MIGRATION: CRISIS IN EUROPE - EUROPE IN CRISIS

Executive Summary

The European Union (EU) faces an unprecedented, but not an unforeseen, mass migration. The bloc increasingly risks losing control of the unfolding events. The crisis has exposed the vulnerabilities of the EU Common European Asylum System. The unpreparedness and lack of capacity of EU member states on the Union’s external borders to cope with the ever rising number of asylum seekers, slow pace of mobilising existing resources to assist crisis-hit member states, inconsistent, and unpredictable application of the current procedural rules are contributing to the notion that the EU is falling apart. However, the problem is political - not insufficient capacity. EU member states and European institutions are in a disagreement on embracing or rejecting migration. The European Commission’s proposals for fine-tuning the crumbling asylum system and mandating quotas for relocating asylum seekers from border states are not viable solutions. EU would be well advised to outline whether and to what extent it is willing and capable to receive asylum seekers, and to stem the massive influx of refugees. Otherwise, mainstream European political parties are doing a disservice to the European integration project, and leaving the room for anti-immigration and far-right political parties to advance their agenda. Being humane, compassionate, and generous towards Syrian asylum seekers is as important as being honest, realistic, and prudent in terms of what EU member states and their citizens are capable and willing to offer to them.

Analysis

Introduction

The European Union has been confronted with migration on an unprecedented scale: to date the total number of migrants has reach 650,000 (EurActiv 2015a).

To give the impression of being efficient EU leaders have been busily discussing the unfolding migration crisis and offering purported solutions. Most recently the President of the European Commission, the executive body empowered to make policy and put forth legislative proposals, proposed a new action plan on September 9th, 2015. Relatedly, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs ministers, the EU decision making body responsible for the matter, adopted a series of measures on September 14th, 2015. Despite the appearance of urgency and drive to address the problem, the EU is slowly losing control of the situation.

The challenge is complex, and elicits strong emotions. Further, conflicting interests complicate the debate among member states regarding how to address the crisis. This also prevents the EU capitals from acting jointly and efficiently. Moreover, EU leaders are apparently short of determination to find political and not only procedural solutions to the unparalleled migration pressure. The unfolding crisis is testing the EU for the second time this year.

The complexity of the issue

The migration crisis is worsened by a number of interlinked political and operational challenges which are confronting the EU, beyond the sheer humanitarian catastrophe covered by all major media outlets.

First, the EU already has endured a mass migration crisis in 2011 following the instability caused by the Arab Spring in the northern African region. This upheaval enabled North African and sub-Saharan migrants to reach the shores of Malta, Italy, and Spain (FRONTEX 2012, pp. 39-44). From then on the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) repeatedly stressed the increased and continued risk of large-scale migration through the Mediterranean and the Western Balkan routes. As predicted, the tide of migrants has been rising rapidly since the second half of 2014 (EASO 2015a, pp. 22-30; FRONTEX 2013, pp. 61-62; FRONTEX 2015a, pp. 5-13). Therefore, the current crisis is not without precedent, and timely warning.

In the aftermath of the 2011 crisis the EU Common European Asylum System was fundamentally reformed in 2013 (European Commission 2013). The EU executive considered the overhaul of various elements of the so-called Dublin system a major success. The effort aimed to establish an “early warning, preparedness and crisis management mechanism, geared to addressing […] problems stemming from particular pressures”. To this end, a special EU-wide operational body, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was tasked with establishing an early warning process to ensure that EU member states are alerted when the smooth functioning of the Dublin system risks being jeopardised by a particular pressure. Furthermore, the restructuring process aimed to enable the EU to take early preventive measures, and to pay appropriate political attention to such situations (European Union 2013). Moreover, the reform envisaged to ensure that “there are humane material reception conditions (such as housing) for asylum seekers across the EU” (European Commission 2013).

The 2013 overhaul arguably expected to address all those shortcomings of the Dublin system which are now clearly exposed. The reform was designed to enable EU member states to avoid the pitfalls of unpreparedness and lack of capacity should a new mass migration occur. A new mass migration already was brewing. In the third quarter of 2014 all available statistics indicated that migration had increased by 150%, compared to the same period of 2013 (FRONTEX 2015a, pp. 5-6 and 10-13, EASO 2015b, p. 4). In spite of these early indicators, the Justice and Home Affairs Council tabled the migration issue as an urgent and pressing matter only on April 20, 2015, following a series of tragic migrant deaths in the Mediterranean Sea. The European Commission presented its first proposal to address the unfolding crisis on May 13, 2015. To be fair, it is clear that no legislative measure or preventive actions could have averted the current migration crisis. The sheer number of potential asylum seekers exceeds all predictions. However, had European political leaders recognised the risk posed by the present mass migration in time, and reacted rapidly to the unfolding crisis by allocating resources to the external borders, the EU could have achieved more. 

