The United States’ and China’s 2015 Military Strategies: A Path Towards Confrontation?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Western Pacific is a strategic environment undergoing profound systemic change. Consequently, both China and the United States’ military documents show significant shifts in the contours of strategic thought. China is deviating from long standing foreign policy practices and developing military power and expeditionary capabilities, which threaten to undermine the U.S.‘s ability to sustain its extended deterrence guarantees in the Western Pacific. China is becoming far more extroverted and subsuming a greater international security activism, reflecting its growing interests and capabilities. The U.S. is shifting to a state-­??based threat posture and continues to pursue hedging against the potential for Chinese aggression and challenges to the U.S’s regional security architecture. The interactive dynamics between these documents show both increasing potential for cooperation and the risk of a competitive strategic rivalry in the Asia Pacific region.

Background

On May 26, 2015, China released its defence white paper, “China’s Military Strategy” (CMS), which for the first time articulated parts of its military strategy. On July 2, 2015, the United States Department of Defence released the “National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015” (NMS). The military strategy documents are for public consumption and provide strategic direction for the way in which the militaries will use its forces to protect and advance their respective national and security interests. While these military documents cannot offer a fully accurate appraisal of U.S.-­??China relations, they do provide insights into each country’s respective strategic assessments and threat perceptions. Reading these military policies together provides a view into security considerations in the Asia-­??Pacific region, areas of potential conflict and competition, and how the contours of the Western Pacific’s security environment may be affected and transformed.

The China Question in the Western Pacific

The bilateral relationship between the United States and China is one of the most significant in today’s international system. The Western Pacific is a re-­??emerging locus of international power as the region continues to benefit from rapid economic growth and integration. In tandem with its ascent, the distribution of economic, political and military power has shifted in the region (Swaine et al, 2015, p.1).

In the modern politico-­??history of the Western Pacific, the region has never experienced the primacy of balance of power politics, as the U.S. was the predominant maritime power and hegemon under which the region existed (Swaine, 2015). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. emerged as a hegemonic leader, presiding over an extensive hierarchical international order, which was predicated on multilateral institutions and alliances (Ikenberry, 2013, p.63).

Under the aegis of U.S. power and deep integration in the liberal international economic order, China has ascended as a great power with evolving core interests (Tellis, 2013, p.93). Beijing also has been developing its non-­??economic capabilities. Namely, China has sought to increase its military capacity. As a result, China’s rise has been a source of anxiety for nations along its littoral and immediate maritime periphery. Increasing tensions surround the uncertainty of China’s grand strategy. Observers are unsure whether it is predicated on building a Sino-­??centric regional order that would be either benign and cooperative or hegemonic and facilitate China to exert greater regional power projection.

Furthermore, U.S.-­??China tensions stem from Washington’s attempt to manage China’s ascent and Beijing’s firm belief that the world is becoming more multipolar and that U.S. maritime primacy in the Asia Pacific region will inhibit rather than preserve China’s security and prosperity. These trends are creating a far more complex and competitive security environment. The region is witnessing an acceleration in military modernisation and increases in defence expenditure with a focus on offensive weapons (Bisley, 2012, p.20). China’s advancing military and technological capabilities are seen as a threat to the U.S.’s alliance system and security architecture in the region. Thus, the region has become defined by a proliferation of security dilemmas and an emerging uncertainty for the region’s security architecture.

Global Assessments

China’s 2015 military strategy comprehensively elaborates on the strategic tasks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), People’s Liberation Army Airforce (PLAAF) and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and its future development. The document offers more details and clarity than its predecessor and underscores several important trends in China’s future strategic intentions. The CMS shows that China’s core interests have shifted from regional to global, “In the new circumstances, the national security issues facing China encompass far more subjects, extend over a greater range, and cover a longer time span than at any time in the country’s history” (CMS, 2015). This signifies that China’s security interests have acquired a new global scope. Ostensibly, China’s deepening involvement in regions across the globe have naturally inspired a security element – to safeguard those external interests (primarily access to African and Persian Gulf resources) (Raina, 2015).

