The Tug of War for Syria: Can the West and Russia Cooperate on Syria?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The brutality of Syrian leader, Bashar al-Assad, and the unprecedented threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has divided the international community over how to address the Syrian civil war. Russian and Western interests in Syria are largely incompatible. Russian national interests have lead to Moscow’s steadfast support of the Assad regime, while Western interests have a[empted to facilitate Assad’s removal. Russia recently began airstrikes in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime, targeting moderate Syrian rebel forces, despite citing a directive to dismantle the ISIS threat. The United States and Russia now share the same airspace on different sides of the Syrian civil war, threatening confrontation. The fundamental differences in strategic interests of Russia and the West have prevented cooperative international action in Syria. Recent developments suggest a likely continuation of uncooperative action.

Introduction

In the 67 years post- independence, political instability and violence has riddled the Syrian state. The 2011 Arab Spring catalysed pro-democracy demonstrations, and protest against Syrian President, Bashar al- Assad. Assad’s use of violent repression to silence protest soon turned the non-violent movement into an armed rebellion. As a consequence, Syria has been entangled in a bloody 4-year civil war. The conflict pits the ruling Alawite Shia-minority against the state’s Sunni-majority.

By the end of 2012, Assad’s government had lost legitimacy in the eyes of many key international actors. The U.S., U.K., France, Turkey, and Gulf States all withdrew support from the Assad regime, and recognised the National Coalition of the Syrian Revolution, the primary opposition party, as the “sole legitimate representative of the Syrian People” (BBC News, 2015c). Following Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons against Syrian citizens in 2013, international cries for his forceful removal increased in popularity.

Numerous rebel factions, the unprecedented trans-border threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and unsynchronised foreign involvement have come to Characterise the conflict in Syria. There are an estimated 1,000 different armed opposition groups in Syria (BBC News, 2013). While many of these entities advance moderate visions of a new democratic Syria, some factions are radical Islamist groups that have taken advantage of the chaos to pursue their own interests. One such group is ISIS.

Since 2014, ISIS has moved rapidly to take large swaths of territory in both Iraq and Syria. ISIS currently holds roughly 50% of Syrian land (Bremmer, 2015). This trilateral conflict pits Assad against both Syrian rebel forces and ISIS, the Syrian rebel forces against both the Assad regime and ISIS, and ISIS against both forces within and beyond Syrian borders.

The international community has participated in the conflict varyingly. Thus far, the West, championed by the U.S., has restricted its involvement to training, arming, and financing moderate rebels and conducting airstrikes against ISIS. After li[le success, the U.S. has ended its rebel support program. Despite the United States’ explicitly articulated opposition to Assad’s continued rule, the U.S.-led coalition forces have not deployed ground forces, and have not taken direct action to oust the Syrian leader.

In contrast, Russia, and to some degree Iran and China, have taken direct measures to support the Assad regime (Black, 2014). Russia has supplied arms to the Assad regime and, with China’s help, has vetoed a proposed United Nations (UN) resolution against the regime (Black, 2014). The recent arrival of an increased number of arms, warships, aircrafts, tanks, armoured vehicles, and upwards of 2,000 military advisors to both Russia’s naval base in Tartus and the Syrian government controlled airbase, Latakia, has ignited fears in the West of a Russian military build-up in Syria (Ingersoll and Kelley, 2013; Bodner, 2015). These fears were confirmed when Russia began airstrikes in Syria at the end of September 2015.

The Syrian conflict has caused a major refugee crisis, an increased rate of ISIS expansion, threatens conflict spill over into neighbouring states, and now risks a direct confrontation between Russia and the United States. In a[empting to resolve the Syrian civil war, the international community confronts two major points of dispute: the Assad regime and ISIS. While the West blames the Assad government for the disarray in Syria and the quick takeover of ISIS, Russia claims ISIS is the root problem and that the organisation's defeat will follow only from a united effort with the current Syrian leader.

Although the complexities of the civil war and viable solutions extend well beyond these two issues, the potentially positive or negative effects of foreign involvement on the Syrian conflict hinge upon reaching agreement on these two principal issues. Cooperation on Syria between the West and Russia seems unlikely. The consequence of a protracted conflict in Syria could include an escalation in violence and scale, potentially leading to a regional Shia-Sunni conflict with the U.S. and Russia fighting a proxy war along sectarian lines (Jenkins, 2014: 3).

