The U.S.-Egypt Strategic Partnership: Rapprochement In A Time Of Uncertainty

Executive Summary

As the Middle East is beset by a proliferation of ungoverned spaces and a multiplication of threats and battlefields, the U.S. is reassessing its relationships in the region. Washington’s partnership with Cairo has deteriorated over the past few years, particularly in the aftermath of Egypt’s political turmoil (2011 – 2015). However, the growing resilient low-level insurgency in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula by ISIS-affiliated militants is forcing the U.S. to strengthen bilateral ties, and to restore the strategic alignment. Central to these initiatives is Washington’s new priority of ensuring that Egypt is secure and capable both to cooperate and to combat terrorism at home and in the region.   

Introduction

In the past four years Egypt has been beleaguered by instability, high levels of violence, and a crippling fiscal deficit. The political turmoil Egypt has experienced since 2011 has produced new tensions and points of divergence in Cairo’s relationship with the United States (U.S.). In recent months, the U.S. has sought to recalibrate the Egyptian-U.S. partnership. At the centre of these developments is the U.S.’s concern with the rise of extremist and Islamic State (ISIS)-affiliated networks operating in the Sinai and Greater Egypt. Currently, Cairo is struggling to combat and contain these elements. Despite recent polarising divergences in interests and political agendas, the U.S. is anxious not to lose Egypt as a crucial counter-terrorism and regional partner. Washington’s latest policy initiatives towards Egypt seek both to strengthen cooperation with Cairo’s new leadership, and to enhance Egypt’s ability to ensure its security and stability. To achieve this, Washington has in part initiated a Strategic Dialogue with Egypt.  

In August 2015, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Egyptian officials for the first round of the U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue. The renewed bilateral talks were the first U.S.-Egyptian Strategic Dialogue since 2009. The Strategic Dialogue is a biannual forum which allows officials to discuss a range of important political, economic, and security topics. Until 2011, bureaucratic inertia and continuity have defined this strategic alignment. The current discussions aim to strengthen the long-standing partnership between Cairo and Washington, and to anchor it in shared strategic goals. The 2015 exchange provided an opportunity to promote and strengthen common values and interests. Subsequently, the bilateral talks played an integral role in strengthening security ties between the two countries.

The reprioritisation of relations comes at a crucial period for Egypt, as Cairo faces intensifying levels of terrorism and a burgeoning resilient low-level insurgency by organised militant groups in the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt, slowly trying to recover from the post-2011 political turmoil, also has stepped up its regional activism, in part by participating in the Sunni Arab coalition in Yemen and strikes against ISIS elements in Libya. These developments provide opportunities for U.S.-Egyptian cooperation. This is important because it comes at a time when Washington is actively countering ISIS and extremist networks in the region.  

One of the key topics discussed at the 2015 U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue was Egypt’s economic situation. As a result of the 2011 political upheaval, Egypt’s economy went into free-fall and has experienced low economic growth rates ever since (Roll and Sailer, 2015). The U.S. has had both limited will, resources, and economic tools to extricate Egypt from the crisis. U.S. economic aid to Egypt has been drastically reduced over the past decade (Adly, 2015). Instead, military aid to the country has been increased (Sharp, 2015, p.22). Egypt’s economic growth post-Morsi has been both fuelled and sustained by extensive investment and financial support from Gulf Arab monarchies. However, this backing may be insufficient to resolve and surmount extant structural problems. These include; infrastructure weakness and the obstruction of investment, that inhibit Egypt’s sustainable economic transformation due to a heavily centralised administration in each sector, prolific corruption, and nepotism (Roll and Sailer, 2015; Alsaafin, 2015). The success of Egypt’s economy is a significant factor in the strategic partnership. If it is to assume a more assertive regional role, Cairo will need to have a stronger economic foundation. This will enable Egypt to mobilise and finance protracted counter-terrorism campaigns and maintain an extended military presence in conflict areas. Counter-terrorism and security matters were another key topic of the strategic discussions. 

