Ideological challenges and political instability in the Middle East

Executive Summary

On 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi established a caliphate in the territory that was under the control of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Throughout the summer of 2014, Western viewers watched on their televisions as members of this terrorist organization rampaged across the region. While in the midst of their campaign of terror, members of ISIL demolished sections of the border that separated Iraq and Syria in a highly symbolic act of unification. In demolishing the border between Iraq and Syria, ISIL succeeded in bringing together their separate holdings in both countries; it also seemed to portend the collapse of the political order that had been created by France and Great Britain at the end of the First World War. Throughout the Cold War era, pan-Arabism had tried and failed to bring the states of the Arab East together, and as a result, many in the region have decided to turn to Islam in order to unify the region. ISIL has seized upon this idea full heartedly, and had established a caliphate in order to challenge the pre-existing Western-based order of the Middle East.

Introduction

Since the First Persian Gulf War, the U.S. has had a growing influence as well as presence in the Middle East. The rise of Islamic terrorism has been a troubling development for the region, and terrorist networks like al- Qaeda and ISIL have caused widespread instability in order to challenge the pre-existing order. Under the Obama administration, the U.S. withdrew from the region, and its influence has been greatly reduced, almost to the point where it is now negligible. Al-Qaeda, ISIL, and other bad actors have thus taken advantage of the U.S. withdrawal and have acted accordingly. Whether or not the indigenous population can be pulled away from the allure of fundamentalist Islam is up for debate. What is needed now most of all is a new political movement that could potentially rival the tide of fundamentalist Islam. In addition to this, it might be necessary for the U.S. military to be present in the region for peace and stability to thrive. An examination of the history of the region will show that further partitioning of the region should be avoided – it has been Balkanized enough. It has yet to be determined whether or not the existing and weak states of Iraq and Syria will be able to survive their ongoing struggle with ISIL. Internal unity and strong leadership within both states is needed now more than ever.

On 14 November 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in the First World War when Sultan Mehmet V declared a jihad against the Allied nations of France, Great Britain, and Russia. For the duration of the war, the Ottoman Empire found itself fighting both the Russians in the Caucasus, and the British along several fronts across the Middle East. During the early stages of the conflict, the British explored ways with which it could destabilize the Ottoman Empire in order to bring about its collapse. During the summer of 1915, Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon made a series of exchanges which would become known as the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. Sharif Hussein, who was the religious leader of the Hedjaz, approached the British High Commissioner with hopes of securing the Arabian Peninsula as an independent Arab state, and becoming its leader at the end of the war. The British were prepared to acknowledge some of the demands made by Sharif Hussein, only if the Arabs were to revolt against the Ottomans. However, from the end of 1915 till the middle part of 1916, both France and Great Britain secretly negotiated what the new post-war political order of the Middle East would look like. The Sykes-Picot Agreement resulted from these negotiations, and helped create the modern political map of the Middle East. In order to secure British support for his claims, Sharif Hussein initiated the Arab Revolt on 10 June 1916 and seized the holy city of Mecca from the Ottomans. By the end of the war, the Hashemite forces had moved as far north as Jerusalem,and the British had forces along the entire Levantine coast, and in Mesopotamia. On 11 November 1918, the First World War was brought to an end when the Central Powers sued for peace.

Armed conflict began in the Middle East on 24 October 1916 when the Russians invaded the easternmost part of Anatolia – this was followed by a British invasion of southern Mesopotamia on 6 November 1914. Both of these campaigns showed early signs of promise, but eventually faltered, and then broke when their respective forces faced stern Turkish resistance. As a result of these failures, the British explored ways with which to destabilize the Ottoman Empire. The British Foreign Office began the process in the spring of 1915 by sending a telegram to Abdullah Hussein, who was acting as an intermediary for his father with the British. The telegram read: “The Arabian Peninsula and its Mahommedan holy places should remain independent. We shall not annex one foot of land in it, nor suffer any other Power to do so” (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 882). The idea presented in this telegram was further expanded upon by Sharif Hussein in his own negotiations with Sir Henry McMahon when he demanded that: “Great Britain recognizes the independence of the Arab countries which are bounded: on the north by the line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37° N. and thence along the line Birejik-Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat (ibn ‘Umar) – Amadia to the Persian frontier; on the east, by the Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf; on the south, by the Indian Ocean (with exclusion of Aden whose status will remain as at present); on the west, by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin” (Antonius, 1965, p. 414).