Russia’s Strategic Interests

Russia’s involvement in Syria stems from an engrained interest in preserving the Assad regime. The two nations have a protracted history of relations. Since 1971, Russia has maintained a naval base in Tartus: a port city on Syria’s Mediterranean coast (Gardner, 2012). In addition to preserving and allegedly expanding this base, Russia also has been the Assad regime’s primary arms supplier since 1956 (Bodner, 2015). For example, in 2009, Russia received roughly $162 million USD for its arms sales to Syria (Yan, 2013). According to Jeffrey Mankoff of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Syrian contracts with the Russian defence industry are worth around $4 billion USD (Yan, 2013). Furthermore, Russia has extensive commercial investments in Syria, including oil and gas infrastructure (Chance, 2015).

This history of Russian-Syrian relations affects Russian policy towards the war-torn state. Currently, Russia’s goal is to maintain positive ties with a long time and tactical regional ally (Jenkins, 2014: 1). In an effort to preserve the Assad regime, Russian President Vladimir Putin previously a[empted to shield the Syrian leader from both UN action and Western airstrikes (Reuters, 2015a).

The desire to maintain positive relations with Assad is twofold. First, the survival of the Assad regime provides Moscow with a steady income. The Russian economy is in a recession due to the collapse of oil prices and the imposed economic sanctions for Moscow’s involvement in Ukraine (Galustian and Karasik, 2015). The funds received from Russia’s arms sales to Syria are vital to Russia’s economic growth. Second, Russia seeks to preserve its naval base in Tartus. Tartus is the point of entry for arms and other military equipment into Syria. Tartus provides Russia with a logistical advantage lacked by the West.

More importantly, Russia values Tartus because it allows Moscow to maintain a presence in the eastern Mediterranean. A greater Russian presence in the eastern Mediterranean facilitates the growth of Moscow’s regional importance and global status. The overthrow of Assad and the installation of a democratic and assumedly pro-Western government would rob Russia of its entry point into regional supremacy.

The Russia-Iran Relationship

Russia also has an interest in maintaining its symbiotic relationship with Iran. Similar to Moscow, Tehran is a long time supporter of the Assad regime. Currently, a Shia-based minority rules Syria despite the country’s Sunni majority. Iran is opposed to the idea of a Sunni-ruled Syria. Syria is also of strategic importance to Iran in its engagement against Israel. Iran uses Syria to funnel weapons to Hezbollah (Yan, 2013). The fall of Assad and the installation of a pro-Western government would mean the loss of an Iranian regional ally.

Although Russo-Iranian relations have not been historically amiable, the two states are now strategic allies with a common enemy in the West. The two countries are in a bilateral relationship for mutually assured national security, trade partnerships, and the prevention of U.S. hegemony (Shaffer, 2001: xi). The increased regional power of the U.S. also means the increased regional power of Saudi Arabia—Iran’s principal regional rival. Therefore, in order to maintain not only a positive but also an advantageous relationship with Iran, Russia must continue to support the Assad regime.

Additionally, albeit seemingly less influential upon Russian Syria policy, is the ma[er of ISIS. The unprecedented and rapid spread of the ISIS threat has elicited concern among most members of the international community; Russia is no exception. The group’s reputation for expertly utilising social media to recruit record numbers of foreign fighters, many of whom are Russian (Bora, 2015), and its swift territorial, economic, and social success in both Iraq and Syria makes it dangerous to any party with hopes of becoming a regional powerhouse. Furthermore, ISIS threatens the longevity of the Assad regime. Therefore, it is well within Russian interests to pursue the defeat of ISIS.

Western Strategic Interests

The United States

Like Russia, the United States and many of its Western allies are more interested in the eventual post conflict scenario than in the resolution of the conflict. The United States has three key interests in the following order of importance: enhancing its regional authority, averting the spread of both Russian and Iranian regional influence, and the defeat of ISIS.

The United States has deemed the removal of Assad a crucial precondition to increasing its influence in the Middle East. Regime change in Syria could pave the way for a new democratic government that could be persuaded to support Western interests. Having another regional ally is vital to the promotion of Western interests in the Middle East.

The United States also anticipates that the departure of Assad will weaken the relative strength of both Russia and Iran. Damascus is Tehran’s only regional ally. Many view Iran to be the West’s, and particularly Washington’s, greatest threat. Removing Assad undoubtedly will weaken Iran and reciprocally strengthen Saudi Arabia. Because Assad has generous backing from Russia, eager to propagate its global footprint, the fall of the dictator could mark a significant setback to Russia’s goal of a[aining both regional and global prominence. In pursuit of Assad’s removal, the West, Israel, and Saudi Arabia have armed, trained, and financed moderate opposition forces. In particular, the United States supports the main opposition alliance in Syria, the National Coalition (BBC News, 2015d).

