Silenced Suffering. An analysis of Yemen’s humanitarian crisis.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strained by years of famine and drought, today Yemenis are struggling to survive the horrors produced by a civil war that has progressively turned into a major regional competition. Children, women, and the elderly are in dire need of assistance as shortages of basic necessities increase incessantly. War crimes are being committed and human rights violated on a daily basis. Despite the gravity of the situation, devising an adequate response to Yemen’s humanitarian emergency does not seem to be a priority for world powers. By identifying the primary determiners of the Yemeni humanitarian crisis and the flaws affecting the efficiency of responses to humanitarian emergencies, this study denounces the urgent need to immediately intervene to prevent the deaths of more innocent Yemeni civilians and uphold respect of universal human rights.  

Introduction

December 2015. For nine months now the Saudi-led coalition has been launching destructive airstrikes against the Iranian-allied Houthi rebels in Yemen. Crushed by morally-blind political ambitions, thousands of innocent Yemenis are being oppressed by increasing suffering, with war crimes and abuses being relentlessly perpetrated against a population already strained by one of the worst humanitarian crisis of our century. Unconcerned by the consequences of war on human lives, military operations have been spreading death and bloodshed among civilians. In a country lacerated by internal conflicts wherein famine, water shortage and extreme poverty have been reigning supreme for years, the turning of the civil war into a venue of regional competition has ‘trapped civilians in the middle’, causing what by now can be defined a humanitarian catastrophe (Amnesty.org, 2015) . Against the extreme situations with which Yemenis are presently coping, the attention given to the war in Yemen and its humanitarian consequences is far from being proportionate to the import of the case. Accordingly, some have talked about the Yemeni conflict as the forgotten war (Idem). In this study, however, such definition is rejected as slightly imperceptive. More specifically, what is being object of gravest negligence is the right of innocent people to be protected from the wave of killings, war crimes and human rights violations that the war has brought to the country. Accordingly, I prefer to talk about the forgotten people, the Yemenis. That ‘human needs go largely unaddressed in some crisis while are inundated with attention and resources in others’ is not new (Smillie and Minear 2004:  1). A look at today’s issues gives a clear example of such discriminatory treatment. The world’s eyes are now turned to the repercussions of the spread of the Islamic state in the Middle East. The urgency to support the victims of the war on terror and to grant the refugees the right to be sheltered and given aid is recurrently proposed to us as our own responsibility. Images of women, children and elderly people embarking in never ending trips to reach safer regions in extremely poor sanitary and security conditions are a reality with which we are confronted everyday by medias, news and world leaders’ official speeches. The most perturbing image of the three years old boy found dead with his family on a Turkish beach after desperately attempting to escape the war has spread in a matter of seconds, sensitizing the world to the atrocities of war. No need to say, we owe to the people affected by the on-going fight on terrorism the aid they deserve. This is not charity; it is our responsibility as human and moral beings. What is questioned here is the contrast between the relevance attributed to certain emergencies and the relative disregard for other, equally impellent situations. The dramatic image of six-years old child wounded by a missile strike in Yemen pleading with doctors not to bury him has not been given the same attention as the above mentioned case of the Syrian boy. And yet, there were no differences between the two children’s cases. They are both innocent victims of war, victims of a situation that has prevented them from living the life that every child deserves. It is a duty of the world powers to actively implement the internationally endorsed values established by international laws and agreements. It is time to stop applying double standards that contradict the very essence of universality. It is time to stop being hypocritical. Looking back at previous humanitarian crisis which have not been object of the necessary interventions and blaming ourselves for such omissions is not enough. We have to answer the call for help of innocents. This is what this study aims at stressing, intending to give a voice to those whose suffering are silenced.

What kind of humanitarian emergency in Yemen?

As per common definition, when talking of humanitarian crisis we refer to ‘a situation in which there is an exceptional and generalized threat to human life, health and subsistence’ (ECP, 2010: 111). Such crises are generally classified depending on their originating factors. On the one hand, a humanitarian emergency can be produced by natural disasters, be they  geophysical, hydrological or biological. On the other hand, they can arise from manmade situations, among which armed conflicts. A third category is constituted by ‘complex emergencies’ which are characterized by the ‘combination of natural and men-made emergencies’ at the same time (Humanitariancoalition.ca, n.d.). According to such distinctions, the current crisis in Yemen falls into this last category. As a matter of fact, both  the combination of natural and manmade factors and the consequences generally attributed to complex emergencies are observable in the Yemeni case. Indeed, ‘extensive violence and loss of life, displacement of population , and widespread damage to society and economy’ are at present affecting the country (Idem). Time-factor is also significant in identifying in Yemen’s situation the features of a complex emergency, as it also meets the criteria of ‘prolonged […], destructing and de-structuralizing impact on all spheres of life’ generally used to identify the gravest humanitarian crises (ECP, 2010: 111). Not only is Yemen one of the most vulnerable, natural-disaster prone region of the Middle East, but it has also been affected for years by political clashes and instability which have contributed to its perpetual state of crisis. In particular, the sharp increase in political, tribal, and religious internal fragmentation that has occurred during the last five years has significantly accelerated  the country’s humanitarian degeneration (RW, 2011). Against this background, today’s civil war is putting the population under further strain. This calls for a most urgent international humanitarian response.

