Principled pragmatism in EU foreign policy: A return to Realpolitik or rapprochement with Russia

Executive Summar

“Principled pragmatism” is a new EU foreign policy concept outlined in the EU Global Strategy launched in June 2016. It signals that the EU must adapt to a “rapidly changing environment”, and insert a dose of political realism in its foreign policy while continuing to uphold its principles. However, principled pragmatism does not tell us whether EU values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, such as freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights will take precedence over a pragmatic Realpolitik analysis of the situation, and decisions will likely be taken on a case-by case basis.

This paper looks at principled pragmatism from the perspective of the EU’s relationship with Russia. The fact that the Global Strategy calls this relationship “interdependent” indicates an intention to appease Russia rather than continue to deter it. There is a danger that principled pragmatism entails in this case that the EU is more interested in a rapprochement with Russia than the terms of this rapprochement. Recent positions of member states and statements of officials show that there is a lack of unity among the EU27 on a Russia strategy, in terms of foreign, energy and trade policy. This is damaging the EU’s credibility as a global power and encourages Russia to continue its belligerent approach in its Near Abroad. 

Introduction

The EU Global Strategy, launched by the European Action Service (EEAS) in June in the shadow of the Brexit referendum is an important and long-awaited document meant to set out the EU's foreign policy priorities for the years to come. Foreign policy is and for the foreseeable future will still be a core competence of the member states, which often have diverging agendas for their relations with third parties. Hence, the Global Strategy is more of an outline of the EU’s core interests and principles driving its interaction with the outside world than a comprehensive description of specific common priorities. However, in the context of geopolitical turmoil in Europe’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods and internal debates about the future of Europe, the Global Strategy sought to update the EU’s approach in a “rapidly changing environment”, despite the significant discrepancies between the member states.

One foreign policy concept that has recently become a buzzword in the European debate and has made its way in the Global Strategy is “principled pragmatism”. This paper focuses on this concept which is particularly noteworthy, due to the desired shift from traditional EU idealism to an approach combining this idealism with political realism. This paper assesses the implications of principled pragmatism between the EU and Russia, as EU foreign policy currently lacks a consistent Russian strategy in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine.

The concept of principled pragmatism and the European debate

In the Global Strategy, the concept of principled pragmatism is vague and lacks clarity. The Strategy merely states that the EU “will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. […] Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead.” (Mogherini, 2016, p. 16) The phrasing lacks conceptual clarity and seems to be an oxymoron: Looking at the terminology, according to the Cambridge dictionary, “principled” means “always behaving in an honest and moral way” while pragmatism has the opposite meaning of behaving “in a sensible way that suits the conditions that really exist, rather than following fixed theories, ideas, or rules”.In effect, principled pragmatism does not tell us whether EU values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, such as freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights will take precedence over a pragmatic, Realpolitik analysis of the situation. If anything, the wording suggests that the EU will take a case-by-case approach rather than judge all situations by the same standard. For instance, the recent policy towards Turkey revealed the EU’s pragmatic side: The migrant deal prioritised the member states’ perceived interest in limiting migration over basic human rights and the Copenhagen criteria[1], while the perceived need to support President Erdogan in the wake of the failed coup has trumped criticism of the human rights violations he committed in its aftermath.

Principled pragmatism does not tell us whether EU values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, such as freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights will take precedence over a pragmatic Realpolitik analysis of the situation Indeed, recent debates on the of future EU foreign policy confirms a shift towards more pragmatism, as compared to the idealism enshrined in the previous, 2003 European Security Strategy, which argued in its chapter on strategic objectives of the EU that “the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” (Solana, 2003, p. 37). This is evident in the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which had been based on the assumption that the EU’s power of attraction and economic carrots can effect policy change and has been criticised for its “rather naive, Eurocentric attitude” (Lehne, 2014) European Council President Donald Tusk mirrored many of the member states’ governments when he criticised the EU for “confronting reality with all kinds of utopias. A utopia of Europe without nation states, a utopia of Europe without conflicting interests and ambitions, a utopia of Europe imposing its own values on the external world (Tusk, 2016).” The EEAS has recently come to terms with that, and seems to have shifted its discourse from imposing values on neighbours to partnerships on a more equal footing. According to High Representative Federica Mogherini, “[a] true partnership can never be built on one party determining the rules of the game or the content of the story you want to tell together. Partners are equal, have to be” (Mogherini, 2015). This hints that principled pragmatism will imply a different kind of relationship with the countries the EU deems vital to its interests.

