Western Sahara: Meltdown of a Frozen Conflict

Executive Summary

On 19th April 2016 the United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon submitted his report on Western Sahara to the Security Council. He asked the UN restricted body to re-establish and support the mandate of the Mission des Nations Unies pour l’Organisation d’un referendum au Sahara Occidental (MINURSO). The report was issued during a time of tensions between the Secretary General and Morocco, following the recent visit of Ban Ki-moon in the region. The present analysis will outline the historical roots of what is commonly known as ‘Africa’s last colony’, explaining new developments. Moreover, it will try to suggest recommendations to defuse the crisis, which is affecting the entire region. In effect, while the Western Sahara issue has always been interpreted has a local, limited struggle involving two or three main actors, it could have enduring and dire consequences for the North and West Africa.

Introduction

Tensions between the UN and Morocco over Western Sahara increased considerably in the last months. The most visible consequence of the crisis has been the expulsion of part of the members of MINURSO in March, following Ban Ki-Moon’s visit to the region. Visiting a refugee camp in Bhir Lahlou in Western Sahara, the UN Secretary General expressed his regret over the dire living conditions of the Saharawis after decades of occupation. The Moroccan government protested against the use of the very word ‘occupation’, considering Western Sahara as an integral part of its national territory and accusing Ban Ki-moon of impartiality over the issue.

The first phase: decolonization and the Green March

The current confrontation between the UN and Morocco needs to be contextualized in historical terms. The Western Sahara issue grounds its roots in the last moments of the decolonization process. The territory was under the colonial rule of Spain until 1975. During the last weeks of Franco’s regime, Spain decided to relinquish what was previously known as the Spanish Sahara, following increasing pressure by both Morocco and Mauritania. The intent of the Spanish government was to create an independent Saharawi State affiliated with Madrid, in which the Spanish economic interests would have been preserved (Soudan, 2015). This plan was obviously supported by the Saharawi people and vigorously sustained by Algeria, which opposed any enlargement of Moroccan territory. Furthermore, the Algerian regime was interested in the creation of an independent state, which could have been used as an economic corridor to export Algerian iron from Tindouf to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. The United Nations (UN) supported the creation of an independent state as the last step of the decolonization process and according to the self-determination principle. Moreover, the resolution 2071/1965 of the General Assembly (GA) of the UN already considered this territory non autonomous.

However, Rabat’s show of strength was impressive: on 6th November 1975 almost 350,000 Moroccans marched towards Western Sahara, apparently unarmed and willing to restore Moroccan rule over the territory. Despite the alleged spontaneous nature of the movement, also known by historians as the Green March, the operation was directed by king Hassan II and by its military entourage, including Colonel Benslimane, General Achabar and Home State Secretary Driss Basri. Facing Morocco’s resoluteness, Prince Juan Carlos was willing to compromise with Hassan II. The future King of Spain was informed of the movements of the Moroccan army, which entered the Saharawi territory in Haouza, Farsia and Jdiriya well before the launch of the Green March, in order to cut off arms supplies from Tindouf. When the Green March approached the Spanish Sahara, Spanish troops did not fire towards Moroccan volunteers. The popular mobilization was called off days later and on 14th November 1975 Morocco, Mauritania and Spain signed the Madrid Accord.

According to the agreement, Spain accepted the decolonization of the Saharawi territory and the institution of a temporary administration for the territory in which Morocco and Mauritania would have collaborated, respecting the rights of local natives. However, the partition plan never worked out, as Mauritania showed no interest in occupying part of the Western Sahara. Moreover, the Saharawi rejected the Moroccan presence and proclaimed the République Arabe Saharaoui Démocratique (RASD), whose exiled government has operated in Tindouf since 1976.