The latter centred on addressing common security threats – particularly the containment of ISIS. The U.S. is cognisant that Egypt will be a crucial player in further curtailing the growing ISIS threat, given Egypt’s location and recent hardline, but presently ineffective approach towards countering ISIS in the Sinai and Libya (Bowden and Elkelani, 2015). The U.S. also reiterated the continuation of military-to-military cooperation and the renewal and extension of U.S. military support and financial aid. Addressing the human rights and security nexus and ensuring a fair and free democratic process was another important focus for the U.S., although Egypt rejects claims of human rights abuse. These divergences can affect the future of dialogue and the partnership and will be discussed below. Lastly, the talks focused on alleviating Egypt’s fears over the Iran deal, as Iran’s rise will inherently disrupt the balance of power and strategic competition in the region.

The renewed Strategic Dialogue with Egypt shows that the U.S. is critically re-examining its relationships in the Middle East, and establishing new priorities as it confronts a new spectrum of challenges. The U.S. has a lot at stake in the Middle East. Washington has an interest in maintaining the flow of oil supplies. Israel is also a linchpin in the U.S.’s Middle East policy, and Israel’s long-standing peace accord with Egypt is an important facet of this relationship and the management of sporadic Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Another core interest is the return of a modicum of stability in the region as the Middle East has experienced a series of destabilising civil wars, which threaten to feed the growth of ISIS and extremism. The presence and extension of the ISIS threat in Egypt has been very significant in spurring the present rapprochement with Cairo. Egypt’s priorities and challenges have changed little from the Mubarak era, which featured the consolidation and preservation of autocratic rule. Cairo’s core interests remain focused on ensuring regime survival, re-imposing state authority, combating terrorism, dealing with societal fatigue, and working towards economic and social rejuvenation. 

The Importance of Egypt

To appreciate the scope of the partnership, it is important to understand why Washington views Egypt as pivotal to U.S. strategic goals in the region. Egypt is the largest Arab nation, with the largest Arab army. It has significant and influential soft power, which it exerts on the region. Egypt also is positioned geostrategically and controls a vital waterway, the Suez Canal. Eight percent of all global trade passes through the canal and Egypt’s instability and political turmoil poses a threat to energy transport and continuity of oil supply (Naylor, 2013). Egypt also plays a critical role in military-to-military cooperation. Egypt grants the U.S. both expedited passage and overflight rights to the Suez Canal. This is strategically beneficial to U.S. military force deployment and force projection in the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa (Sharp, 2015, p.14; Hawthorne, 2015). Furthermore, Egypt is a stabilising force in the region, and plays an important role in counter-terrorism. Cairo is a key partner in intelligence exchange with the U.S. and in the effort to counter and degrade violent extremist networks both in the region and along Egypt’s porous borders. An inwardly-focused and unstable Egypt deprives both the region and the U.S. of a critical military ally in these efforts. Lastly, Egypt is an important interlocutor in Arab-Israeli relations. Historically, Cairo has played a significant mediating role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. However, recently Egypt has become less of an important diplomatic player in the negotiations – primarily due to the intransigent nature of the conflict (Sharp, 2015, p.15). 

Not all analysts have viewed Egypt as strategically important. Some have argued that Cairo is less critical owing to the decline in the basis for the strategic partnership: the absence of the Soviet threat and the hazard it posed to the Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa (Cook, 2015). In addition, the overall decline in military cooperation between Cairo and Washington – the last significant joint military campaign being the 1990-91 “Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm” – erodes the idea of the relationship being “strategic” and “relevant” (Cook, 2015; Hawthorne, 2015). Moreover, Egypt lacks asymmetric capabilities, while the U.S. is in search of partners that are more proficient in irregular warfare and counter-terrorism support (Sharp, 2015, p.15). Nonetheless, this paper highlights that the threat ISIS poses to the region is a driving force in the U.S.’s efforts to breathe new purpose into the strategic relationship with Egypt, and to overcome the bureaucratic inertia (Cook, 2015) that has long sustained the bilateral partnership.