Before moving to the analysis of the current situation, a global overview of the major events that have characterized the region from 2010 to 2015 is presented in order to give the reader a solid basis for an understanding of the extreme extent of the Yemeni humanitarian emergency.

The crisis’ catalysts. Nature and War

Much of Yemen’s extreme humanitarian conditions originate from the scarcity of water. Devoid of rivers, Yemen is not only ‘located in a dry, semi-arid region of the Middle East’ (Glass, 2010: 17), but it is also severely threatened by the effects of the on-going environmental and climatic changes. Since the turn of the new century, temperatures in the region have increased while the frequency of rainfall has decreased, this contributing to the depletion of water storages and causing a persistent state of drought (RW, 2009). As per official data, ‘the average person in Yemen survives on one-fifth the amount of water that the World Health Organization considers adequate’ (Glass, 2010: 23). Additionally, because of the lack of appropriate systems of disinfection, most of the available water is contaminated, a fact that exposes millions of people every day to water-borne diseases such as cholera, malaria, diahorrea and skin diseases (BBC News, 2015). Closely related to water scarcity is food insecurity, the second main determiner of the Yemenis’ precarious humanitarian conditions. In fact, lack of water sources combined with the extremely low rate of rainfall per annum impinges heavily on the country’s agricultural productivity. With agriculture being the mainstay of Yemen’s economy, the effects of water paucity are dramatic. In such conditions, coffee, corn, wheat, qat, and all of Yemen’s major crops and products are hard to cultivate, an obstacle not only to the growth of the country’s economy but, first and foremost, to people’s nutrition. This is all the more so if we consider that only 7% of all the Yemeni territory is cultivable (Matlock, 2008). In 2012, UN data recorded that more than 6.8 million were food insecure in Yemen, many of these being boys and girls under the age of five (UN, 2011: 4). Malnutrition is clearly a big concern driving the humanitarian crisis to higher levels. To make matter worse, the number of people in need of food is likely to raise over time as Yemen is among the countries in the world with the highest population growth rate, with experts predicting that by 2050 the population will reach approximately 42,5 million, namely a 100% increase compared to the numbers for 2010 (UN, 2012). The combined effect of such intense demographic growth with food and water shortages has put Yemen in a constant state of poverty, with ‘widespread hunger and malnutrition’ and most of people living ‘below the poverty line of $2 a day and without access to proper sanitation’ (El-Deeb, 2010). Poor natural conditions have thus made of famine, drought, and diseases a daily reality, causing one of the gravest humanitarian emergency of our century. Yet, natural adversities are not the only determiners of Yemen’s dire humanitarian situation. Indeed, the Arab Spring wave and the political turmoil that have overwhelmed the country in 2011 have added a heavy load to the lives of the Yemenis. 