Second phase: the local dimension

The armed rebellion against the Moroccan rule in the region began in the same year, when the Frente Popular de Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro started its endless battle against Rabat. Founded in 1973, the commonly known Polisario Front profited from the generous support of Algeria, which hosted the exiled RASD government in Tindouf and armed the Saharawis’ rebellion. In this context, it is worth noting that “While two main actors ­ Morocco and the Polisario Front, whose military forces are totally disproportioned ­ are officially opposed on the issue, the long-standing term of conflict is due to the disagreement between Algiers and Rabat” (Khadija Mohsen-Finan, 2015).

The historical rivalry in the Maghreb dates back to the early years after the independence of both countries when Algeria and Morocco were engaged in the Sand War. In 1963 just one year after Algeria’s independence, Morocco claimed Tindouf and Béchar. According to Rabat, both localities, as well as the border area between the two countries, were part of the Greater Morocco, an irredentist idea used by the Makhzen (the ‘palace’ or the King of Morocco) to justify its expansionism. The three weeks war in 1963 ended in a stalemate and a ceasefire brokered by the Organization of the African Unity (OAU, now African Union - UA) and the Arab League. Nevertheless, the Sand War ground basis for the enmity between the two major powers in Maghreb, preventing every integration efforts in the area.

The great political divide between Algiers and Rabat could also explain the enmity. While Morocco has been under the monarchical rule of the Alawi dynasty since and even before its independence in 1956, Algeria’s struggle to end the French colonial rule impressed a strong revolutionary character to the country. Since the beginning, the Algerian regime headed towards socialism, taking advantage of the presence in North Africa of Nasser’s Egypt and receiving arms shipments from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The political and ideological divide can in part explain the Western Sahara war, which began in 1975 and was finished in 1991. During all this period the Polisario Front engaged the Moroccan army in a guerrilla warfare, gaining considerable successes. However, during the late 80s, the rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco led to minor contribution from Algiers to the Saharawi movement. Moreover, King Hassan II changed his combat strategy in order to wear down the Polisario, offering them economic advantages and fractioning their front.

Moroccan interest for Western Sahara could be better understood looking at the economic resources of this territory. According to the 2013 report by the Economic, Social and Environmental Council of Morocco, one of the most important economic sector in the area is the fishing, where 74.000 people are legally employed. Fishing represents 17% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Western Sahara, employs 31% of the local workforce and represents 78% of the Moroccan fishing output (CESE, 2013). The non-governmental organization (NGO) Western Sahara Resource Watch also stressed the importance of agriculture, in particular the cultivation of tomatoes, cucumber and melons. Furthermore, the Moroccan government is implementing the Maroc verte plan passing from 36.000 tons of fresh picked products in 2008 to 160.000 tons in 2020 (it attained 80.000 tons in 2013).

Apart from fishing and agriculture, the Western Sahara is rich in phosphates. The national Officine chérofoendes phosphates (OCP) is the first exporter and the second producer of phosphates in the world (Quarante, 2014). Moreover, the kingdom holds the largest reserves of this mineral worldwide and the sector represented 6% of Morocco’s GDP in 2012. The Bou Craa site is relevant for the OCP and authorities planned to double its production by 2020. Even the oil and gas sector raised expectations in 2001, when the Kingdom signed a deal with the French company Total for the exploration of the Anzarane offshore field, in front of the southern part of Western Sahara. Even though the French company dispatched a mission in the area in 2013, the project resulted not economically viable.

Third phase: the internationalization of the issue

Morocco took advantage of the Western Sahara war, both in terms of an obvious territorial expansion and in terms of national identity. The Green March in particular was the occasion to exploit the nationalist cause and provide the Makhzen with an indispensable legitimacy during difficult times. Nevertheless, the continuation of the war damaged the image of Morocco on several fronts, in particular in the African continent, where the OUA took position against Moroccan policy. African countries criticized Rabat and in 1982 RASD was admitted as Member State to the organization. As a result Morocco withdrew its membership in 1984.