Principled pragmatism towards Russia? The question of interdependence

This paper analyses the EU’s possible approach towards Russia in light of the EU’s recent shift towards principled pragmatism. Will principled pragmatism imply a return to Realpolitik? Will it involve increased cooperation with NATO with the goal of deterring further Russian incursions in its “Near Abroad”, strengthening support for Eastern Partners’ European aspirations, a smooth extension of sanctions, and taking steps to reduce imports of Russian gas? Or will it rather mean that the EU will try to appease Russia, judging that the main interest for Europe in such tumultuous times is avoiding any escalation? There is a danger that the latter option will be preferred, despite the effects this could have on the security of eastern member states and on Eastern partners European trajectory, not to mention on values such as democratisation, rule of law and human rights. Most likely, these questions have not been answered and the EU’s approach will depend as much on domestic politics as on international developments. However, a closer reading of the EU Global Strategy and a review of recent events and statements show that a pattern is emerging.

The Global Strategy criticises Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine and calling the relationship with Russia “a strategic challenge” (Mogherini, 2016, p.33) the EU Global Strategy states that the EU and Russia have an “interdependent” relationship and that the EU will “engage Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate if and when our interests overlap” (ibid., p. 33). Given the context, this language hints towards appeasement. While expressing the need for a closer transatlantic partnership, deepening the cooperation with NATO and deepening trade and investment with China, the relationship with Russia is the only one the Global Strategy calls interdependent.

This choice of wording is dubious, considering the almost full lack of cooperation on political and security issues since 2014. Economically, too, the statement is far-fetched. Russia is only the fourth largest trading partner of the EU, after the US, China and even Switzerland, with a share of 6% of the EU’s total trade in 2015. By comparison, in the same year, the share of the US in the EU’s total trade was 18% and China’s was 15%. While the volume of trade with Russia was higher before the mutual sanctions, reaching 10% in 2008, the US and China were still much more important partners to the EU (Eurostat Press Release, 2016). Furthermore, in 2015, out of all EU member states, Russia was the main trading partner only to Lithuania and the second main partner only to Latvia (ibid.). Trade between the EU and Russia is mainly limited to a few fields. On the one hand, traditional EU exports to Russia include machinery and transport equipment, pharmaceuticals and agricultural products. On the other hand, Russian exports to the EU are dominated by raw materials, in particular oil and natural gas, making the EU the main trading partner of Russia. The EU is the most important investor in Russia, with up to 75% of FDI stocks in Russia coming from EU Member States (DG Trade, 2016). Thus, EU – Russia trade relations can be hardly depicted as interdependent. Rather, it is Russia that needs to rely on the EU, considering its dependence on the EU market for its natural gas and oil and on EU FDI. Furthermore, the fact that the EU exports high skill, technology-intensive products, while Russia exports raw materials subject to price fluctuations adds to the uneven economic relationship.

The Global Strategy and Energy Union – birds of the same feather?

A key question is what principled pragmatism will entail with regards to energy policy, as this is the only field in which it could be claimed that some EU member states are dependent on Russia. Russia’s energy strategy is an integral part of its foreign policy. It aims to maintain and deepen Europe’s reliance on Russian energy supplies in order to increase its economic and geopolitical influence (Umbach, 2014). Supply disruptions have been part of Russia’s strategy towards Ukraine, leading to severe shortages in some EU member states in the winters of 2006 and 2009. Some Central and Eastern European countries are extremely vulnerable to potential supply disruptions in the gas transiting Ukraine: Bulgaria imports 100% of its annual gas consumption from Russia, the Czech Republic 99%, Slovakia 95%, Hungary 89% and Poland 53%. The Baltic States and Finland also imported their entire annual natural gas consumption from Russia until recently (Chyong & Tcherneva, 2015).