China also has globalised its national security policy, “...the armed forces will actively participate in both regional and international security cooperation and effectively secure China’s overseas interests” (CMS, 2015). Thus, emerging is a far more extroverted China, one that is shifting towards greater international security activism. This represents a significant departure from its traditional hands-­??off approach to global affairs and previous sole focus on economic development. China adopting a more global role militarily is important in that this signifies a normative shift in China’s foreign policy approach. It is a departure from Deng Xiaoping’s tradition of “keeping a low profile” (Singh, 2015). Instead, China is adopting a more novel, assertive and confident posture, which symbolises a fundamental shift in interest and capabilities (Ratner et al, 2015, p.11). China’s increasing global activism offers more opportunities for cooperation as there will be a considerable level of overlap in strategic interests for bilateral collaboration, but also an increased propensity for competition.

Much like China’s 2015 CMS, the U.S. 2015 NMS shows an awareness for meta-­??trends that are shaping the international system. In particular, the document emphasises diminishing U.S. comparative military advantage. This results from the diffusion of military technology, which is testing the U.S.’s ability to maintain its technological edge, and a multiplication of threats in an increasingly conflict-­??prone strategic environment. The NMS also highlights both the shifting and complex nature of modern warfare with an analysis of “hybrid warfare”. While China’s strategy augurs a more extroverted China with increasing global power status, the tone of the U.S. NMS reflects that of, as succinctly put by Pradhan, “the world’s sole superpower in a holding position, embarking on rear-­guard action to maintain primacy in the face of its slowly diminishing global influence.” (Pradhan, 2015) Most evidently, the globalisation of China’s national security interests will be one of the most significant trends affecting U.S. foreign and security policy (Ratner et al, 2015, p.11).

Threat Perception

One of the more significant aspects of the U.S.’s 2015 NMS document is the emphasis on traditional state actors presenting more of a security challenge than non-­??state actors. The NMS coalesces Russia, Iran, North Korea and China as the “revisionist states” challenging international norms and U.S. security interests. Comparatively, the U.S.’s 2011 NMS focused heavily on the threat emanating from non-­??state actors. This shift towards near-­??peer adversaries is both reflective of and a reactive response to the multiplicity of strategic surprises Washington has faced recently from state actors.

There is a significant shift in how China is considered in the 2011 NMS and 2015 NMS documents. The 2011 NMS expressed some concern for China’s assertiveness, it maintained a more benign outlook towards Beijing, expressing a desire for cooperation and strong positive bilateral relations with the nation (NMS, 2011). By contrast, the 2015 NMS adopts a dramatic shift in tone, holding China directly accountable for increased tensions in the Asia Pacific region. Although the document does attempt to paint China in an adversarial light, the text also is more ambivalent in that it asserts that “none of these nations are believed to be seeking direct military conflict with the United States or our allies. Nonetheless, they each pose serious security concerns...” (NMS, 2015).

China is aware of the complex and shifting global strategic environment. Although Beijing does not foresee a future global conflict, it does instead articulate threats emanating from both its immediate periphery and “hegemonism, power politics and neo-­?? interventionism” (CMS, 2015). The language clearly represents an informal gesture towards the United States. When it comes to U.S.-­??China relations, there is a noticeable shift in China’s tone. China is explicit in mentioning the U.S.’s rebalancing efforts towards the nation, and the U.S.’s increased military presence and military alliance enhancement efforts in its 2015 CMS. The document also makes a passing reference to the U.S. in a negative tone: “some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-­??in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China” (CMS, 2015). This reflects a stressed relationship stemming from an increasing chasm between the different ideas and approaches the U.S. and China have in how to best preserve stability in the region. The shift in perception towards overtly characterising each other as threats serves to compound the Western Pacific as a locale of international politics and strategic vulnerability.

Strategy and Capabilities

The 2015 CMS components of Beijing’s “active defence policy”, which is a strategy that combines strategic defence and offence at the operational and tactical levels. Active defence has been the essence of Chinese defence thinking since the Second World War and the rise of Mao Zedong (Cheng, 2015). Since its inception, the concept has undergone numerous evolutions reflecting changes in the international system. True to this tradition, China’s 2015 CMS continues to highlight major transformations in China’s defence strategy. This is underpinned by the advancement of the PLA capabilities to “reorient from theatre defence to trans-­??theatre mobility” (CMS, 2015) and operate beyond its territorial borders. Similarly, the PLAAF adopts a posture shifting from “territorial air defence to both defence and offense” (CMS, 2015).

