Fethullah Gulen and Turkey’s Failed Military Coup

July 22, 2016

U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen, whose followers Turkey blames for a failed coup, pauses before speaking to journalists in this... REUTERS TV
Report

A week after the attempted coup in Turkey, President Erdogan is trying to punish the plotters behind the try to topple the government.

During the armed intervention, the leader of the AK Party had declared that the supporters of the coup would have paid a heavy price. Turkey is now plummeting into chaos, as a wave of arrests and suspensions has hit several institutions and social classes. According to Numan Kurtulmus, spokesperson of the government, there have been 9,322 arrests between July 15 and July 20. The Ministry of Education has communicated that more than 15,000 teachers have been suspended, along with several imams, 30 prefects out of 81, about 8,000 police officers, more than 200 judges and 1,500 officials of the Ministry of Finance.

On July 20, President Erdogan announced in an interview that he was going to approve the state of emergency for three months. On the following day, the Parliament passed the law and the state of emergency has been declared, in accordance with article 120 of Turkish constitution. In addition, as stated by Kurtulmus, Turkey is going to suspend the European Convention of Human Rights, which can be suspended for security reasons and in case of national threat.

The methods used by Erdogan and the massive measures implemented suggest that the will of the President is to purge Turkish society of all the individuals linked to oppositions. The government has in fact targeted the military factions backing the coup, but it has also targeted all those persons who recently expressed dissent.

The methods used and the measures implemented suggest that the will of the President is to purge Turkish society of all individuals linked to oppositions

Fethullah Gulen has been blamed of masterminding the coup and is one of the most influential figures in Turkey. Gulen was a religious leader (his belief is Hanafi Islam) and thanks to his charismatic sermons he became popular during the Eighties and the Nineties. His movement Hizmet grew up, obtaining approvals in all the country. Gulen has been an important ally for Erdogan, as he backed the AK Party from 2002 until 2010. The service (this is the translation of Hizmet) has established roots in the national judicial system and is largely appreciated by young students enrolled in universities. In addition, Gulen has many supporters within Turkish cultural and religious institutions, some of the classes the executive targeted the most during these days. In 2010, the Muslim cleric withdrew his support for Erdogan, after a corruption scandal hit some of the leaders of the AK Party. Gulen controlled a crucial daily newspaper named Zaman, which after 2010 regularly criticized Erdogan.

The military in Turkey has long played a crucial role as guarantor of the constitutional order. In 1960, for instance, the army intervened in order to restore the principles stated by Kemal Ataturk. In 1997, the army demanded and obtained the resignation of PM Erbakan. The military also intervened in 1971 and in 1980, influencing national political events. Furthermore, the army has always been deeply involved in national economic dynamics. As it was the case for Egypt, after the Second World War, the economic elite has been largely composed of military officers. Erdogan reached power in 2003, becoming Prime Minister. He enjoyed support of the new economic elite, deeply connected to the group of Muslim entrepreneurs Musiad. This group, rooted in Anatolia, gained momentum during the Nineties and once Erdogan became Prime Minister, guaranteed to him the backing of key economic actors. Soon he showed the will to centralize power and amend the constitution, but he understood three factors could have hindered his ambitions: the army, political opponents, the judiciary power.

The army was tackled through the reorganization and replacement of key officers, in order to undermine the Kemalist leanings which could have prevented constitutional changes. Gulen supported these provisions. However, Turkey in this moment needed to have an equipped and trained military, as the country had to deal with relevant internal and external threats. Exactly for these reasons, some analysts and the intelligence had warned Turkey that the conditions could have been suitable for a coup.

When he showed the will to centralize power, he understood three factors could have hindered his ambitions: the army, oppositions and the legal system

The judicial system is still a crucial issue for the President, as it is generally considered a “stronghold” of opposition groups. Among them, Hizmet, as many judges are tied to Fethullah Gulen. The cleric, already in the Seventies, had encouraged several times his supporters to enter in the judiciary and these calls already produced effects when Erdogan was appointed Prime Minister for the first time.