In response, Sir Henry McMahon wrote:“The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits and boundaries, and in regard to those portions of the territories wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to her Ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give you the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:

Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.

Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability. When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and assistance of Great Britain only, and that such European Advisers and officials as may be required in the formation of a sound form of administration will be British. With regard to the Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognize that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitates special measures of administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to secure our mutual economic interests” (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 918).

Exchanges between Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon would continue on for several more months. In the end, Sharif Hussein did remarkably well in his negotiations with Sir Henry McMahon. Not only did he manage to enlarge his territory, but he also received support for his claims from one of the world’s great powers. Despite having reached a mutual understanding with their new Arab ally, the British had already decided to counteract this understanding by beginning their own negotiations with the French on 23 November 1916.

The two men largely responsible for creating the modern political map of the Middle East were Sir Mark Sykes (1879 – 1919), and Francois Georges-Picot (1870 – 1951). The claims made by France for obtaining territory in the Levant were entirely based on economic and religious rights that had strong historical sentiments for the French. In addition to this, there were several organizations within the French government that pressured the foreign ministry to adopt policies that would see France acquire what the members of those organizations called ‘la Syrie intégral,’ or the whole of Syria (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 768). ‘La Syrie intégral’ was to occupy a region from “the Taurus mountains in the north to the Egyptian border in the south and would include much of the Arabian desert” (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 768). British power in the region was already considerable, and did not need to be bolstered. Despite this, Sir Mark Sykes was able to secure for Great Britain additional acquisitions in the region. On 31 January 1916, a draft agreement was signed, and under the agreement, both powers were to receive coastal territory that was to be under their direct control; for the British, this was to be the Ottoman Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra. While the French were to receive territory west of the cities of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo.

The terms that were reached in the Sykes-Picot Agreement were not final and were subject to change. Final designs and plans for the region would not become formal until the San Remo Conference of 1920. The Russian divulgation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1917 was a great international embarrassment and had upset all parties involved. Despite this, both France and Great Britain were still committed to the basic outline of the agreement. Imperialists in the French government were still demanding ‘la Syrie intégral.’ On 16 November 1917, Georges Clemenceau was appointed to be prime minister of France. In his discussions with British Prime Minister Lloyd George, Clemenceau weakened France’s position within the Sykes-Picot Agreement by showing disinterest in the region altogether (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 969). As a result of this, Sykes was able to get Picot to hand over Mosul to the British, extending Mesopotamia’s borders northwards. While these negotiations were being discussed by both parties, the British were undertaking the Palestine campaign. On 1 October 1918, the Palestine campaign was concluded when the British occupied the city of Damascus. Worried about British intensions in Syria, Clemenceau temporarily allied with the imperialists in his government and hardened his position demanding assurances from Lloyd George that the British would not seize Syria (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 999). In order to reassure his ally, Lloyd George ordered that all British forces were to be pulled out of Syria by the end of 1918.

 “Appalled by the imperialist agenda of both France and Great Britain, it was President Wilson who proposed the mandate system as a way to limit the potential for territorial annexations in the region”

On 19 April 1920, the victorious Allies met at San Remo, Italy for a seven day conference to decide the fate of the Central Powers and to establish a new world order. In the Middle East, the centuries-old Ottoman Empire had collapsed giving way to a newly formed Turkish Republic; while the Arab lands to the south experienced several political developments. The first of these involves the fate of the negotiations between Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon. These were largely ignored and declared invalid during the peace talks, since the British refused to uphold to their commitment to Sharif Hussein. The second issue involves the decision made by Allied leaders to establish mandates over their allotted territories. Appalled by the imperialist agenda of both France, and Great Britain, it was President Wilson who proposed the mandate system as a way to limit the potential for territorial annexations in the region (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 987). Mandates were designed to be under indirect rule of their respective power. In the end, the San Remo Conference awarded mandates to both France and Great Britain; France was to receive Lebanon, and Syria, while Great Britain was to receive Mesopotamia (later renamed Iraq), and Palestine.