In this context, a common EU energy policy is much needed, and has been formally launched by the Juncker Commission in February 2015 as the Energy Union. The main goals include achieving supply security by diversifying Europe’s sources of energy and a fully integrated European market to enable free energy flows across member states, as a means of further reducing dependence from Russia (Siddi, 2016). Indeed, several positive results have been reached in recent years. For instance, Lithuania and Poland built LNG terminals which recently became operational (Denková, 2015), and the proposed Balticonnector pipeline between Finland and Estonia should connect the two countries’ grids in 2019 (Smedley, 2016). Furthermore, the South Stream pipeline project transporting Russian gas through the Black Sea towards Austria was cancelled by Gazprom due to non-compliance with European legislation (Gotev, 2014).

The notions of principled pragmatism and interdependence which have made their way in the Global Strategy seem to be at odds with the EU’s Energy Union

However, member states are sometimes impeding the development of the Energy Union, something which plays into Russia’s divide et impera[2] strategies. For instance, Germany is planning to double the capacity of the Nord Stream sub-sea pipeline which takes Russian gas through the Baltic Sea directly to Germany, despite complaints from high-ranking EU officials such as Commission President Juncker as well as Eastern European member states (Baczynska & De Carbonnel, 2016). This would increase total Western European dependence on Russian gas. Also, since Nord Stream bypasses Ukraine, Russia would drastically increase its influence in Ukraine and eastern EU member states because it would be able to cut gas supply there when pricing disputes arise or if there was a political need.^[3] Additionally, since the Russian – Turkish rapprochement, negotiations have started again on Turkish Stream (Basboga, 2016). This project, envisioned by Russia to replace South Stream, could open doors for further Russian gas to Southern Europe, particularly Italy, a key energy partner to Russia.

Overall, principled pragmatism in energy policy will have to entail some measure of compliance with the provisions of the common energy policy. The construction of interconnectors, the inauguration of new LNG terminals and the liberalisation of gas markets are useful measures which go a long way towards limiting Russian influence in Europe. However, for some EU member states such as Germany and Italy, a pragmatic energy policy means maintaining cooperative relations with Russia and even enhancing them.

Thus, so far, there is still a discrepancy between stated EU goals and the policies of EU member states. The notions of principled pragmatism and interdependence which have made their way in the Global Strategy seem to be at odds with the EU’s Energy Union. It remains to be seen whether powerful states and energy companies could derail the Energy Union and push the Commission into giving the green light to projects such as Nord Stream 2. Should this happen, the security of Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the credibility of the EU’s foreign and energy policy would suffer.

Lack of European unity on a Russia strategy

There are several member states in the EU which would like to appease Russia rather than pursue a credible policy of deterrence. The most important EU member state which has had an ambiguous stance towards Russia since the 2014 aggressions is Germany, where public discourse has focused on dialogue and the easing of sanctions. For instance, German Ambassador to the US Wolfgang Ischinger recently appreciated that “Russia is not particularly interested in dialogue at the moment but we should shower it with offers” (Karnitschnig, 2016). More worryingly, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier undermined the logic of NATO deterrence before a large military training exercise in Poland in June 2016, stating “what we shouldn’t do now is inflame the situation further through saber-rattling and warmongering. […] Whoever believes that a symbolic tank parade on the alliance’s eastern border will bring security is mistaken. […] We are well-advised to not create pretexts to renew an old confrontation. [It would be] fatal to search only for military solutions and a policy of deterrence”. (ibid.)  Internal debates on the usefulness of sanctions are equally permeated by dovish attitudes. Influential Minister President of Bavaria Horst Seehofer recently argued in favour of phasing out sanctions, as a “bloc mentality is not suited for these times” (ibid.).

