Is Serbia stirring the Balkan cauldron?

At the start of November, Serbia, Russia and Belarus will hold a joint air force exercise termed "Slav Brotherhood 2016", while Serbia and Russia will hold a similar exercise shortly afterwards. Although such exercises are not particularly new, Serbia's aberrant role as a Russia-friendly state aspiring to become part of the European Union (EU), and possibly even NATO, has raised a lot of concern whether Serbia's government is stirring the Balkan cauldron, especially in light of the rising nationalism and pro-Russian sentiment in the region (Blank, 2016). The Serbian Progressive Party of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic, now firmly in control of parliament with its coalition partner, the Socialist Party, is expected to continue to pursue a pro-EU foreign policy. However, many experts are concerned that Vucic's pursuit of EU accession is not based on "genuine respect for European values and the rule of law" but rather a reversion to an opportunistic and populist past (Maza, 2016). Regardless, I argue that the Serbian leadership is doing what it must to maintain domestic popularity, retain Russia as an important ally while pursuing the most realistic option - integration into the EU.

Without a doubt, Russia is countering NATO and EU influence in Europe, including the Balkans (STRATFOR, 2016). In this light, Serbia has long been considered to be the most obvious candidate as a client-state of Russia (Lo, 2015). It shares with Russia common cultural and religious heritage, but also strong historical, and military relations. Serbia is also dependent on Russia for energy. Not surprisingly, Vucic recently confirmed that Russia has significant soft power projection in Serbia. This is mainly felt through the rising number of pro-Russian media outlets in Serbia, such as Pravda, Russia Today and Sputnik, with Konstantin Malofeev, a wealthy Russian tycoon, allegedly leading the role (B92, 2016). While Serbia is too small and thus too marginal for any direct economic benefits to Russia, it can be strategically useful as a transit state for the Russian energy and to counter or limit the EU's eastward expansion.

While it may thus appear that Russia is pulling strings to keep Serbia within its reach, there is stronger evidence that Serbia does not want to undermine good relations with an important investor and a traditional friend (Nuttall, 2016). In other words, what defines Vucic's policies has to do a lot more with regional geopolitical dynamics and domestic problems, and less with substantial Russian interests in the region. Each development presents a risk for the EU and NATO, or an opportunity for Russia, to shape the region's geopolitical future.

First regional development focuses on a separatist entity in Bosnia, Republika Srpska (RS), led by Milorad Dodik, who has held a referendum on September 25 asking the RS citizens to support the celebration of RS's national day on January 9, challenging Bosnia Constitutional Court's decision to ban the referendum. While the turnout was just over 55%, allegedly 99.8% of voters voted in favour of the celebration (The Economist, 2016). The outcome has sparked Western condemnation and might result in Dodik's prosecution, which could subsequently trigger interethnic violence. Dodik is considered to be Russia's faithful ally, not so much due to Russia's geopolitical interests, but rather because supporting Dodik undermines Western interests in Bosnia (Karabeg, 2014). The Russian embassy in Sarajevo has taken a stance defending Dodik's plans, and Putin has met with Dodik right before the referendum, implicitly giving Dodik the needed legitimacy.

Many experts are concerned that Vucic’s pursuit of EU accession is not based on “genuine respect for European values and the rule of law” but rather a reversion to an opportunistic and populist past

Second, opposition in Montenegro also has close ties to Moscow, particularly in voicing its disapproval of further NATO expansion. Montenegro used to be a close ally of Russia until its government led by Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic repeatedly accused Moscow of funding the opposition (Nuttall, 2016). Djukanovic's severance of close relations with Russia shook up Russian investments in Montenegro's commodities, real estate and tourism sectors, but did not stop it altogether. In fact, Russia has remained Montenegro's biggest investor, although around 95% of Montenegro's exports are to the West (Rapoaza, 2015). More recently, NATO's formal invitation to Montenegro to join the military alliance received a rather cautionary response from Russia. There are rumours that Russia was behind the recent failure to resolve the border dispute between Montenegro and Kosovo, an outcome that is detrimental to NATO's broader geopolitical goals in the region (Reka, 2016). In particular, Montenegro cannot become part of the alliance if there are open questions related to territorial disputes with Kosovo (Prishtina Insight, 2016). By boycotting the ratification session, Serbian minority deputies in Kosovo's parliament have effectively forestalled Montenegro's NATO membership. Russia may have influenced their decision.