The impact of politics

As is the case in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, in 2011 Yemen was hit by the revolutionary wave referred to as the Arab Spring. Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose presidency had been based on rentierism and support by the military, was substituted by the leadership of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, whose power was legitimized by a referendum held on February 2012 (Thiel, n.d.). The impact of the revolution was huge, not only politically. Already burdened by years of extreme poverty and instability, the Arab Spring indeed delivered a fatal blow to the Yemeni economy. In particular, the energy sector was most affected by the political unrest. With pipelines and oil channels being subject to attacks by insurrecting tribesmen, both oil international export and provision for domestic consumption underwent a steep decline. As a consequence, the government found itself deprived of its most important source of revenue and the Yemenis facing shortages of fuel and electricity (Salisbury, 2011). Simultaneously, the clashes strongly impacted on the food and water supply. During 2011, prices of bread in Sana’a increased by 100% in a matter of months but the steepest increase was in the price of water, whose price grew by more than 300% in same timeframe. Furthermore, rising inflation accelerated the upswing in food prices, and the impossibility of accessing most parts of the country brought malnutrition to unprecedented levels (Idem). In contrast with the common expectation that the revolt would have calmed down the political ferments, from 2012 to 2015 Yemen remained largely fragmented and political cohesion a remote aspiration. The implementation of the agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), whose aim was to grant the transition to ‘democratic governance in Yemen’, proved to be a failure early after its approval. As a matter of fact, by ‘including a sharing arrangement between the old ruling elites in Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) and the alliance of traditional opposition parties (the ‘Join Meeting Parties’)’, the agreement did not include in the transitional framework ‘any representative of the countrywide protest movements’. Contrasting with  the democratic aspiration of the accord, such exclusion ignited the discontent of the many marginalized from the representational system (Transfeld, 2015). A bloody civil war was looming over the country. Notably, it was between the second and third phase of the transition process that the Houthis, a Shia minority from the Yemeni northern region reunited in a rebel group known as Ansar Allah, surged against the governance of President Hadi, forcing him to flee from Sana’a and seek refuge in Saudi Arabia (Idem). Ever since, the Houthis have proved to be military powerful and organized. Yet, they do not have the capacity to lead the country either politically or economically (Laub, 2015). Devoid of presidential guidance and troubled by the actions of a group lacking the skills to lead the nation, Yemen has offered its regional neighbors a tasty titbit for advancing their foreign policy aspirations. Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose historical rivalry has already prompted their interference in local, middle eastern conflicts, are now making of Yemen a major venue of their regional antagonism. Both countries have indeed strong interest at stake depending on the future development of the Yemeni political situation. As regards Saudi Arabia, ‘what happens in its southern borders constitutes a grave question of national security’, as such territory not only is a major point of infiltration for terrorism into the kingdom but, more dangerously, it is seen as an ‘easy prey for Teheran to penetrate’ the Saudi Peninsula. Thus, Iran’s support for Houthis rebels is perceived by the Saudis as an Iranian attempt to consolidate a ‘friendly based of operations against Saudi Arabia’ as ‘easier access to Yemen’ would inevitably equate to ‘easier access to the Saudi territory’ (Reardon, 2015). In addition to the threat posed by the Iranian influence in the region, economic factors have also driven the Saudi intervention. Specifically, the Houthis taking over the western cost of Yemen would place the interests of the Kingdom in extreme jeopardy, especially if we consider the repercussions that could stem from the rebels’ presence over the Bab al Mandeb Strait ‘which is a conduit for around 5% of all oil world trade’ (Salisbury, 2015: 2). Different reasons ground Iran’s support for the Houthis’ actions. Teheran’s interference in the Yemeni conflict is aimed instead at protecting the Iranian ‘line in the sand’, namely Iraq and Syria. Against the background of the Saudi airstrikes against ISIS conducted in cooperation with the US-led coalition, Iran is actually trying to protect its ‘buffer states’ from the ‘Sunni Middle East’ by ‘pressuring the Saudi’s to tread lightly in Iraq and Syria or risk a concentrated effort to further undermine them from the southern border’ (Reardon, 2015).  Turning the Yemeni civil war into a wider conflict based on hegemonic aspirations, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s involvement is striking a heavy blow to the already precarious conditions of the country, bringing the humanitarian crisis to unparalleled levels.