The AK party has considerably evolved its positions since 2003. During the first mandate as PM, Erdogan was supposed to lead the country towards European integration. Few years later, the guidelines of Turkish foreign policy changed sharply and the improvement of relations with Islamic countries became a priority. On the economic front, the new doctrine led to an increase of exchanges with neighbouring countries, along with decreased connections with European partners. Politically, this led to an orientation called “no more troubles with the neighbours”, aimed at restoring diplomatic relations with Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Balkan, Caucasian, Caspian, Central Asian and Gulf nations. A clear example has been the normalization of relations with Armenia, Greece, Cyprus, Iran and Iraq.

While Erdogan is leading the nation in a pro-Islamic direction, he is also taking advantage of conditions to cope with the third factor able to put constraints on his ambitions. Since 2010, the Turkish President has intensified his fight against political opponents, trying to repress the different groups which could pose him a threat. Turkey is military involved in a conflict against the Islamic State in Syria, the population is considerably shaken because of the lack of security. Several terrorist attacks occurred on the national soil, with different organizations active in the state and claiming responsibility for the events. Not only terrorist attacks, but Turkey has also recently been theatre of political assassinations and executions. In a shocked country, Erdogan has used his powers to target some fringes of political foes. The ongoing economic crisis is another element which has given to the government more room for manoeuvre, as the Turkish population is frightened by economic instability. In the last six years, the executive has already made efforts to limit opposition groups and figures: many journalists and lawyers have been arrested or suspended because of their ideas. It is possible to remember the arrest of 44 Kurdish journalists in 2012, or the arrest in 2014 of 27 media officers (many of them linked to the newspaper Zaman). The failed attempt to topple the government could represent an opportunity to follow on that path. The Turkish President is apparently targeting not only those who are actually connected to the coup attempt, but he is also targeting figures not related to inquiries. The coup attempt will probably lead Erdogan to turn again the screw and further reduce the number of opponents, reducing the space for political dissent. In this situation, the suspension of the European Convention will play a crucial role, just as the state of emergency. These two provisions will guarantee to the executive the conditions needed to find the plotters and punish dissidents.

Western countries are worried about the temporary lack of the rule of law in Turkey, many European leaders demanded Erdogan to respect human rights. The President, however, seemed determined to reach his goals and did not dedicate much attention to the admonishments. Turkey has also to cope with the issue of Kurdish nationalism: the Kurds, after fighting against the Islamic State on the ground, could raise their voice and demand greater autonomy. Iraq is now facing a similar scenario and Erdogan’s priority is to avoid it. As far as the Islamic State is concerned, Turkey is involved in the conflict against it in Syria, but on this front the government is focused on internal security. The terrorist organization demonstrated it can operate within Turkish soil and, for the President

Terrorism is a double-edged sword: chaos and attacks can create conditions to restrain dissent, but the population can blame institutions for the lack of protection.

Furthermore, the issue of terrorism is not limited to the Islamist organization, but the Kurds are able to conduct important operations as well. In the meantime, European countries demand Erdogan to respect human rights and to remain within the boundaries of the rule of law. More important, what European countries demand Turkey is to respect the migration deal, deemed essential for their stability. However, it does not seem the coup attempt will have a direct impact on the agreement. The President is well aware he can use it as a means of political pressure. Furthermore, the armed intervention occurred on the night of July 15 could mark a turning point in Turkish foreign policy. Fethullah Gulen is currently in the US and it is not sure whether Obama will accept extradition. Erdogan also stated that maybe foreign nations influenced the failed coup. In case the events of July 15 produced a shift in Turkish system of alliances, this could have a significant impact also on the migration deal.     

 

Lorenzo Siggillino is a Junior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. He may be contacted at Lorenzo.siggillino@cgsrs.org

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