Before having to evacuate Damascus in 1917 in order to alleviate tensions with France over the area, the British installed Faisal bin Hussein as military governor. With the support of al-Fatat, or the Young Arab Society, Faisal began the process of establishing an administration. As a nationalist organization, al-Fatat rejected the decisions that had been made at the San Remo Conference. On 8 March 1920, Faisal bin Hussein established the Arab Kingdom of Syria in an act of defiance towards French claims and designs for Syria. This experiment in nation-building was to be short lived however. On 24 July 1920, French general Henri Gouraud (1867 – 1946) conquered the Arab Kingdom of Syria when French troops seized the city of Damascus, and established the French Mandate of Syria in its place. On 31 August 1920, general Gouraud established ‘le Grand Liban,’ or Greater Lebanon. After conquering the city of Damascus and establishing the mandates of Lebanon and Syria, general Gouraud became High Commissioner. It was general Gouraud who shaped French policy most in these mandates during their formative years. In Syria, Gouraud attempted to establish direct rule by building up a sizable military presence; in addition to this, Gouraud divided Syria into four autonomous states in a policy that is widely referred to as “divide and rule” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p. 219 – 220). As a result of these policies, Gouraud’s successors had to deal with constant resistance to French rule in Syria. This resistance finally broke into armed insurrection with the Jabal Druze revolt of 1926 – 27. The 1926 - 27 revolt quickly expanded to cover the mandate and was costly for the French to suppress. The political elite in Damascus threw their support behind the revolt, and at the same time began to organize into what would eventually be called the National Bloc.

While the French were busy establishing their two mandates, the British were also simultaneously establishing theirs. On 25 April 1920, the British established the mandate of Palestine; and a day later on 26 April 1920, followed the mandate of Iraq. After establishing the mandate, the British decided to administer the country through a system that was entirely based on the one that had been employed in India for years (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 1121). During the summer of 1920, a local revolt in the south forced the British to make adjustments to the mandate. On 10 October 1922, an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was approved that detailed what these adjustments would be. The Indian system was removed, and it was replaced with an entirely new political system. This was then followed by the appointment of Faisal bin Hussein as king. The king and all government officials were to be advised by British officials; Great Britain was to supply the country with all types of aid; and the treaty was to last for twenty years (Marr, 2011, p. 26 - 27). The years following the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 were exceptionally placid time for the mandate. A year later, on 11 April 1921, the British partitioned the mandate of Palestine into two parts, and the easternmost portion was established as the Emirate of Transjordan and was given to Abdullah Hussein.

During the Interwar years, the populations of these newly established mandates experienced various degrees of nationalistic fervor. This was best seen in Syria, with the establishment of the Nationalist Bloc party during the Jabal Druze revolt. The promise of eventual independence also helped to foster this interest in national politics. For the mandates of Lebanon and Syria, the Interwar years were characterized by the level of control with which France dominated the two mandates. In 1926, Henri Ponsot (1877 – 1963) was appointed to be High Commissioner, and attempted to relieve the tension within the mandate by beginning to work with the Nationalists over the issues of forming an indigenous government and treaty for Syria (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 4247). Some progress was made, but continuous bickering over certain issues (independence) led to the stalling of negotiations. Following the departure of Ponsot from Beirut in 1933, the issues of setting up a treaty and an indigenous government stalled. In 1936, Leon Blum and the Popular Front came to power in Paris and began negotiations with the Nationalist Bloc once again. Negotiations made considerable progress to the point where a draft treaty was agreed upon by both parties. However, the collapse of the Popular Front government ensured that the progress made in 1936 would not be followed up on by the new French government. In the late 1930s, the Nationalist Bloc was drawn to the allure and success of fascism in Italy, and as a result, created its own Nationalist Youth and Steel Shirt organizations (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 4809). In 1932, Antun Saadeh founded the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, challenging the domination that the Nationalist Bloc party had enjoyed in politics since the Jabal Druze revolt of 1926 – 27.