On the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe

In the last months, figures concerning Yemen’s humanitarian emergency have soared at an incessant pace. With civilians being ‘caught in the cross fire’, every day the number of people in need grows exponentially (Riordan, 2015). As per data released by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), since the beginning of the conflict people requiring assistance have increased by 33%, meaning approximately the 80% of the Yemeni population, among which are more than 7 million children (UNOCHA: 2015, 5). Continuous airstrikes are making it impossible to access the country and move within its territories, this constituting a crucial limit for Yemen wherein 90% of food is imported (Idem). Relevantly, World Food Program’s Executive Director, Ertharin Cousin, has denounced the significance of the situation, calling for urgent intervention to counter the “increase in the number of severe malnutrition cases” (in Aljazeera 2015). Not only food but also safe drinkable water is depleting as war rages. Being forced to ‘drink unsafe water as a result of the disintegration of local water systems’, millions of Yemenis are exposed to ‘life-threatening illnesses’ (Oxfam International, 2015). Cholera, diahorrea, malaria, dengue, worm infestations and skin diseases are signaled by international organizations as increasingly menacing Yemen’s population. Because of the ongoing conflict, fuel stocks are also running out as most regions are currently inaccessible, this in turn further contributing to food and water shortages as ‘fuel is necessary both to transport supplies but also to pump clean water’ (Gov.uk, 2015). Yet, lack of essentials represents just one of the factors determining the exacerbation of Yemenis’ humanitarian conditions. In violation of international humanitarian laws and human right principles which ‘very clearly set out the responsibility of parties to protect civilians’ (O'Brien, 2015), since the beginning of the war over 2355 civilians have been killed by ‘coalition airstrikes’ and ‘indiscriminate shelling in residential areas’ (Alaraby, 2015). In addition, civilian facilities such as houses, schools, markets and hospitals are being struck indistinctly (MSF USA, 2015). These facts not only violate the principal of distinction between civilians and combatants in wartime but, because of their frequency, they can also be considered intentional war crimes (BBC News, 2015). As reported by Amnesty International, ‘evidence gathered revealed a pattern of raids targeting heavily populated sites. […] In the majority of cases no military target could be located nearby’. Such indifference for civilian casualties does not only involve the Saudi-led coalition, but also the Houthis and the anti-Houthis rebels who have been accused of using ‘imprecise weapons including grad-type rockets, mortars and artillery fires in densely populated residential areas’ (Idem). Last but not least, intense mass displacement stands out as a clear signal of the extent of Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. Recent data have shed light on figures of internally displaced people. As of august 2015, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimated over 1.439.100 displaced Yemenis, ‘tripling the previous record of 2012’ (IDMC, 2015). Ever since, the number of IDPs has progressively risen and is likely ‘to deteriorate further’ if a solution to the conflict is not found soon (Idem). Currently, ‘21 out of Yemen’s 22 Governorates are hosting displaced people’, people ‘that have been forced to leave their homes to find shelter somewhere else’ and that have often experienced multiple displacements (Unocha.org, 2015). The luckiest among them manage to ‘settle in public buildings’, in ‘schools or Mosques’ (BBC News, 2015), but the majority lives in ‘makeshift structures, in caves or in the open under extreme heat’ and in precarious sanitary conditions (Unocha.org, 2015). To shortages of basic goods, facilities destruction, and internal displacement, the ongoing conflict is also heavily affecting Yemen’s economy, with the most vulnerable people and poor households bearing ‘the strain created by ongoing political instability’ (Salisbury, 2011: 17). Such repercussions are similar to those experienced in 2011, but on an exponentially higher scale. During the Yemeni Arab Spring, sabotage activity by tribesmen severely damaged crucial oil pipelines and refineries, ‘cutting off a key source of government revenue’ (Idem: 13). Scarcity of fuel prompted Sana’a to increase the price of gasoline, this in turn ‘bringing consumer prices up to the cost of production’. Food prices increased by 60-70% nationwide, water prices by more than 300%, and fuel on the black market by 500%, making it almost impossible for people access basic commodities (Idem: 14). After the 2011 tumults, an overall improvement of the economic situation resulted from the increase in oil exports, ‘which contributed [throughout 2012 and 2013] in pushing economic development to reach 2.4% and 4.8% respectively’ (Rcssmideast.org, 2015). Such recovery, however, was doomed to be short-lived. The civil war and the interference of regional powers in the conflict have indeed inverted the previous positive economic trend, erasing the progress achieved in the aftermath of the 2011 events. At present, most affected is, as in 2011, the oil sector. According to available data, after a drop of almost 70%, oil production is now ‘nearly suspended’ in the region (Worldbank.org, 2015) . As oil constitutes 87% of Yemen’s exports, state revenues are steeply declining, a drop that is further aggravated by the international decline in oil prices (Rcssmideast.org, 2015). Additionally, the fall in oil exports is causing the devaluation of the Yemeni Riyal with a significant consequent rise in the cost of imports (Idem). The inflationary effect originated by these repercussions eventually weighs on the Yemeni population as the increase in market price makes it even harder for people to meet their food needs and access basic commodities. The price of fuel is estimated to have quadrupled in the last few months (Fao.org, 2015). Similarly, the price of water has risen by more than 300% since March, forcing people to spend more than ‘30% of their income just to get water’ (Mis, 2015). With most of the population living ‘on less than $2 a day’, the victims of the troubled political developments in Yemen are doomed become more and more numerous (Idem).

Humanitarian Imperatives and the Responsibility to Protect

In light of the extent of the Yemeni crisis, last July UN humanitarian chief Stephen O’Brien ‘ convened a meeting of UN agencies and declared a level three (L3) emergency for the country’ (America.aljazeera.com, 2015). A L3 emergency is identified on the basis of five specific criteria, namely ‘the scale, urgency and complexity of the needs’, the ‘lack of domestic capacity to respond, and the reputational risk for the humanitarian system’. When such status is recognized, ‘system-wide mobilization to significantly increase the scale of the response’ is called for at the international and intergovernmental level (Education Cluster, 2015). However, as in many precedent cases of highest-level humanitarian emergency, significant dissonances at the implementation level are preventing an adequate response to the Yemenis’ needs.

Must or Should?

