Attempted military coup in Turkey and implications for EU-Turkey relations

Turkey witnessed a night of violence as a coup d’etat against the Turkish government was attempted by elements of the Turkish military. The speed and execution of the attempted coup showed good organisation and efficiency, however countercoup forces prevailed after dozens of people died in clashes. Fissures within the Turkish military have long been present, dividing the nationalists, secularists, Islamists and the Kurds (STRATFOR, 2016). While followers of the Gulen movement are the most suspect, regardless of which faction is responsible for the coup, implications for the EU- Turkey relations could be serious.

18th July 2016

‘soft power’. Such ‘soft power’, however was based on geopolitical guidelines which were implemented to safeguard Europe’s peace and stability. After all, the Balkans and the Middle East were frequent sources of instability. In that sense, the EU sought to project its own power and principles abroad, in order to pacify its neighbourhood and extend its geopolitical reach. However, liberal ideals cannot thrive in a competitive environment characterized by hard power. With the attempted military coup in Turkey, the EU again faces potential instability, and inevitable review of its foreign policy.

The immediate impact on EU-Turkey relations will be how Erdogan handles the plotters. Already Erdogan has announced that the plotters will pay a “heavy price” and that he will “cleanse our army” (Dolan and Solaker, 2016). Prior to the coup, he has been accused of violating human rights, severely curtailing freedom of speech and expression, and taking Turkey

The immediate impact on EU- Turkey relations will be how Erdogan handles the plotters.

The EU has had a difficult relationship with Turkey, one that the EU sought to frame in a liberal framework. The liberal framework has been part of EU’s projection of its own in a pro-Islamic direction. In other words, he was already paranoid that he might lose power. Another act of repression, including a possible reinstatement of death penalty to punish the plotters, would be strongly opposed by Brussels as it would undermine what the EU has aimed to achieve in Turkey regarding the promotion of the rule of law and human rights. This is reflected in the latest statements of European leaders who believe that a coup may ruin the foundations of freedom and democracy in Turkey.

The plotters may not be the only target for Erdogan, as some commentators fear (Hudson, 2016). The Turkish leader also faces opposition from the secularists and the Kurds. If Erdogan uses this opportunity to also suppress these other elements of the opposition, as he has done with the anti-terror legislation, it would send an even stronger signal to the EU that its relations with Turkey cannot be built on common values, specified in the Copenhagen criteria. The EU has already raised concerns in the past regarding the independence of the Turkish judiciary, executive and legislative branches. If these branches continue to be politicized, and if Erdogan fulfills his long-running plan to rewrite the constitution, it will be increasingly more difficult for the EU to move accession negotiations forward. Yet it may well be the case that Turkey has given up on its EU aspirations, a policy that certainly resonates well among the Turkish public, giving EU even less leverage over the Turkish leadership (Bobic, 2015).

Turkey’s controversial law has also been a stumbling block in the EU-Turkey migration deal. Turkey is a vital player for the EU to properly deal with the migrant crisis, given Turkey’s geopolitical sway and location.

How the coup attempt will affect the EU- Turkey migrant deal was the most immediate concern of the Polish President Andrzej Duda. The deal specifies that the EU can send migrants arriving illegally in Greece back to Turkey, while in return visa requirements for Turkish travellers to the EU will be eased. However, Turkey is expected to revise its antiterrorism legislation in order for the deal to function. If the deal fails, credibility of European leaders will be put on line. Yet, Erdogan has already questioned the deal and sacked Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who was the one that negotiated the deal and represented a pro-European faction within the Turkish government (Spiegel et al., 2016).

A possible reinstatement of death penalty to punish the plotters, would be strongly opposed by Brussels as it would undermine what the EU has aimed to achieve in Turkey.

While Erdogan might not seem to be banking on much progress with the EU, the European public does not express much enthusiasm about extending the open- border policy toward Turkey either. Such policy could easily result in demographic shifts that would only further strengthen far-right elements that are gaining ground in France, Belgium, German, Netherlands, among others.

Militarily, both the EU and NATO have a reason to be concerned whether one of the most important NATO members, bordering the chaos in Syria, can prove to be a reliable partner. Islamic State has been blamed for several bombings in Turkish cities, while the Kurds have also stepped up their insurgency against the government. Alone, these two security challenges have proved to be extremely difficult for Turkey to deal with. With a possibility that the Turkish regime can fall, NATO assets and regional security could be put in additional jeopardy. After all, according to Franck (108), Turkey’s position can be used to stabilise the Black Sea region, control access to and from the Mediterranean Sea, to balance Russia in the Caucasus, and serve as a Southern anchor for NATO. An unstable Turkey brings all of these strategic elements into question.Still, the outcome is better than what would have been the case if the coup had succeeded. Most Western leaders have expressed their support for Erdogan’s regime, despite some concerns about the future of democracy in the country, indicating how vital a stable Turkey is for EU and NATO’s geostrategic positioning. This does not mean, however, that future relations will easily overcome aforementioned implications. We can in fact expect them to persist for some time. The EU, after all, will continue to struggle between its geopolitical concerns and its normative values while Turkey has neglected the latter (Martin, 2015). Which take precedence will be part of many internal debates, however, history seems to indicate that when norms and hard security issues clash, the latter prevail.

Marinko Bobic is a Junior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. He may be contacted at marinko.bobic@cgsrs.org.

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