How the election of Donald Trump may change US foreign policy: Isolationism or demagoguery?

Donald Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric has worried European elites and pundits since the start of his campaign for the presidency of the United States. Reactions from EU leaders in the wake of his election have been reserved at best. For instance, French President Francois Hollande said Mr Trump's victory "opens a period of uncertainty" (BBC, 9 November 2016) after previously stating that his excesses make one “want to retch” (The Guardian, 3 August 2016) while Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi made his support for Hillary Clinton clear (Balmer, 2016). Additionally, German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier warned that a Trump presidency would lead to "many uncertainties for the trans-Atlantic relationship” (Goulard, 2016) and president of the European Parliament Martin Schultz anticipated that working with Trump would be “harder than the previous administration” (Kroet, 2016). In Europe, Mr. Trump’s election was mainly welcomed by far right populist politicians such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban or French National Front Leader Marine Le Pen (The Guardian, 9 November 2016).

Donald Trump is a 70-year-old businessman who has never held public office and has arguably no experience on foreign policy, having notoriously been confused in a 2016 interview by the fact that Crimea had been occupied by Russia (Sanger and Haberman, 2016). Since the US Constitution theoretically grants the President a freer hand on external matters than many democratic leaders enjoy and given the superpower status of the US, Mr. Trump’s election will no doubt have an influence on the entire world, including the old continent. This paper looks at the implications of Mr Trump’s election on the United States’ foreign policy towards the European continent. It argues that Europe, as well as the entire international system, would be less secure should Mr Trump’s key foreign policy campaign promises be implemented. However, the implementation of certain promises remains unlikely.

Towards a new era of American isolationism

From a purely foreign policy perspective, the main reason why so many in Europe are worried about Donald Trump is that his inward-looking stance hints in effect towards a return to American isolationism. Since World War II, European security and prosperity have been closely connected to the liberal order created, fostered and, when necessary, defended by the United States. The US leadership understood that building a liberal institutional framework that would co-opt Europe was the best way of achieving its arguably selfish, realist priority of containing and eventually deterring the Soviet Union. Thus, the US offered security guarantees through NATO, set up the Breton Woods financial institutions to make sure that its allies had an incentive to remain capitalist and provided key assistance in rebuilding Europe in the form of the Marshall Plan. When European economic cooperation stimulated by the Marshall Plan took off, the US encouraged the European Communities which later became the EU. Until now, all US presidents have held on to this institutional framework and defended US cooperation with Europe as a key aspect of US foreign policy, and the formula has proven successful, bringing both security and prosperity to the two continents during and after the Cold War.

Donald Trump, however, is challenging this liberal order and the institutional framework underpinning it, in both its security and its economic aspects. While Barack Obama understood that the US could not act as an interventionist power all the time, introducing his “lead from behind” approach – similar to offshore balancing in realist theory – President elect Trump is arguing for a return to the isolationism many in America advocated for during the first half of the twentieth century.

“We cannot be the policemen of the world. We cannot protect countries all over the world where they're not paying us what we need”

D. Trump at the First Presidential debate on September 26^th, 2016

On two occasions, this isolationism meant that the US failed to maintain the balance of power in Europe, contributing to the outbreak of two World Wars.

Donald Trump is undermining NATO’s deterrence capability and encouraging President Putin to further challenge the red lines in Eastern Europe, even militarily.

Newt Gingrich, the most likely candidate for the Secretary of State position at the time of writing, has supported Mr Trump’s stance, arguing that he might not risk nuclear war with Russia should a country like Estonia, “basically in the suburbs of St. Petersburg”, be attacked (Flores, 2016). NATO’s collective defence provision, Article 5 of its charter, remains a key deterrent against states seeking to change the status quo and challenge the global order. For Europe, Russia as a resurgent, revisionist power has become once again a threat, especially since the annexation of Crimea. Its military capabilities could easily overwhelm NATO members on the Eastern flank, as shown by a recent series of war games carried out by the RAND Corporation (Shlapak and Johnson, 2016). By connecting NATO collective defence to financial contributions, either the pledged NATO contributions or otherwise, Donald Trump is undermining NATO’s deterrence capability and encouraging President Putin to further challenge the red lines in Eastern Europe, even militarily.

President elect Trump has a history of expressing admiration for Vladimir Putin and has shown his desire to work together with Russia on a range of issues. This applies in particularly to Syria, where Donald Trump would like Russia to take the lead in eliminating Islamist terrorism (Miller, 2016). However, it is not clear how letting Russia fulfil its geopolitical goals in the Middle East would help US interests other than saving taxpayers’ money in the short-term, as Putin wants to challenge American primacy in the region and secure a sphere of influence from which the West would be excluded. From the European perspective, focusing on diplomacy and mutual respect is a preferable alternative to escalating tensions, but recent experiences have shown these efforts were poorly reciprocated by Putin. Thus, any rapprochement, such as withdrawing sanctions, should be conditioned by a change in Russia’s policies in its Near Abroad and the Middle East rather than be offered free of charge, as Donald Trump has implied (Osborn and Lowe, 2016).

