Stopping AQAP from winning the war in Yemen

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The civil war in Yemen has created instability and insecurity that terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have exploited. The current level of United States (U.S.) involvement in Yemen’s conflict, which primarily provides support to Saudi Arabia’s pro-Yemeni government forces, is likely to be insufficient to eliminate the threat posed by AQAP. The U.S. should refocus its attention on terrorism in Yemen by fulfilling its three-fold strategy; increasing air strikes against AQAP targets, augmenting development assistance and counterterror capacity building efforts, and encouraging international support for a political settlement and stabilisation efforts.

Introduction

In 1990, the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) merged with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) to form the modern Republic of Yemen. North Yemen’s former leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and its former capital, Sanaa, respectively became the president and capital of the new state, while South Yemen’s former leader, Ali Salim al-Beidh, became the new vice president. Post-unification, Yemen has suffered from economic hardship, corruption, sectarian violence, and terrorism. In 1994, the state experienced its first civil war. In 2011, the Yemeni Revolution was but another chapter in the Arab Spring. As a result of the revolution, President Saleh stepped down and Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi assumed the presidency. In 2015, the country erupted into a second civil war when the politically marginalized Houthi rebels, which already had seized control of Sanaa back in September 2014, rejected the government’s constitutional proposal, established their own constitution and governing bodies, placed Hadi under house arrest, and began their advance south toward the Gulf of Aden. At first Hadi resigned from the Presidency rather than submit to Houthi political demands, but in early 2015, Hadi fled the capital and declared his resignation null, prompting a bloody power struggle for Yemen. 

To date, the United Nations and Oman have failed to implement a successful ceasefire agreement. The conflict has caused significant damage to Yemen, including a 33 percent increase in the need for humanitarian assistance, an “impending famine”, the closure of 3,500 schools, devastated infrastructure, increased poverty, and additional damage to the already frail economy through a dramatic reduction in oil production, and reduced government spending (a 25-35% contraction in real GDP in 2015) (Worldbank.org, 2016). 

Additional actors have complicated this internal conflict further. Prior to the outbreak of civil war, Hadi had accused Saleh of attempting to undermine his regime (Crash Course: Conflict in Yemen, n.d.). In a likely bid for a return to power, armed forces loyal to Saleh joined the Houthis in battling against Hadi. Foreign powers, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, also are heavily invested in this conflict. Many have accused Tehran and Riyadh of using Yemen as the latest battleground in their proxy war (Engel, 2016; Zimmerman, 2015). 

Islamic terror groups may have profited the most from Yemen’s civil unrest. These entities have taken advantage of the chaos to expand their territorial control and perpetuate attacks. Prior to the civil war, the Houthis and the Yemeni military both had been independently battling the terrorist groups. Post onset of civil conflict, the Houthis and the Yemeni armed forces are battling each other, leaving terrorism to run rampant. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), though predominately operating in Iraq and Syria, also has expanded to Yemen through its affiliate, Sanaa Province. In March 2015, Sanaa Province perpetrated the first attacks against Houthi mosques. Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has had a long-term presence in Yemen, but the breakdown in governance and decreased security brought on by the civil war has allowed the group to expand at an unprecedented rate.  

With international attention focused on ISIS, the threat from al-Qaeda and its affiliates has taken a back seat on many policy agendas. While al-Qaeda Central may not be what it was prior to the U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan, some of its affiliate organisations, such as its branch in Yemen, have expanded to become a critical threat to the United States. AQAP has been responsible for several attempted and successful acts of transnational terror against the West. As the situation in Yemen deteriorates further and AQAP’s capabilities grow, the U.S. likely will need to take action in Yemen against AQAP. Otherwise, the state risks losing control of the rapidly growing terror presence. 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 

AQAP originated in the late 1980s when the Yemeni mujahedeen began returning home after almost a decade of fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. The then president of North Yemen, Saleh, used these returning fighters to combat the Soviet-backed Marxist government in South Yemen as part of his struggle toward the unification and eventual leadership of a united Yemen (Sergie, n.d.). Among these returning veterans was Osama bin Laden and “a corps of jihadists who had trained under bin Laden …[and] formed the militant group Islamic Jihad in Yemen (1990–94), one of several AQAP predecessors” (Sergie, n.d.). These individuals eventually would coalesce into al-Qaeda in Yemen—one of two immediate predecessors to today’s AQAP (Sergie, n.d.). 