Part of Germany’s ambiguity towards Russia can be explained by the fact that exports to Russia totalled 38 billion euros in 2013 - the highest in the EU. Furthermore, Germany gets more than 30% of its oil and gas from Russia. However, this does not amount to much as German-Russian trade volume is less than half of Germany’s trade with Poland (Gressel, 2016). Germany is also committed to Energiewende, the transition to a low-carbon economy. Thus, economic national interest cannot explain the desire for appeasement. Instead, other less objective factors have been put forward, such as the institutional memory of seeking détente with the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War through Ostpolitik, the long history of a less assertive foreign policy due to the collective memory of Nazi aggression in World War II and broader questions about whether a more assertive international role and projecting military power should or should not be a German goal (e.g. Techau 2016; Gressel, 2016; Karnitschnig, 2016).

Other countries in the EU, such as Italy, Greece and Hungary have taken a more lenient approach, choosing to maintain good relations with Russia and arguing for the removal or revision of sanctions in negotiations with other EU member states (Rankin, 2016). Furthermore, politicians and public opinion in some important EU member states are becoming increasingly pro-Russian, a trend coupled with the rise of Euroscepticism. For instance, in April 2016, France's lower house of parliament adopted a non-binding vote in favour of lifting EU sanctions against Russia, while a non-binding Dutch referendum rejected the Ukraine – EU Association Agreement. These votes took place in the context of proven Russian funding for extremist parties in both countries (Foster, 2016).

On the other hand, the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, Poland and Romania have taken a tough stance towards Russia during the last two years. Geographic proximity and a history of conflict made these countries see their eastern neighbour as a major security threat and push for deterrence as a common Russia strategy, in particular after the events of 2014. For instance, strengthening the NATO’s military presence in the east, with four new battalions, was a key priority for the Baltic states and Poland at the 2016 Warsaw Summit (McNamara, 2016). Romania will host a multinational brigade and proposed a failed common NATO fleet in the Black Sea in order to deter Russia. Poland and Romania are supporting NATO’s open-door policy and the strengthening of its eastern flank (Atlantic Council, 2015). All these EU member states have been supporters of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, in itself a Polish – Swedish initiative, in order to facilitate a European perspective for the partner countries. Additionally, they have been staunch supporters of the extension of Russian sanctions (Amos, 2016).

The question of deterrence versus appeasement seems to create rifts between member states on a geographical basis: those closer to Russia see it as a threat and are expecting a harder policy while the ones who are not on the frontline do not prioritise it as a security concern and believe the EU should make the first step towards the normalisation of relations.

Conclusion

The birth of principled pragmatism means that the EU’s idealism has come to terms with the reality in the EU’s neighbourhood. That being said, it is unclear whether values will take precedence over interests, and the Global Strategy suggests that the EU will take a case-by-case approach. The EU still needs to better define its common interests and have a more coherent approach to the interests versus values debate.

When it comes to the future of EU – Russian relations, the fact that the Strategy calls this relation “interdependent” is worrying. It signals that for some EU member states and the EEAS, principled pragmatism in this situation means that they are more interested in a rapprochement with Russia than the terms of this rapprochement. In effect this entails appeasement rather than deterrence or a Realpolitik approach. There is a danger that EU foreign policy will slowly forget Russia’s unacceptable behaviour and that support for the defence of member states in proximity to Russia and for the European future of Eastern Partnership countries will decrease.

Unity is needed among EU member states, as a coherent Russia strategy would ultimately make EU foreign policy stronger and more credible and its member states safer. At the moment, there is a chasm between member states with diverging views on Russia. The ambivalence shown by important member states such as Germany and Italy is detrimental as it gives Russia an incentive to continue its aggressive policies. Principled pragmatism should at least mean that member states are consistent with stated EU goals ranging from Russian compliance with the Minsk agreement to the Energy Union. The lack of consensus on such goals only encourages Russia to try to further divide EU countries.  

Iulian Mihalache is a Junior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. He may be contacted at  lulian.mihalache@cgsrs.org.

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