Third, Serbia's relations with Croatia have also suffered another blow lately after a man was sentenced to three years in a Serbian prison for allegedly having had spied for Croatia. This latest row intensified particularly after Croatia briefly blocked Serbia's accession negotiations with the EU (Pavelic and Maurice, 2016). This was followed by back and forth accusations over history and rehabilitation of war criminals. Although some of the rhetoric was interpreted to be part of the electoral ploy to win over the electorate in recent parliamentary elections in Croatia, these events have only further shaken already complicated relations between the two neighbours. Since Croatia is a NATO member, and since the Russian army participated in two military exercises in Serbia near the Croatian border, there are serious risks that Serbia's EU accession could be used as a weapon in bilateral disputes, or that warmongering could implicate either NATO, Russia or both (Pavlic, 2016).

Fourth, further south, in Macedonia, Russia has not been a pivotal player until recently when the Macedonian government failed to appease growing opposition over a scandal, allegedly involving a decision by former Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, to illegally wiretap 20,000 people, such as reporters, religious leaders and political figures (Marusic, 2016). As a way to resolve the crisis, general elections have been scheduled to be held in December, but the opposition has been claiming that it has evidence to prove criminal allegations against government members. The stakes are therefore very high, especially since Washington and Brussels have criticized Gruevski's undemocratic policies while Russian officials suggested that the West may be implicated in attempting to overthrow Gruevski (The Economist, 2015).

In addition to this problem, popular support for integration into the EU has sharply declined in the country, giving Russia an opportunity to step in (Reka, 2016). In fact, Russia has already stepped into Macedonia, Serbia and Greece to seek to develop energy pipelines, effectively turning them into the battleground for energy politics. Finally, there are rumors that Russia is attempting to carve up the country into three parts that would go to Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. Part of this plan is allegedly supported by Greece, whereby Russia and Greece would mass 100,000 refugees on the Macedonian border to destabilize Macedonia, and even the entire Balkans (Blank, 2016).

It is therefore intuitive to observe that nationalism and pro-Russian sentiment are on the rise in the region. However, Russia does not have solid geopolitical plans for the region, otherwise, we would observe more aggressive dynamics taking place. For example, in 2011 Kosovo Serbs were refused Russian citizenship as it would have directly implicated Russia in conflict with the West. Russia has also learned in Montenegro how feeble its investments in the Balkans can be. Rather, Russia is using its influence in the region as a bargaining chip with the West. In particular, Orenstein (2015) argues that after the West recognised Kosovo's independence and the Russo-Georgian war, boundaries were divided whereby the Balkans were given to the EU, while the former Soviet states were given to Russia, with a possible exception of the Baltic states. These boundaries are suggestive of the Cold War era and to a large extent define EU's and Russia's primary interests, yet the division is not being adhered to, giving an incentive to both parties to gain greater leverage over the other. For example, Russia is attempting to assert its influence in traditionally Western states, such as Greece, while the West has pushed NATO alliance all the way to the Russian border. In this game of redrawing of geopolitical boundaries, Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Croatia are cases where instability can easily resurface and spoil the plans for any major power.

It is within these changing conditions where Vucic faces the most difficult, domestic obstacle, namely an increasing anti-EU sentiment at home. Research has shown that it is mostly younger Serbians who are hostile towards the EU, while the elderly are more open to integration with the West (Urosevic, 2016). For the younger generation which spent their childhood witnessing Western sanctions and NATO bombs, it is Russia which should be romanticised, due to its role in defending Serbia's claim over Kosovo (Karabeg, 2014; Nuttall, 2016). As a result, anti-NATO and anti-American protests in Serbia tend to attract large crowds. Overall, just over eighty percent of Serbians have stated that they are against NATO membership (Dragojlo, 2016). Not surprisingly, Blank (2016) has correctly observed that Serbian authorities face significant obstacles to reaching the goal of joining the EU. Perhaps the greatest obstacle is to overcome the tendency of the region to degenerate into instability, which can come from many sources, such as regional spillovers, populism and related to those, lack of experience with democracy and human rights (STRATFOR, 2015).

