Can Russia Implement its New Naval Doctrine?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Moscow recently released its new and ambitious marine doctrine. While experts diverge as to the intended aim of the document, the unanswered question is whether Russia is able to implement the plans outlined therein. Indeed, Moscow is experiencing a capability gap in the naval sphere. This fact should be considered when assessing the threat posed by the Russian navy.

Introduction

July 26, 2015 marked Naval Day in Russia, and also saw the release of the country’s new Marine Doctrine by President Vladimir Putin. The document identifies several strategic shifts for the Russian navy. Most prominently, the text envisions a change in Russian naval operations towards blue water operations -­?? deployments far beyond the Russian littoral, with the Atlantic and Mediterranean as focal points (Bodner). Moreover, the new strategy recommends projecting force into and extracting energy resources from the Arctic, as well as acquiring four new spy ships (one for each Russian fleet). The vessel, Yury Ivanov, is designed to monitor U.S. anti-­??missile activities, and replace the antiquated spy ships currently used by the Russian navy (Bennett). Overall, the Russian navy is expected to take delivery of 10 warships and over 40 support vessels by the end of 2015 (Laursen), and 100 ships by 2020. The new maritime strategy also highlights the importance of establishing closer partnerships with China and India (Unattributed). The enthusiastic program raises a question: can Moscow enact it?

Rationale for Strategic Shifts

The Russian rationale for these strategic shifts is centred on augmenting Moscow’s status as a naval power, and responding to perceived NATO encirclement along its borders (Kremlin), (Oliphant). For instance, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin attributed the focus on augmenting Russian naval strength in the Atlantic to “the [NATO] plan to move its infrastructure to the borders of Russia and the attempts to give the alliance a global role” (Marjanovich). Moscow finds both developments “unacceptable” (Oliphant), and has promised to respond (Kremlin). Similarly, Rogozin stated that one benefit of successfully projecting force into the Arctic is access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans for Russia’s Northern Fleet -­?? the largest of all four major Russian fleets -­?? unimpeded by NATO (Bodner). Unhindered access to the two oceans is not Russia’s only aim in the Arctic.

Facing ongoing economic sanctions, and a volatile energy market “natural resources and pure geopolitical imperatives” are driving Moscow’s interest in the Arctic (Stratfor). The region contains approximately 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered natural gas and 13 percent of its undiscovered oil reserves (Stratfor). To achieve these goals, Russia has begun to militarise the Arctic (Stratfor), and allocated $4.3 billion USD to an Arctic development program between 2015-­?? 2020 (Laursen). These efforts may clash with NATO and U.S. strategies for the region, as will be discussed below.

Moscow’s interest in guaranteeing a “permanent naval presence” in the Mediterranean is intertwined with its aim to reinvigorate the Black Sea Fleet (Oliphant). Prior to the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, Moscow leased the Sevastopol naval base from Ukraine, and was prohibited by the agreement from adding new ships to its force. Following the onset of the Ukraine crisis, Russia was freed from the constraint, and has since deployed over 10 new ships to the Black Sea Fleet. Russian military officials hope to “use it as the foundation of a permanent Mediterranean flotilla” (Bodner). Russian authorities identify this as part of Crimea and Sevastopol’s “rapid integration into the national [Russian] economy” (Kremlin). Crimean reintegration is bound to encounter hurdles, not least of which are estimated total losses of $150-­??200 billion USD over the next three to four years to the Russian economy (Sharifulin). Reinforcing Russia’s strategic positions requires not only deployments, but also procurement.

In addition to perceiving threats from NATO expansion, Moscow also feels menaced by the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA, also known as the U.S. missile defense system in Europe). Russia is alarmed that the EPAA could threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrence capabilities (Unattributed). Another concern of Russian officials is that the ultimate goal of the European missile defence program -­?? to provide a defence from Iranian missile launches -­?? is unnecessary (Mindock), especially given the recently concluded nuclear accord (Unattributed). With EPAA continuing regardless, Moscow has felt the need to acquire new military hardware.