In 2000, al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) attacked the destroyer USS Cole stationed at the port of Aden, killing 17 Americans (Sergie, n.d.). After the attack, U.S. President George W. Bush pushed Yemen’s government to pursue greater counterterror action against AQY and reciprocally sent Special Forces and intelligence personnel to aid Yemen in its counterterror efforts. The counterterror relationship yielded its first returns when a U.S. drone strike killed AQY’s leader, Abu Ali al-Harithi, in 2002  (Sergie, n.d.). However, in 2006, after several convicted terrorists escaped from a prison in Sanaa, al-Qaeda reinvigorated its campaign of violence, and conducted attacks against the U.S. and Italian Embassies in Sanaa (Nctc.gov, n.d.). This “break” in AQY’s fortune coupled with Saudi Arabia’s increased counterterror efforts in 2008 led the Saudi-based al-Qaeda members to flee south into Yemen, and eventually prompted the creation of AQAP. AQAP formed in 2009 when al-Qaeda’s Yemeni franchise merged with its Saudi franchise. In 2010, AQAP was added to the U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). AQAP, like its parent organisation, aspires to create a caliphate in the Middle East. More specifically, AQAP is  focusing its immediate attention on creating a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula. 

Rather than fighting to win political control of the state, AQAP is fighting to tear down [Yemen’s] borders and install a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula

The FTO considers Ansar al-Shari’a (AAS), which also operates in Yemen, an alias for AQAP (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Between AAS and AQAP, the Yemen-based al-Qaeda branch has committed numerous domestic and international acts of terror. International targets have included; the 2009 suicide bombing in Yemen against South Korean tourists, the 2009 attempted assassination of Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, the failed underwear bomber of 2009 against a U.S. airliner, two failed attacks against British nationals in 2010, another failed bombing attack via cargo plane against the U.S., and the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Domestically, AQAP carried out over 150 attacks in 2014 against the Houthis, Yemeni military, and civilians utilising improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, and small arms (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). According to the most recent 2014 U.S. State Department report, AQAP has roughly 1000 members (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). This is a significant increase from the mere 200-300 members AQAP had at its inception in 2009 (Sergie, n.d.). Like other al-Qaeda franchises, AQAP funds itself through looting, kidnap for ransom, and donations (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). AQAP also is similar to al-Qaeda in its use of advanced recruitment techniques. While al-Qaeda has been particularly successful in recruiting disenfranchised Arab youth and other locals, of all its affiliates, AQAP may be best at attracting Western fighters and inspiring acts of terrorism abroad. AQAP boasts an English-language propaganda magazine called “Inspire”, as well as numerous well-produced recruitment videos in English.

The Effects of Yemen’s Civil War for Counterterrorism

The conflict in Yemen is AQAP’s latest “break” in their Jihadist struggle. AQAP is exploiting the instability in the country. The Houthis' control of the northwest part of Yemen including the capital, Sanaa, does not hinder AQAP from operating in a much larger swath of territory in southern and central Yemen. AQAP also has increased attacks and conducted a prison break operation that freed many of its members (Mullen, 2015). This terrorist group opposes both the Houthi rebels and the current Yemeni government. However, rather than fighting to win political control of the state, AQAP is fighting to tear down its borders and install a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula.

This conflict features several conditions that have both exacerbated the confrontation and augmented the ability of terrorists to thrive in Yemen. First, the government’s limited force capabilities that were once targeted at degrading and destroying AQAP now are almost entirely dedicated to fighting the Houthis. Hadi’s forces cannot afford to expend too much effort on fighting terrorism since their primary objective is to re-take the capital and to reinstate Hadi as President of Yemen. Likewise, the Houthis currently are focused on maintaining their victories and expanding their territory. The Houthi push for territorial expansion eventually may infringe upon AQAP-controlled lands, forcing them to confront the terrorist group again. Until then, the rebels will be prioritising wining the civil war. 