Morocco’s isolation was concerning for King Hassan II, who decided to rethink its policy towards the Western Sahara during the eighties. Accepting the self- determination principle for the Saharawi, the Makhzen gave its preference for a diplomatic solution of the issue, recurring to the mediation of the UN. Following a formal request by the UN General Assembly, in 1985 UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar started a good offices mission in cooperation with the OUA. On 30th August 1988 Morocco and the Polisario Front found a common agreement. The compromise, later included in the UN Security Council in the resolution 658/1990, aimed at a fair and conclusive settlement of the issue, through the implementation of a cease-fire and the organisation of a referendum to allow the Western Sahara people to exercise their right to the self- determination, choosing, without military or administrative constraints, between independence or integration with Morocco.

In this context, the UNSC resolution 690/1991 ordered the creation of the MINURSO. The missions was tasked to oversee the cease-fire, to control the reduction of the Moroccan forces on the territory, to supervise the exchange of the war prisoners, to identify the legitimate electors and to hold the referendum. According to some authors (Novosselof, 2015), MINURSO was only able to complete the first task. While the cease-fire was generally respected, political developments in the territory remained frozen.

The main reason of the stalemate during the last 25 years has been the changing balance of power in the region. After the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the ‘black decade’ in Algeria, Morocco found itself in a privileged position to affirm its interests in Western Sahara: taking advantage of the support of its main international sponsors, Rabat was able to slow down MINURSO’s activity. Apart from France, the United States were particularly supportive of Moroccan position: the appointment of the former Secretary of State James A. Baker by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 1997 had direct consequences on the process. In effect, Baker proposed a new plan to negotiate between the parties, considering a substantial autonomy for Western Sahara in the context of a full Moroccan sovereignty (Novosseloff, 2015). Event though this new plan was not successful, it showed the great support enjoyed by Rabat from Western countries.

The current crisis

Based on the Baker plan, a new plan by Moroccan government suggested in 2007 self-government for Western Sahara, conceding a certain degree of autonomy. Without any follow-up on the issue, the conflict remained frozen until 2010: in October that year a Saharawi protest camp in Gadaym Izik, near Laayoune, was stormed and dismantled by Moroccan security forces. At least 20,000 people were dispersed, increasing tensions in the territory and preceding the current crisis. In the meanwhile, an important development occurred on the diplomatic front. In 2009 the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appointed the former US diplomat Christopher Ross as UN envoy to Western Sahara. Given Ross’s previous appointment as US ambassador in Algiers, the choice annoyed Rabat. Relationship between king Mohammed VI and the UN envoy were not sympathetic. In 2012 Morocco declared Ross persona non grata and in November 2015 the Moroccan Foreign Minister Salaheddine Mezouar stated that the UN envoy would never again return to the Western Sahara (Mouhsine, 2015).

More in general, in the last year a change of attitude was registered by Western powers towards the issue: the role of NGOs and civil society actors raised awareness of the Saharawi question in the public opinion of different countries. The cause began to be carefully considered, perhaps supported. In a parallel with the Israeli-Palestinian case, trade deals and economic partnerships represented the main leverage to pressure Morocco into changing its policy. On 11th January for example the State Department of the United States (US) vetoed a Congress’ measure to provide economic assistance to Rabat. Foggy Bottom stated that the 2016 Federal Budget provisions concerning Morocco cannot provide financial aid to Western Sahara, a territory whose status has not been determined yet (Profazio, 2015).

The move in Washington followed similar measures by the European Union (EU): following an appeal by the Polisario Front, on 10th December 2015 the European Court of Justice suspended a farm trade deal on agriculture with Rabat, due to lacking references to Western Sahara. According to the EU top court, the deal cannot apply in the disputed territory. The Polisario Front suited a similar appeal against a fishing agreement between EU and Rabat. The EU and US stances on Western Sahara represent an interesting trend in dealing with disputed territories, after the precedent of the trade deal row with Israel regarding products coming from settlements in the occupied territories.

