At the brink of the South China Sea Dilemma: Re- evaluating the US’ role and its Changing Strategies

Executive Summary

While disputes in the South China Sea are not new, China’s recent behaviour in the South China Sea, including its continued development of airstrips in the contested territory, is reaching a pivotal juncture. China’s regional neighbours are taking tougher stances against Beijing’s perceived aggressive actions, indicated by the Philippines’ case against China’s territorial claims at the Permanent Arbitration Court (PCA). The US’ connection with the region and its ties with those contesting China’s maritime territorial claims implies a re-orientation of Washington’s posture in the Asia-Pacific region, and a sore spot for Sino-American relations. In light of such developments and renewed worries over regional security, this paper re-evaluates the US’ role in the conflict, and examines the transforming trajectory of the conflict. The analysis suggests that the US will need to continue leveraging its regional allies to balance its relationship with China, the desire to enforce a rules-based order, and maintain its foothold in the region. 

ANALYSIS

Introduction

At the end of 2015, the Philippines’ case against China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, at the United Nations (UN)-backed PCA at The Hague was closed.  According to the Philippines, China’s 1947 historically claimed ‘9-dash line,’ which includes hundreds of disputed islands and reefs, violated United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) agreements on exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and territorial seas. China is not only reinforcing its territorial claims in the South China Sea with the created islands, but enhancing its ability to extract natural resources, sustain air and sea patrols, and maintain control over fishing activities (NY Times 2015). Experts have pointed to Beijing’s reasons for its actions in the sea, including its desire to gain regional hegemony, supersede American military power in the region, and enhance its security capabilities. The Philippines’ move to challenge China’s actions in the disputed waters, including its occupation and construction activities, aggressive military surveillance of contested features, and interference with Philippine fishing activities under international law have several potential consequences. The case not only risks invalidating China’s claimed indisputable sovereignty, but also recognises China’s non-compliance to a rule-based order, undermining its strategy to emerge as a ‘peaceful’ power (Bijian 2005) without potentially destabilising the region or eliciting backlash from its neighbours. China’s refusal to participate in the PCA hearings, and its non-observance of the stipulated 1 January 2016 deadline for a rebuttal may question the practical effect of such efforts. Regardless, the PCA’s ruling would be legally binding under the UNCLOS and its signatories, which include both China and the Philippines. While enforcement remains a question, China’s defiance of the legal framework of UNCLOS principles can put political pressure on Beijing.  Other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia as well as Japan’s observance of the hearings illustrates the growing wariness of China’s alleged benign rise. The current state of the South China Sea dispute is negating or reversing the previous ‘trend toward more cooperation’ with China (Kang 2007). Such expressed support for a rules-based resolution augurs increased balancing behaviour to counter China’s power.   

Some argue that the Philippine legal action against China is potentially inconsequential, and that the court is unable to ensure China’s compliance (Parameswaran 2015). Notwithstanding such arguments, it would be remiss not to acknowledge ‘the strategic consequence’ of the move, and its potential long-term effects. Namely, the possible wave of similar actions by other regional states (Heydarian, 30 December 2015). In November 2015, Indonesia threatened to bring Beijing to the PCA to clarify its claims to the Natuna Islands, which extend past China’s alleged ‘nine-dashed line,’ while also increasing its military presence on the islands. China’s concession to Indonesia and acknowledgement of ‘Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Natuna Islands’ (Hong Lei, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Washington Times, 2015) signals the potential success of such balancing actions. Moreover, Japan has strengthened military alliances with Vietnam and the Philippines in November and December 2015, Australia conducted ‘freedom of navigation flights’ over the disputed area in mid-December 2015, and there is desire to increase economic cooperation among ASEAN members through the American-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The aim would be to establish open order in Asia-Pacific and to ensure the free flow of goods amidst China’s militarisation of the trade routes (Twining, 2015). The Philippines’ attempt to delegitimise China’s legal entitlement to its built features highlights China’s behaviour. However, it remains to be seen whether the rulings will have binding consequences for China, and ensure its full cooperation with UNCLOS principles. China’s continued military presence in the region, including additional test flights on 6 January 2016 on one of its runways built on a reef in the Spratly Islands, has unsettled Vietnam and the Philippines. Moreover, mirroring the international community’s urge to halt the creation of artificially created features, China responded to its neighbours’ condemnation of these test flights by claiming that its actions “fall totally within China’s sovereignty” (Xinhuanet, 2016).  Increasing public disapproval and regional states’ cooperative measures aim to contain China. But, challenges to countering China’s behaviour through a rules-based resolution to the South China Sea dispute remain. 