1930 was a pivotal year for the mandate of Iraq, and the mandate system. In the summer, a new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was agreed upon by both countries; Iraq was to be released from the mandate and welcomed into the League of Nations. In 1933, King Faisal died, and his son, Ghazi (1912 – 1939), ascended to the throne and became the new king of Iraq. The reign of King Ghazi saw two important developments take place: the first was the establishment of a new group of career politicians who were represented by individuals such as Nuri al-Said (1888 – 1958), and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani (1892 – 1965); the second major development was the return of political instability. Tribal revolts and political instability in Baghdad regularly plagued the reign of Ghazi (Marr, 2011, p. 40). In an effort to appease the populace, King Ghazi reshuffled the cabinet. Despite having made a change in the government, it soon became clear that the new cabinet was just as unpopular as the last. On 29 October 1936, Iraq experienced its first coup d’état by the military. Led by Bakr Sidqi (1890 – 1937), the coup forced King Ghazi to make yet another cabinet change, placing army nationalists in a position of power (Marr, 2011, p. 46). On 4 April 1939, the Kingdom of Iraq entered a regency council when King Ghazi died, and Abd al-Ilah (1913 – 1958) acted as regent on behalf of the young King Faisal II.

“Best known for its three principles of ‘unity, liberty, and socialism,’ the Ba'ath became the principle vehicle for the pan-Arab message”

The Second World War was a disaster for France. In Syria, the Vichy French took control of the mandate and were eventually defeated by the Free French who were led by Charles de Gaulle (1890 – 1970). Under pressure from his British allies, de Gaulle was forced to promise independence to Lebanon and Syria at the end of the war (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 4445). In addition to this, de Gaulle allowed the 1936 draft treaty to be enacted, and an indigenous government was formed in 1943. In 1944 – 45, de Gaulle attempted to force both Lebanon and Syria to accept a continuation of the mandate. As a result of this, riots broke out across both Lebanon and Syria (Fieldhouse, 2000, location 4467). Free French forces were moved in to quell the riots, but a British intervention forced the French to stand down. Under immense pressure, both France and Great Britain would withdrawal all of their forces from both territories by the end of 1946.

During the Second World War, political instability continued to plague Iraq. Still bound to Great Britain by treaty, the country wanted to stay neutral in the conflict. The British however, wanted to use Iraq for communication-strategic purposes. On 10 April 1941, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani launched a coup d’état that deposed Regent Abd al-Ilah and established a new regime. The British were swift in their response, and the Rashid Ali regime was overthrown by British troops by the end of May 1941. Both Regent Abd al-Ilah and veteran politician Nuri al-Said were placed back in power by the British. During the British occupation, Nuri al-Said proposed what has been dubbed as the “Fertile Crescent Plan.” This plan called for the merging of all of the mandates (Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria) into the Kingdom of Iraq (Ismael, 1991, p. 192). The British rejected the idea since they knew that the Free French under de Gaulle would never agree to it.

Trial and Error: Ideological Development in the Middle East

During the Cold War years, political development continued at varied paces throughout the Arab East. In Syria, political development stagnated as a result of a series of military coups: Hussni al-Zaim (March 1949), Sami al-Hinnawi (August 1949), and Adib al-Shishakli (December 1949); civilian rule was restored to Syria in 1954 when President Shishakli was overthrown. Nationalist Bloc leader Shukri al-Quiwatli returned from exile and won the presidential elections in 1955 and would rule Syria for the next three years. Despite not being able to maintain a lengthy period of political stability during this time, political intellectualism was able to flourish. On 7 April 1947, Syrian intellectuals Michel Alfaq (1910 – 1989) and Salah al-Din al-Bitar (1912 – 1989) founded the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party (henceforth known as the Ba'ath, and translated as ‘resurrection or renaissance’). Best known for its three principles of “unity, liberty, and socialism,” the Ba'ath became the principle vehicle for the pan-Arab message. As a result of its firm belief in pan- Arabism, the Ba'ath Party leadership decided to approach the leadership of both Egypt and Syria with the idea of a union. On 1 February 1958, Presidents al-Quwatli and Nasser announced that the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) had been established as a result of a union between Egypt and Syria. Despite having such high hopes for this experiment in pan-Arab unity, the United Arab Republic would not last. This was in part because of the overriding position with which President Nasser had placed Egyptians over their Syrian partners. As a result of this, Syrian officers organized and began to plot for a coup to take place in 1961.