Much of Washington’s recent military activity in Syria has been focused on defeating ISIS. To this end, the U.S. is leading an international coalition to combat the terrorist group. Therefore it is, without question, in the interests of the U.S. and its Western allies to root out ISIS from Syria and the region. However, the U.S.’ current tactical approach of air strikes against ISIS targets has been only marginally effective. ISIS poses both a national security risk, and threatens Western interests in the Middle East through its destabilisation effect and its non- democratic ambitions.

The European Union (EU)

Stability within the Syrian state is of strategic significance to the EU. The conflict has led to a major refugee crisis that not only affects the states immediately bordering Syria, but also has spread to EU member states and beyond. If the Syrian conflict persists or worsens, the EU is concerned about an increased flow of refugees, the uncontrolled transfer of weapons, and the threat of returning foreign fighters (Pierini, 2014). Just as the United States has called for the removal of Assad and the dismantling of ISIS, so has the EU. The EU supports a political solution to the conflict through working with organisations like the UN, the League of Arab States, and other international actors (European Union External Action, 2015).

So far, participation by EU member states in the Syrian civil war has been limited. Immediately following the onset of the Syrian civil war, the EU suspended all bilateral cooperation with the Syrian government (European Union External Action, 2015). EU member states mostly have contributed development and humanitarian assistance (Pierini, 2014) valued at over 3 billion euros (European Union External Action, 2015). The migration cricis has brought the Syrian conflict to the top of the European agenda, opening discussion for greater involvement by Brussels in the conflict.

The Other Players

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States

Riyadh, like most Gulf States, vies for the removal of Assad (Reuters, 2015b). Similar to its Western allies, Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) blame ISIS’ swift success and the worsening situation in Syria on the lack of a stable central authority in the country (Reuters, 2015b). The GCC, consisting of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar, has stated that it supports a political solution in Syria without foreign involvement (Maclean, 2015).

As a Sunni-majority nation and a regional competitor to the Shia- majority Iran, Saudi Arabia also has a deep-seeded desire to aid the Sunni-majority Syrian opposition in defeating the Alawite Shia government. Currently, Saudi Arabia provides military and monetary assistance to several anti-Assad rebel groups (BBC News, 2015d).

Saudi Arabia also is a member of the coalition air campaign against ISIS (BBC News, 2015d). The United States, as the leader of the coalition, values its tactical relationship with Saudi Arabia. Just as Russia has a vested interest in maintaining its symbiotic relationship with Iran, the U.S. also has a vested interest in maintaining its strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia. The desire to preserve such a relationship undoubtedly plays into the U.S.’ push for the removal of Assad.

Turkey and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Turkey has heavily criticized the Assad regime since the start of the civil war. Ankara has provided support to the Syrian opposition forces, and is a participant in the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS (BBC News, 2015d). However, the Turkish role in comba[ing ISIS and Assad has been hampered by its staunch oppostion to arming its Kurdish population as a means to defeating both threats. Ankara’s position in the conflict is further complicated by the 2 million refugees that the conflict has pushed into Turkey (BBC News, 2015d). 

After Russia began its airstrikes in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime, a few of its aircraft reportedly have crossed over into Turkish airspace (Ezro, 2015). Russia claimed this violation was merely an accident due to bad weather (Ezro, 2015). Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdo?an, has stated that his nation will not tolerate any further Russian violations of its airspace, and that such actions risk NATO involvement and a quick deteriation of the Turkish-Russian relationship (Ezro, 2015). As Turkey is a member of NATO, the organisation has condemned Russia for its violation of Turkish airspace, and for its airstrikes in Syria (Shaheen, 2015).

Although Turkey and Russia have a history of tension, relations over the past few decades have been cooperative in nature (Ezro, 2015). The two states share an estensive trade, immigration, and energy relationship (Ezro, 2015). Russia imports roughly 60% of Turkey’s natural gas, making Turkey dependant upon the continuation of positive ties (Ezro, 2015). In an effort to combat ISIS, Russia has also publically indicated that it will soon support Turkey’s Kurdish People's Protection Units; an organisation that Turkey viwes as terrorists (Ezro, 2015). Turkey has nearly 1 million Kurds living within its borders. The Kurds have always vied for their own state, and an armed Kurdish population would threaten the Turkish state. If relations sour between Russia and Turkey, Russia may follow through on its proposition to arm the Turkish Kurds. Although Erdogan has taken a strong verbal stance against Russia’s violation of its airspace, he likely will be more conservitive if it comes to pledging Turkish or NATO military action against Russia.