Against this backdrop of shortcomings in the implementation of the reform of the Dublin system, it is fair to suggest that EU member states collectively failed to achieve the objectives of the 2013 overhaul, including; reasonable preparedness to handle large number of asylum applications, and providing satisfactory reception facilities to the applicants. Moreover, EU leaders did not pay appropriate political attention to the evolving migration pressure, recognise and address infrastructure vulnerabilities of entry point countries, and start rapidly deploying all possible emergency mechanisms provided by the EU system to assist Greece, Italy or Hungary to cope with the influx of migrants.

Second, against the background of inadequate timely preparations for the developing crisis, EU member states face further operational challenges not foreseen or addressed by the Dublin mechanism. Not only is the number of migrants entering the EU at the Italian, Greek, or Hungarian borders increasing daily, it appears that they all wish to find a new home in countries other than their point of debarkation or border crossing (Marcus, J. 2015). Member states on the EU’s external borders are overwhelmed with the ever increasing flow of people in need of registration, accommodation, and social services until the asylum procedure is completed. The EU’s asylum policy stipulates that the entry point country is responsible for processing asylum applications in cases when the applicants crossed the border irregularly (e.g. without a visa). Over the last couple of weeks it became clear that potential refugees undertaking life-threatening journeys from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Eritrea to Europe are far from being intimidated by the border states efforts to register them. They aspire to settle in Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium, or Austria where family members or friends have already found refuge, or a better prospect of life awaits them. They simply do not wish to stay in Hungary or Greece where their successful integration is perceived to be limited. 

Since the Dublin system does not provide guidance on how to proceed if thousands of asylum seekers wish to choose the country where they want to settle, EU member states on the border regions are perplexed. Should they follow EU rules, register asylum applications, and accommodate people which is apparently beyond their capacity and against the will of the migrants? Or, should they allow distressed people to pass freely to Germany and elsewhere? Germany, France, and Austria also seem confused as to what policy to adopt. Along with EU institutions they stress the need to consistently apply EU law: border states must process asylum applications, and take care of asylum seekers. Nonetheless, member states reckon that the pressure from distressed migrants makes impracticable the application of general rules of the Dublin system. Therefore they accept that potential asylum seekers are traversing Greece, Hungary or Denmark to reach Germany or Sweden and apply for asylum there. This conundrum has been on display and followed by millions via media coverage from Hungary where thousands of migrants hoped to board trains to Germany, or wandering through the country on foot towards Austria. Meanwhile, Hungarian authorities attempted and clearly failed to direct migrants to reception centres in the countryside to register their applications. 

Third, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is right that the EU is facing “a primarily refugee crisis, not only a migration phenomenon” (UNHCR 2015b). Nonetheless, the high number of asylum seekers are not necessarily fleeing the war zones of Syria. Though the numbers significantly decreased in the second quarter of this year, 35% of all applicants in the first quarter of 2015 arrived from European countries such as; Serbia, Kosovo, Russia, and Albania (Eurostat 2015a; FRONTEX 2015b, p. 10). Another large group of migrants are of Afghani origin (roughly 75,000 through August 2015). Their presence is mainly due to the fact that Iran and Pakistan took administrative measures (including non-issuing or non-renewing refugee cards or residence permits) to reduce the number of Afghani nationals staying on their territory this year. The slow pace of asylum applications in Turkey also pushes Afghanis to leave the country (FRONTEX 2015b, pp. 20-24). It is estimated that Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey host around 5,5 million Afghani nationals. Also, there is an increase of migrants of African origin (e.g. from Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Senegal, and Mali) using Western Balkan routes instead of Libya due to safer passage via Turkey with Turkish Airlines extended African connections (FRONTEX 2015b, pp. 16-17).

