Morocco’s local elections: Challenges and risks for the PJD

Executive Summary 

On 4 September 2015, Moroccans went to poll to cast their vote. Despite its local character, the elections represented a first important test for the government of Abdelilah Benkirane. Furthermore, the results hint at the current strength of the coalition government and provide useful trends for next year’s general elections. After the protests in 2011, the resultant reforms and subsequent electoral victory, the Parti de la Justice et du Dévéloppement (PJD) - the Islamist ruling party - maintained its control over the government, suffering only minor setbacks in its four-year rule of the country. Given the growing political instability in North Africa and the increasing threat of terrorism, Morocco seems to represent a factor of continuity in a changing regional landscape. 

The success of PJD

All the principal Moroccan and international media outlets agreed about the PJD’ According to the Ministry of Interior’s results, the Islamist party gained 25.6% of the seats in the regional councils, compared to the 19.4% of the Parti de l’Authenticité et de la Modernité (PAM) and the 17.5% of the Istiqlal (Lamlili, 2015). Both parties represent the main opposition to the current coalition government and together, they combine a long historical tradition with a new political experiment. Founded in 1944, Istiqlal was the leading nationalist party during the independence struggle against the French rule, and it has represented a powerful political force in the following decades. On the other hand, PAM was created only in 2008 and its main asset has since been its founder, Fouad Ali el-Himma, friend and now counsellor of King Mohammed VI (Sakhtivel, 2015). It should be noted that the role of the monarchy is pivotal in Morocco’s politics: the ‘raison d’être’ of the PAM, as well as Istiqlal’s withdrawal from the government coalition in 2013 could be ascribed to the makhzen (the ‘palace’, which includes the king and the notables of the reign). Benkirane’s decision not to confront the king on the main political issues (Salmi, 2015) can be considered a natural consequence of this important assumption.

The PJD has yet to be seriously challenged and consequently, it has been able to grow in terms of electoral consent. The prominence of the Islamist party is evident not only in the regional elections, the first ones after the constitutional reform of 2011 and the regionalisation programme, aimed at delegating powers from the central authority to the local level (Fauer, 2015); but also the municipal elections held the same day. Despite its third place with 15.9% of the seats - well behind the PAM (21.1%) and the Istiqlal (16.2%) - the PJD obtained more than three times the seats it gained in the previous local elections of 2009. The comparison between these two consultations shows the political resilience of PAM (21.5% of the seats in 2009) and Istiqlal (19%), while the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) witnessed a decline from 11.6% to 8.43%.  

Some interesting considerations emerge also from a comparison with the previous general elections of 2011. Despite the different nature of the two consultations (the most recent being local, and the previous one national), both PAM and Istiqlal seemed to recover from a disappointing 11% and 15%, respectively gained in 2011. Moreover, new dynamics appeared inside the government coalition: the Rassemblement Nationals des Indépendants (RNI) and the Mouvement Populaire (MP), both partners with the PJD, tried to take advantage of the elections in order to advance their political agenda in the country. This was evident in the city of Tétouan, where Rachid Talbi Alami of RNI challenged the PJD candidate, causing a rift between the two parties before the RNI’s president Salaheddine Mezouar reaffirmed its allegiance to the coalition (Menara, 2015).

           Source: Government of Morocco

Political tensions caused some damage to the ruling party. Despite the high number of votes received, PJD was able to nominate only two Regional Council Presidents - Rabat and Errachidia - while the PAM obtained five: Tanger - Tétouan - al-Hoceima; Oriental; Béni Mellal - Kheénifra; Grand Casablanca - Settat; Marrackech - Safi) (Akdim, 2015). 

Future challenges to Benkirane

All these factors seem to diminish the apparent electoral success of PJD. Despite the fact that political alliances in municipalities and regions can differ from the national level, two important points emerged after the elections. The first is represented by the political dynamics towards 2016: Next year’s general elections will be challenging the current status quo in Morocco’s political landscape. This became evident last May, when four Ministers (two of them representing the MP) resigned from the government (al-Ashhab, 2015). In the next months political tensions are likely to increase, with the different parties willing to position themselves and take advantage of all the possible opportunities at the local level, in order to become visible to their constituencies and prepare their ground for the next consultations. Moreover, as shown by the different results in regional and municipal elections, PJD’s victory was particularly relevant in cities and urban centres, while the Islamist party was not able to penetrate in rural and conservative areas, where PAM seems to be prevalent (Mezran, 2015). This regional divide will be a determinant in the next elections and consequently, will be able to shape political alliances in their aftermath. 

The second observation concerns Moroccan public opinion. Low turnout has been the main reason for the postponement of local elections from June to September. Despite the fact that the turnout in 2015 has proved steady (52% of the electorate cast their vote, nearly the same as in 2009), half of the population still seems uninterested in the elections. This figure is particularly worrisome if compared to the 2011 turnout of 45%. The electoral boycott of several political movements, including the influent Islamist Jamaat al-Adl Wal Ihsan (AWI) helps to explain these figures. AWI and other minor leftist parties continue to consider the election process as a farce, mainly orchestrated by the makhzen. These accusations are prevalent throughout public opinion, corroborated by rumours of ‘vote buying’ during the electoral campaign. Although the Ministry of Interior has recently approved a stricter regulation on campaign financing, several media outlets warned about possible irregularities during the most recent consultations (Lamlili, Akdim , 2015). Furthermore, the International Budget Partnership has recently ranked Morocco 74^th out of 102 countries in the Open Budget Index 2015, which measures the central government’s budget transparency (Sidiguitebe, 2015). These figures appear to contradict Benkirane’s promises of eradicating bribery from Moroccan politics.

The risks of a co-optation policy

In May 2015, in an attempt to invert the trend of the low turnout, the government revised the political party law, allowing party unions to participate in the election process. Even though the reform was criticized and interpreted as a co-optation policy (Profazio, 2015), the amendment was praised by several leftist parties, including the Fédération de la gauche démocratique (FGD), a political alliance that consists of the Parti Socialiste Unifié, the Parti de l’avant-garde Démocratique et Socialiste and the Congrès National Ittihadi. As a result, the parties of FGD, most of which boycotted the national elections in 2011, participated in the last local polls. 

However, the risk of a large-scale co-optation represented by the increasing convergence between the makhzen and the PAM threatens PJD’s rule. A significant historical precedent can be found in the 1970s when King Hassan II started to support the Istiqlal (previously considered a threat to the monarchy) as a counterweight to the growing socialist movements. With the PJD affirming itself as a relevant political force in the Morocco, it cannot be ruled out that the monarchy will resort to the PAM as a new counterweight, using all its instruments to maintain a political balance inside the country and playing the traditional pivotal role, which it is accustomed to.