Syria’s Neighbours

Israel’s primary concern with the Syrian civil war is the Syrian transfer of arms to the Lebanon-based organisation, Hezbollah (Levite, 2014). As previouly discussed, Iran is suspected of using Syria to funnel weapons to Hezbollah. Syria’s relationship with Iran and its supposed support of Hezbollah makes Israel a proponent of Assad’s removal. Russia’s recent airstrikes have made Israel incrasingly concerned about the threat of Iran. Despite this, Israel has made an effort not to condemn Russian airstrikes, unlike the United States and NATO (Harel, 2015). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke with Russian officials to ensure that both states will avoid direct clashes during their independent manovers in Syria (Harel, 2015). Israel drew a red-line at the discovery of any actor caught using Syrian territory to transfer nuclear weapons to Hezbollah, and promised to take defenseive action in such a senairo (Harel, 2015).

Both Jordan and Lebanon are experiencing the effects of conflict spill over. Already, these two states suffer a refugee crisis, and an increased threat from foreign fighters. Jordan and Lebanon are also members of the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS and are facing an increasingly fragile security, economic, humanitarian, and political climate as the Syrian conflict worsens (BBC News, 2015e; Muasher, 2014). Beyond suffering the acute consequences of conflict spillover, Lebonon has not actively involved itself on either side of the war.

Jordan, too, has been relatively quiet, although not to the extent of Lebanon. Jordan and Syria always have clashed on their political outlooks and regularly supported opposing policies (Muasher, 2014). Jordan has been a partner to the United States and and other parties to resolve the Arab-Israli conflict, in contrast to Syria’s supposed support of Hezbollah, which is a primary actor within the conflict (Muasher, 2014). Despite this, the fact that the two states share a border means that they also share extensive commercial ties (Muasher, 2014). Therefore, for most of the conflict, Jordan has avoided directly confronting the Assad regime (Muasher, 2014). However, a reluctance to take a bold stance against Assad has not prevented Jordan from quietly providing a ‘staging ground’ for rebels to conduct their operations (Hubbard, 2014). So far, Jordan has not commented publicly on Russian airstrikes in Syria.

The Unlikely Feat of Cooperation

Cooperation in Syria depends upon the ability of all parties to agree on two pivotal issues: Assad’s reign and ISIS. Given the vastly different strategic interests of Russia and the West in Syria, an effective cooperative effort seems unlikely.

As the “root of all evil” and a hindrance to the regional interests of the United States and its allies, these powers argue that Assad must go. Conversely, Russia contends that ISIS is the greatest menace to Syria and any solution to the issue must involve Syria’s legitimate ruling authority, Bashar al-Assad (BBC News, 2015b). Furthermore, Russia is pushing for a conflict-resolution that involves a negotiated se[lement between Assad and the main opposition parties (Galustian and Karasik, 2015). According to Putin, "The Syrian president...agrees... [to] holding early elections, parliamentary elections, and establishing contact with the so-called 'healthy' opposition, bringing them into governing" (Galustian and Karasik, 2015). The West also is seeking an “inclusive” post-Assad Syrian government, but “inclusive” refers to the highly fractionalized rebel groups vying for command and not to a power-sharing agreement between the current regime and opposition forces (Babich, 2015). Unsurprisingly, the West has yet to budge on its ‘no Assad’ posture, and does not show signs of yielding.

The issue of ISIS seems to be the only area where Russian and Western interests overlap in Syria. Here, we can expect the greatest number of concessions on both sides, such as joint military operations and intelligence sharing. Unfortunately, any collaborative efforts at degrading ISIS will be hindered by Russia’s unwillingness to exclude Assad from the process. Currently, Moscow is proposing that the two sides form a grand coalition against ISIS (Reuters, 2015b). This fundamental gap in expectations for a post-conflict Syria makes any cooperative agreement seem unlikely.

Russia’s veto power in the U.N. Security Council allows Putin to block all unwelcome action against the Assad regime. In effect, this forces the U.S. and other interested Western powers to pursue policy change through intervention without the backing of the international community. This places the U.S. in a particularly precarious position of balancing its interests for regional hegemony through the strategic ousting of Assad with its fear of becoming entangled in a deadly, expensive, and unpopular war in Syria as it did not too long ago in Iraq.

