Nuclear Materials Smuggling in Moldova: A Watershed Moment?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past five years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has helped Moldovan authorities to interrupt at least four attempts by smugglers, including one with suspected connections to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), to sell radioactive and dual-use materials to potential buyers. The latter attempt is especially worrisome because it has fulfilled a long-feared scenario in which organized criminal gangs are trying to link up with enemies of the West such as, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Al Qaeda - both of which have made clear their ambition to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In light of such determination, states in possession of nuclear and non-nuclear materials should be encouraged, at a minimum, to adhere to stringent material security standards and undergo relevant security culture awareness training.

Introduction

At the first Democratic presidential debate on October 13, 2015 candidate Hilary Clinton identified nuclear proliferation as a “top national security threat” - and not without reason (Neuhauser). According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), from 1993 to 2013 there were at least 16 “confirmed incidents” involving the “unauthorized possession of highly enriched uranium [HEU] or plutonium,” the key components of an atomic bomb, including “attempts to sell or traffic these [dual-use] materials across international borders” (Neuhauser). Perhaps even more critical than this “irrefutable evidence of a security failure,” is the observation that “nearly all of the stolen [HEU] and plutonium that has been seized over the years had never been missed when it was originally stolen” (Neuhauser; Bass). These figures are especially problematic given the numerous attempts at nuclear materials smuggling in Russia and other former Soviet states. Most recently, over the past five years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has helped Moldovan authorities to interrupt at least four attempts by smugglers, including one with suspected connections to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), to sell radioactive and dual-use materials to potential buyers (Butler, Ghirda).

Radioactive materials, such as Cesium- 137, may be used to construct a radiation dispersal device (RRD), commonly known as a “dirty bomb.” Some observers are skeptical of the dangers posed by such devices, even in terrorist hands. In this view, the main hurdle to its construction by non-state actors is “the simple physics” (Neuhauser). Even if a terrorist organization had managed to fashion a RRD, the argument continues, its detonation would not “pose a substantial danger beyond the conventional blast and the psychological effect... there would be no real health threat from the radioactive component” (Conca). Moreover, argues Al Mauroni, Director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies, “there has never been a detonated dirty bomb in history. Ever (Mauroni). However, reasons for concern remain.

Terrorists - including those affiliated with Al Qaeda and other organizations - have expressed interest in and have attempted to obtain nuclear materials and other WMD (Mowatt-Larssen; Butler, Ghirda). Once obtained, it would be relatively easy to construct, transport, and detonate a crude nuclear explosive device (Bunn, Wier). For a state- sponsored program, the difficulty in constructing a nuclear weapon lies first in legally acquiring the requisite nuclear material, and, later, in the miniaturization required to mount a nuclear warhead atop a guided missile. Non-state actors are not bound by such considerations. Why risk losing control of additional radiological materials, when the IAEA already has reported 664 incidents of theft or loss of nuclear or radiological materials between 1993 and 2013 (Perez, et. al.)?

Nuclear Materials Smuggling in Moldova

The most alarming of the recently uncovered attempts at nuclear materials smuggling in Moldova occurred in 2011. In that case, a mid-level associate of a Russian man named Alexandr Agheenco, a smuggler with purported links to the FSB, “was recorded arranging the sale of bomb-grade uranium, U-235, and blueprints for a dirty bomb to a man in Sudan” (Butler, Ghirda). Tests of the seized material “confirmed that it was high-grade material that could be used in a nuclear bomb” (Butler, Ghirda). In addition to the HEU and RRD schematics, the potential buyer, Yosif Faisal Ibrahim, also was interested in obtaining “attack helicopters and armored personnel carriers” according to contracts found by investigators (Butler, Ghirda).

Authorities could not determine who was behind Ibrahim, or why he was seeking nuclear materials. The murkiness of this account may prompt doubts regarding the severity of the threat.

It is unclear whether this and the other attempted materials trafficking cases in Moldova are indicative of widespread nuclear smuggling operations. However, the 2011 incident is not the first time a non-state actor in Sudan had attempted illicitly to obtain weapons- useable materials. Al Qaeda began its efforts to acquire such material in the early 1990s. While Osama bin Laden was living in Sudan, his aides received word that a Sudanese military officer was offering to sell weapons-grade uranium. Bin Laden was willing to pay full price for the material: $1.5 million USD. After the purchase, however, al Qaeda members realized that they had been scammed. This failure did not dissuade Bin Laden from making another attempt to obtain nuclear and WMD in the spring of 2001 (Graham, Talent). The 2011 case in Moldova fulfilled a long-feared scenario in which organized criminal gangs are trying to link up with enemies of the West such as, ISIS and Al Qaeda - both of which have made clear their ambition to use WMD (Anderson). The fact that the remaining Moldovan smuggling cases involved materials unsuitable for constructing either RRDs, or WMDs should not detract from the severity of this instance.

