Has the Islamic State made the leap from state building to international terrorism?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Investigations into the Metrojet disaster over the Sinai Peninsula concluded that an on-board bomb caused the deadly crash. Immediately following the incident, the Islamic States’ (IS) Egypt affiliate group, Sinai Province, claimed responsibility in the name of retaliation for Russia’s intervention against IS in Syria. While the level of involvement, if any, of IS leadership in the panning of the attack remains unknown, IS’ claim of direct responsibly for the subsequent attacks in Beirut and Paris have lead many to believe IS has made the leap from state building to international terrorism. The veracity of the IS’ claims suggests new implications for the capabilities of IS. and for the future role of both Russia and the West in Syria.

Introduction: The Metrojet Plane Crash

On October 31, 2015, a Russian plane operated by the charter company, Metrojet, was scheduled to travel from Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to St. Petersburg, Russia before it crashed soon after takeoff over the Sinai Peninsula. All 224 people on board died (BBC News, 2015b). The majority of the passengers were Russian. Since the crash, both Russia and the United Kingdom (UK) have suspended all flights to and from the Sharm el-Sheikh International Airport. This suspension has left 20,000 British citizens (Winter, 2015) and 50,000 Russian citizens (BBC News, 2015b) stranded in the Egyptian resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh.

Several nations are participating in the Egyptian-led investigation of the crash, including the UK, the United States (U.S.), France, Germany, and Ireland (Starr and Yan, 2015). Initially, there were reports of mechanical issues, but Hossam Kamal, the Egyptian Civil Aviation Minister, asserts that investigators have not found any indications of on board problems during the flight (BBC News, 2015a). Findings by French air accident investigators have echoed this conclusion, adding that evidence points to the conclusion that the plane’s condition went from normal to nothing “…suggesting a ‘violent, sudden’ explosion” (BBC News, 2015b). 

Ayman el-Muqadem, the head of the Metrojet crash investigation, reported that the plane’s black box revealed an abnormal noise during the last second before the plane crashed (Zarroli, 2015). El-Muqadem says that investigators were exploring a number of possible causes for the crash; "It could be lithium batteries in the luggage of one of the passengers, it could be an explosion in the fuel tank, it could be fatigue in the body of the aircraft, it could be the explosion of something" (Zarroli, 2015).

Despite the initial uncertainty, many of the investigators quickly concluded that a bomb caused the crash. From the beginning, U.S. President Barack Obama called the idea that the crash was caused by a bomb “a possibility” (Starr, Mullen and Hume, 2015). Some U.S. officials asserted that they are “99.9% certain” and find it “likely” that the crash was a direct result of a terrorist bombing (Starr, Mullen and Hume, 2015). Similarly, U.K. officials have reported that their intelligence and investigations support the bombing theory. Likewise, Israel stated that it strongly believes a bomb caused the downing of the plane, although it is not formally participating in the investigation (Williams, 2015).

Early supporting evidence of an on-board bomb includes reports that U.S. military satellites picked up a “heat flash” over the Sinai at approximately the same time as the crash (BBC News, 2015a), the confirmation by Russian investigators that the plane broke up in mid-air  (BBC News, 2015a), and evidence from U.S. and U.K. intelligence agencies of intercepted communication between the Islamic State (IS) and IS’ affiliate group in Egypt, Sinai Province (Starr, Mullen and Hume, 2015). 

Immediately after the crash, Sinai Province publicly claimed responsibility for the attack. Investigators and intelligence agencies have not yet been able to validate their claim. Despite their public assertion, the IS affiliate group failed to provide details to support their allegation. This is uncharacteristic of IS; an organization that often boasts the how, who, and why of its attacks. A few days later, Sinai Province once against claimed responsibility, yet still did not supplement their claim with details. Instead, the group dared Egyptian and Russian investigators to “figure out what happened” (Winter, 2015), and called Russia a “prestigious target” since Moscow began its intervention against IS in Syria (Saleh and Solomon, 2015). A few weeks after the crash, the group produced pictures depicting what they claimed to be the bomb used in the attack. On November 17, 2015 Russia concluded the official investigation and declared that an onboard bomb had downed the Metrojet flight.  