Most international treaties and norms prioritize the value and enhancement of human  rights protection as a primary responsibility of national and international actors. To name a few core principles, the concept of protection appears ten times in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Ferris, 2011: 3). The idea of humanity, intended as the ‘duty to address human suffering whenever it is found and to protect life, health and ensure respect for human being’, is codified under the Fourth Geneva Convention and is also a norm under international customary law (GSDRC, 2015). Respect, as the obligation of state to ensure that human rights are fully respected in the context of state policies, laws and actions, is another fundamental of most sources of international human rights law (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2010). In addition to those just mentioned, many other norms apply to the present Yemeni situation, requiring both state actors and the international community to take steps to counter the ongoing crisis. Specifically, the current Yemeni situation calls for a thorough respect for the fundamental duty to protect civilian persons in time of war as established in 1949, during the International Convention for the Protection of Victims Of War. Yet, despite the existence of such juridical framework, a stark contradiction is unfortunately noticeable between the formal letter of law and practice.  It appears that double standards are applied when it comes to considering humanitarian crises and whether and how to respond to civilians’ sufferance. Behind such inconstancies lie entrenched political interests, this contradicting the essence inherent in the concept of universality permeating international humanitarian law. As explained by Smillie and Minear (2004: 1), ‘human Rights and humanitarianism are not treated as unassailable moral goods […] but as ideologies’ so that ‘the case for their compelling claim on international action has become a matter of public debate rather than some kind of categorical imperative who’s need to be undertaken is deemed to be self-evident’. The consequent downgrade of humanitarianism ‘from a given to a desideratum’ partly explains the observable unevenness of the responses to humanitarian emergencies (Idem). As a matter of fact, whether humanitarianism produces a direct responsibility of states to intervene in cases of emergencies is subject to lively debate, proving how, despite the formal adherence to international humanitarian law, such norms are still far from being considered as originating universally binding obligations. A look at recent cases shows that in the international arena a Realist-oriented conception of action is still predominant, whereby national interests act as the sole and real driver of decision and policy making. This applies also when it comes to humanitarian emergencies. In most cases of humanitarian assistance, the provision of aid has been strictly related to the benefits that could be originated by such intervention. As Huseyn Aliyev puts it (2011): ‘states might come to assist a humanitarian crisis as a part of whatever alliance or union, but their very participation in that alliance will likely to be predicated by national interests’. In this regards, the 2011 humanitarian intervention in Libya is highly emblematic. Officially presented as a military intervention aimed at preventing Gaddafi form carrying out a ‘massacre that would have reverberated across the region and strained the conscience of the world’ (Kreps, 2012: 2), the truth behind the US-led coalition’s action was to be found in economic interests rather than philanthropic intent. With Libya possessing ‘Africa’s largest proved crude oil reserves and being the fifth largest holder of natural gas reserves’ (Eia.gov, 2015), in 2011 the recipients of more than the 85% of Libya’s crude oil exports (Reuters, 2011) were those same states that one year later joined the coalition to oust  Gaddafi and save the Libyans form a ‘brutal repression and looming humanitarian crisis’ (whitehouse.gov, 2011). Actually, exaggerating the threat of massacre was a useful and morally acceptable cover to feed the public opinion with, especially in the eyes of Western populations who have constantly been presented with the myth of the spread of democracy and liberal values. Indeed, among the many ways to sugar the bitter pill of realpolitik, humanitarianism is undoubtedly the most appealing to decision makers due to the strong impact it has on the public opinion. A factual proof of the close connection between humanitarian action and national interest can also be identified a contrario, by observing all those emergencies which have not been efficiently met by the international community despite their gravity. The case of Rwanda best exemplifies the tendency to neglect those situation which, though requiring urgent aid, could not provide any return on state powers’ intervention. In 1994, the Hutu Rwandan majority perpetrated in little more than three months a mass genocide, killing almost a million people between Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Differently from the Libyan case, the mass killing was let to happen notwithstanding the fact that the Clinton administration was fully aware of the local development. As testified by Tad Dagne, Researcher at the Congressional Research Service in Washington, the US ‘knew before, during and after’ about the slaughter (Monitor, 2009). According to official papers, Clinton’s cabinet and, most likely, the President himself ‘had been told of a planned final solution to eliminate all Tutsis’ but decided no matter how no to intervene (Carroll, 2004). Avoiding the use of the term genocide as if this could have somehow spared it from its obligation to act, the US administration when even further by discouraging a ‘robust UN response’ (Ferroggiaro, 2001) and suggesting the withdrawal from the region of UNAMIR, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda established in 1993 in order to keep the peace in the country (Hrw.org, n.d.). The most striking contradiction between the US attitude in the Rwanda and Libya’s cases is that, while in Libya the massacre that could have been carried out by Gaddafi was essentially potential, in Rwanda it was not a matter of potentiality but of concrete facts, of people being actually killed (Kreps, 2012). A naïve interpretation could lead to postulate that the US learn its lesson after Rwanda, and so decided to promptly respond to the Libyan emergency. However desirable, the choice to intervene in Libya did not spur form a developed sense of integrity. The real objective of ‘Operation Unified Protector’ was a regime-change intervention against Gaddafi’s rise, a thorny presence in a region rich in enormous economic resources (Herman, 2014). Oil was certainly the main factor driving the operation. Indeed, given the huge role played by Libya in supplying high-quality crude to the West (Morse and Lee, 2011), ‘a considerable anxiety [rose] in oil circles about the possibility of a generalized political breakdown, with attendant threats to oil supplies and investments’ (Gibbs, 2011). On the contrary, Rwanda did not offer any ‘compelling political or economic interests’, this being the actual reason for the overall indifference toward the killing of thousands of innocents (Archive.adl.org, n.d.). In other words, ‘in a world of limited resources’, Rwanda was not perceived as a priority justifying the ‘financial sacrifices that would have been necessary to stop the genocide’ (Idem). Today, Yemen is being victim of an even greater evil than such a hypocritical attitude. Indeed, not only the humanitarian crisis is being neglected and hidden from public opinion, but, most gravely, those countries that publicly condemn war crimes and preach the protection of human rights are themselves contributing to the Yemeni ongoing conflict, thus making them co-responsible for the regional humanitarian emergency. As argued by Paul Mcleary (2015), Washington is taking a ‘large but little known role in arming and fueling Riyadh’s warplanes’. Considering the primary role of the Saudi airstrikes in aggravating the Yemeni humanitarian crisis, the US can be said to be highly responsible for the death figures previously mentioned as the ‘daily bombing campaign would not be possible without the constant presence of US Air Force Tanker planes refueling coalition jets, and the million worth of precision-guided munitions sold to Riyadh and its allies by American defense contractors’ (Idem). Similarly, the Italian government continues to be closely engaged in military arms commerce with Saudi Arabia, as testified by the Saudi use in airstrikes of Mk84 bombs provided by Rwm Italia (Browne, 2015). All the same, France and the United Kingdom’s policy of arms trading with the Saudis is currently favoring the replenishment of ‘Saudi Arabia’s stocks of weapons’. In this regard, OXFAM has recently denounced how, by selling arms to the Kingdom, Western governments are ‘quietly fuelling the Yemen conflict and exacerbating one of the world's worst humanitarian crises potentially in breach of both domestic and international laws on the sales of arms’ (Oxfam GB, 2015). Thus, those powers who vehemently intervened to prevent the Libyan massacre back in 2011 are the same that today are providing the Saudi power with the means with which it the Kingdom is carrying out its nefarious attacks. This considered, one should question the extent to which the so called universal rights established by international treaties are actually respected and implemented by those actors that have, at least formally, endorsed them. 