But the most defining shift in military strategic thought comes in China’s blue-­??water focus; China’s maritime power ambitions. Beijing labels the oceans as one of the domains it will concentrate its force development, signalling its intentions of expanding its operations by shifting from, “offshore water defense” to both “offshore water defense” and “open seas protection”. In essence, China is shifting from a continental to a maritime power in-­??line with its new strategic tasks of safeguarding overseas interests. Maritime security has become of great importance to China. There are a number of factors for this development, which largely stem from China’s growing dependence on the maritime sphere.

First, Beijing seeks to secure itself against the interdiction at sea of its trade routes and energy supply (Yahuda, 2013, p.449). The document speaks of “protect[ing] the security of strategic SLOCs,” (strategic lines of communication) (CMS, 2015) and this is indicative of an increasing focus on Beijing’s vulnerability towards commodity denial (Khurana, 2015). Second, China also seeks to counter its perceived strategic maritime vulnerability, both in the South China Sea (SCS) and Indian Ocean Region and capitalise on the U.S.’s declining primacy and commitment in the region. Third, in light of increasing global energy demands, China seeks to quench its resource thirst through exploiting hydrocarbon reserves in the SCS (Buszynski, 2012). The document embodies these factors with the statement, “great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests” (CMS, 2015).

Beijing also reinforces this maritime shift by their plans to develop maritime combat readiness through the preparations for “maritime military struggle” (CMS, 2015). In previous military doctrines, no particular emphasis was placed on any specific domain for the ‘preparation for military struggle’ (PMS) (Fravel, 2015). The new emphasis placed on maritime struggle reflects China’s growing offshore ambitions and concerns. On balance, on the topic of PMS, the CMS does highlight positive developments with its emphasis on enhancing capabilities for conducting ‘Military Operations Other Than War’ (MOOTW), such as emergency rescue, disaster relief, rights and interest protection, stabilising missions and counter-­??terrorism (CMS, 2015; Hong, 2015). This, however, advances China’s naval presence beyond its territorial waters and increases Beijing’s ability to wield military influence cynically in order to advance its interests and diplomatic agenda (DoD, p.28, 2014).

China’s evolving power projection and expeditionary capabilities mixed with conflicting military approaches and offensive postures in the region produce an unpredictable strategic environment and make a strategic rivalry more likely. Policy makers are in a quandary over how to interpret China’s policy. Are the advancing power projection-­?? orientated capabilities reflective of China’s de facto dominance aspirations in the Western Pacific? Or are they reflective of the country’s perennial quest for security? The outcome of this decision will lead to the cooperative or competitive future of the Asia-­??Pacific region. China’s defence white paper is highly reflective of a security dilemma, and inherently, China’s security-­??seeking activities will lead to conflictual interactions.

Against the backdrop of China’s increasing power projection capabilities, Beijing is pursuing its core strategic interests in the SCS. China’s aggressive posture and activities in the SCS to fortify reefs and shoals by artificially constructing islands and building forward staging bases has had escalatory ramifications. The fortification and land reclamation efforts in the disputed SCS waters by territorial claimants is hardly a new phenomenon. The majority of claimants to varying extents have projected a civilian and maritime presence in the disputed waters and built airstrips (except for China and Brunei). “Vietnam has 48 outposts; the Philippines, 8; China, 8; Malaysia, 5, and Taiwan, 1.” (Shear, 2015) The real pressing question is: how far will China’s attempts go to build a new status quo in the disputed waters? China’s 2015 CMS makes no mention of China’s military requirements in the SCS to clarify this. This, intertwined with China’s recent assertion of claims in the SCS, ignites the U.S.’s long-­??term concerns of China’s motives in the region, forments mistrust and stresses the ties between the U.S. and peripheral states it is obliged to protect in the region.