Background of the Renewed Strategic Rapprochement 

Egypt has been a benefactor of U.S. military and economic assistance since the late 1970s. This is in large part due to Egypt’s signing of the 1978 peace treaty with Israel, which, consequently, resulted in both Egypt’s isolation from the Arab world and Arab nations’ withdrawal of economic and financial support (Matthews and Callaway, 2013, p.46). Thereafter, Egypt became dependent on the U.S. for support to counterbalance its isolation. Between 1948 and 2015 U.S. bilateral foreign aid to Egypt totalled $76 billion USD (Sharp, 2015, p16). 

For decades, Egypt has had a centralised authoritarian regime. In 2011, the Mubarak government (1981 – 2011) succumbed to its structural vulnerabilities, and was overthrown in a revolutionary movement (Gerges, 2014, p.18). Explanations abound for the collapse of the Mubarak regime (Henderson and Ganguly, 2014; Hamed, 2015; Stacher, 2011). Nonetheless, a military-backed regime was deposed and Mohamed Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political organisation, was democratically elected in June 2012. This period of democratic rule was short lived. The military establishment retained a prominent role in the post-authoritarian transition phase and in July 2013 overthrew Morsi. Soon after, the military reinstated authoritarian rule. In October 2013, the U.S. restricted aid as a result of the incumbent military-backed regime’s brutal suppression of the ousted-President Morsi’s supporters (Gordon and Landler, 2013).

Withholding aid was a contentious policy, particularly because military aid had represented a symbolic investment in sustaining the U.S.-Egypt partnership (Zinni, 2015). Reneging on the military investment could have been interpreted as a lack of interest in maintaining the alliance. This consequently generated a lot of mistrust and tension between the two nations. In early 2015, U.S. aid was reinstated. Restoring aid was important for reducing Egyptian resentment and suspicion. Egyptian officials and national media have accused the Obama administration of instigating the 2011 revolutionary uprisings, and backing the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hawthorne, 2015; Schwartz, 2013). 

However, aid was re-established predominantly to avert Egypt’s further descent into chaos, and to temper the rising spectre of terrorism and instability, particularly due to increasing militant activity in the Sinai Peninsula. In the absence of U.S. aid Egyptian military capabilities degraded, and the suspension of aid significantly impeded Cairo’s ability to effectively counter its security threats. The American security assistance program to Egypt lacks an evaluation process. This makes it difficult to assess the success of past assistance to Cairo in achieving U.S. strategic goals (GAO, p.44, 2015). Thus, it remains undetermined whether the resumption of U.S. military aid will contribute to regional stability or guarantee that Egypt can more effectively counter its threats. However, the return of U.S. military aid suggests that the strategic aspect of the partnership will remain strong. 

More significantly, the military aid has been recalibrated to give Washington more flexibility in managing the assistance to Egypt (Chollet, 2015). The U.S. has ended “cash-flow financing”, which allowed Egypt to purchase military equipment on credit. Instead, Washington will judge Egyptian military purchases against a specific criteria. Namely, the new requirement will be that these purchases advance the following goals; counter-terrorism, border security, maritime security, and Sinai security (Wittes, 2015). This allows aid to be used to bolster areas of mutual interest and to enhance Egypt’s security and asymmetric capabilities. It also prevents Cairo from investing in obsolete weapon systems (Chollet, 2015). There is a clear effort in Washington to modernise the relationship and to steer Egypt towards being a stronger, more modern, and more capable military power. 

Divergence

A significant divergence stresses the U.S.-Egypt partnership and may affect future dialogue. Both Washington and Cairo have competing narratives over how best to ensure Egypt’s stability. The U.S. believes that there is a connection between militancy, authoritarianism, and political violence. Moreover, that exclusivist governance makes the country vulnerable to a resurgence and recurrence of extremist violence. The Sisi regime’s current stabilising effort has involved high levels of repression, political opposition targeting, human rights abuses and increasing state power and control (Hamid, 2015). Unsurprisingly both radicalisation and the ideological frameworks for Islamist militancy emerged and thrived under authoritarian systems in Egypt (Ashour 2015a). The lack of political channels and democratic institutions means that violence has become one of the only means of challenging the status quo (Revkin, 2014). Thus, Washington insists that democratisation is integral to re-stabilising the country and combating terrorism. The Sisi regime, however, has blamed the Muslim Brotherhood (Solomon, 2015) and political Islam for the ills of the nation. This disagreement and the U.S.’s concern over Cairo’s poor human rights record has been a source of polarisation. However, the Strategic Dialogue was an important opportunity for Cairo and Washington to signify that their political disagreements will not impede the durability and the underlying importance of the relationship (Trager and Sayag, 2015). Even though the U.S. is confronted with a dilemma involving strategic interests and principles and disagreements over Egypt’s political trajectory, there are areas of strategic convergence that surmount these obstacles in the partnership. 