The Philippines is looking to the United States (US) for diplomatic and military support. Increasing US-Philippine coordination, namely the Philippines’ Supreme Court’s upholding of a security deal on 12 January 2016 between the two allies could boost the US’ leverage in balancing against China. The agreement allows for an increased American military presence in the region (Banloai 2016). China’s behaviour in the South China Sea remains the bone of contention that challenges the dynamics of the balance of power, and subsequently the US’ strategy towards the region. The potential confrontation between Washington and Beijing and recent developments in South China Sea security warrant a reassessment of the US’ role in the conflict. 

Straining the Sino-American Relationship 

Scholars have pointed to the changing international environment and the challenge of China’s rise to the US’ position in the international system as a major factor behind the 2012 reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific region. In addition to its accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009 and promotion of free trade in the region through the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama Administration has sought to strengthen bilateral relations with China, “one of the most prominent [of its] emerging partners” (Clinton 2011). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recognised that this “pivot point,” or strategic positioning to “sustain [US] leadership, secure [US] interests, and advance [US] values” in the region required engagement and cooperation with China, including the US’ goal of “maintaining peace and security across the Asia Pacific region,” and “defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea,” (Clinton 2011). Cooperation seemed effective. A 2009 joint US-China statement cited planned exchanges between both militaries claiming, “the goal of these efforts is to improve their capabilities for practical cooperation and foster greater understanding of each other’s intentions and of the international security environment” (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009). At the time, Chinese president Xi Jinping reiterated that both China and the US shared common interests of managing disputes and enforcing freedom of navigation in the South China Sea according to international law and stated that Beijing had no plans to militarise the Spratly Islands. 

However, China’s accumulating maritime disputes throughout the past six years are tensing Sino-American relations, and American attitudes toward Chinese aggression have shifted from understanding towards distrust.  The Obama Administration’s peace and security rhetoric was present since the beginning of the administration’s strategic adjustment to the region, but its offshore balancing approach is no longer overlooking the conflict to encourage “just making sure that rules of the road are upheld” (The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, 2015). These days, the US is becoming more engaged in the conflict by objecting to and calling for the cessation of China’s activities in the waters. Open addresses and public discourse on China’s behaviour, such as US Navy Commander Scott H. Swift’s open disapproval of China’s “unilateral assertiveness” (Swift 2015) is one indication that the US is no longer acting as a bystander in the conflict. In October 2015, the US challenged China’s territorial claims over the waterway when sailing a US destroyer close to one of China’s artificially created islands, invoking UNCLOS’ freedom of navigation. And in a November 2015 meeting with ASEAN members, Obama urged China to halt its land reclamation and militarisation of disputed islands.  

"China’s accumulating maritime disputes throughout the past six years are tensing Sino-American relations, and American attitudes toward Chinese aggression have shifted from understanding towards distrust"

China remains unbothered by American condemnation. In January 2016, Beijing allowed Chinese tourists for the first time a visit to an artificially created island built on the Philippine-claimed Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands. Secretary of State John Kerry’s meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on 23 February 2016 only reiterated US-Chinese contentions in the South China Sea. Beijing re-asserted its “territorial integrity,” suggesting its action in the South China Sea is legal. There was mention of China’s newly constructed radar facilities in the Spratly islands, which would allow Beijing to “establish effective control over the sea and airspace” (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016). This is another step in shifting the military balance in the region. Both sides stated the need for mutual understanding, and the maintenance of peace and stability. But, progress toward a diplomatic solution is wearing thin. This month, China turned accusations of militarisation around to the US, pointing to the US Navy’s recent deployment of ships, while warning the US not to complicate the issue (Xinhua 2016). 

It is essential to note these recent developments in the conflict for three reasons. Firstly, China’s building of defence capabilities in the South China Sea significantly challenges the US’ maritime dominance in the western Pacific region, and is a major sore spot in the Sino-American relationship. China’s imperatives to control the South China Sea is no longer an insinuation, but a material reality. Secondly, previous and recent diplomatic initiatives are failing to make progress. From an American perspective, China would take the proper steps to acquiesce to the rule of law, including participating in multilateral talks or initiatives with its neighbours to quell concerns and resolve the conflict peacefully. The reactive actions on both sides and the flexing of military power beg the possibility of escalation and potential confrontation between the two powers. Thirdly, it is evident that US posture towards China needs to change to be more effective, implying an approach that is no longer a pivot, but necessitates a firmer stance.  

The Philippine’s Case against China: Of US interests and its Implications 

The impact of the Philippine case brought against China in impeding China’s actions in the South China Sea remains uncertain. It is unclear whether the court will rule in favour of all of Manila’s claims. Even so, China may continue its trend of indifference and assertiveness (Parameswaran 2015). But, the case is still significant for several reasons. The way China has upset its neighbours, including American regional allies, to the point of bringing Chinese actions accountable under international law, is changing the trajectory of US-China ties. Additionally, the case highlights how American interests are at stake. Going forward, Washington should adopt an approach differing from its previously neutral position in the conflict to one that looks to engage regional partners and multilateralism. 