These migrants are in most cases endeavouring to escape poverty, government mismanagement, the deteriorating security situation, or general despair of their home country in order to find a better life in prosperous European countries. In EU jargon these (typically economic) migrants who arrive through illegal channels (e.g. by the assistance of smugglers) are called irregular migrants. Media coverage and political statements often mix the two categories: asylum seekers and irregular migrants. The overall number of those arriving in Europe from non war-torn countries of Africa and Asia is far from insignificant. A conservative estimate is that approximately 150,000 people, presumably economic migrants, reached the EU so far this year  (FRONTEX 2015b, pp. 16-17).

Forth, going through the asylum procedure - which can verify individual claims and grant international protection (refugee status, subsidiary protection, or authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons) for those in need - may take many months, or even years. Meanwhile, both potential refugees and economic migrants, who also apply for asylum, are allowed to stay in the EU. Both classes of migrants are entitled to receive social benefits, accommodation, cash allowances, and under certain conditions access to the labor market depending on national laws of member states. This liberal handling of asylum applicants unsurprisingly creates strong incentives for economic migrants to endeavour to reach Europe. As a result, 55% of asylum applications are ill-founded and rejected by the EU member states first instance asylum authorities (Eurostat 2015a). Irregular migrants are ordered to return to their home country when their asylum applications are ultimately refused. However, the inefficiency of the return system, or the impossibility of returning irregular migrants to their country of origin is another problem facing the EU. According to Eurostat, in “2013 over 430,000 non-EU citizens were issued with an order to leave an EU Member State, 43% of which were recorded as being returned” (Eurostat 2014). Effective return of those ordered to leave was only 98,000 in 2013, showing the inefficiency of the system. Thus, illegal migrants linger in the EU member states without legal avenues of integration. Therefore, the European Commission’s new action plan envisages a series of measures to enhance the efficiency of the return mechanism i.e. enhancing law enforcement cooperation of EU member states to clump down illegal migrants.

Massive misuse of the EU’s asylum systems places increased administrative and financial burdens on member states, alienates the public from the refugees, and ultimately diverts attention from focusing all available resources to help those fleeing from persecution and war. Amalgamating the two categories of migrants at a procedural level, granting all migrants the same sorts of benefits, and the failure to enforce return orders of irregular migrants augments anti-immigration sentiments. Member states have finally started to realise that their generous asylum systems often are misused and serve as a pull factor for migration disguised as asylum request. Several member states such as; Germany, Finland, Denmark, and the UK are reducing the benefits offered to those who seek international protection on their territories.

Fifth, recent events demonstrate an unintended consequence of the EU’s incapacity to take control of asylum seekers wandering from Greece through Hungary and Austria to Germany. Namely, the Schengen Area has ceased to function, similarly to the Dublin system, as a number of Schengen States, including Germany, closed their borders (EurActiv 2015b). The uncontrolled entry of thousands of migrants compromised the functioning of Schengen, which is based on the principle of abolishing border checks among member countries, and establishing a uniform border control system at the external borders of the bloc. As a result of Germany’s failure to cope with tens of thousands of migrants arriving in Bavaria on its Austrian border, reintroduction of systemic control on its border became necessary. As a consequence of this decision, Slovakia, Austria, and the Netherlands also have introduced border controls, while Hungary literally sealed its border with Serbia by erecting a wall. 

Besides the practical implications of the reintroduction of border control for EU nationals and beyond, this move has two very symbolic messages. First, one of the EU’s most significant achievements, passport-free travel, has been compromised and is no longer available. Thus, the European project has failed its citizens. Second, this setback highlights the increasing gap between charitable statements of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other EU leaders to accommodate 1,000,000 asylum seekers this year, and the harsh realities of life on the ground for them.

As the mass migration continues unabated, the EU asylum system is falling apart. The political agenda of each member state, and the extent of the migration pressure on them dictate the application of the Common European Asylum System. The result is lack of coherence and predictability. The most striking example of this irresolute policy course is that of Germany. At the beginning of September Berlin expressed a willingness and preparedness to accommodate some 800,000 migrants this year, and allowed thousands of asylum seekers wandering from Greece through Hungary to enter the country. Less than a week later, German authorities abruptly closed the borders “temporarily” because they were unable to cope with over several thousand migrants arriving daily, and again emphasised that Hungary and Greece must register and accommodate individuals crossing the borders there (EurActiv 2015b). 

Vulnerabilities in the EU’s current asylum policy and the insufficient institutional capacity of its member states to cope with the increasing migration from the Middle East and Africa became apparent during the last few weeks.