Two steps forward, one step back

The case reported in the previous section has proved how human rights and principles are frequently involved in games of power-politics. As said, this attitude nullifies the ratio of universality underlying the whole framework of international  humanitarian laws. With this background in mind, it is appropriate to look at those legal attempts made at the international level to counter such discriminatory practice and grant the due protection to innocent victims of war. Notably, the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) as formulated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) is a most important instrument in this sense. In light of the obstacle to the protection of people represented by the tendency to associate state-sovereignty with the idea of control, the Commission formulated in 2001 the R2P as a way to conciliate the principle of sovereignty with the safeguard of human rights. Back in 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan already denounced the limits to humanitarian responses posed by the traditional conception of sovereignty. In his words: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to gross violations of human rights that affect every percept of our humanity?” (in Evans, 2004). Responding to such plea, the ICISS has offered a more human-oriented concept of sovereignty intended ‘in terms of its essence being not so much control as responsibility’ (Idem). The text developed by the Commission declaims: ‘The primary responsibility to protect rests with the state concerned […] it is only if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, that it becomes the responsibility of the international community to act in its place’ (Idrc.ca, 2001). At the 2005 World Summit, participating Governments agreed to endorse the R2P and identified three fundamental pillars, the first of which being, as previously stated, the enduring responsibility of the state to protect its people. Second is the responsibility of the international community to assist states to fulfill their national obligations. Third is the commitment to timely and decisive collective action in ways that are consistent with the UN Charter (Serrano, 2011). With particular reference to Yemen, as early as 2011 the UN Security Council already called for the Yemeni government to abide by its primary responsibility to protect its people from the threat to their security arising from local political developments (Globalr2p.org, 2015). This call, however, was not followed by an appropriate response and violence and tribal clashes have continued, as seen, to endanger the life of Yemenis up to the present. Althoug President Hadi is still the legitimate sovereign of Yemen, today he has actually “lost control over the country” (in Levs, 2015). This absence of a leading power makes it impossible to expect an effective implementation of the first pillar of the R2P. As a matter of logic, this implies that the international community pursuant to the second pillar established in 2005 should undertake the protection of Yemenis. Yet, facts prove that this is not the case. As said, governments of states that have formally recognized the R2P have done little so far to prevent the Yemeni crisis from further degenerating, raising doubts about the effectiveness of the principle. The main problem here is that, although it has been included among the cluster of principles constituting the international humanitarian legal system, the Responsibility to Protect ‘has not yet achieved the status of internationally binding norm’ (Serrano, 2011: 1). This is a primary cause of states’ ‘flagrant disregard’ for the duties that should be produced by its legal recognition (Breakey, 2011: 49). Essentially, ‘what is lacking is the sense of legal obligation necessary to truly implement the R2P’ (Idem). Lack of binding power combined with political unwillingness to commit to costly interventions if states do not see in such action the possibility to draw any relevant benefit is what have made so far of the Responsibility to Protect a failed norm, written on paper but factually disregarded (Idem).