Who is Sinai Province?

Sinai Province is IS’ Egypt-based affiliate group that has operated mostly in northeastern Sinai bordering Gaza since 2011 (Saleh and Solomon, 2015). Prior to pledging support to IS in November 2014 and changing their name, Sinai Province was known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem). Since its inception, Sinai Province has expanded beyond the Sinai, moving into Egypt’s Western Desert (BBC News, 2015c). It is estimated that the IS affiliate group has between 1,000 and 1,500 members (BBC News, 2015c). 

Although only a fraction of the size of its parent organization in Syria, Sinai Province has committed several successful attacks against Egyptian security forces, including an attack on an Egyptian naval vessel in July 2015. While mostly targeting the Egyptian security forces, Sinai Province also has targeted civilians and a foreigner. Unlike some of IS’ other affiliate groups that have pledged support to IS but have continued to operate independently, Sinai Province has used tactics similar to those of the “main” IS in Syria. These include; “…suicide bombers backed up by direct and indirect fire, well-aimed mortars used in combination with small arms, and simultaneous assaults in many places” (BBC News, 2015c). This similarity could indicate increased coordination and greater ties between the two groups, implying greater IS activities and control in Egypt. Analysts are becoming increasingly worried that IS is augmenting its ties to the region by sending financial support and “skilled members” (Saleh and Solomon, 2015).

Implications of a successful Islamic State terrorist attack 

Although investigators have concluded that an onboard bomb caused the crash, Sinai Province’s involvement has not yet been verified. Initially, Russia accused the U.K. of prematurely halting all flights to and from Sharm el-Sheikh on the account of suspected terrorism, and Egypt has been highly skeptical of the notion that terrorism caused the crash. For the sake of its tourism industry, Egypt certainly would not want terrorism to be the cause of the crash. But, Russia’s declaration of a bomb-induced crash and its subsequent increase in airstrikes against IS in Syria show that Moscow now believes that terrorism, specifically conducted by IS, caused the deadly crash. 

 Some experts do not believe that Sinai Province has the resources to carry out such an attack. Others question why Sinai Province would want to invoke the wrath of international forces when its main target to date has been the Egyptian state (BBC News, 2015a). And some, such as CNN terrorism analyst Paul Cruickshank, point out that withholding details of a successful attack is uncharacteristic of IS, particularly when they claim to have just committed one of the most significant terrorist attacks since 9/11 (Starr and Shoichet, 2015). Since his observation, IS has produced a photo that seemingly shows the bomb used to take down the plane, but like their earlier claims of responsibility, this photo has not yet been verified. 

From the early stages of the investigation, the United States has openly stated that the IS affiliate group likely planted a bomb on the plane. After the attack, U.S. and U.K. intelligence agencies intercepted communication in which two members of Sinai Province supposedly discussed plans for something big in the area, although specifics were not mentioned. This led officials to believe that the organisation claiming responsibility is, indeed, responsible  (Harris, 2015; Starr and Marsh, 2015). U.S. officials have made clear that they have not yet found evidence that would support any direct involvement of IS leadership in Syria in the planning of the attack (Starr and Marsh, 2015). In other words, if IS is responsible, U.S. officials currently believe that Sinai Province orchestrated the attack alone, although undoubtedly on behalf of and with the blessing of their parent organisation. 

According to Starr and Shoichet (2015) reporting on U.S. intelligence findings on IS, Sinai Province is one of IS’ most active affiliate organizations with bomb-making capabilities. However, Starr and Shoichet (2015) also comment that the Metrojet bombing would “represent an increase in [Sinai Province’s] sophistication.” Either Sinai Province acted as an opportunistic bandit and took advantage of a tragedy to increase its propaganda, or the organization is true to its word and did bomb the plane. If an IS affiliate has committed the first successful bombing of an aircraft in mid-air, a feat that al-Qaeda has attempted and failed for years, it could be a game changer (Winter 2015). Even though investigators have not yet found evidence of coordination between IS and its affiliate in Egypt, Winter (2015) writes: 

…the ability to pull off an operation like this could be a boon of Isis’s “caliphate” model and the internationalised operational capabilities it presents. Hypothetically speaking, the attack could have been planned by Isis in Syria, the bomb could have been built by Isis in Egypt, and the operative who smuggled it on board could have been from Isis’s Russian affiliate. 