What is the EU planning to do?

EU politicians are keen to emphasise in this time of crisis that there is a need for a “European solution”. At least member states agree on the Union’s common foreign policy, the need to assuage the root causes of migration. It is however highly unrealistic to expect that the “renewed efforts […] being devoted to support diplomatic initiatives and find political solutions” will come to fruition anytime soon (European Commission 2015e, Presidency of the European Union 2015b), and that the international community will join together to end the war in Syria, uproot the Islamic State, stabilise Afghanistan, or turn Eritrea into a prosperous Western-style democracy. The EU has been failing to ensure political stability, fight corruption, and enshrine economic prosperity in its own backyard, the Western Balkans. Therefore, eradicating the root causes of migration from Africa to Asia is unrealistic to say the least. This is however the only productive aspect of the debate, for member states largely disagree on the appropriate course of action when asylum seekers are at the borders.

The European Commission has formulated three packages of policy proposals so far this year to address the root causes of the migration and find EU-wide solutions to the evolving crisis (European Commission 2015b and 2015d; Presidency of the European Union 2015d). These submissions form the basis of the debate and prospective EU action, so it is worthwhile to summarise them. The key elements of the proposals are as follows:

• Introduction of a mandatory relocation mechanism of asylum seekers from the border states of Greece, Hungary, and Italy to other EU member states based on an objective criteria (GDP/capita, unemployment rate, size of the population, etc.) as a burden sharing scheme among member states. The target is to relocate 160,000 people.
• Adoption of a series of measures to enhance operational capacity of member states to cope with the migration flow. This set of proposals includes a wide variety of actions, i.e. allocating resources to clamp down on migrant smugglers, drawing up a common EU list of those safe countries wherefrom people cannot apply for asylum, in particular candidate countries for EU accession in the Western Balkans, reinforcing the rescue operation in the Mediterranean, or taking legal action against member states incorrectly applying EU asylum procedures.
• Providing development assistance to African countries, prime sources of economic migrants, to stem root causes of migration by addressing “demographic pressure, environmental stress, extreme poverty, internal tensions, institutional weaknesses, weak social and economic infrastructures, and insufficient resilience to food crises” (European Commission 2015d). The trust fund will mobilise € 1,8 billion in EU funding. Apart from development aid, the EU will increase its international efforts to find political solutions to conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
• Contributing EU funds of € 40 million to the efforts of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey to accommodate and take care of Syrian refugees.
• Stepping up efforts to reduce irregular migration and make returns efficient. These measures include a revision of failed attempts to conclude readmission agreements with the third countries of major sources of economic migration in Africa, and taking coordinated law enforcement measures with the member states to reduce the number of illegal migrants in the EU.

The European Commission seems to set forth hardly realistic objectives. Most of the elements of the proposals - such as the mandatory relocation scheme - appear overly ambitious. Countering irregular migration by allocating vast sums in development aid to African countries is rather self-delusional. Similarly, supporting diplomatic initiatives and finding political solutions to conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Libya is an impressive PR exercise.

First, the key component of the proposal is the mandatory relocation scheme. Notwithstanding the clear dissent of a number of EU member states, the European Commission put forward a more ambitious plan on September 9th 2015, setting the bar even higher. The European Commission expected that the extraordinary meeting of interior ministers of September 14th 2015 would adopt the relocation scheme. However, this calculation proved to be idealistic since member states showed little appetite to host asylum seekers earlier this year (or in 2011 for that matter when the proposal was first tested and refuted) even though making a pledge became voluntary and the numbers were law. Out of 40,000 asylum seekers for relocation, 32,700 were pledged by Germany and Sweden alone, the remaining 26 member states volunteered to host 5,300 people (still 2,000 short of the Commission’s original request) (European Commission 2015f). Also, the EU has not endeavoured to carry out a scheme on this scale before. There are examples of voluntary resettlements, that is relocation of asylum seekers from outside the EU to provide them with international protection. EU member states resettled a total of 6,394 people in 2014 (European Union 2015). A similar scheme was applied in the resettlement of 227 refugees from Malta to other EU member states in 2011 (European Commission 2011, p. 8).