With support from the British, Regent Abd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Said were put back into positions of power in 1941. On 2 June 1953, Faisal II became of age and ascended the throne to become the new king of Iraq. During his reign, King Faisal II continued to utilize Nuri al-Said as prime minister, and also kept close relations with Great Britain. This angered the Iraqi army and the nationalists. On 14 July 1958, a military coup was launched by Abd al-Karim Qasim (1914 – 1963) that resulted with the death of King Faisal II and the establishment of the Republic of Iraq. Under the new Qasim regime power was shared between a three man council, and a new Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). A Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish representative sat on the three man council, while military associates and Arab nationalists close to Qasim were placed on the RCC (Marr, 2011, p. 86). For much of the time that he was in power, Qasim utilized a broad array of Leftist politicians to administer the country. As time went on, Qasim became more and more reliant on the Iraqi Communist Party for its support within the regime. While it had secured a position of leadership in the regime, the Iraqi Communist Party felt threatened by the rise of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party; and decided to engage the upstart political party in street fighting in the city of Mosul (Marr, 2011, p. 90). Fearful of what the effects of prolonged communist influence would mean for the country, Abdul Salam Arif (1921 – 1966) negotiated a deal with the Ba'ath to share power once the existing regime had been overthrown. On 8 February 1963, the Qasim regime was overthrown when Arif and his Ba'athist supporters seized control in Baghdad.

On 28 September 1961, the U.A.R. collapsed when Syria declared its independence from its union with Egypt. The secession of Syria from its union with Egypt enabled the revival of political life in Syria; and both Aflaq and al-Bitar worked diligently to rebuild the Ba'ath Party. As the political elite worked to restore civilian rule, a group of Alawite officers known as the Military Committee held important positions throughout the new regime. For a short while the Military Committee had allowed the Ba'ath a share of power in the new government. However, in 1966, the Military Committee carried out a purge that saw both the Ba'ath Party and the government come under the complete control of the Military Committee (Galvani, 1974, p. 8 – 9). On 13 November 1970, Defense Minister and Commander of the Air Force, Hafez al-Assad (1930 – 2000) ordered the arrest of his rival Salah Jadid (1926 – 1993) that enabled him to become prime minister.

After seizing power in 1970, Hafez al-Assad became both head of state and head of the Ba'ath Party by acquiring the positions of prime minister and secretary general. While under his rule, the Ba'ath Party was transformed into what some refer to as the “Neo-Ba'ath.” After the failure that was the U.A.R., pan-Arabism took a severe hit across the Arab world, and the Neo-Ba'athists decided that it was best to take a different approach for the future. Rather than attempt unity, the Neo-Ba'athists prescribed to a new belief that economic development should come first (Galvani, 1974, p. 7). Al-Assad took full advantage of this new doctrine by creating a personal dictatorship over Syria. This was followed by a massive buildup of the Syrian military that was to be dominated by the Ba'ath and loyal to al-Assad. In the 1980s, challenges to al-Assad’s dictatorship grew as a result of his support for the Shia / Ayatollah of Iran. The Islamic Front, which was a Sunni- based organization, orchestrated guerrilla attacks against the regime (Cleveland and Bunton, 2000, p. 406 – 407). Under orders from al-Assad, the Syrian military crushed the organization and its attempt to overthrow the regime. Al-Assad would rule over Syria until his death in 2000.

Following the coup d’état that saw the replacement of Abd al-Karim Qasim with Abdul Salam Arif, the Iraqi Ba'ath Party made substantial progress in regards to obtaining national renown when it was invited to work alongside the military to help form the new regime. Simultaneously, the Ba'ath also carried out purges against Qasim supporters, and Communists. As a result of its support for pan- Arabism, the Ba'ath drew the regime into an unwanted conflict with the Kurds. In 1964, ideological discord within the Ba'ath Party burst into the open, allowing Arif to force all members of the Ba'ath out of office (Marr, 2011, p. 122). On 13 April 1966, Arif died, and his brother Abd al- Rahman Arif became president of Iraq a few days later.

