European Neighbourhood Policy “Light”: Why a Step Back Might be a Step Forward in Eastern Europe

INTRODUCTION

At Riga the heads of states came together for the fourth Eastern Partnership summit on 21/22 May. Since Vilnius a lot has changed in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovitch was ousted from office after he refused to sign the negotiated Association Agreement in Vilnius. As a result Crimea was annexed by Russia, a war broke out in eastern Ukraine, a civilian airplane was shot down, killing 298 people and relations between the West and Russia reached a nadir since the end of the Cold War. Member countries’ attitudes towards the partnership program have changed. While Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have shown the strongest ambitions to join the European Partnership - all three have signed political association and free trade agreements - Armenia has joined the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. Belarus and Azerbaijan have proven reluctant to engage in the partnership programme ever since its establishment in 2009.

Although the summit is designed to gather European leaders with their six Eastern European counterparts, Russia was omnipresent at the recently concluded summit. Rather than engage directly, European leaders chastised Russian President Vladimir Putin for Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. The President of the European Council Donald Tusk taunted Russia with “aggressive and destructive behaviour” (FAZ, 21 May 2015). Earlier German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the Eastern Partnership was not aimed against anybody - meaning Russia - As Moscow has accused the EU of moving closer to its borders and thus threatening Russian interests.

DAMPENED EXPECTATIONS

Already before the summit leaders dampened high expectations for the event. Merkel made clear that the partnership is not intended to be a tool for enlargement but rather for rapprochement to the EU. Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel said in similar vein that the EU needs to be honest with its partner countries regarding membership prospects, even when that could result in their populations turning 3 | European Neighbourhood Policy “light” – why a step back might be a step forward in Eastern Europe Copyright© of the Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies (CGSRS) away from the European project (Le Monde, 22 May 2015).

In order to avoid further confrontation with Russia, European leaders acted cautiously in promising future engagement with the EU. For this reason a declaration from the summit did not explicitly promise EU membership to partner countries. This development would in all likelihood disappoint the most ambitious states Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. Due to the absence of a clear membership path, these states rely on concrete results in order to persuade their citizens of the chosen European path. Amid visa liberation is an important goal in the medium term. The Joint Declaration re-emphasises their aspirations of strengthening reforms and cooperation with the EU (European Commission, 21 May 2015).

CHALLENGES IN PARTNER STATES

The dampened declarations come at a time when Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia face domestic issues which are likely to complicate European integration. All three states face the challenge of preserving their territorial integrity. The breakaway regions of Transnistria, the Donbass, Abkhazia and South Ossetia test their respective central power and seek Russian support in their aspirations for independence or their refusal to follow the European path chosen by the central government. In Moldova, recent protests over corruption and administrative mismanagement have threatened the stability of an already weak coalition government which consists of two proWestern parties. However, in order to pass legislation, they rely on the pro-Russian Communist Party.

This constellation complicates the realisation of any legislation in light of European integration because the Communist party would most likely oppose it. The disappearance of $1 trillion from Moldovan banks was a grist to the mill of Moldovan popular discontent, already troubled by a weakened economy which stems from the economic downturn in Russia. This could potentially lead to the downfall of Moldova’s ruling coalition, a  development which would benefit the proRussian parties. Like in Moldova, Georgia is also suffering from an economic downturn. The hardship stems from the fall of the Russian rouble last year and the overall difficult economic situation in Russia. Under these circumstances popular disappointment is spreading among Georgians over the European choice due to a lack of visible and recognisable benefits from the signed Association Agreement for ordinary citizens (Financial Times, 17 May 2015). This could give Russia renewed influence in the former Soviet Republic. The removal of the Russian import ban on Georgian wine and other agricultural products has benefited the Georgian economy and thus has opened the door for Russian support among the rural Georgian population. Moreover, Russia has strengthened its hard power tools in Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by signing agreements which reinforce Moscow’s grip on these territories.

REGIONAL STABILITY THROUGH ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

In light of these developments the EU has to be cautious not to forfeit its influence at the expense of a Russian reclamation of leverage. Moreover, any European over-consideration of Russian sentiments in the region would send a disastrous signal to its partner countries. Such a move would suggest that their independent decisions to pursue European integration will not be respected – thus denying them the right to exercise their sovereign will. However, it cannot be in the interest of the EU to risk regional instability on its Eastern flank, and to be in a continuous political confrontation with its biggest neighbour. Therefore, the cautious approach taken by the EU at Riga can be viewed as a wider strategy to stabilise the region, reconcile EU-Russian relations without discarding the aspirations of its Eastern partner states. The short-term priority of the EU should be to reconcile relations with Russia in order to avoid further Russian incursions in the region. While strong messages - which condemned recent Russian actions and which were reiterated at the summit - are necessary to voice European discontent, the EU should aim for a relaxation in EURussia relations. This could be achieved 5 | European Neighbourhood Policy “light” – why a step back might be a step forward in Eastern Europe Copyright© of the Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies (CGSRS) through economic cooperation already practiced with its partnership states under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

Without fully integrating Russia into the Eastern Partnership Programme both sides are able to foster economic activity. The resultant improvement in access to goods and services, the reduction of tariffs and quotas coupled with the abolition of trade barriers and the reassurance of a stable legal environment could lead to mutual economic engagement which ultimately could alleviate tensions in Eastern Europe. Yet, in order to achieve closer economic cooperation the current sanctions regime imposed on Russia after Moscow annexed the Crimea needs to be rolled back in accordance to the Minsk II agreement concluded in February between Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany. The prospect of closer economic cooperation with the EU should induce Russia to fulfil the provisions of Minsk II. For mutual trust building the EU should compile a document outlining the circumstances under which conditions which sanctions could be lifted and start negotiations for closer economic cooperation.

ENP LIGHT IN THE SHORT TERM – INITIAL GOALS IN THE LONG TERM?

For the Eastern partnership countries this approach would mean an ENP light in the short-term. In order to avoid antagonising Russia which perceives any expansion of European influence in the former Soviet Republics as a threat to its interests, EU membership would be off the agenda and European engagement would be mainly limited to financial assistance and visa liberalisation. Moreover, due to current domestic issues in the partner countries an ENP light would give them the necessary time to consolidate themselves and their relations with Russia and resolve any economic issues. The EU possesses a powerful tool in order to ensure continuous engagement in those countries. Through financial assistance the EU contributes to stability and economic growth. According to European Commission documents, Georgia will receive € 335 million and € 410 million for public administration reform, agriculture and rural development between 2014 and 2017. The same amount is foreseen for Moldova in the same time period (European Commission, 2015). For Ukraine the Commission has already granted € 1.6 billion since Yanukovitch left office and the new Ukrainian incumbent is due to sign a memorandum of understanding with the European Commission which entails further aid packages totalling € 1.8 billion (Stratfor, 21 May 2015). These funds will maintain - provided the money is spent effectively - the EU’s leverage in those states while negotiating an economic cooperation with Moscow.

CONCLUSION

Even though economic cooperation with Russia or any deal similar to the DCFTA would not change Moscow’s mind on Crimea, it could help to stabilise the situation in eastern Ukraine and prevent Russia from taking similar steps elsewhere in the region. In the long-term, economic cooperation between the EU and Russia would allow for more European leverage in the partnership states when - through more cooperation - Russia would not see EU influence as a threat to its interests. This would also allow the EU to pursue its goals which it was reluctant to do at this summit due to fears of augmenting regional instability and antagonising Russia.

Frank Lunemann is a Junior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. He may be contacted at frank.lunemann@cgsrs.org.

Follow The CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies on Facebook and Twitter (@CGSRS_UK).