Raising no serious criticism from the EU, the US, or even Russia, Vucic has pursued the only pragmatic policy that majority of Serbians would unite around, to implement reforms requested by Brussels without severing ties with Russia

More liberal domestic opponents, but also critical Western observers, in fact, tend to focus on Vucic's violation of democratic and human rights principles. For a state that does not have much, if any, history of upholding democracy and limited progress in human rights, this is hardly surprising. Populist leaders have fared far better than others throughout history, and today is no exception. The Serbian Radical Party, led by a populist Vojislav Seselj, has made a strong comeback in the recent elections, while other anti-EU parties have emerged, such as Dveri and the Serbian People's Party (SPP) (Nuttall, 2016). Still, the liberal opponents, such as Democratic Party (DS), believe that by flirting with nationalists and pro-Russian parties, Vucic is effectively strengthening his political position. While true, it is also the case that by appealing to more nationalist and pro-Russian sentiments, Vucic can keep the anti-EU parties at bay. Therefore, external observers of Serbia's delicate balance between the EU, Russia, democracy and populism, as it seems, are unable or unwilling to recognize Serbia's domestic situation. As the older, more pro-EU, voters disappear from Serbia's electoral process, Vucic may be simply doing what it takes to steer the country away from international isolation. As much as Russia is Serbia's historically ally, it does not surround Serbia's borders the way the EU does, nor can we expect this to easily change in the near future.

For the EU, or the US, the most realistic policy option is to keep Serbia’s Western trajectory on track by providing credible membership prospects

Despite idolization of Russia and even Vladimir Putin in many Serbian circles, Serbia has very few geopolitical options, with or without Kosovo. Serbia must, at least, lean toward a pro-EU future or pay a heavy price to be an isolated bulwark of Russian interests. Raising no serious criticism from the EU, the US or even Russia, Vucic has pursued the only pragmatic policy that majority of Serbians would unite around, to implement reforms requested by Brussels without severing ties with Russia. Just like the Serbian media coverage highlights Vucic's balancing act, the popular sentiment is not conducive to actions that would exclusively promote only the EU or Russian ideals. However, Vucic realizes that over time, political and economic integration with the West will give most Serbians greater benefits. Despite the fact that Serbia has a free trade regime with Russia, it is Italy, Germany, and Bosnia & Herzegovina that are more important export markets for Serbia (Nuttall, 2016). Moreover, the European Union allocates significant funds to its prospective members. On the other hand, it is mostly dependence on the Russian energy which defines the relations between Serbia and Russia, although Russia has provided funding as well. Often highlighted is the fact that Russia cheaply bought a majority stake in Serbian oil firm NIS, giving Gazprom exploration rights at very advantageous terms (Reka, 2016). As well, the South Stream project was supposed to have given Serbia a stable supply of gas and bring financial benefits for being a transit state, but the disruption of that plan has left Serbia with a realization on how brittle Russian investments in the region are (Nuttall, 2016).

Russia has indeed been Serbia's traditional ally in times of trouble. However, today, it is Western troops which are stationed throughout the Balkans, establishing a ‘fait accompli' that will be hard to change. Although Serbia continues to train its military together with Russia, it is also the case that Serbia trains ten times more with the US and NATO (Dragojlo, 2016). Not surprisingly, Vucic has formed his cabinet with a coalition that includes both pro-Western and pro-Russian figures with a promise to continue his pro-EU reforms. His balancing act can also be observed elsewhere. For example, in mid-February, he has reached a logistics agreement with NATO, but he has eschewed EU's sanctions on Russia (Blank, 2016). However, it is not clear whether the balancing act can hold as there will be mounting international and domestic pressure closer to finalization of the membership accession to the EU. For the time being, however, Vucic has successfully channelled the pro-Russian and nationalist sentiment away from the mainstream politics.

For the EU or the US, the most realistic policy option is to keep Serbia's Western trajectory on track by providing credible membership prospects. Resistance from some EU members to continue with the EU enlargement can reverberate in Serbia's domestic politics by lending credence to Eurosceptical voices. As long as the enlargement process is ongoing, it is unlikely that Serbia will slip back into opportunistic and populist decisions. Demanding too much from Serbia's ruling elite might be interpreted as an application of double-standards and punish pro-EU forces in Serbia, yet asking too little would give more opportunity to other global players, such as Russia.