Following extensive media coverage of the tragic death of a little boy on Greek shores, the tide of public sentiment became supportive of asylum seekers. People expect more compassion and sympathy from political leaders, sentiments which could help the European Commission to realise its goals. Thus, public opinion demanded that some EU member states volunteer to accommodate Syrian asylum seekers: the UK pledged 20,000 directly from the refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, or Turkey, and France decided to receive 24,000 (interestingly, this number is equivalent to the European Commission’s mandatory quota proposal for France). Poland also appears to be more open to taking care of some 2,000 potential refugees. However, these pledges appear to be more of a face-saving political exercise than real commitment to burden sharing. There is of course some pressure on other EU member states to follow suit, and we can expect that they will make voluntary pledges eventually. It is however unrealistic to expect that the European Commission’s quota of 160,000 will be achieved. At their September 14th, 2015 meeting the EU Justice and Home Affairs ministers only approved the relocation scheme of 38,000 asylum seekers based on earlier voluntary pledges of the member states (Presidency of the European Union 2015d, p. 3).

Second, a large part of the European Commission action plan consists of measures which have failed to produce substantial benefit for the EU previously. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that they can be successful now. 

The EU has finally realised that irregular migration is a significant issue in large part because it  fuels anti-immigration sentiments among citizens, where the EU has so far failed to produce satisfactory results such as; concluding readmission agreements with sub-Saharan African and Horn of Africa countries. The provision of lavish benefits to economic migrants applying for asylum, difficulties enforcing return orders, preference for humane treatment of illegal migrants, and emphasising voluntary returns instead of applying more robust law enforcement measures to cramp down on third-country nationals staying illegally in the member states all have served as incentives for economic migrants, largely from Africa, to journey to Europe. The migrants lack incentive to return voluntarily to the misery from which they escaped. In this context it is also myopic not to realise that African countries have limited incentives to cooperate with the EU on readmission of their nationals, and they have not done so for years. The proposed EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa with its € 1.8 billion in funding to address destabilisation, forced displacement, and irregular migration by promoting economic and equal opportunities, security and development can only perpetuate the current situation whereby the EU is pumping considerable funds into corrupt African regimes, without the ability to extract meaningful cooperation from the latter in areas of importance for the EU.

Third, some of the ideas to improve the efficiency of the Dublin system, and assist member states in better implementing immigration laws are relevant in the unfolding crisis. However, these do not significantly mitigate the massive pressure on the member states to handle the influx of migrants. For example, the establishment of so-called hotspots, asylum application points where EU experts assist national authorities in registering migrants, is of course important. This formula could alleviate the administrative burden of crisis-hit member states, and prove significantly less expensive than relocating thousands of migrants from one country to another. This project was put forward in May 2015 when the European Commission first set out a number of initiatives to tackle the crisis. However, the scale of this scheme is far from being sufficient: so far, only one project is operational at two Italian ports (European Commission 2015b). Such assistance cannot make a difference when thousands of migrants are entering the border states daily.

Not only are the European Commission proposals likely to have limited impact, but member states also disagree on its key elements. EU member states are split into two groups. One bloc believes that the migration crisis is a refugee crisis triggered by the Syrian war, and EU member states have moral and legal obligations to help all those who seek refuge in Europe. They stress that the Dublin system is clear which member state is responsible for the assessment of asylum applications when migrants cross their borders. However, they admit that the EU’s asylum system in its current form is unable to handle such an influx of migration efficiently, so the process needs to be reformed. Also, member states must share the burden among themselves, and accept relocating asylum seekers from border states. Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Austria and Luxembourg, the latter being the agenda setting country holding the presidency of the EU until the end of the year, are in this group. Their approach is largely supported and served by EU institutions, ranging from the president of the European Council, the ultimate political decision making body of the heads of states and governments, the foreign policy chief, and the president of the European Commission. The packages of the EU executive reflect these countries’ views on the solution for the crisis.

The opposing group believes that the EU cannot sustain the current policy of accommodating the increasing flow of asylum seekers. This approach risks losing control of external borders and curtailing the free movement of people among EU member states. Political statements of EU leaders stressing moral and legal obligations of the EU to accept all the potential asylum seekers, and various measures underpinning this pledge, e.g. the rescue operations in the Mediterranean, the proposed relocation mechanism for asylum seekers, the generous benefits to which asylum seekers are entitled all are pull factors of migration. These governments stress that individual member states have the right to decide what type of immigration policy they want to pursue. Therefore, they refuse any diktat from Brussels, such as mandatory quotas for accepting asylum seekers which would be seen by their constituencies as interfering with national sovereignty. This bloc is comprised of the Central European Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), the Baltic states, United Kingdom, and to some extent Spain, Finland, and Denmark (the latter is not a member of the Dublin system).