Military humanitarian intervention is not a viable option

Among the arguments proposed by this study is the need to attribute to the provision of humanitarian aid and to the R2P the status of international binding obligations. The analysis here turns to the forms in which such aid should be provided, with specific reference to the current Yemeni crisis. When we refer to humanitarian aid, we tend to include all those measures ‘designated to save lives, alleviate suffering and protect and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies’ (GHA, 2015: 20). In practice, there are numerous ways through which such goal can be implemented. Among them, the most debated is humanitarian intervention by military means. Conceived as a last resort option, humanitarian military interventions have proved to be double-edged swords as they can be effective when combined with other aid mechanisms, but only upon the necessary condition of a thorough coordination and understanding among participating actors. Should such operational organization lack, interventions by force can produce the opposite effect of exacerbating the crisis  (Williams and Stewart, 2008). A parallel between the present situation in Yemen and the 1993’s intervention in Somalia is presented to support the thesis that military involvement should not be considered as a possible alternative for the solution of the Yemeni emergency. As Yemen today, in the beginning of the 90s Somalia underwent a most serious complex humanitarian emergency produced by the combination of widespread famine and the civil war between Somali armed forces and local rebel groups. In light of the mounting emergency, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 794 authorizing ‘all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia’ (in Council on Foreign Relations, 2010). Such decision was immediately followed by President Bush’s commitment to Operation Restore Hope, a military mission whose official goal was to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Somalis to be implemented by the US leading a UN sanctioned multilateral force. Yet, the operation turned out to be short-lived and the responsibility for humanitarian intervention in Somalia was assumed by the UN in May 1993 through a mission called Operation Continue Hope, or UNOSOM II (Dworken, 1995). Ex post, UNOSOM II did not produce the expected outcomes, but rather caused a further degeneration in that country’s state of emergency to the point that by March 1994 the decision to withdraw the US forces was taken and was soon followed by the withdrawal of UN forces from the ground (Idem). Overall, the humanitarian military intervention in Somalia turned out to be a failure. Two major mistakes can be detected when analyzing the case. First, the US plausibly underestimated the fact that landing troops, even if moved by humanitarian intent, necessarily leads to an interference in a country’s politics (Clarke and Herbst, 1997). Indeed, the US-led forces ‘quickly became engulfed in factional violence instead of facilitating conflict resolution’ (Gizelis, 2005: 371), causing an increase rather than the expected decrease in local turmoil. The second mistake was the decision to leave the management of such complex operations under the sole UN-leadership in May 1993. In fact, it soon became clear that the UN were ‘not able to manage complex political-military operations without the support of a coalition of states or a military alliance’ (Clarke and Herbst, 1997) eventually leading to the progressive withdrawal of forces from the region and to the consequent failure of the intervention. Although at present no sign of willingness has been shown by the UN and international powers to engage in an humanitarian military mission in Yemen, here the case is made that, should such an option be considered in the future, it would likely end in failure just as in Somalia twenty years ago. No doubt a military intervention would improve humanitarian conditions in the short term by ‘stopping the dying and protecting some fundamental rights’ (Seybolt, 2007: 276). However, in the long term it would offer a definitive solution neither politically nor in terms of solving humanitarian issues. As Seybolt puts it: ‘Humanitarian intervention treats the symptoms but not the causes of violent conflicts’  (Idem: 262). A major obstacle to the success of an hypothetical humanitarian mission in Yemen would be represented by the country’s high level of tribal fragmentation and clashes. For a military humanitarian operation to succeed, it is fundamental to reach cooperation between the intervening forces and local actors (Gizelis, 2005). The Somali case has offered a strong case for this argument. Back in 1993, the US-led forces found themselves tangled in the Somali conflict among clans, which led the Americans to take a stance in the clashes, specifically siding against the warlord Aideed (Idem). As explained by Gizelis (2005: 373): ‘Given the structure of the Somali clan system, the biased line at the outset was highly detrimental to achieving cooperation with clan and local factions’. The fact that Yemen is also internally divided in tribes, clans and tribal confederations, most of which are currently taking sides in the war, grounds the assumption that similar developments to those in Somalia might generate from a military intervention in the region, inevitably leading to the exacerbation of the already dire security and humanitarian situation. In brief, the likelihood that the conflict would further escalate is too high to even think about an effective humanitarian mission. Rather than relying on military means to solve the Yemeni emergency, diplomatic negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and with local authorities should be paralleled by an increase in humanitarian assistance by international agencies and ad hoc organs through delivery of basic-needs goods, medicines, provision of shelter and measures aimed at protecting the most vulnerable. To make this happen, state powers should respond more effectively to UN Coordinated appeals. Indeed, there have been numerous cases where UN state members ‘have not paid their full dues and have cut their donations to the UN voluntary funds’ (Globalpolicy.org, n.d.). Regarding the financing of humanitarian agencies, the tendency of governments to allocate resources on the basis of political interests represents another big issue. As denounced by Maria Weisser: ‘Since the funding of these institutions are mostly voluntary contributions, each nation is in a position to influence their work significantly, thus turning contributions into a tool for international leverage’ (Weisser, 2009). To avoid such practices, a reform of the norms regulating the financial provisions to humanitarian agencies is desirable. A major improvement in this sense would be the reaching of a ‘common donor understanding’ based only on ‘assessed and not voluntary contributions’ since, as long as financing is voluntary, the risk of response to humanitarian crises being politicized will be too high and so is the probability of increase in the number of ‘forgotten emergencies’ (Smillie and Minear, 2004). This, however, is futurology. The Yemeni humanitarian situation incessantly worsens every day, making the call for humanitarian aid extremely urgent. As previously mentioned, it is of foremost importance to foster diplomatic negotiations with Saudi Arabia to stop carrying out those devastating airstrikes that have been killing civilians and destroying civil facilities for months now. At the same time, the UNSC should call for stronger commitment by State Members to respond to the emergency by augmenting the financing to specialized agencies. Among the possible ways to prevent the humanitarian crisis from further degenerating, a humanitarian military intervention is  the least advantageous. We do not want Yemen to become a failed state as Somalia did in the aftermath of the withdrawal of US and UN troops twenty years ago (Gizelis, 2005). Hopefully, diplomatic exchanges together with increased humanitarian aid will suffice to safeguard the Yemeni people and put an end to their sufferance.   