A widening of IS’ regional influence, or a widening of its self-proclaimed Caliphate, could expand its sources of funding and criminal networks, increase its manpower, and make it all the harder to root out. Furthermore, until now, IS has been primarily focused on expanding and holding the territory under its Caliphate, not in conducting international terrorism. So far, its acts of terrorism have been limited to the violent and oppressive treatment of those within its lands, whether they be captured foreigners, local civilians, or individuals belonging to hostile military and armed rebel groups. Previously, IS has only urged its affiliates and ‘lone wolf’ actors to strike at western targets, but has not directly orchestrated an attack itself. While the bombing could still be an IS-inspired attack by Sinai Province, if IS did orchestrate the bombing of the downed Russian plane, this would be its first act of international terrorism. 

Although IS’ direct involvement may have been in doubt prior to the bombing of the Russian plane, recent events suggest that IS may have shifted their “game plan” and now possess the desire and capability to orchestrate acts of international terrorism. Since IS’ suspected responsibility for the bombing of the Russian plane, IS has also claimed responsibility for twin bombings in Beirut, Lebanon, and a series of coordinated attacks in Paris, France. Following the November 13, 2015 attacks in Paris, IS posted videos threatening to commit similar attacks against all countries participating in airstrikes against the group in Syria. 

Hitherto, what has separated IS from organizations like al-Qaeda has been its lack of participation in international terrorism. If IS’ claim of responsibility for both the Metrojet flight bombing and the attacks in Paris are legitimate, IS would now be “on par” with other international terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, although IS has already surpassed its parent organization in many other ways. The cumulative effect of IS’ potential involvement in all three attacks has the potential to change the global security climate.

A Quick Acceptance 

IS promised retaliatory action against Russia for Moscow’s September 2015 intervention in Syria. IS claimed that the Metrojet bombing was an act of retaliation “...in response to Russian air strikes that killed hundreds of Muslims on Syrian land” (Gutterman, 2015). On November 12, 2015 in a video titled “Soon Very Soon the Blood Will Spill like an Ocean,” IS further threatened to attack the Russian homeland (Abdelaziz and Felton, 2015). The video was posted to IS-affiliated social media accounts, and has not yet been authenticated. 

Russia is not the only state IS has threatened. The group also has promised to attack all other nations working against it, claiming the attacks in Paris were a demonstration of what is to come. In Beirut, many believe the attacks in the Shia-majority section of the city were reprisal for Hezbollah’s increased involvement in the Syrian civil war against IS. Given the recent plane bombing and attacks in Paris, both Russia and the West are unlikely to take the threat lightly. Already, Russia and France are taking action under the assumption that IS is responsible for both the Metrojet bombing and the Paris attacks by pledging increased vigor in their “war on IS”. The United States has promised to increase intelligence sharing with France, and the anti-IS coalition also has pledged to intensify their airstrikes.

Russia and the West have been quick to accept IS’ move from state building to international terrorism. Thus far, there has been no definitive evidence of IS’ involvement outside of IS’ claims and patchy intelligence findings. While it is likely that IS did, indeed, orchestrate the three recent terror attacks, the strategic interests of both the West and Russia to fault IS for these attacks must be examined.

As initially stated by President Obama prior to the onset of U.S. airstrikes against IS, the West is a major target of IS’ past and future terror attacks, and "…if unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region” (Coates, 2015). Furthermore, the establishment of a Caliphate threatens U.S. regional allies. IS is undoubtedly an unprecedented global threat, but the West also needs to justify and solidify (and possibly justify an opportunistic increase in) its presence in the Middle East. Post-withdrawal from Iraq, the West, and particularly the United States, has been weary of re-engaging with the region. But the region is still a strategic stronghold for global powers, and with Russia working its way into the region, it becomes more pressing for the West to maintain the lead.