Egypt’s Insurgency Threat & Counter-Insurgency/Counter-Terrorism Strategy

One of Washington and Cairo’s shared strategic concerns, and a major focus of the recent Strategic Dialogue, is the ongoing instability in Egypt, coupled with the increasing threat posed by ISIS. Egypt’s current instability results from its inability to exert full control over its territory, and to quell the complex insurgency in Northern Sinai. 

Incumbent Egyptian regimes always have been beset by an existential power struggle between radical Islamists and the state (Springborg, p.244, 2015). Sporadic terrorist activities and intermittent clashes have been a prevalent feature of the Islamist threat to Egypt. In the 1990s, Cairo was confronted with a low level Islamist insurgency, spearheaded by Gama’a Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The insurrection lasted six years, but ultimately failed due to Cairo’s multi-layered strategy, the diminishing of popular support for the Islamists, and fragmentation of the Islamist movement (Rubin, 2009, p.83). 

2011 marked the re-emergence of the Islamist insurgency in Egypt. This was due in large part to the security vacuum caused by the destabilising uprisings. The Sinai peninsula is the epicentre of the insurgency campaign in Egypt. The Sinai is located on Egypt’s periphery and is notable for both its underdevelopment and the inhabitants’ complicated and deep-rooted social and economic grievances. These unresolved issues have produced sporadic militancy, a life-line for radicalism and extremist organisations to thrive and mobilise. Consequently, the region has become a focal point of intense state-repression (Fadel, 2015), which serves to fuel the militancy. 

The Sinai insurgency is comprised of various overlapping networks (Gaub, 2015, p.3). The insurgents primarily hail from home-grown Islamist groups and disaffected Bedouins. One of the more significant Sinai-based militant organisations, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, rebranded itself as “Wilayat al-Sinai”/ the “Sinai Province” (SP) and pledged loyalty to ISIS in November 2014. SP, with its intra-regional linkages, has emerged as one of the most significant Jihadist threats that Egypt faces. 

Usually transnational ties bring a greater level of funding, logistical support, and training (Georgy, 2015). However, Northern Sinai-based militant groups in the past have had limited international support, and were driven predominantly by domestic grievances. Conversely, the militant movement today is interlinked with the project of transnational jihad (Okail and McManus, 2015). Although the SP has shifted into ISIS’s orbit, how much external logistical support and funding it receives remains unclear. Nonetheless, the present terrorism threat is far more transnational in nature, with stronger regional linkages. 

Egypt has been both a contributor to and a victim of the transnational jihadist movement (Revkin, 2014). Egypt faces an influx of returning radicalised battle-hardened fighters from jihadist campaigns abroad. Reportedly, as many as 5,000 Egyptians are fighting for ISIS in Syria (Elmenshawy, 2014). Egyptian military officials also claim that they have arrested many foreign fighters in the Sinai (predominantly Syrian and Palestinian nationals) (Kirkpatrick and Schmitt, 2014). 

Egypt’s current counter-insurgency campaign in Northern Sinai against SP has been largely ineffective. The SP have orchestrated large-scale attacks that have burdened Egypt with significant military loses (NYA, 2015). The nature of the insurgency threat is changing rapidly, as attacks have become more sophisticated, showing a higher level of coordination, planning, and a burgeoning technological capacity (Okail and McManus, 2015). This has been epitomised in the success and level of sophistication involved in attacks on both hard and soft targets. The militants recently have engaged soft targets, such as kidnapping foreigners. This has been a unique development, as the kidnapping of the Croatian, Tomislav Salopek, represented the first time a Westerner was abducted in Greater Cairo. Subsequently, he was transferred to the organisation’s stronghold, held for ransom, and later executed (Ashour, 2015). Not only did the perpetrators mimic the gruesome tactics of their Raqqa, Syrian-based counterparts, but they also, for the first time, adopted a more aggressive strategy. The new approach shifted from solely targeting security forces to now including Western foreigners. The judiciary also have become a prioritised target, with the SP recently launching a campaign entitled, “Extermination of the Judiciary” (Okail and McManus, 2015). The current wave of violence engulfing Egypt is evolving and so too is the scope and scale of the insurgency’s operations. 