Conclusion

Ten months of killings do not seem to be enough to make a humanitarian emergency worthy of the attention of world powers. This is what appears to be happening with the present situation in Yemen. Thousands of civilians have been killed and just as many are struggling to find ways to survive the unbearable difficulties caused by the country’s human-unfriendly natural conditions together with the heavy repercussions on everyday life caused by the ongoing conflict. Yet, it is rare to hear news about the Yemeni developments, newspapers are mostly silent about such crisis and the only sources that provide reliable information are academic or geopolitical journals which, understandably, are mainly consulted only by experts and professionals in the field. The Yemeni humanitarian emergency is, in a few words, being hidden from the public opinion which is instead being directed to other, likewise important, political issues. The consequence of this obscurantism is that Yemen is likely to fall among those crises identified as forgotten emergencies. Intending to provide the reader with a global picture of the current events affecting the life conditions of the Yemeni people, this study has analyzed the factors, both natural and manmade, that have contributed to the progressive degeneration of the humanitarian crisis overwhelming the country since 2010. In particular, attention has been directed to the humanitarian repercussions of the ongoing civil war and related interference of regional powers. Against this background, the passiveness of world powers to intervene with appropriate political and humanitarian measures to prevent further sacrifice of innocent civilians has paved the way for the analysis of specific cases whereby double standards have been applied when it came to reacting against humanitarian emergencies. The main finding of the study is that, although state-powers and the international community have formally committed to implementing human rights and the protection of civilians from harms to their dignity on the basis of the principle of universality, in practice the responses to such situations still depend on underlying political interests. From this assessment, the evaluation of possible ways to respond to the emergency has led to the exclusion of humanitarian military intervention as a viable alternative. Rather than a hasty military solution, which would likely exacerbate the conflict and consequently worsen the country’s humanitarian conditions, the plea here has been directed to world powers to simultaneously embark upon diplomatic talks with the regional powers involved in the conflict and with Yemeni authorities. At the same time, the call is to increase the assistance to Yemenis by providing additional financial resources to humanitarian agencies. A code of silence is being applied to the death of thousands of women, children and the most vulnerable people in Yemen. It is not too late to intervene, it is our moral obligation to provide aid to the people of Yemen because one human life is no more deserving of the help it needs than another. This is how the concept of universality permeating human rights and humanitarian international laws should be applied. It is time to practice what we preach. 

Conclusions for policy

• Immediate action by the international community is required to prevent the humanitarian crisis in Yemen from further degenerating. Politically, diplomatic talks with Saudi Arabia and with local Yemeni authorities are to be implemented in order to reach a ceasefire agreement and stop the killing of innocent people. As per humanitarian aid provision, humanitarian agencies must be enabled to exercise their activities and provide vital supplies through a stronger commitment by member states to respond to the UN coordinated appeals and to the amount of financing requested for the operations in Yemen.

• Humanitarian operations in Yemen should be implemented following the hierarchy of priorities established by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), i.e. saving lives, protecting civilians and ensuring equitable access to assistance in line with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.

• Western governments should follow Oxfam’s recommendation to temporarily ‘suspend arms shipments and military support to Saudi Arabia’ (2015) in order to prevent the continuation of the bombing campaign and the replenishment of Saudi’s stocks of weapons. 

• Every diplomatic and non-military form of interventions must be preferred to the use of force.

• Military humanitarian intervention should not be considered as a viable option for the solution of the Yemeni crisis in light of the exacerbating effect it would most likely produce on the ongoing conflict.

• The international community should formally recognize the status of international binding norm to the Responsibility to Protect and endorse it as producing direct obligations on states. Sanctions for non-fulfillment or non-abidance by states should be incorporated in the legal discipline of the R2P.