 If IS’ claim of responsibility for the bombing is true, such a swift and deadly repercussion for Russian intervention in Syria makes Moscow appear weak domestically and in the eyes of an already discontented international community. It must act, and it must do so with equal potency and lethality. Furthermore, if France escalates its involvement in Syria, it is likely that Russia assumes its Western allies, such as the U.S. and U.K., will follow. Russia has a vested interest in preserving its position in the Middle East. The only way for Moscow to counter the Western sphere of influence is to increase its own participation in the Middle East.

Greater Russian involvement in Syria can either pave the way for IS defeat, or fuel the looming proxy war between the United States and Russia. Thus far, Russia has clashed with the U.S. and other members of the anti-IS coalition due to Russia’s adamant stance that the Syrian ruler Bashar Al-Assad must be included in the defeat of IS and in the resolution of the Syrian civil war. To add fuel to the fire, other anti-IS coalition member states have accused Russia of conducting more airstrikes against anti-Assad rebel forces than against IS. Some of these anti-Assad rebels had been previously financed, armed, and trained by the United States. If Russia chooses to step up its involvement in Syria, even with its pledged support to the French airstrike campaign, such a move could increase existing tensions between Russia and the United States. A further deterioration in Russo-American relations would depend on whether Russia uses its pledge of increased strikes against IS to surreptitiously increase its strikes against anti-Assad rebels. 

Even though Russia and the United States are on opposite sides of the Syrian civil war, these attacks that targeted both sides provide an opportunity for cooperative action against IS. If Russia’s relative value of Assad’s retained leadership has shifted to favor the defeat of IS in order to prevent acts of terrorism in Russia proper, there may be room for negotiation between the U.S. and Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin also may be hoping that this event creates an opportunity to offer compromise in exchange for an easing of Western sanctions for the Ukrainian conflict without appearing weak domestically. 

Likewise, if the West’s relative value of Assad’s removal is outweighed by the perceived threat of IS, the West may be ultimately willing to drop their demands for a negotiated peace settlement that excludes Assad for the resolution of the Syrian civil war. At least, the West might be willing to defer this demand until IS is defeated; an undoubtedly lengthy operation. Already, at the G-20 Summit in Turkey just following the Paris attacks, it was agreed that a broad  process would serve as the method for peace in Syria (Barnes, 2015). G-20 members, once adamantly opposed to Russian intervention, had “…a noticeable shift to a less-critical tone regarding Russia’s military effort there” (Barnes, 2015). France has been one of President Assad’s greatest naysayers in the international community. If France and Russia are willing to work together despite this fundamental difference, there may be hope for more negotiations in the future. While it is still uncertain whether these agreements were commitments or political maneuvers, the recent terror attacks may have been the push needed to facilitate a genuine cooperative solution to the IS threat. 

The Purpose of Terrorism

The behavior and tactics of terrorism have been well studied. One common finding is that terrorists provoke the adversary with the greater capital, often domestic or foreign governments, into acts of indiscriminate and disproportionate violence against the local populations within which they take refuge. In asymmetric warfare, it is often most effective to prove to the local ‘hearts and minds’ that said terrorist organization, though also violent and undesirable, is still the lesser of two evils. Once a government has been provoked into using disproportionate and indiscriminate violence against a local population, the terrorist organisation subsequently will offer protection, replenishment of damaged resources, and stand as a symbol of indigenous strength in contrast to the destruction wrought by foreign intervention. 