One of the more significant shifts in the SP movement comes in the transition from a traditional focus on soft to hard targets. The insurgents in the Sinai have been targeting military assets – including seizing control of buildings and Egyptian military equipment (NYA, 2015a). Also, they have used anti-aircraft surface–to–air guided missiles to neutralise Egyptian army helicopters (Ashour, 2015). Furthermore, they have posed a threat to Egypt’s maritime security – as they have attacked Egyptian patrol boats that safeguard the 120-mile stretch of the Suez Canal. There are international concerns that the extremist network may target other ships navigating this waterway. This possibility further diminishes global confidence in Egypt’s military capabilities to safeguard national and international economic interests (Sharp, p.11, 2015). On July 1, 2015 the militants demonstrated their ground warfare capabilities as the SP launched the largest and most complex multi-pronged ground assault outside of Iraq and Syria (Faruki et al, 2015). This aggressive campaign led to the brief seizure of the city of Shiekh Zuweid, in the Northern Sinai peninsula. It is clear that the operational capabilities of these violent organisations is expanding, indicating a failure of Egypt’s counter-terrorism efforts.  

The geographical scope of the attacks has shifted dramatically. Previously the militant activities were limited to the Sinai Peninsula. However, now, there is an increasing concentration of attacks in Cairo and other provinces (Okail and McManus, 2015). The high-profile assassination of Hisham Barakat, Egypt’s chief prosecutor, was emblematic of the shifting trend in terrorist attacks given the geographical scope, nature of the attack, and the level of sophistication involved (Okail and McManus, 2015). These developments mark both a growth and an emboldening in the insurgency. There is also a further risk that more of the small cells in Sinai will become organisationally linked to ISIS, and join under its banner of transnational Jihad. Thus, success in defeating these new threats is dependent increasingly on Cairo’s adaptability and capacity for asymmetric warfare and deploying effective counter-insurgency measures.

Ostensibly, Cairo lacks a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy (RCSS, 2015). This is in large part due to Egypt’s failure to demarcate between “traditional war” and the “war on terror” (RCSS, 2015). These are very different types of conflicts, which require variegated responses and appropriate strategies. In the absence of a coherent strategy, Egypt has reverted to older ineffective tactics (Okail and McManus, 2015). These include; a mixture of intense repression, collective punishment, co-option of tribal leaders and draconian security measures that entail indefinite imprisonment and targeted campaigns which malign and coalesce dissidents, journalists, and terrorists. In addition, Egypt’s counter-insurgency campaign in the Sinai has relied more on force and kinetic operations than it has on intelligence (Springborg, 2015, p.242). Lack of intelligence and understanding of the human terrain certainly have been important factors in the intensification of the insurgency and the failures of Cairo’s counter-insurgency campaign. Egypt’s historical lessons show that the brutal counter-terrorism tactics employed in the 1990s, to counter an Islamic insurgency movement in the country, were detrimental to the situation (Mobley, 2012, p.187; El-Din, 2013). This is compounded by the fact that although the nature of the terrorism threat has evolved and transformed, Cairo continues to pursue an outdated military doctrine. Egypt’s indiscriminate repression in Northern Sinai is counterproductive and reflects Cairo’s counter-terrorism impotence. 