However, the measures taken did not produce relevant outcomes. Furthermore, they showed Morocco’s resoluteness towards the issue. This was evident for example in the diplomatic row with Sweden: confronting an internal review of Stockholm’s policy towards Western Sahara, the Moroccan government threatened a boycott of Swedish companies and temporarily blocked the opening of the first Ikea store in the country (el-Yaakoubi, 2015). Tensions decreased last January, following Swedish decision not to recognize Western Sahara. At the same time, the Makhzen continues to consider the Western Sahara as an integral part of the country. On 6th November, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Green March, Mohammed VI outlined a new development plan for the region. The king, who said he would offer no more than autonomy to the Saharawi, visited what the kingdom calls the Southern Provinces in February, outlining a €1,5 billions investment project in the phosphates sector.

In regards to the EU, Rabat’s retaliation firstly consisted in the suspension of formal contacts with the Brussels (el-Yaakoubi, 2016). The decision, which disrupted around 1 billion Euros of funding, forced officials to review EU’s policy on the issue: on 23rd February the European Council and the European Commission appealed against the decision of the Court of Justice. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini also demanded temporary measures to reactivate the trade agreement with Morocco. Relations returned normal in March.

However, major problems emerged with the UN. Following the visit of Ban Ki-moon to Mauritania and Algeria at the beginning of March, violent critics were expressed by Moroccan government against the UN Secretary General, accused of no longer being neutral. On 13th March, thousands of people (3 million according to Moroccan news agency MAP) protested in the street of Rabat against the UN (al-Huffington Post, 2016). More important, on 15th March the kingdom announced the reduction of the civil component of the MINURSO, the annulation of Rabat’s voluntary contribution the UN mission ($3 million per year) and a general review of Morocco’s commitment to UN peace- keeping operations. In the following days Morocco asked the UN to remove 84 staff members from the Western Sahara mission and to close the military liaison office in the disputed territory. Ban Ki-moon, who is in his last year in office, was forced to express regret over his comments in Bhir Lahlou and the use of the word ‘occupation’.

Morocco’s foreign policy in flux

The ongoing crisis does not only represent a local issue, but it affects the stability of the entire region and could have deep international implications. Morocco benefits from the support of its traditional allies, most of them included in Friends of Sahara group (France, Spain, US, United Kingdom and Russia). France, for example, reiterated on several occasions its support for the kingdom. On 9th March, Romain Nadal, spokesperson of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that Paris considered the 2007 Moroccan plan for the autonomy of the region “as a serious and trustworthy basis for a negotiable solution” (Idir, 2016). Given the difficult relations with Algeria (emerged after the most recent visit in Algiers by French Prime Minister Manuel Valls), Morocco represents the cornerstone of France’s foreign policy in Maghreb. The importance of Rabat is reflected not only in the numerous economic deals between the two countries, but also in the fight against international terrorist organisations.

In this context, Morocco’s joint counterterrorism operations with Spain reflect excellent relations with Madrid. Spanish support for Morocco on the Western Sahara issue emerged on 29th April, when the UN Security Council approved the resolution renewing the MINURSO mandate (al-Huffington Post, 2016). Spain, together with France, the United Kingdom and the United States, approved the MINURSO renewal until 30th April 2017, contributing to maintain the ‘status quo’. Confirming the support for UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and its envoy Christopher Ross, UNSC Resolution 2285/2016 placed mild pressure on Morocco. Moreover, it does not order the Moroccan government to rescind the expulsion of the civil component of MINURSO; and it does not specify further steps to resolve the mission’s severe limitations (Gladstone, 2016).

The resolution was proposed by the US delegation, the penholder of the Friends of Sahara group. The relationship between Rabat and Washington started to deteriorate as a consequence of the US review of its policy on Western Sahara. The first signs of the US’s shift in stance over the issue emerged in the last few years, when the US delegation insisted to include a general overview of the respect of the human rights in the MINURSO’s mandate. Facing Moroccan opposition, Washington was forced to withdraw the proposal.