This is likely IS’ new ‘game plan’. In response to IS’ claimed responsibility for the Metrojet flight bombing, Russia has increased its airstrikes in Syria. In response to IS’ claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks, France has injected new vigor into its airstrikes. Although both nations target IS strongholds and facilities, it is inevitable that civilians will be caught in the crossfire, whether through direct casualties or damage to local resources. For example, Raqqa, the unofficial capital of IS’ Caliphate, is still a civilian occupied city. Because it has been subjugated to IS rule, France has hit the city hard with its retaliatory airstrikes. Many lives have been lost in the campaign against IS, strengthening the terrorist group’s pitch as the lesser of two evils. As of August 2015, the anti-IS coalition had conducted 5,700 airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, killing an estimated 459 civilians (Ross, 2015). Nevertheless, a military defeat is an essential component of the overall defeat of IS. But this military defeat must be strategic, proportional, and if needed, enduring.

The purpose of terrorism is policy change, and policy change is what IS is achieving. Not only have some states halted all flights over the Sinai Peninsula, but Russia and France also have altered their level of military commitment in Syria. It is likely that the U.S., U.K., and other members of the anti-IS coalition soon will alter their military involvement in Syria, as well. These attacks also have succeeded in influencing Western perception of Syrian refugees and Muslims living in Western society. Already, many countries have considered or enacted policy change. Many U.S. state governors have voted to refuse Syrian refugees, and some European Union states are calling for a re-evaluation of their refugee policy in light of the recent attacks in Paris. One of the Paris attackers appears to have worked his way across Europe with the flow of refugees. IS has succeeded in inducing hysteria and fear. Now, IS can pitch its Caliphate as a haven for marginalised individuals in Western society. This will both draw in foreign fighters and inspire home grown terrorism.

Conclusion

In order to circumvent IS’ gambit, the international community should advance a strategic multi-pronged approach to defeating the organisation. A strong military component is vital, but an indiscriminate and disproportional retaliation for the recent terrorist attacks only will alienate the local population and fuel IS’ appeal. As previous pitfalls of intervention have proved, no solution will last if the local population is not on board. Often, foreign intervention is ill received among local civilians. Therefore, the international community should invest in the development of an Arab League joint military force to manage any and all military interventions in the region. In early 2015, the Arab league agreed to establish a joint military force to counter threats to peace and security in the region. While such a venture will take time, the international community should facilitate the process through financial support, equipment donations, and training assistance. 

Until such an entity is fully established, foreign powers should function as a support system to successful local militia forces, such as the Kurds, rather than using local militia forces as a support system to foreign intervention. The West and Russia also must expend extensive resources on throttling IS’ sources of funding and on bringing political stability to Syria to remove the lawlessness that IS preys upon. The international community needs to prove to local populations that IS is the enemy, not the other way around, by supporting the refugee flow, providing humanitarian assistance, and not giving into IS’ goads for indiscriminate and disproportional violence. 

Prior to the recent terror attacks that began with the bombing of the Russian plane, IS has focused on maintaining and expanding the territory under its control. International terrorism was not yet in its strategic interests. While Sinai Province is undoubtedly an emergent threat, the severity of their threat is limited by the level of involvement, if any, of IS leadership in managing their activities. IS’ first coordinated attack outside of the Caliphate using an affiliate organisation could be indicative of IS desire for expansion. If IS’ claims of responsibility for the subsequent attacks in Beirut and Paris can be validated, it would signal a new chapter for the rapidly growing terrorist organisation. The quick assumption that IS not only inspired the attacks but also directly orchestrated them from Syria indicates a likely change in the international approach to defeating IS in Syria. An increase in both the Russian and Western presence in Syria risks confrontation, but it also provides a unique opportunity for cooperative action.

Conclusions for Policy

• The United States and other members of the coalition against IS should attempt to reach a cooperative solution with Russia on defeating IS;

• A cooperative solution to the defeat of IS should include exchanging military assistance and intelligence sharing to protect Russian assets at home and abroad from IS terrorist attacks in exchange for the cessation of Russian airstrikes against anti-Assad rebel forces in Syria as well as a guarantee that Russia will terminate its support of the Assad regime;

• Ultimately, for lasting peace from the IS threat, Russia and the West should strive for an inclusive political settlement to the Syrian civil war backed by third party military intervention. Political stability will help prevent the anarchic rule of terrorism. 

• In the long term, an Arab League joint military force should manage regional military intervention.