Unlike China’s 2015 CMS, the U.S.’s NMS 2015 provides little explanation of how the armed forces will operate in the various domains of land, air and sea and in discussing the capabilities to counter threats identified therein. However, the NMS document does feature an important element which alludes towards China’s “counter-­??intervention” strategy in East Asia (Webster, 2015). Namely, its acquisition of anti-­??access/area-­??denial (A2/AD) weapons and capabilities to deny the U.S’s ability to intervene in China’s littoral and the East and SCS (Fravel and Twomey, 2015, p.171). China’s acquisition of these capabilities undermines the U.S’s task of protecting allies and discharging security obligations in the region (Tellis, 2013, p.87). The U.S. 2015 NMS recognises this growing challenge and emphasises investing in “counter A2/AD, space, cyber, and hybrid threats...” (U.S., NMS, 2015) and in improving joint interoperability to enhance capabilities to operate in the region. Furthermore, the U.S. continues its rebalancing policy against China, a policy it has pursued since 2011. To a greater extent, the U.S. 2015 NMS has theorised and formalised recent practices. It has, however, drawn recent criticism and responses from Chinese representatives, claiming that the U.S.’s 2015 NMS was projecting “irrational exaggerations of China’s threat” (Reuters, 2015).

Security Partnerships

The U.S. 2015 NMS seeks to deepen security partnerships and sustain regional alliances. Although concerned with China’s activities, the document hopes that China will become a global and regional partner. However, China does not reciprocate this gesture entirely. The CMS document demonstrates that Beijing seems focused on diminishing the U.S.’s alliance system in the Western Pacific by fostering its own closer partnerships with U.S.’ allies in the region. The CMS document also indicates the potential emergence of a “China-­??Russia quasi-­?? alliance” (Khurana, 2015), as China emphasises military-­??to-­??military cooperation with Russia and Europe rather than with the U.S. Not only does Russia remain the preferred partner for military exercises for China, but also there are rumours of recent arms deals, in which Russia will supply China with advanced air defence systems, aircrafts and submarines (Weitz, 2015).

Conclusion

While there are points of continuity in China’s 2015 CMS, there are also profound shifts in Chinese foreign policy and military strategy as the nation continues to develop greater interests and capabilities. Similarly, with the U.S.’s 2015 NMS, there are profound shifts in the contours of strategic thought as the nation adopts a state-­??based threat perception to deal with a wider range of strategic challenges. When read together, the documents outline the Western Pacific as a dynamic environment defined by mixed patterns of cooperation and competition. Comparatively, there is a clear divergence in strategic policy. The overall tone of both documents, when addressing each other, is one embedded in mistrust and latent adversarial characterisations. The documents undermine the benign trends of cooperation in the region and both engender and imagine an increasingly adversarial and destabilising region.

Though the military policies do not project a sense of fatalism, there is an explicit indication of an emerging conflictual interactive dynamic. Outside of bilateral military-­??to-­??military diplomacy there have been few opportunities or initiatives taken to reduce tensions and engage threat perceptions (Twomey, 2013, p.251). The evolving conflicting views regarding the means of preserving long-­??term national and regional stability and the nature of the region’s security architecture evoke a sense of systemic uncertainty and strategic vulnerability. Both 2015 military strategies stand as a blue-­??print for cooperation on strategic objectives, but also as driving forces for possible confrontation.

CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY

Creating a Constructive Partnership: Address the mutual strategic distrust between the U.S. and China, by working towards creating a constructive partnership. This can be done by creating provisions for strategic assurances between the two regional powers. Credible assurances will reduce miscalculations and will serve as a confidence-­??building measure.

Establishing a Maritime Crisis Management Mechanism: the U.S. should seek to establish a bilateral maritime crisis management mechanism, in order to prevent miscalculations and the escalation of a political-­??military crisis over territorial disputes in the SCS. The U.S. should also take the opportunity to strengthen its position on the maritime territorial disputes and make clear on its responses to aggressive actions in the disputed waters.

Greater Transparency: Both military doctrines should be more transparent in regard to the planned expenditures, allocation of resources, policies and hardware-­?? acquisition plans. Greater transparency will go a long way in reducing miscalculations over capacity and intent.