Misunderstandings between Washington and Rabat also emerged during the drafting of the UNSC resolution last April. An earlier version demanded the re- establishment of the MINURSO in 60 days, reflecting the increasing discomfort of the Obama’s administration over the issue. After diplomatic pressure by France, the time allowed to UN Secretary General to report on the issue was extended to 90 days. Nevertheless, the turning point in US-Morocco relations was reached: in effect, Morocco took the opportunity of the publication of the 2016 Human Rights Report to protest against the State Department, summoning the US ambassador in Rabat, Dwight Bush (L’Orient Le Jour, 2016).

Facing the new stance of United States over the issue, the Makhzen elaborated a strategy to reaffirm its sovereignty over Western Sahara. It consisted of a diplomatic offensive that resulted in a turnover of nearly 80 ambassadors and several tours to rally allies in the region and beyond. For example, in March, Mohammed VI visited Russia where he received the support of President Vladimir Putin. Apart from the lucrative trade deals signed, it is worth noting that the Russian President stated that Moscow takes due account of Morocco’s position concerning the settlement of the Western Sahara problem (Lamlili, 2016). On the other hand, the Russian government is generally considered an ally of Algeria (80% of Algerian arms come from Russia) and Russia’s representative abstained from voting in the last UN Security Council’s session on Western Sahara. Nevertheless, the new Cold War climate and the general trend of the Russian foreign policy to oppose territorial partitions and secessions could generate unexpected outcomes.

One of the main supporters of the Makhzen’s cause has been Saudi Arabia. More recently, Riyadh announced its support for Moroccan territorial integrity. Furthermore, the Saudi monarchy was able to convince the other Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to support Morocco’s stance over Western Sahara during the first Morocco-GCC summit on 20th April, a follow-up of the 2011 invitation to Mohammed VI to join the Gulf group. Even though Morocco declined the invitation, relations between both sides intensified as the GCC set up a fund of $5 billions for Morocco and Jordan to prevent an Arab Spring scenario in both countries; Morocco reciprocated, joining the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen to fight the Houtis in 2015.

In the last few months, Saudi businessmen have showed interest in investing in Western Sahara (Abdelbari, 2016). Apart from political considerations about the monarchical nature of both regimes, this new development reaffirms regional alliances. Saudi Arabia is opposed on several fronts to Algeria, which decided not to follow the Arab League’s and Gulf Cooperation Council’s ­ Riyadh-proposed ­ decision to list Hezbollah as a terrorist group. However, the main contentious point between Saudi Arabia and Algeria in the last months has been falling oil prices on the world markets. Set by the Saudi monarchy to prevent Iran’s re-entry into the international markets, to damage Russia’s economy and discourage investments in the shale oil sector, the oil slump has adversely affected oil exporter countries, including Algiers.

Conclusion

The realignment of Morocco’s foreign policy (or like some authors argue, the Moroccan ‘diplomatie à géometrie variable’, (Lamlili, 2016), is a natural consequence of its strategy to preserve the sovereignty over Western Sahara. This could lead to instability in the region, multiplying the number of actors involved. Risks also emerge when considering the internal politics of Morocco: the next parliamentary elections will take place on 7th October and on several occasion opposition parties claimed Western Sahara as an integral part of the country. Moreover, the idea of the Grande Maroc is still alive in the public opinion: on 17th February the Secretary General of the Istitqlal party, Hamid Chabat, claimed Tindouf, Hassi-Messaoud and Béchar, accusing Algeria of colonialism (Hamadi, 2016). A more pronounced nationalistic approach by the ruling Parti pour la justice et le développement (PJD) to win the support of the people could not be ruled out approaching the elections, in particular if protests and demonstrations against the rising unemployment and economic difficulties will continue.