After being ousted from power by Arif in 1964, the Ba'ath Party began a transformation that would enable it to regain and hold onto its lost position of leadership. The men who led the Ba'ath Party during this time were Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr (1914 – 1982), and Saddam Hussein (1937 –2006). Determined to avoid what had happened to the party in 1964, factionalism along ideological lines was eradicated, and a formal split with Damascus gave al-Bakr and Hussein decisive authority in party policy (Marr, 2011, p. 176). With a basic power base throughout the country, al-Bakr and Hussein decided to act against the Arif regime. On 17 July 1968, the Ba'athists launched a coup d’état against their one time allies and seized power. After seizing power, the Ba'ath carried out a brutal purge that would ultimately allow it to dominate all aspects of Iraqi politics and society for the foreseeable future. This was supported by the creation of an intelligence network (that was headed by Saddam Hussein), and mass organizations that would oversee the spread of Ba'athist doctrine throughout Iraqi society (Marr, 2011, p. 140). With the Ba'ath Party expanding, al-Bakr and Hussein acquired positions of power in the new regime. Al-Bakr became president, prime minister, chairman of the RCC, Secretary General of the Ba'ath, and chief of the armed forces. Hussein was placed in a supporting role to al-Bakr and was given most of the vice / deputy ranks of these positions. Unlike past regimes, the Ba'athist regime of al- Bakr and Hussein had brought discipline, order, and stability to Iraq. However, it came at a terrible price for both the country and the people.

“In an attempt to bring an end to the global War on Terror, President Barack Obama decided to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011; plans for a withdrawal from Afghanistan were also announced, but since then have been put on hold”

In 1979, al-Bakr resigned from all positions of power, allowing Hussein to become president, secretary general of the Ba'ath, chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and commander in chief of the armed forces. In keeping with Ba'athist tradition, Hussein carried out a series of purges after acquiring his new position of leadership. As a finger in the eye towards the Syrian Ba'ath Party, Hussein appointed Michel Aflaq to lead the Iraqi Ba'ath for a time. With both the Ba'ath Party and the military firmly under his control, Hussein ruled Iraq with an iron fist. While under his rule, Iraq would embark upon a series of foreign policy blunders. The first was an attempt to build a nuclear program – which was bombed by Israel in 1980, the second was the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 – 88, and the third was the invasion of Kuwait that resulted in the First Persian Gulf War of 1990. It was the First Persian Gulf War (1990 – 91) that brought Saddam Hussein and Iraq to the world’s attention.

On September 11, 2001, the U.S. was attacked by al- Qaeda, marking the beginning of the global War on Terror. The U.S. responded to this act of aggression with the invasion and destruction of al-Qaeda’s bases in Afghanistan. President George W. Bush then followed this up with an invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. The liberation of Iraq from the rule of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath should have been a proud moment for the U.S., but the country was allowed to slip into a period that was marked by sectarian violence. This mistake was corrected by the Bush administration when it launched the 2007 – 08 troop surge. In an attempt to bring an end to the global War on Terror, President Barack Obama decided to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011; plans for a withdrawal from Afghanistan were also announced, but since then have been put on hold. On 2 May 2011, it was announced by President Obama that Osama bin Laden – who was the leader of al-Qaeda – had been killed in a raid in Pakistan by U.S. Special Forces.

The Contemporary Era and the Islamic

Challenge

In the contemporary era, Iraq and Syria went in completely different directions. In Iraq, the U.S. occupation led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and Ba'athist rule paving the way for the creation of a new federal republic. While in Syria, the son of Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad (1965 - ) was elected to the position of president on 10 July 2000, ensuring the continuation of al-Assad rule over Syria. A challenge to Bashar al-Assad’s rule would arise in 2011 that was directly tied to the larger Arab Spring. Full scale civil erupted when opposition turned violent, and fighting between pro-regime forces and a multitude of opposition groups is still ongoing to this day.

One of the immediate consequences of the withdrawal of the United States from the region has been the revival of the Islamic terrorist network known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. In 2004 the group was known as al- Qaeda in Iraq and was decimated, but not eradicated during the 2007 – 08 surge by U.S. forces (Thompson, 2015). In 2011, President Obama decided to withdraw all U.S. forces from Iraq and this gave al-Qaeda in Iraq a much needed reprieve – it enabled the group to rebuild in Iraq and migrate into Syria where it would come under the control of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (1971 - ). After establishing a base in Syria, the group came to be known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The group has taken full advantage of the Syrian Civil War and has acquired a large swathe of territory in western Syria with its capital in Raqqa. In early 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant began to enter Iraqi territory in force, and managed to seize the northern city of Mosul.