Questions also surround Egypt’s strategic military posture. Cairo still focuses on conventional military build-up (Stratfor, 2015) as opposed to enhancing asymmetric capabilities and developing a more flexible military structure. Therefore, Egypt has continued to purchase anti-ballistic, anti-ship missiles and frigates. Egypt’s military also is stifled by overcentralisation. Consequently, its ineffective and rigid command and control structure always has complicated past conflicts (Brooks, 2013). As recently as Autumn 2013, the Egyptian military did not have a specialised counter-terrorism unit (Springborg, 2015, p.247). This lack of structural recalibration is largely due to institutional inertia. Instead, Egypt’s military institutions have concentrated on forming and optimising for conventional warfare. This has entrenched a focus on conventional warfare into education, training, threat perception, and doctrine (Stratfor, 2015). Prestige has been another obstacle. Egypt’s concentration on acquiring large and expensive conventional weapons systems has intrinsic value, as it advances their image as the largest Arab army. Thus, Egypt has focused on acquiring equipment to enhance its reputation rather than essential hardware that would improve battlefield effectiveness. The reality is that this prestigious hardware is too expensive to maintain and obsolete for countering modern day security threats.

The Middle East is beset by a sustained proliferation of patterns of irregular warfare, with increasing emphasis being placed on state actors’ asymmetric capabilities (Basson, 2015). Given the multi-dimensional nature of the Sinai insurgency, Egypt cannot respond to the crisis with a conventional military posture. An effective response will require a more intricate counter-insurgency strategy that integrates flexible forces supplied with sufficient intelligence to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Tellingly, to date Egypt has completely failed to readjust its military force posture to address counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism prerogatives. This is largely due to a combination of military institutional inertia, a lack of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, and a disconnect in the country’s threat analysis and threat prioritisation. The extension of the ISIS-supported insurgency into Egypt proper and the growth of clandestine and ISIS-affiliated networks reflected this failure. The July 1 offensive in Northern Sinai demonstrated ISIS’s potential ability to consolidate territorial gains in Egypt. This signifies the growing ability of ISIS to expand its physical presence and operations in the region (Faruki et al, 2015). Thus, the U.S.-Egypt rapprochement comes at a crucial moment, when threats are rapidly multiplying and strengthening the anti-ISIS coalition is paramount. 

Conclusion

Despite disagreements and divergences, the U.S. and Egypt will continue to have a strong relationship. The threat posed by ISIS has taken preeminent priority in Washington, and in its strategic relationship with Cairo. The U.S. has a lot at stake in the region and an inwardly-focused and unstable Egypt would be highly undesirable. Therefore, it has become critically important to re-stabilise Egypt, continue providing military aid, and develop its asymmetrical warfare capabilities. The scale of the ISIS affiliated-SP operations and attacks highlights the ineffectiveness of Egypt’s current counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns and the evolution of the terrorism threat. Thus, the bilateral partnership is becoming increasingly more important for addressing shared security threats and regional challenges. The U.S. is attempting to strike a balance between its calls for democracy and Egypt’s security crisis. However, the growing threat posed by ISIS is causing the U.S. to be continually deferential to authoritarian rule in the region. Both Egypt and the U.S. will remain important to each other – Egypt for its geostrategic advantage and its role as a bellwether for the region – the U.S. because of its size, support and the legitimacy its approbation of the incumbent regime will bestow. 

POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS

1. Re-stabilizing and re-establishing security in Egypt is critical, but policy makers must be cautious in how Cairo achieves this goal. Repression fails to address the underlying socioeconomic grievances of citizens, and feeds the growth of extremist ideologies. 

2. The security situation in Sinai has regional implications. Egypt must improve its asymmetric warfare capacity and develop a clearer counter-terrorism strategy. This requires a greater conceptual understanding of terrorism and the underlying local and regional aspects of these security threats. Cairo needs to create a more flexible military organisation, which is crucial to success in counter-insurgency campaigns. Egypt needs to develop capabilities to isolate insurgents from the Bedouin population in the Sinai – both physically and politically. Egypt also must ensure that its response remains lawful. Greater intelligence, reforms and economic incentives will have a strategic and instrumental value in removing the extremist elements’ support base. Most significantly, the insurgency largely stems from the power struggle between lesser political forces vying for a stake in the new system, or attempting to address various socioeconomic grievances. Thus, invariably, the solution may lie in engaging local political actors, advancing a political agreement, and improving the central government’s management of development initiatives.