In that case, the risks originated from the melting down of a frozen conflict cannot be underestimated. On several occasions the Saharawis have threatened to return to armed struggle and fight against the Moroccan troops. The Secretary General of the Polisario Front and President of RASD Mohammed Abdelaziz1 has repeatedly urged the international community against the reprisal of the conflict, asking for a full implementation of the MINURSO mandate and highlighting the necessity of the referendum. The Polisario Front interpreted Morocco’s latest actions against the MINURSO as a dangerous provocation that could lead to war. The regional implications of an unfrozen conflict in Western Sahara are multiplied by the current arms race between the two main contenders: according to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in the period 2011-2015, Algeria is the largest arms importer in Africa (Algeria’s weapon imports represent 30% of the continent’s total), followed by Morocco (26%) and Uganda (Bousqet, 2016).

The persistence of the current ‘status quo’ is untenable. Experts also warn against the risk of terrorist infiltrations in Western Sahara (Spencer, 2016). In the last months, countries in the region have accused each other of terrorism support. In March, the Wikileaks website published emails of former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, concerning Algerian counterterrorism efforts and revealing important details about a secret deal signed in 2012 between Algerian officials and Mokhtar Belmokhtar (Babouche, 2016). According to this deal, the al-Mourabitoun leader would have focused his attention on Mali and occasionally on Western Sahara, with the help of Algerian intelligence services. Even though the existence of this kind of deal is unlikely, it is worth noting similar rumours regarding a supposed truce between AQIM and Mauritania in 2010, emerging from declassified memos discovered in Osama bin Laden compound in Abottabad, Pakistan (Joscelyn, 2016).

The region is permeable to terrorist infiltration. The Saharawi refugee camps in the region, in particular, represent an easy target for the jihadist recruitment and propaganda. Moreover, the Islamic State’s (IS) interest in border areas and turbulent, far remote regions is well known. Both the Maghreb and the West Africa are already a confrontation ground for IS and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Adding Western Sahara to this complex scenario could produce a new category of risks for the entire region.

Policy Recommendations

1. Morocco’s re-elaboration of its foreign policy gave to Saudi Arabia and Russia the opportunity to meddle in the Western Sahara issue, vexing more long-standing actors like Algeria. The presence of new actors with different agendas could represent a risk, preventing a settlement. If this trend persists, it could alienate the support of more traditional allies like US. It is therefore suggested a return to the local dimension, in order to reduce the number of actors involved to a minimum required to achieve a common understanding.
2. The renewal of the MINURSO mandate decided by the UN Security Council in late April was crucial to defuse the crisis. It ensures the respect of the cease-fire, representing the continuity of the international supervision. However, MINURSO should not perpetrate the ‘status quo’. In order to impress a turning point for the mission, it should be recommended to add new tasks in order to develop the political component of the mission.
3. Rabat’s Ministry of Foreign affairs issued a statement indicating MINURSO’s essential tasks in the surveillance of the cease-fire and in the demining activity (Majdi, 2016). Nevertheless, the organisation of a referendum for the self-determination of the Saharawi people still figures as the main goal of the mission. In case the Security Council does not decide to change the mission’s nature, a referendum must be held in Western Sahara. Given the consensus among the major powers over the 2007 Moroccan plan, the consultation should propose integration, independence or autonomy for the Western Sahara.
4. It is important to defuse regional tensions and prevent any conflict. In this context, the role of the regional organizations could be crucial. The Western Sahara issue could represent the occasion to reactivate the Union pour le Maghreb Arabe (UMA), sponsoring a regional integration among the Member States and settling controversies
5. Morocco is an important economic and security partner for Europe and the West in general. Morocco’s important contribution in the fight against international terrorism emerged during the November 2015 attacks in Paris. Given the fact that 4 out of 5 perpetrators of the March 2016 Brussels bombings were of Moroccan origin, Morocco’s intelligence could have been determinant in this case, too. It is thus recommended that intelligence cooperation between EU and Rabat should be strengthened. Security cooperation should not distinguish on the different positions taken by governments or institution over the Western Sahara issue.