On 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared that a caliphate had been established in the territory that was under the control of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (now often referred to simply as the Islamic State). The creation of a new Islamic-based political entity that is straddling over territory in both Iraq and Syria was a masterful stroke by the group. As one Islamic State fighter commented: “Thanks to God, we are now on the border between Syria and Iraq. Syria is right in front of you, we’ve brought a bulldozer to take down the barricades, to open the route for Muslims. Thank God. We don’t believe in the Sykes-Picot Agreement” (VICE, The Islamic State, 2014). Since uniting their two holdings, the Islamic State has been systematically destroying the border between Iraq and Syria. As was mentioned above, the unification of these territories has been a long time ambition of pan-Arab nationalists.

In order to govern this territory, the Islamic State utilizes a strict interpretation of an Islamic sect that is known as Wahhabism. At its core, the Islamic State is an extremely authoritarian and zealous political entity. While most Muslims try to be pious believers and practice what is written in the Quran, the Islamic State and its religious leaders have tried to be as accurate or fundamental as possible with their interpretation (Wood, 2015). This includes not only what is written in the Quran, but also what is known as the Sharia. The Sharia is Islamic law that details how believers should govern themselves inside their own community. This is clearly an attempt to develop a “purist” form of Islam; and it has been criticized by both practicing Muslims and Westerners for its stark and medieval outlook. The ultimate goal of these fundamentalists is to establish an Islamic state modeled on the empire that had been created by the Prophet Muhammad and the Rashidun caliphs during the seventh century (Wahid, 2006, p. 6). It is all rather contradictory. Here is a group that has been able to revitalize the dream of establishing a caliphate in an attempt to mobilize the Islamic world, and yet, because of the campaign of terror that it continues to carry out is forcing the very Muslims that it was hoping to attract to denounce and shun the group. Despite the condemnation and criticism that it has received from around the world, the Islamic State still has widespread appeal to many radicalized Muslims because of what it claims to represent. As a result of this, the Islamic State has managed to surpass al-Qaeda as the world’s number one terrorist network in attacks, recruitment, and territory.

Conclusion

From this, it can be seen that the region has had a long and troubled history. The blatant disrespect for established political institutions by the militaries of both countries during the Cold War era had led to the creation of a new political elite that was dominated and represented by the military. Despite having been divided into separate polities, there has always been strong sympathy for unity throughout the Arab East. As a movement, Pan-Arabism has largely failed in its mission to bring about the creation of a single Arab state and unify the region. The failure of pan-Arabism was compounded further by the collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1961. This allowed the already pre-determined states to retain, and then solidify their holdings around Baghdad and Damascus under the military. The resurgence of Islam as a political force in the region has led to an increase in sectarian violence between both Sunni and Shia. As such, it remains to be seen whether or not the indigenous population can create new modes of political thought to counter the rising tide of such groups as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.

Policy Recommendations

1. The Syrian Foreign Legion. Those countries acting as host to a large number of Syrian refugees should come together and create a Syrian Foreign Legion. This will need to involve an extensive training program (to include both military as well as civilian training). Military training should be from one particular nation and one branch of service from that nation’s military, and equipment should conform to standardization as well. The civilian training will include medical as well as political education programs (in order to ensure that those men and women serving in the foreign legion will be able to provide medical services to the armed force and to adhere to the rule of law, and respect human rights etc.).
2. Strengthening of Jordan. The Hashemite monarchy, currently under the leadership of King Abdullah II, has without a doubt shown that it is quite capable of providing leadership for the region when crises call for it. For its part, Jordan has been forced to bear the brunt of most of the regions problems over the years, and as a result, its leadership and people should be rewarded. The West should support the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in three areas: economic, military, and political. Such support will enable Jordan to continue to take on the regions’ problems, and act as a bulwark within the region. Throughout much of its history, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been a model of economic and political stability that is rarely seen in a Middle Eastern country.
3. U.S. Military Operations. While there is currently no support by the general public of the U.S. for an extensive ground campaign in the Middle East, it is clear that the U.S. military is needed in the region. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Republican candidate Ted Cruz (R-TX) advocated for the unleashing of U.S. air power on ISIL. The current strategy that is employed by the Obama administration of allowing the bureaucracy to dictate worthy targets for air strikes (thereby limiting the freedom of the U.S. military) has clearly hamstrung the U.S. armed forces. If the U.S. is going to conduct an air war against ISIL, then it should do so based on its past experience during the Vietnam War with Operations Rolling Thunder and Linebacker.

Shane Vrable is a Junior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. He may be contacted at Shane.vrabel@cgsrs.org.

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