Transnistria’s call to join Russia: A bluff in troubled times and for what consequences?

On September 7, Evgheny Shevchuk, president of the separatist republic of Transnistria, announced by presidential decree that he will move to enact a 2006 referendum in which 97% of the population of the breakaway territory opted for unification with Russia (Radio Liberty Radio Free Europe, 9 September 2016).

As a first measure, this implies aligning the Transnistrian legal system with Russian legislation. Shevchuk’s seemingly radical move generated a lot of attention in Moldova, the country Transnistria is formally part of, and in the region, particularly in neighbouring Romania. The announcement comes after sustained Russian military drills in the breakaway republic over the summer, which have raised strong criticism from the Moldovan foreign ministry (Radio Liberty Radio Free Europe, 18 August 2016). Coupled with these exercises, Shevchuk’s decree seems to paint a worrying picture and suggests a change in the status quo of this long-standing frozen conflict. However, this paper argues that the decree is not a Russian geopolitical move, but rather the result of domestic politics. Despite this, the decree could have significant implications for Moldova and its breakaway territory.

Analysts in Moldova (e.g. C?lug?reanu, 2016) and abroad (e.g. Ernst, 2016) agree that the announcement is a populist move by Shevchuk, who faces a strong challenge in the Transnistrian presidential elections scheduled for December 11 this year and requires all the political capital he can muster. Shevchuk and his government’s popularity levels are dwindling as Transnistria’s economy is in a deep crisis. The breakaway republic has an aging, pro-Russian population that is to a large extent nostalgic for the Soviet times, when standards of living were higher, and fearful of Moldova’s pro-EU path. 135,000 of Transnistria’s roughly 300,000 inhabitants are pensioners, about 180,000 have Russian citizenship, and many young people are migrating to Russia (Lungu, 2016). The 2006 referendum was unrecognized by international institutions or the EU, only being considered legitimate by the Russian Duma. However, it suggests that a large proportion of the population really does support joining Russia. In this context, Shevchuk’s announcement should be a very popular move before the December 11 elections. He will be facing parliament speaker Vadim Krasnoselski, who is running on behalf of the Obnovlenie (Renewal) party, which already has parliamentary majority since the 2015 elections. Obnovlenie is the political arm of the Sheriff group, Transnistria’s most important company, which is involved in many different sectors of the economy. Furthermore, Shevchuk was accused in June 2016 by Russian officials of siphoning off Russian aid to Transnistria (Ernst, 2016), so the decree could also be a way of diverting interest from this scandal.

Russia’s interests in the region also show that Shevchuk’s move was the result of domestic pressures rather than a ploy directed by Moscow. Russia sees the whole of Moldova as part of its required “sphere of influence” or buffer zone against the West. Since the early 1990s, the separatist regime in Transnistria has represented a useful lever through which Moscow can control Moldova’s future and put pressure on Chisinau when necessary (Popescu and Litra, 2012). In effect, the frozen conflict on Moldova’s territory ensures that the country will not be a member of NATO and will incur considerable costs if it seeks to move closer to the EU. The recent military exercises in Transnistria aimed to show precisely that Russia remains the main military power in the region, including on Moldova’s territory, and can therefore influence Moldova’s domestic politics.

However, changing the status quo would not be in Russia’s favour. An annexation of Transnistria would completely antagonise Moldova’s population and push the post-Soviet republic towards an inflexible, pro-EU direction. Thus, while gaining territory, Russia would lose its leverage over the rest of the country. Crimea’s annexation took place after the majority of Ukrainians had rejected Russian influence in their country, but in Moldova, Russia can realistically hope for the return of a friendly government after the October 30 presidential elections. Furthermore, Crimea is strategically much more important than Transnistria, and Russia would not risk a further deterioration in relations with the West given the international context. Russia has been seeking a normalisation of relations with the West and the removal of sanctions, which were recently extended by the EU.

An annexation of Transnistria would completely antagonise Moldova’s population and push the post-Soviet republic towards an inflexible, pro-EU direction. Thus, while gaining territory, Russia would lose its leverage over the rest of the country

Annexing additional territory would prove counterproductive towards that end. Logistically, too, annexing Transnistria would imply significant challenges, as the breakaway territory borders pro-European Ukraine and Moldova, but not Russia. Furthermore, the experience of Crimea only shows that the economic costs of annexation are a heavy burden, particularly in the context of relatively low oil and gas prices and Western sanctions. Russia is already in effect propping the breakaway republic. Transnistrian security is guaranteed by about 1,500 Russian troops (Pugsley and Wesslau, 2016), Gazprom transfers for free up to $400 million worth of gas to the territory annually (Ca?us, 2016) and Russia subsidises every pensioner in Transnistria by paying them a monthly supplement of $10 (Lungu, 2016). It is unlikely that Russia will be willing to invest further financial resources in the territory, given that its current involvement is enough for fulfilling its goals described above.

