To Arm or Not to Arm Ukraine? The Question Still Bedevilling Washington

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following a protracted policy debate, the U.S. Congress recently authorised $300 million USD in lethal aid to Ukraine. The weapons originally being considered for transfer included; anti-tank missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), communication systems, and radar equipment. However, the hardware that arrived in the war-torn country has been characterised as “little more than junk” (Gibbons-Neff). If Washington is to continue the initiative, it should proceed in good faith, and abandon its current contradictory dual purpose policy. To do otherwise would not only breed distrust between Kiev and Washington, but also would lower the morale and survivability rates of Ukrainian frontline troops. 

ANALYSIS

Introduction 

The Ukrainian military’s myriad weaknesses became apparent almost immediately following Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea. “Rampant institutional problems” included; “dismal” morale, lack of basic military skills among enlisted troops, including in the country’s special forces (Spetsnaz), reliance upon largely outdated Soviet-era equipment, draft evasion, “vexing” shortages of equipment that is standard issue in Western militaries, and corruption (Gibbons-Neff; Kramer; Unattributed). Heavy casualties have been one consequence of such extensive unpreparedness. In November 2014, following a little over six months of conflict in Eastern Ukraine and despite the declaration of a ceasefire accord that September, the United Nations (UN) reported that “4,300 combatants and civilians have been killed” (Evans). Prompted in part by such heavy losses, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko “all but begged for U.S. military aid beyond the token ‘non-lethal‘ supplies the Obama administration has provided” (Unattributed). The Ukrainian President’s request, and its subsequent iterations, have sparked controversy in Washington.   

Non-Lethal Aid to Ukraine

For the duration of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Kiev has been lobbying Washington and other Western governments for non-lethal and lethal assistance. The U.S. has been supplying Kiev with non-lethal aid such as; body armour, night-vision equipment, radios, and medical kits since the beginning of hostilities (Unattributed). The U.S. Congress approved a second round of “non-lethal defensive” aid in the amount of $75 million USD in March 2015. In addition to more radios, first aid kits, and military ambulances, this assistance package included surveillance drones, counter mortar radar systems as well as 30 armoured Humvees and 300 unarmored Humvees (Baker; Unattributed). This newly coined term, “defensive weaponry”, is a misnomer as “such weapons are equally suited for offensive and defensive operations” (Unattributed). However, its use indicates a policy cleavage among U.S. policymakers and the Obama administration on how best to respond to the unfolding crisis in Ukraine. Before discussing this divide, the text will outline one final component of American non-lethal aid to Kiev: the provision of U.S. basic training to the Ukrainian military.    

U.S. Basic Training to Ukrainian Forces: No Panacea

Under Operation Fearless Guardian-2015 the U.S. Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade initially was tasked with providing basic training to Ukraine’s National Guard, a “rear echelon force that helps protect supply lines away from the front” (Gibbons-Neff). Subsequently, that mandate was expanded “to cover the entirety of the military,” including frontline Army forces from Eastern Ukraine (Bennett; Gibbons-Neff). Washington enlarged the scope of the training to “deflect pressure for even more direct U.S. involvement, such as providing lethal military assistance to Kyiv” (Mankoff). However, simultaneously American policymakers, including President Barack Obama, have sought not to antagonise Russian President Vladimir Putin, thereby hoping to reduce the likelihood that the latter will escalate the conflict (Shapiro; Norton-Taylor, Baker; Steinhauer, Herszenhorn; Gordon, Schmitt). This dual purpose approach has hampered various facets of Washington’s Ukraine policy from provision of basic military training to eventually supplying Kiev with lethal arms. 

In practice that delicate balancing act has limited the scope and utility of the basic training. Less than 1,000 Ukrainian military personnel will receive the training, which is comprised of “63 classes of remedial military instruction provided by 300 United States Army trainers in three consecutive two-month courses” (Kramer). The training, though evidently badly needed, was received with skepticism by some Ukrainian troops (Kramer). Perhaps most importantly, the training “will not allow the Ukrainian government to win its war with the separatists” (Mankoff). While undoubtedly helpful, the training provided by the U.S. military is far from the panacea sought by Kiev. The Ukrainian government is convinced, most likely erroneously, that to ensure a decisive victory the country must obtain lethal aid from the U.S. and its Western partners.

U.S. Lethal Aid to Ukraine

As mentioned above, the decision to provide even non-lethal aid to Ukraine was difficult for Washington. This is even more evident in the provision of lethal aid to the war-torn country. Proponents of the move, including some Republican congressional leaders, frequently cited Ukraine’s need to “guarantee its security” using lethal arms as a “potent deterrent to Russian provocations” (Ramani; Unattributed). By contrast, opponents argued that provision of lethal aid represents “a significant change in U.S. policy that could move our country towards a proxy war with Moscow” (Culp, Sitther). The Obama administration, reluctant to become “a belligerent party in a proxy war with Russia, the only country on earth that can destroy the United States”, initially had sought to limit American involvement in the conflict to the provision of non-lethal aid (Steinhauer, Herszenhorn). 