Redefining free trade agreements

Donald Trump is also undermining the economic branch of the liberal order. Global trade has been the main engine of growth for every hegemon since the late sixteenth century, having brought power and influence to the Dutch Republic, Britain and eventually the US (Jayman, 2015, p. 120). Free trade has become the norm rather than the exception for the global hegemon since the Repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain in the mid-nineteenth century (Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006). However, as part of his “Make America Great Again” campaign, Trump has promised to alleviate the effects of globalisation and bring back jobs to America. He has attacked free trade deals such as NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), claiming that he would renegotiate them. He has also argued for raising tariffs and import taxes and hinted to a trade war with China in the context of the large trade deficit of the US (Blake, 2016). Given the fact that Republicans kept control of both the Senate and House of Representatives, the recently signed TPP might not be ratified. While Mr. Trump focused mainly on criticising trade with Mexico and Asia, Europeans, too, should expect changes in the negotiations. Due to the new President’s stance on trade, the chances of TTIP being concluded and ratified under the current US administration have also lowered. TTIP is expected to further cement the relationship between the world’s largest trading partners and provide growth, being projected to increase the size of the EU economy by around €120 billion, or 0.5% of GDP, and the US by €95 billion, or 0.4% of GDP (DG Trade, 2013). Reneging free trade is a stark reminder of the Great Depression period in the 1930s when the US reverted to protectionism in order to promote its industry but ended up making a recovery much more difficult (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2009).

Trump’s foreign policy views are dangerous due to the intention of withdrawing the US from its role as global policeman. According to the hegemonic stability theory, the international system requires a hegemon to deploy “preponderance of power”, ensuring cooperation from other state actors and enforcing the rules of the international regimes it has created (e.g. Webb and Krasner, 1989). Should the US fail to uphold these regimes, this would not only damage its own power, influence and reputation. It would also make the international system less stable and open the door for competitors vying to take the hegemon’s place. In Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Russia seems to be looking forward to such a moment.

Trump and the establishment

That being said, it is very unlikely that Donald Trump would transfer his views on external relations into actual policy. First of all, he belongs to the recent wave of populist leaders across the West who attract attention by adopting a sensationalist rhetoric directed against the establishment. In the context of demagoguery and broken promises even from mainstream politicians, and of a particularly aggressive electoral campaign based on shock and slander, it is realistic to believe that many of Trump’s statements were merely meant to challenge voters and place him in opposition to the Democrat side. Donald Trump already toned down his rhetoric and sought to reassure US allies of continued cooperation by claiming that, “while we will always put America's interests first, we will deal fairly with everyone” (Yuhas, 2016). His victory speech further demonstrated a desire for détente and while he expressed his “great honour” to meet with President Obama for transition talks at the White House, he exhibited a positive and cooperative attitude despite a long term smear campaign Donald Trump undertook against the outgoing president (BBC, 11 November 2016). Boris Johnson undertook a similar transformation in the UK, from an assertive, flamboyant Brexit campaigner to a much more low-key, conventional Foreign Secretary.

Because of the large resources and time required to fully plan and carry out actions within a large organisation, leaders are effectively limited to pre-existing plans in case a decision must be taken quickly.

Even if Donald Trump wanted to turn his foreign policy campaign goals into reality, he would have a very tough time doing so. Graham Allison’s groundbreaking analysis (1971) of the Cuban missile crisis offers a theoretical framework that is still relevant today. Allison’s “organizational process model” starts from the premise that, when faced with a problem, government leaders break it down and assign it according to pre-established organizational lines. Behaviour “relevant to any important problem reflects the independent outputs of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders” (p. 67). Organizations follow standard operating procedures and set repertoires when taking actions. Because of the large resources and time required to fully plan and carry out actions within a large organisation, leaders are effectively limited to pre-existing plans in case a decision must be taken quickly. Should Donald Trump be inclined to act on his foreign policy promises, he would face organizational challenges in changing the standard operating procedures of a large bureaucracy. Furthermore, while President Elect Trump might replace the heads of relevant departments and agencies, the large part of the bureaucracy will remain the same. It is not unreasonable to think that many important diplomats, military figures, but also bureaucrats in the Department of State or Defense are favourable to the establishment policies of previous administrations and will try to convince the leadership of their utility. This could explain why any major change in relations with Russia, for instance unilaterally withdrawing sanctions, is unlikely. Cooperation with the EU as well as relevant international organisations such as NATO or the Breton Woods institutions will likely remain as prevalent because of the organisational framework for that is in place, despite possible tensions at the highest level.

In conclusion, Mr. Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric is indeed dangerous as it points to US isolationism in an already very volatile international environment. This would make the entire international system less stable. Europe, in particular, would face a severe security problem due to a resurgent Russia. However, it is unlikely that the most controversial campaign promises of Donald Trump will be transposed into actual foreign policy during his mandate. A more important danger would be a shift in the mentality of mainstream voters, and in particular those in the lower echelons of public administration, towards the kind of populist ideas advocated by the likes of Trump.

Iulian Mihalache is a Junior fellow at the CGSRS | Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. He may be contacted at  lulian.mihalache@cgsrs.org.

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