Internet Censorship in Russia: Citizens’ Responses and the Kremlin’s Aims

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Online censorship is a novel phenomenon in Russia. Especially following Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin has endeavoured to reverse that trend. Several legislative acts and amendments governing the censorship of online content have been passed. The public response to the measures has been diverse. The Kremlin seeks to augment its control of the internet to rival that which it currently exerts over traditional media as internet penetration increases in Russia.

Introduction

Censorship of the Russian internet is a relatively new phenomenon. Until 2012 - the year after Moscow was rocked by street protests - internet freedom in the country was unimpeded (Mcmillan). That year, a law on “protecting minors from information that may harm their health and development” was amended to include a list of websites featuring “forbidden information.” The amended legislation became known as “the blacklist law” or “the law on Internet censorship” (Turovsky). A previously unknown government agency - Russia’s Federal Supervision Agency for Information Technologies and Communications, or Roskomnadzor, was one of those tasked with overseeing online and media content and enforcing relevant legislation. In 2014, following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and the onset of conflict in Ukraine, additional legislation was adopted “preventing the dissemination of ‘extremism’ online and expanding the authorities’ surveillance powers” (Okrest). Most worryingly, since the Russian government defines what constitutes “extremism”, the result has been “a chilling effect on free speech”, and self-censorship (Bernard; Kelly). 

ANALYSIS

Roskomnadzor administers a central list of blocked sites (Mcmillan). The agency, along with others responsible for enforcing the blacklist law and the related legislation on “extremism”, has “the authority to make decisions about blocking various types of information... [with or] without a court order” (Kelly). In all, the following content can be removed: information about suicide, drug propaganda, child pornography, information about juvenile victims of crime, materials that violate copyright, content related to extremism, and calls for unsanctioned public actions or rallies (Kelly). Roskomnadzor receives requests to remove online content from three main sources; the courts, state regulatory experts, and citizens (Turovsky). The latter category may be surprising, but a large segment of the Russian public appears to support online censorship, and identifies the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) as the organisation most trusted to regulate the internet (Knauer; Nisbet, Mikati). The content removal process, however, is fraught with challenges.

Foremost among these obstacles is the ambiguity of the legislation governing online censorship. The current legal framework “offers no clear criteria for evaluating the legality of content... and does not specify how [internet service 

providers] ISPs should restrict access” (Kelly). Moreover, authorities frequently “do not offer a detailed explanation for blocking decisions” (Kelly). Failure to remove “offensive” material promptly, especially items deemed “extremist”, may result in criminal prosecution. This circumstance, in part, explains why individuals and organisations are eager to comply with the laws, and do not object to the online censorship. 

One observer even has termed the current system “prior censorship” (Gessen). Most commonly, authorities issue content removal requests, and individuals comply. However, some Russian citizens are so eager to remain “on the right side of the law” that they query Roskomnadzor regarding the legality of their online content. This defensive mechanism may be more understandable when considered in the Russian legal context. Namely, “there are no special laws protecting online modes of expression” (Kelly). Moreover, individuals charged with infringing the censorship legislation should not expect a reprieve from the judicial brach. This is so as “courts tend to side with the executive authorities, refusing to apply provisions of the constitution and international treaties that protect the basic rights of... internet users” (Kelly). 

In such a punitive environment, perhaps the best defence is, unfortunately, to “keep your head down” (Okrest).         Still, how effective is Roskomnadzor in enforcing the various censorship legislation? Unsurprisingly, according to the agency, very effective. An official figure claims that a mere 2.5% of website operators currently fail to block prohibited content (Turovsky). Independent sources point to a decidedly different picture. Due to the ambiguities of the legislation governing censorship, ISPs responsible for complying with blocking orders “carry out the widest blocking possible”, including sites against which the authorities have no complaints (Kelly). At the personnel level, there are concerns that officials issuing requests to ban content are incompetent, and lack the necessary software (Okrest). These handicaps, however, have not rendered the blocking orders empty threats. Conversely, precisely because there is no accountability for which sites are blocked, the threat of a blocking order is that much more unpredictable (Mcmillan). So, why are Russian citizens so seemingly complacent in the face of such a formidable challenge?      

As mentioned above, some Russian citizens do not protest the over-regulated nature of the internet due to “fear of getting in trouble, either with the law, or with peers, neighbors, or family” (Pfeifer; Okrest). However, the majority are ambivalent, and “certainly do not see [the legislation] as an attempt to restrict their right of access to information” (Sinelschikova). Such individuals would be unlikely to use TOR, an encryption protocol intended to safeguard online privacy. Indeed, TOR use in Russia is extremely low at just .01% of all online users (Okrest). Nevertheless, self-censorship and ambivalence only partially explain the complacency of Russian internet users. 

Another factor which can account for this complacency is consistent and stable support of censorship policies (Sinelschikova). A poll of 1,600 Russians by the Internet Policy Observatory found that 49% of respondents believed that content related to homosexuality and anti-government protests should be blocked by authorities (Nisbet, Mikati). The overlap between those topics and those banned by the internet censorship legislation is not coincidental.  

Television, heavily dominated and controlled by the Kremlin, is the main news source for 84% of the population, and trusted by 90% (Nisbet, Mikati). It is perhaps unsurprising that citizens exposed almost exclusively to Putin’s wary attitude towards the internet, including his belief that the web is a “CIA project”, could begin to view the internet as “a source of a vague threat” (Pfeifer; Sinelschikova). So pervasive is this sense of threat that another poll of those who back online censorship in Russia found that 38% of respondents do not use the internet at all (Sinelschikova). For these individuals, widespread censorship becomes the preferred solution to a perceived threat many may not fully comprehend. 

Capitalising on the fear mongering atmosphere it has created, the Kremlin has adopted a paternalistic stance on internet censorship. The official argument posits that the aim is to protect individuals from materials they themselves view as harmful - not to restrict access arbitrarily to online content. In reality, Moscow’s censorship policies have not only cowed citizens into silence, but also are likely to expand as “the Internet becomes more widely used [in Russia] and begins to rival television in its reach (Pfeifer).   

Conclusion

Unlike elsewhere, internet in Russia has not always been subject to censorship. Over the last two years, especially following Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin has sought to reverse that trend via the passage of several legislative acts and amendments. Despite implementation hurdles, the enforcement of the censorship laws has had varying effects on the population. Some have resorted to self-censorship in order to avoid the wrath of the regime. Others, prompted by the fear mongering atmosphere in the widely influential government-controlled regular media, support the censorship efforts. Neither response should obscure what is likely the Kremlin’s true aim: to ensure that Putin’s voice dominates the Russian internet, akin to the regular airwaves. 

CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY

• More Russian companies should be encouraged to purchase connectivity with providers outside the country. Doing so would make it much more difficult for the Kremlin to force those entities offline, than it has been for other governments whose countries only had a few connections to international infrastructure. 
• Russian internet users should be informed of how to use TOR encryption to ensure their privacy online before authorities circumvent that protocol, as well.
• U.S. policymakers should be aware of the nuanced response of Russian citizens to online censorship.

Elizabeth Zolotukhina is a Senior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. She may be contacted at elizabeth.zolotukhina@cgsrs.org

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