Moscow for its part has attempted to exploit this division among U.S. policymakers to limit the presence of the U.S. military personnel or hardware in what it considers its sphere of influence. A representative of the Russian Defense Ministry warned of “dangerous consequences” in such a scenario, and U.S. authorities have expressed concerns that “Moscow’s threats may be serious” (Shapiro). Given the stakes, Washington was prudent to limit American involvement in the Ukraine conflict to the provision of non-lethal aid, despite congressional pressure.

Last month the White House acquiesced to congressional pressure and agreed to provide lethal arms to Ukraine. President Obama signed a bill into law, known as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which appropriated $300 million USD to help Kiev counter Moscow-backed separatists. This figure included $50 million USD for lethal equipment such as “anti-armor weapon systems, mortars, grenade launchers, small arms, and ammunition (Unattributed). However, the administration’s reservations about this course of action subsequently became evident in the type of assistance provided.

No Winners

Following the passage of the NDAA, Ukraine continues to receive “mostly outdated and used” U.S. military equipment (Unattributed). This includes 100 humvees “meant for spare parts” and unfit for troop transport (Unattributed). The Pentagon “had no official comment on the condition of the equipment” (Unattributed). Ukrainian military commanders, the intended recipients, were quick to take umbrage at the condition of the deliveries, and to attribute it to “incompetence in the US military bureaucracy” (Unattributed; Gibbons-Neff). However, the veracity of that attribution is unclear. 

On the one hand, a Pentagon official has described the transferred equipment as “the stuff that’s sitting around somewhere that no service can use” (Burke). On the other, Washington also has sent “new equipment such as night vision goggles and first-aid kits” (Gibbons-Neff). The decision to provide new non-lethal items (night vision goggles and first aid kits) and antiquated lethal hardware (humvees) is additional evidence of the dual purpose policy pursued by American officials in Ukraine. Aiming to prevent Russian escalation of the conflict, U.S. authorities - now obligated to provide both lethal and non-lethal aid - furnish Kiev with outdated lethal arms. Non-lethal items which, in theory, should not spark Moscow’s ire are provided new, as agreed. In lieu of Department of Defense incompetence, unauthorised diversion upon arrival in Ukraine also should be considered. “Previous shipments of meals ready-to-eat (MREs) previously ended up on online auction sites such as eBay... while more sensitive high-tech equipment, which faces export controls in the US, runs the risk of being captured or similarly sold off (Unattributed). In fact, the Ukrainian military already has “lost sensitive equipment such as an AN/TPQ-49 lightweight counter-mortar radar” (Unattributed). These revelations surface at least two difficult issues.   

First, the purported fate of U.S. lethal and non-lethal aid once in Ukraine calls into question the advisability of providing such assistance. At best these circumstances give credence to the view that President Poroshenko is unable to stem “corruption” (Unattributed). This rightly has “sparked fears of [U.S. supplied] weapons entering into the wrong hands” (Ramani). Second, if lethal and non-lethal aid is to be continued despite these disclosures, only new lethal and non-lethal equipment should be transferred to Ukrainian forces. Not only is that what Ukrainian field commanders expect, but it also would best enhance their survivability in the conflict (Burke). To do otherwise, lowers morale among Ukrainian troops, and had led Kiev to “[call] into question the U.S. government’s commitment to [the] war” (Gibbons-Neff). Current U.S. policy in Ukraine is very unlikely to achieve either of its two main, conflicting aims: not to antagonize Russia, and to enable Ukraine to undertake territorial defence.

Conclusion 

The Obama administration is unlikely to dispel the notion that Washington “has done the minimum to bolster the Ukrainian government and deter a reinvigorated Russia” (Gibbons-Neff). The perceived threat from Moscow is too high for the U.S. to agree to supply new lethal items to Kiev. Instead, the two-track balancing act which seeks simultaneously to placate Russia, and to enable Ukraine to defend itself against Russian-backed separatists on its territory is likely to continue. This equivocation also has limited the utility of American non-lethal aid to Kiev, such as basic training for frontline Ukrainian troops. Perhaps most crucially the current approach has impaired Washington’s standing in Kiev, and has further endangered frontline Ukrainian forces.   

CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY 

• Current U.S. policy regarding the provision of lethal and non-lethal aid to Ukraine is hampered by contradictory goals. However laudable, not antagonising President Putin in Russia’s perceived “sphere of influence” in Ukraine is directly at odds with contributing to Kiev’s efforts to defend its territory from Russian-backed separatists. Pursuit of such a policy results in varying degrees of antagonism on all sides.

• This dichotomy should be resolved forthwith, most likely in favour of Washington providing Ukraine only with non-lethal aid. Even this decision should be taken with caution due to evident corruption in the Ukrainian military.  

• Despite Kiev’s wishes, the U.S. rightly is highly unlikely to provide its ally only with lethal aid. Doing so would be extremely ill-advised, and dangerous for all parties.

Elizabeth Zolotukhina is a Senior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. She may be contacted at elizabeth.zolotukhina@cgsrs.org

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