Second, Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaged in a proxy war in Yemen. These two states have taken opposite sides in the Yemeni civil war. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s involvement in Yemen is only the latest chapter in their longstanding conflict. The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran is ethnic, sectarian, and geopolitical. The two nations disagree on issues ranging from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to U.S. regional involvement. Recently, this longstanding divide has manifested in their approach to the issues in Syria, Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon, to name a few. Prior to Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, the two nations were allies with mutual interests in regional politics and security, as well as a common relationship with the United States. After the revolution, Iran’s relationship with the United States deteriorated. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia’s continued relationship with the U.S. became one source of tension between the two regional powers. Saudi Arabia also supported Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, which soured relations further. However, the Sunni-Shia sectarian divide was one of the greatest sources of tension while relations were good, and was exacerbated once ties became bitter. The Sunnis are regionally represented by Saudi Arabia, and the Shias by Iran. 

While Iran is backing the Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia has supported the Yemeni government. With the support of the United States, the Saudis have created a coalition that has conducted a bombing campaign in Yemen against the insurgents. While Iranian and Saudi involvement is often attributed to an ever-increasing level of violence in Yemen, it also portends augmented instability, which allows terrorist organisations to thrive. AQAP has been rushing to seize Houthi territory recently hit by Saudi airstrikes. The Houthi-targeted airstrikes often have failed to return territorial control to the Yemeni government. Instead, frequently the plan has backfired, providing AQAP with a stronger foothold within Yemen. 

Third, the Houthis, representing a branch of Shia-Islam, risk alienating Yemen’s Sunni population if they eventually extend territorial control into the predominately Sunni provinces. These provinces, where AQAP already operates, are likely to be wary of any Shia pitch for power. The success of the Houthi rebellion may unintentionally provide AQAP (an extremist Sunni terrorist organisation) with a growing recruitment base from which it can exploit the local fears of a Shia and/or Iranian governed Yemen (Sergie, n.d.).

Fourth, once the Houthis took over the Yemeni capital and the country plunged into civil war, the U.S. suspended its program training and assisting the Yemeni military and withdrew special operations forces. The removal of foreign support for counterterror capacity building has damaged what capability Yemen had left to fight terrorism. Saudi Arabia’s air campaign has destroyed the military installations of U.S.-trained Yemeni counterterrorism troops (Gordon, 2015). This weakened Yemen’s ability to combat terrorism further. These airstrikes also have killed hundreds if not thousands of civilians. Although the estimates vary, Human Rights Watch estimates around 2,355 civilians have died from this conflict (with a majority of these deaths caused by coalition airstrikes) as of September 2015 (Solvang, 2015), which only worsens the growing humanitarian crisis and which can potentially push locals towards groups like al-Qaeda. Although AQAP also is rooted in Sunni Islam, the group rejects foreign involvement in Yemen, especially by nations like Saudi Arabia with strong relationships with the United States. The extremism of AQAP may be foreign to a majority of Muslims, but the group’s rhetoric that rejects foreign interference may draw in more followers than it would otherwise if conditions in Yemen were different. 

However, airstrikes conducted on behalf of counterterror efforts have had some success. According to Roggio and Barry (2016), “Since 2002, the US has been conducting a covert program to target and kill al Qaeda commanders based in Yemen. Reports show that strikes have numbered 135 since 2002, with enemy deaths numbering 657 and civilian deaths numbering 105.”  Although the frequency of airstrikes has decreased, some of these strikes have occurred since the onset of the civil war. In mid-2015, AQAP leader Nasser al-Wuhayshi was killed by a U.S. missile strike. Another senior leader, Harith al-Nadhari, was also killed by a strike in 2015.

Implications for U.S. foreign policy

In March 2015, the White House released a statement that read in part, “President Obama has authorised the provision of logistical and intelligence support to GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council]-led military operations” (Zenko, 2015). Yes, the United States is involved in Yemen’s civil war. However, this is both a backseat position and the assistance is for an operation intended to support the Yemeni government, and not specifically mandated for counterterrorism. While taking a supportive role in an internal conflict may be a politically wise maneuver, not pursuing AQAP may be an ill-advised choice. Right now, AQAP may be primarily a Yemeni or even a regional issue, but the terrorist group has expressed a desire and capability to carry out attacks on U.S. soil, against American interests abroad, and against Washington's allies. According to former CIA deputy and acting Director Michael Morell, “Despite that significant threat from ISIS, it is not the most significant threat to the homeland today… The most significant threat to the homeland today still comes from al Qaeda and three al Qaeda groups in particular” (Hattem, 2015). One of these three groups is AQAP, perhaps the most dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate. 