The Russian Military Build-up and Pro-Assad Airstrikes

For decades, Russia has conducted multi-annual naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea (Harress, 2015). The export of heavy military equipment to Syria began in 2010 (Bodner, 2015) and in 2012 Russia revamped its naval presence in the Mediterranean (Harress, 2015). This military expansion piqued Western interest, but did not cause sufficient concern with international bodies to warrant action. However, Russia’s significantly augmented military presence in Syria in early September 2015 unquestionably has alarmed the West. There are reports that Russia is now using drones to conduct surveillance missions over Syria (Solomon and Dagher, 2015). Other sources suggest that Russian military personnel arriving in Syria are intended not only as advisors, but also as front line soldiers (Barmin, 2015).

Recently published satellite photos showing construction at two Syrian military bases provoked concern in the West. Officials were alarmed by the possibility of Russian preparation for offensive action in Syria (Nissenbaum and Lee, 2015). In response to the accusations, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denied the alleged increase of Russian forces (Marples, 2015). The U.S. also has declared the manoeuvre to be merely a defensive move for the protection of Russia’s in-country forces (BBC News, 2015a). The U.S.’ decree likely is an a[empt to maintain positive relations as the two sides deliberate over cooperative action in Syria. While this is indubitably a positive indication for cooperative efforts, it is more likely that recent Russian activity in Syria will increase Western distrust of Russian intentions and prevent the realisation of any lasting cooperative action.

On September 30, 2015 Russia began airstrikes in Syria. Not long after, Russia also commenced long- range cruise missiles strikes fired from warships stationed in the Caspian Sea (Marcus, 2015b). These strikes began just two days after Putin’s address to the UN general assembly, in which he called efforts at comba[ing the ISIS threat without the Syrian President “an enormous mistake” (Washington Post, 2015). Although Putin claimed that these airstrikes were intended to target ISIS, the United States averred that over 90% of Russian airstrikes to date have not hit any ISIS targets (The Guardian, 2015). Instead, the airstrikes have targeted anti-Assad moderate rebel forces, some of whom are supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Hodge et al., 2015). Aside from verbal condemnation by the U.S. and its allies, no state or international organisation has yet reciprocated for Russia’s intervention.

Russia’s End Game

Speculation on Russian intentions in Syria varies widely. Russia seems to be pursuing both its diplomatic option, increasing discussions with the international community on a collective solution, and its military option, increasing its presence on the ground in Syria (Kozhanov, 2015). The question is not only what is Russia doing, but why is Russia doing it.

Some hazard that Russia’s military build-up is a gambit to force negotiations with the U.S. (Trenin, 2015). U.S. Senator John McCain has stated that Putin is a[empting to force the United States to choose between the defeat of ISIS and the defeat of Assad (Pengelly, 2015). Senator McCain is not alone in this belief; analyst Michale Kofman of the CAN Corporation argues that Russia is trying to remove the rebel threat to the Assad regime while simulteanously “...legitimizing his forces as part of an anti-ISIS coalition. In the future, Russia likely will seek European support for a new political process, and try to force the U.S. to come on board” (Marcus, 2015b). The sucessful inclusion of EU member states, the United States, and other key international palyers into the Syrian conflict se[lement process will mean that Russia and Iran will have inserted themselves as equals into the process, regardless of Assad’s retainment of power (Marcus, 2015b).

Others speculate that Putin is trying to divert a[ention from Ukraine (Borik, 2015). Russia’s involvement in the la[er conflict has marred its reputation. Russia has no desire to fight a war on two fronts and, slowly but surely, Moscow has been distancing itself from the Ukrainian conflict (Golts, 2015). It is possible that Putin is engaging in a new war to distract from Russia’s exit in Ukraine (Golts, 2015). Making Russia a key player in the resolution of the Syrian civil war could restore Moscow’s image, and increase the value of Russian involvement in international affairs (Borik, 2015). Some experts have gone as far as to say that Russia is a[empting to barter concessions on Syria for free reign in Ukraine or, at the very least, the lifting of Western economic sanctions (Fisher, 2015; Marples, 2015).