The bluff of Shevchuk’s presidential decree can also be inferred from the official replies of relevant actors in the region. By the time of writing, the Russian presidential administration made no statement on the issue and Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov declined to comment (Independent.md, 10 September 2016), signalling that Russia does not want to instrumentalise the event. Ukrainian authorities, too, have remained quiet. Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip (Independent.md, 8 September 2016), Romanian Foreign Minister Lazar Comanescu (Realitatea.net, 2016) and the Romanian Presidential Administration (Deac, 2016) have taken a similar approach, arguing that Shevchuk’s decree is a populist, provocative move that must be taken in the context of the Transnistrian presidential elections.

That being said, it is very likely that the decree will have significant consequences both for Moldova and its breakaway territory. In Transnistria, it is unclear whether Shevchuk’s move will be enough to win him the elections, given his unpopularity and the fact that he is battling the territory’s largest economic actor. Considering that an actual unification is extremely unlikely, the decree could also backfire and undermine the Transnistrian president’s legitimacy. This is because union with Russia would be an acknowledgement of the fact that the government is too weak to be independent and that the breakaway republic relies on Russia for survival.

Moldova, too, could be affected by the decree. Moldova is holding its own presidential elections on October 30, and the result will be of utmost importance to the country’s future on the geopolitical arena. The current government, led from the background by oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, is seen by many people as corrupt and the pro-European parties have until now failed to select a common candidate. In these conditions, the candidate of the pro-Russian Socialist Party, Igor Dodon, could become the winner. Recent polls (e.g. Europa Liber?, 2016, Realitatea.md, 2016) put Dodon ahead of prospective pro-EU candidate Maia Sandu and suggest the two could compete in the second round. The danger of a new pro-Russian president is real: a May 2016 poll found that, if they had to choose between the two options, 46.8% of Moldovans would opt for the Eurasian Union and only 35.6% for the EU. This is all the more worrying considering that in 2009, 73% of Moldovans were in favour of joining the EU (Independent.md, 8 May, 2016).

Igor Dodon has already tried to capitalise on Shevchuk’s announcement. He promised that he would annihilate Transnistrian unionism if he becomes president while claiming that the breakaway republic’s fears are fuelled by the Moldovan government’s pro-EU and pro-NATO attitude. Dodon’s preconditions for reuniting the country are Moldovan neutrality and restoring friendly relations with Russia (Independent.md, 9 September 2016). There is a danger that people will believe this kind of discourse, particularly in the context of attacks on the EU and NATO by the pro-Russian media. Romania and Moldova, which share a common language, have been accused of intending to unite, despite the fact that this is not on the agenda of either government (Bugajski and Doran, 2016). Spreading such fears was instrumental in Transnistria’s break from Moldova following a war in the early 1990s (Hill, 2010) and this argument could also be used in driving a wedge between Moldova and the EU. Thus, Shevchuk’s decree could help the Kremlin by making people believe that Moldova could only reintegrate Transnistria by re-entering the Russian orbit and turning its back to the EU and its values.

Under these circumstances, I believe the best course of action for the EU is the one it has taken, namely to ignore the decree and try not to escalate the situation. The EU has already been successful in its relations with Transnistria. It managed to quietly ensure that the breakaway region gradually joins the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Moldova and continues to trade with the EU (Ca?us, 2016). Transnistria already exports more goods to the EU than to Russia (Lungu, 2016). Economic cooperation is the best answer to Transnistria’s call to join Russia, as economic business elites will come to terms with the merits of good relations with the EU. The EU must continue to exercise its soft power as the Transnistrian leadership will probably want to derive economic benefits from both Russia and the EU after the elections. However, cooperation in other fields or a change in the frozen conflict’s status quo is unlikely as this would draw a negative reaction from Russia.

Iulian Mihalache is a Junior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. He may be contacted at  lulian.mihalache@cgsrs.org.

Follow The CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies on Facebook and Twitter (@CGSRS_UKCGSRS ).