Specifically, the recently released naval strategy stipulates that the four Russian fleets (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific) each receive one new spy ship, the Yury Ivanov. The models currently in use by the navy were constructed in the 1980s, and are not competitive against the U.S. fleet. Overall, the Russian navy is expected to take delivery of 10 warships and over 40 support vessels by the end of 2015 (Laursen), and 100 ships by 2020. Having outlined the strategic rationale for the main directions of the new Russian naval doctrine, the text will consider the international reception of the same.

International Reception

Many American and Russian analysts view the document as provoking confrontation with the U.S. and/or NATO (Oliphant); (Bodner). Conversely, another expert holds that “clearly [the new naval doctrine] is a counter measure because the Russian government perceives that NATO has climbed the escalation ladder” (Ankov). An alternative opinion is that the text is a message from Russian leaders directly responsible for ensuring the country’s security to NATO defence planners that Moscow will “oppose and resist the Empire’s attempts to subdue Russia or achieve planetary hegemony” (Marjanovich). The assumption inherent to all of the above views is that Russia will be able to enact the ambitious program outlined in its marine doctrine. Otherwise, the threat posed is greatly diminished. That ability is not and should not be a foregone conclusion.

Can Moscow Implement its Naval Strategy?

The question of implementation is not superfluous. Doubts exist regarding Russia’s ability to implement several aspects of its newly released naval doctrine. Russian ships already are deployed in the Atlantic Ocean, “and it is difficult to imagine how their strength could be elevated” (Bodner).

Although the Soviet navy was an effective blue-­??water force, in recent years the Russian navy has mostly functioned as a coastal defence force. This situation is partly due short supply. Specifically, according to Maxim Shepovalenko, a military expert at the Moscow-­??based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, “of Russia’s over 215 surface ships, only a quarter of them are capable of blue-­?? water operations, while the remaining are primarily meant for littoral operations” (as cited in Bodner). New ships intended for blue-­??water operations are not yet in production, and are not expected until the mid-­?? to late-­??2020s. Of the vessels the Russian navy is slated to receive under the new strategy most are “small vessels like frigates, corvettes and patrol boats” (Bodner). Moscow also faces hurdles in implementing other projects identified in its naval strategy.

Russia’s plan to exploit Arctic natural resources may encounter several stumbling blocks. First, the costs of extracting oil and natural gas are economically feasible only when prices for natural resources are high (Gorenburg). Arctic economic development is exacerbated further by the region’s uniquely inhospitable climate and ageing existing infrastructure. Second, other Arctic countries, including NATO member Norway, are also interested in benefitting from these resources, which could “potentially turn the region into a political battleground” (Stratfor). This would be an unfortunate development because “NATO does not have an Arctic strategy” (Trainor). Similarly, Russia’s plans to militarise the Arctic may clash with NATO’s stated intention not to militarise the region (Unattributed). Moreover, the United States, as rotating chair of the Arctic Council from 2015 to 2017, has committed its term in part to “promoting responsible stewardship and fostering international cooperation.” (U.S. Department of State). This position will allow Washington to “monitor Russia’s northern military expansion with its NATO partners” (Trainor). This is not to imply that armed conflict is inevitable. On the contrary, “on the whole, Russia seeks cooperative international relationships in the Arctic” (Gorenburg).

Conclusion

The newly released Russian naval strategy is an ambitious document. It discerns several strategic shifts for the Russian navy. Most prominently, the text envisions a change in Russian naval operations towards blue water operations -­?? deployments far beyond the Russian littoral, with the Atlantic and Mediterranean as focal points. Moreover, the document recommends projecting force into and extracting energy resources from the Arctic, among other aims. However, relevant concerns exist regarding Moscow’s ability to fulfil these goals. This fact should not be overlooked when assessing the potential threat posed by the Russian navy.

CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY

• There is a gap between Moscow’s aims and capabilities in the naval sphere.

• U.S. and NATO policymakers need to avoid assuming that provocative statements by Russian leaders are necessarily a signal of belligerent intent.

•Moscow does not desire a military confrontation either with the U.S., or with NATO under Article 5. Therefore, despite apparently aggressive plans for the Arctic and elsewhere, Russia will avoid initiating conflict.

Elizabeth Zolotukhina is a Senior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. She may be contacted at elizabeth.zolotukhina@cgsrs.org

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