iranian and U.S. leadership have sent negotiators that were willing to conference and discuss, but neither leadership has compromised.

The Iranian Parliament passed a law banning international inspectors from military sites, which is a key component for convincing the equally oppositional U.S. Congress to approve any accord. Iranian hardliners still maintain that the U.S. is the “Great Satan” and chants of “death to America” can still be heard. Any final accord must be approved by many of these same hardliners (Klapper). Meanwhile, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei retains the final say in all decisions regarding Iran’s nuclear program (Giles).

The U.S. Congress has passed a law requiring a 30 day review period for any deal reached, if one is concluded by 9 July and 60 days if reached thereafter (Roberts). This law, H.R. 1191 states that the “President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran or refrain from applying sanctions pursuant to an agreement prior to and during the transmission period and during the congressional review period” (United States Congress). President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry have signed an accord with Iran. However, Congress will delay the U.S. from implementing the accord and is able to keep sanctions due to be lifted under the newly signed deal in force. President Obama has vowed to veto any legislation that would impede the deal. A two thirds majority is required in both houses of Congress in order to override a presidential veto, which would be possible only if the President’s fellow Democrats cease to support the deal (Reuters).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Iran and the P5+1 had agreed that talks needed to be extended past the self-­?? imposed June 30 deadline (Sanger and Gordon). With two prior long term extension of talks, both sides believed that there was a reasonable chance of success (Bergmann). Yet, at the time, the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, said that there was no new target date, while U.S. officials said that there was no talk of a long term extension (Lee and Klapper). President Obama had stated that he was still willing to walk away from the talks (Ouedraogo). Despite this, a deal has finally been reached.

Iranian and American negotiators seemed optimistic and willing to negotiate. Ali Akbar Seleni, head of Iran’s atomic agency, joined the talks, which showed a serious desire to accelerate the discussion and to conclude a deal (Lee and Klapper). Iran has significantly reduced its stock of enriched uranium, meeting a key condition. However, President Rouhani has indicated that Iran would intensify its nuclear activities if it detects any violations of the accord from the countries negotiating it; an Iranian ‘snap back’ provision (Lee and Klapper). From the beginning, Rouhani has warned that the window for a nuclear agreement is not unlimited (Giles, page 32).

Even with negotiations concluded, leaders that make the final decisions remain unwilling to yield any ground. Congress and the Ayatollah seem to have locked themselves into a political game of red rover; each forming a solid line made up of their respective stipulations, which either side is unwilling to break through and actually sign a deal. Senator Ben Cardin best illustrated the political red rover when he said, “We recognise that it’s not just what the U.S. wants. It’s whether Iran will get to where we need them to get to” (Roberts).

With Iran working against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) before any country in the West, there has been a slight, but significant warming in the U.S.-­?? Iran relationship (Bergmann). It is likely that the U.S. would need Iranian support in the fight against ISIS as the group continues to radiate out from its bases in Syria. In the region, the fight against terrorism, stability in Afghanistan, and peace in Iraq are all primary concerns of the U.S. and Iran (Giles, page 33). While it is obvious that the U.S. and Iran have almost no mutual trust, diplomacy is how bridges can be built across distrust (Calabresi, page 32).

The Iranian people have paid dearly in order to realise Iran’s enrichment endeavours. They have suffered through severe sanctions, negative economic growth for two years and a surge in inflation (Giles, page 28). It would be politically infeasible for Iran to relinquish their uranium enrichment program altogether.

Signing a deal over nuclear proliferation is in the best interest of both countries, even if either side has yet to see the true worth of an accord for the future of Iran and its relationship with the rest of the world. Given the current political situation in the region, it is in the best interest of the U.S. and Iranian leadership to see this accord as a stepping stone for continued cooperation. Iranian citizens have welcomed the deal, and President Obama has promised to veto any legislation impeding Washington’s implementation of the deal. The real test will be convincing Iranian hardliners that this deal is in Iran’s best interest. Even though this prospect seems rather bleak, it is important to remember that Iranian negotiators would not have been able to strike a deal without the blessing of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei (Dehghan). He will have the final say in any changes made to the Iranian nuclear program. Both sides need to see that signing this accord will contribute to a safer and more secure world.