The “Other” Smuggling Cases

The remaining three Moldovan smuggling cases, in August 2010, mid- 2014, and February 2015, all involved either materials inappropriate for making either RRDs, or WMDs. Nevertheless, they too raise troubling questions regarding sensitive material security. In the August 2010 case, police seized 1.8 kilograms of uranium 238, known as yellowcake, from a garage in Chisinau, Moldova. Although this type of uranium “would be difficult to turn into a bomb”, the foiled smuggling attempt featured other distressing aspects (Butler, Ghirda). Namely, two of the individuals arrested were officers in the former Soviet army (Perez). And, Moldovan authorities suspected that the uranium originated from the melted down Chernobyl reactor in Ukraine. Attempts by FBI and Moldovan law enforcement to inform Ukrainian authorities of that fact went unanswered (Butler, Ghirda).

The mid-2014 and February 2015 smuggling cases interrupted by the FBI and Moldovan authorities both featured attempts to sell cesium and uranium unsuitable for building RRDs or WMDs (Conca). Some view this outcome as a reason not to fear nuclear materials smuggling (Conca; Mauroni). However, improving nuclear security, and being aware of the materials in authorized custody should be strongly encouraged among all states possessing either nuclear weapons, or nuclear materials. Ukrainian authorities‘ failure to respond to findings that the interdicted material in the August 2010 case was of Ukrainian origin is alarming. Their nonresponse is unfortunately, not unique.

The Russian Perspective

Another illustrative incident involves the interdiction in June 2011 of a criminal syndicate, whose members (including Russian nationals) attempted to sell at least 4.4 kilograms of Russian- origin HEU in North Africa.1 Russian officials’ categorical dismissal of the U.S. finding identifying the HEU as being of Russian origin (Digges) was remarkably similar to Moscow’s response to an earlier incident in 2006, when a Russian national attempted to smuggle 100 grams of weapons-grade uranium over the Russia-Georgia border.2 These incidents of attempted Russian nuclear materials smuggling highlight several points. First, Ukrainian officials are not alone in loathing to admit that materials supposedly secure in their custody may be less so. Second, observers who attribute Moscow’s apparent unconcern for nuclear material smuggling to the recent downturn in U.S.-Russian ties following Moscow’s involvement in Ukraine and Moscow’s de-prioritization of tangible nuclear security cooperation with Washington are mistaken (Conca; Butler, Ghirda.) Such a dismissive attitude towards nuclear materials security on the part of Moscow and Kiev predates both the crisis in Ukraine and the subsequent sharp decline in U.S.- Russian ties.

Conclusion

The repeated attempts to smuggle fissile and non-fissile materials suggest that demand for such items exists. Terrorists and other non-state actors have expressed an interest in building RRDs and WMDs. The 2011 case in Moldova fulfilled a long-feared scenario of organized criminal gangs trying to link up with enemies of the West such as, ISIS and Al Qaeda. Yes, not all smuggled materials are suitable for building RRDs and/or WMDs. But, especially in light of the dismissive attitude towards nuclear security in some FSU states, should the international community simply wait for smugglers and terrorists to “get it right”? On the contrary, all states in possession of nuclear and non- nuclear materials should be encouraged at a minimum to adhere to stringent material security standards and undergo relevant security culture awareness training.

CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY

• Law enforcement officers in economically fragile states should be offered anti-bribery and anti-corruption training, as well as training in how to conduct proper sting investigations. These activities could bolster their capabilities not only to arrest select smugglers, but to terminate an entire smuggling ring effectively.
• In the event of future smuggling incidents, thorough investigative reporting should be conducted to preclude the publication of spurious information regarding the events.
• All states in possession of nuclear and non-nuclear materials should be encouraged, at a minimum, to adhere to stringent material security standards and undergo relevant security culture awareness training.

Elizabeth Zolotukhina is a Senior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. She may be contacted at elizabeth.zolotukhina@cgsrs.org

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