US-Philippine historical ties, dating back to the beginning of the American colonial era in 1898, have paved the way for the current economic, cultural, and military ties between the two countries. The Philippines thus acts as a strategic regional ally for the Obama Administration’s rebalance toward the Asia Pacific, illustrating the US’ role in preserving the status quo and regional security. Importantly, the US’ 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines warrants American involvement in case of an armed attack in the Pacific. The US realises its obligations to this alliance. In November 2015, Obama emphasised its “ironclad commitment to the defense of [its] ally”, and announced additional expenditure of $250 million USD over the next two years to ensure maritime security in the region (NY, 2015). Manila has welcomed this role, with the January 2016 Philippine Supreme Court approval of a military deal that would station American troops and weapons in Philippine bases and “give teeth” to the US Philippines’ Mutual Defense Treaty (Diaz 2016).  

The arbitration case and subsequent Philippine-American coordination is the beginning of the US trend of coalition building to counter Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea. Other ASEAN members are supporting the American efforts to balance against China. Vietnam, which previously has remained silent on the first USS’ Lassen freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in 2015, endorsed its 30 January 2016 Curtis Wilbur FONOP (Rapp-Hooper 2016). Moreover, Australia, Japan, and South Korea recently have conducted military surveillance exercises (Idem). India and Japan are planning to conduct naval exercises in the South China Sea in coordination with the US later this year. As Heydarian (2016) writes: “The trend-line is clear: China’s accelerated conventional and asymmetrical military development puts it in a comfortable race towards challenging American naval hegemony in East Asia. In the short run, however, China isn’t only confronting American naval muscle, but it is also facing growing resistance by middle powers such as Japan and Australia, as well as smaller powers like Vietnam and the Philippines, the arbitration case of which, if successful, could provide legal justification for more regular and multilateral FON operations against Chinese-occupied land features”.   

Thus, increasing multilateralism and coalition-building with its allies will allow the US to safeguard its interests of upholding global rules and norms, ensuring freedom of navigation, and acting as the provider of regional stability and security (Glaser 2012). Protecting such interests and balancing its desire to maintain a cooperative relationship with China will rely heavily on coordination with its allies to establish its position in the region and “send a coherent legal and normative message to Beijing” (Rapp-Hooper 2016). 

All together now: Building a Case against China 

So, what does the future hold for the US’ role in the conflict? 

The Philippine arbitration case plays a driving force to change the US’ role in the conflict. While China’s aggression in the South China Sea does not yet pose a direct national security threat to the US, the Obama Administration is explicitly focussed on the future Sino-American relations and maintains desire for China to “[share]…the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining an international order” (Obama, The Atlantic). In short, the Obama Administration wants to ensure that China’s rise does not threaten the status quo.  The case, and its future ruling, has the potential to underline China’s defiance to the status quo, and thus is impetus for the US to take on a forceful role in the conflict. As much as the case is an attempt to establish norms and solidify the rules-based order in the international system, the Philippines’ move is also symbolic of the growing aggression and counterbalancing measures taken by China’s neighbours. Moreover, American allies are invoking partnership with the US as anti-China sentiments rise. ASEAN neighbours are pushing more and more for Washington’s direct involvement in the conflict to build clout in preventing Chinese expansionism. If the PCA substantiates Philippine claims, proving China an international outlaw, it could “justify more substantive naval asset deployments on the ground, and conduct more frequent and forceful FONOPs” (Heydarian 2016). Moreover, if China continues to develop anti-access and anti-denial systems in the South China Sea, the US could be prompted to change its national security strategy (Ladwig III 2016).   

Anticipating Beijing’s unwavering stance, it is essential that the US continue invoking international law and soft balancing measures to prevent escalation and to impose the status quo. As Twining (2015) notes, the US can help in ‘reunifying ASEAN around the principle that Asia’s maritime disputes cannot be resolved through force and developing a robust plan of action to enforce that norm’. This will contribute to the Obama Administration’s goal of isolating China (Obama, The Atlantic, 2016). Considering the 14 March 2016 protests in Vietnam denouncing China’s aggression in the South China Sea and The Malaysian-Australian planned meeting to discuss China’s militarisation, garnering support and subsequently putting pressure on China is opportune. Working with its regional allies, strengthening relationships with them, continuing a multilateral approach is essential to building a unified case against Chinese territorial claims and aggression in the South China Sea.