Possible Scenarios for Why Russia’s Federation Council Might Hold an Emergency Meeting

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This week’s announcement that the Russian Federation Council most likely will hold an emergency session is an indicator of high-level talks within the Russian government. This policy brief discusses the most pressing scenarios which could justify such an emergency meeting.

This week the speaker of the Federation Council, Valentina Matviyenko, announced that senators should be ready for a possible emergency meeting (Telecanal Doshd, 3 June 2015). The Federation Council is the upper house of the Russian Duma. It consists of 170 senators. Its competencies range from coordinating business with the State Duma to the deployment of military troops abroad. Other powers include delineating the state budget, approving border changes, and high-level nominations within the government.

Extraordinary meetings of the Council are rare. The last emergency session of the Federation Council occurred in March 2014 when members held a vote over the annexation of Crimea. Matviyenko’s announcement has prompted speculation as to her rationale for calling an emergency session in the forthcoming weeks. Such a development could hint at important governmental considerations on significant topics within the Kremlin.

Given the current Russian involvement in Ukraine, the deployment of troops could be one issue for discussion. Even though there is no evidence for such a deployment in Ukraine, it would require the approval of the Federation Council. Though, this possibility would be unlikely, given the significant financial resources such a deployment would require. Furthermore, it would escalate the already strained political relationship between Russia and the West. Given the current economic situation this cannot be in the interest of the Kremlin. The continuation of low-level conflicts in the region is a more likely outcome. This would not require an official decision by the Russian government. Therefore an emergency session of the Council would not be required. 

A formal recognition of the Ukrainian breakaway republics of Donetsk and Lugansk would be a more realistic reason for convening the Council. In a similar vein the Federation Council met on an emergency basis after the August 2008 Georgia War in order to recognise formally Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A similar recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk however, risks further damage to Russia’s relations with the West. This is the case because the Minsk II Agreement stipulates the unity of Ukrainian territory and local elections under Ukrainian law. A formal recognition of the two separatist regions would breach these provisions.

Russian troops also are currently present in the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria. A deployment of additional forces would coincide with recent events in the region. On 1 June 66 public organisations from Transnistria asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to protect the people of Transnistria from external threats (Sputnik News, 26 May 2015). This request could be utilised as a legitimate justification for the deployment of additional Russian military personnel in Transnistria. In light of Kiev’s decision to repeal an agreement which granted Russian forces the right to transit Ukraine en route to Moldova an additional Russian deployment could send a signal to Kiev, underlining Moscow’s presence in the region.

Matviyenko’s announcement can be seen in different lights and different scenarios are possible. It is a sign of high-level talks within the Russian government which could pave the path for the next steps in Russian foreign policy in the region.

Frank Lunemann is a Junior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. He may be contacted at frank.lunemann@cgsrs.org.

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