The civil war will continue to worsen as terrorist attacks increase, both sides lose territory to terrorist organisations, and all parties will be stretched thin as they fight a two front war. Likely, the civil war never will be truly resolved as long as terrorism is undermining the security of the Yemeni state and the ability of one side to maintain control over the whole country. The loss of legitimacy resulting from an inability to provide security or social services across the country will undermine the rule of any party. 

“Increased U.S. involvement in any capacity has the potential to damage relation with major regional players”

Many have called for increased U.S. involvement in the deteriorating situation in Yemen. Although an internal conflict, the growth of transnational terrorist organisations makes it a much more important conflict. However, increased U.S. involvement in any capacity has the potential to damage relations with major regional players. One such casualty may be Washington’s relationship with its longtime strategic ally, Saudi Arabia. If the U.S. ceases to support Saudi Arabia’s coalition, even if to remain neutral or to focus its efforts on other conflicts, Riyadh may take such a move as a rejection of its relationship in favour of building new bridges with Iran. It is difficult to weigh the strategic value of a strong Saudi relationship against avoiding involvement in more foreign wars or against a potentially improved relationship with Iran. Although the U.S. has long been allied with Saudi Arabia, the global political climate is shifting. While the U.S. once sought to isolate Iran, the Nuclear Deal has opened new doors for Iran and for its relationship with the international community. If the U.S. plays its cards right, it may be able to secure improved relations with Iran. If the U.S. fumbles this delicate opportunity, the relationship gains made through the Iranian Nuclear Deal may become compromised. In an effort to appease Saudi Arabia, making bolder moves to support their mission against the Houthis may irreparably anger Iran. 

While it is in the strategic interests of the United States to intervene on behalf of counterterrorism in Yemen, given that U.S. involvement never will be a simple or politically “safe” maneouver, the U.S. has devised a plan for Yemen. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Obama administration has a three-fold strategy for Yemen: combating AQAP in the short term, increasing development assistance in the long term, and organizing international support for stabilization efforts” (Sergie, n.d.). While this is a reasonable and well-rounded plan, it has not yet been executed. The beginning of the Yemeni civil war has stalled these efforts. To combat AQAP in the short term, the U.S. should increase airstrikes against AQAP targets and encourage participation from the international community. Current airstrikes (on behalf of Saudi Arabia and its coalition) have increased, but against Houthi targets and not necessarily in pursuit of terrorism. While the U.S. can encourage the Saudi-led coalition also to pursue AQAP, the U.S.’ involvement in conducting airstrikes in Yemen should be limited to pursuing AQAP targets and should clearly be differentiated as such. This will help the U.S. achieve its strategic interests in rooting out AQAP, without risking its budding and fragile relationship with Iran.

Involving the international community in a collation effort is important because it allows for decreased operational costs and mitigates (to some degree) the notion of U.S. imperialistic intentions. And finally, the long-term American strategy of increasing development assistance to Yemen is both necessary for alleviating the strain of the civil war and for creating an environment that does not foster terrorism. However, development aid alone is insufficient. Yemen needs assistance in the economic, social, and political spheres. The first step would be to increase international pressure for Yemen to reach a lasting ceasefire and political settlement. The United Nations’ and Oman’s efforts have thus far made little progress. However, a wider international audience is capable of applying pressure for a settlement, as has happened in Syria. While Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is not nearly as dire as that in Syria, the situation is worsening and the longer it continues, the worst it will get. The worse it gets, the stronger AQAP (among other unfavourable non-state actors) will become. Domestic political instability is among the primary causes of international terrorism (Campos and Gassebner, 2009). Once a political solution is reached, the next step would be to improve Yemen’s counterterror capabilities. Initiatives such as the train and assist program that the United States suspended pending the civil war should be reinstated and expanded. The U.S. and other willing nations should incorporate Yemen into existing counterterror institutions, and work to establish capacity building programs. 

Conclusions for Policy

The U.S. should aim to fully achieve its stated three-fold strategy in Yemen. This should be achieved by;

1. Combatting AQAP in the short term by increasing air strikes against AQAP targets in Yemen. Ideally, this should be done through a coalition effort. However, this effort should be differentiated from the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing campaign against Houthi targets.

2. Increasing development assistance to foster a lasting solution. Development assistance should be augmented with strong international pressure to reach a political settlement and counterterror capacity building programs once a political settlement is reached.

3. The U.S. should strive to organise international support for stabilisation efforts.