Conclusion

The Syrian civil war, which is unprecedented in its complexity due to the three-way conflict between the Assad government, rebel forces, and ISIS, is but the most recent standoff between Russia and the West. Russian interests in preserving Syria’s current ruling regime directly conflict with Western interests and have led to a suspected Russian military build-up and the start of airstrikes against both ISIS and anti-Assad forces in Syria. The U.S. has warned Russia of repercussions for intervention because, in the eyes of the West, Assad is no longer the legitimate authority in Syria (Lukyanov, 2015). Thus far, the U.S. and its allies have not taken action against Russia for its airstrikes. Now, the United States and Russia share airspace on two different sides of the war. While some fear the potential for a proxy war between the two great powers, others claim the proxy war has begun already.

Despite warnings against Russian intervention, the West also has interposed through the arming, training, and funding of moderate opposition forces. To Western dismay, this intervention has not produced the sought results. In a testimony to the Senate Armed Services Commi[ee, a U.S. general admi[ed that the U.S.’ 500 million USD effort to train roughly 5,000 Syrian rebels had failed; only about 4 or 5 U.S.-trained Syrian soldiers have been deployed into ba[le (Urban, 2015). On October 9, 2015 the Obama administration halted this program (Shear, Cooper and Schmi[, 2015). Instead, the unspent funds now will be used ‘to provide lethal aid’ to rebel groups already engaged against ISIS (Shear, Cooper and Schmi[, 2015).

Tensions are high between Washington and Moscow because the conflict could either result in cooperative international efforts or, if cooperation breaks down, in the direct clash of Russian and U.S. missions in Syria. Given the tainted history of Western-Russian interactions and the rising tensions of Russia’s recently commenced airstrikes, it is not difficult to imagine a quick escalation from skirmishes to a Russo-American proxy war (Fisher, 2015).

Conclusions for Policy

Western failure to resolve the Syrian civil conflict and stop ISIS suggests that the West could be inclined to pursue a cooperative solution with Russia. Rhetoric by both sides indicates a substantial interest in cooperating on efforts to defeat ISIS. However, it also appears that both parties are unwilling to compromise on the fate of the Assad regime. The ability of the two sides to agree upon the fate of Assad largely will determine the potential for cooperation and could prevent a U.S.-Russian proxy war.

Russia and the West’s hope for reaching a cooperative peace strategy likely hinges on Russia’s ability to leverage the defeat of ISIS. Both sides agree that ISIS is a menace that must be eradicated. However, the U.S. has engaged in more military operations against ISIS than Russia, and Washington has limited efforts to remove Assad from power. This could indicate the relative value of defeating ISIS to the removal of Assad on the U.S. policy agenda, thereby signifying a Western willingness to make concessions.

At the same time, it is unclear if Russia is able and willing to sustain long term involvement in the conflict should cooperation fail, particularly if such participation includes direct clashes with the U.S. military. Russia is already fighting one war in Ukraine, and the deteriorating security climate in Afghanistan has the potential to pull Moscow into another conflict. If the U.S. can convince Russia that sustained involvement in Syria is not advantageous, Moscow also may be willing to compromise. However, Russia has demonstrated an ability to execute bold and strategic manoeuvres. It is therefore unlikely that Moscow would insert itself into the Syrian conflict if Russian military planners did not feel confident the country could endure the strain.

There have been previous instances of U.S.-Russian cooperation, such as the Moscow-negotiated surrender of Assad’s chemical weapons (Marcus, 2015a). However, the surrender of Assad’s chemical weapons did not come at the cost of Russian interests. Any collective international effort at resolving the Syrian crisis is going to require one of the two parties to concede. Given the weight of the national interests behind both the West and Russia’s respective positions, it seems unlikely that an agreement on cooperative action can be reached. If the West does not concede first, allowing Assad to retain power, then cooperative action through Russian concession is likely to require a Western promise for some amount of Russian influence in a post-Assad Syria (Kozhanov, 2015). It is unclear if the West is prepared to offer such a compromise, if any. At the end of September 2015, Putin travelled to New York to address the UN General Assembly (Babich, 2015). Putin had stated that he intended to use this meeting to discuss a collaborative international solution both to the Syrian conflict, and the threat of ISIS (Golts, 2015). Yet, he mostly discussed the imperative to cooperate with the Syrian regime. Prior to the onset of Russian airstrikes in Syria, talks on cooperative efforts mostly involved discussions of a political solution that may or may not involve President Assad. The commencement of Russian airstrikes has shifted the debate from talks of cooperation to that of conflict deterrence. Although the United States and Russia have yet to clash directly in Syria, preventing skirmishes between the two sides seems less likely with each passing day.