However, there has been a significant development in the debate recently which indicates that EU member states may eventually come to an agreement not by solving the problem but rather by exporting it. On the surface, German public opinion appears to favour accommodating the rising number of asylum seekers. However, the more they arrive in Bavaria, the more German political leaders are getting nervous about how to handle the crisis, and the long-term repercussions of current decisions (Reuters, 2015; EurActiv 2015c). Moreover, it appears that Germany has quickly reached its limits in handling the incoming asylum seekers smoothly and correctly. Apart from hastily closing its borders, the vice-chancellor has called on the international community to help Lebanon and Jordan assist Syrian refugees, hinting that Berlin and the EU may change course (again) and aim to address the problem outside the EU (EurActiv 2015b). This move was not accidental. The day after Germany closed its borders and the vice-chancellor pointed to a new direction in handling the crisis, the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council approved the proposal that in medium-term asylum seekers should be accommodated, and their applications processed in reception centres in the “affected regions”, where they also would stay until a return to their country of origin is possible (Presidency of the European Union 2015c, p. 6). In this perspective the German decision to stop receiving asylum applicants may be indicative of a policy change, not a temporary measure as it was first labelled.

Nonetheless, minor improvements in the crumbling Dublin system and the overly ambitious mandatory burden sharing scheme all divert attention from the key issue: the EU has been increasingly failing to face reality and has lost opportunities to decide its future. The heart of the matter is political and not capacity deficiency. Thus, it cannot be solved by forcing national governments to swallow the pill of mandatory quotas, or pumping money into corrupt African regimes to discuss with them root causes of migration, or bringing member states to the Court of Justice of the EU if they cannot provide adequate reception facilities for asylum seekers. As Czech premier Bohuslav Sobotka pointed out “the debate on quotas has only one purpose. It diverts attention from the real core of the problem. Europe lost capability to regulate migration” (EurActiv 2015d).

Thus, EU member states must first of all outline a vision and compromise on how to deal with the increasingly uncontrolled migration crisis in Europe, and then follow through consistently. At a minimum, they should make it clear to EU citizens and to asylum seekers whether they desire to or are capable of receiving anyone who flees war or persecution, and whether borders shall be open for them. Diverting, unrealistic PR measures, such as mandatory quotas, should be left out of the debate.

The difficulty of the task is immense. It is therefore understandable that EU leaders prefer to pretend they are addressing the issue of migration while they are manifestly not doing so. Migration (or rather immigration) is one of the hottest issues of national politics in almost all EU member states. Political leaders are fearful of the backlash any substantive action may provoke - a decision which has to be defended domestically. Far right and anti-immigrant parties and movements are on the rise from France to Greece. Mainstream political parties are changing course, pressured not to loose public support. Real or perceived fear of Islamisation of Europe plays a role in national debates on immigration, and on the long-term implications of the increasingly changing social fabric of some member states. The rising insecurity and recent terrorist attacks committed by home-grown, radical Islamists amplify resentments. Anti-immigration zeal mostly find its base in Europe’s depressed economic landscape with youth unemployment at 20,4% (Eurostat 2015b). Unemployment figures also raise the question of the prospects for meaningfully integrating those migrants who are in 70% single males and 80% under age 35. Terrorist attacks in France also highlighted the increasing risk of radicalisation among young, disoriented Muslim immigrants who tend to be unemployed, or marginalised. Thus, in a rather hostile European environment, such a large-scale, abrupt integration of people with different religious, cultural, and social backgrounds may prove to be a strenuous task.

Conclusion for policy

The European Council will meet on October 15-16, 2015 to discuss the migration crisis. Political leadership should be able to take a perspective, reflect on the long term challenges of unstoppable, uncontrolled, and unwanted migration in Europe. It is essential that the EU finally takes control of the migration crisis, and not assume a reactive posture. There are roughly 10 million Syrian and Afghani refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East (FRONTEX 2015b, pp. 20-21; UNHCR 2015c). The migration of those fleeing war is far from having reached its peak. It is entirely clear that being humane, compassionate, and generous towards Syrian asylum seekers is as important as being honest, realistic, and prudent with what the EU member states and their citizens capable and willing to offer to them.