A “Global Britain” in a post-Brexit scenario

Executive Summary

The British withdrawal from the EU set in motion negotiations over the future of the London-Brussels relationship. It also forced UK policy makers to think about what kind of international role would be suitable and sustainable for the UK post-Brexit. On more than one occasion, British Prime Minister Theresa May envisioned a “Global Britain” that would cooperate with the EU, but also one which could exert its influence beyond European borders. Brexit affects not only trade and free movement of people and goods. Consequences extend to the security and defence sectors which influence the UK’s role in the international arena. How the UK will strengthen its role in NATO and its cooperation with the EU and its member states so as to protect its national interests will define its breadth of action as a “Global Britain”.

Introduction:

British Prime Minister Theresa May’s 2017 Brexit speech called for a “truly Global Britain - the best friend and neighbour to our European partners, but a country that reaches beyond the borders of Europe too” (May, 2017). Such a high ambition is underpinned by a strong geopolitical role and stable foreign relations. In order to succeed and maintain this status though the United Kingdom (UK) has to address three main security and defence issues: London’s relationship with and role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UK’s future cooperation with the European Union (EU) in missions that affect the UK’s interests, and the negotiations over data sharing and research and development (R&D) programmes in the security and defence fields. Even though the debate around Brexit did not focus on possible future scenarios for security and defence matters, major international developments underline the significance of these negotiations: the Syrian war, terrorism and the Islamic State (IS), developments in Southern and Eastern Europe, and the evolving relations with Russia. The 2015 British Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) set the goals for the future of the defence and security sectors. The document promised that the UK will fulfill the NATO pledge to spend 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence and also that London will increase its defence spending by 0.5% annually through 2020-21. Whether the level of ambition set by May and the goals outlined in the 2015 SDSR will be reached will depend on several factors. These include; how Brexit will affect the British economy and the funds allocated to the security and defence sectors, how the UK will respond to a potential hard Brexit, and the leadership the UK can maintain, boost, or see diminished in NATO. 

What role for the UK in the Atlantic Alliance?

During the 2018 Munich Security Conference, May reiterated the UK’s commitment to continue spending 2% of its GDP on defence, London’s strong relationship with the US, and NATO’s role as the cornerstone of European security. The feasibility of these intentions and of the SDSR goals (annual 0.5% defence spending increase and commitment to NATO pledge) is in doubt given the uncertainty of the financial and economic repercussion of Brexit on the British GDP, and consequently on the share that can be allocated to the security and defence sector (Black, Hall, Cox, Kepe, and Silfversten, 2017; Rand). The pressure exerted by the U.S. and Washington’s unstable opinion of NATO also contribute to the uncertainty of the UK’s role in the Alliance and as an interlocutor between the EU and the Atlantic partner. In addition, the outlined spending increase and the promise to abide by the NATO pledge was made in 2015 when the GNP was expected to grow by 2.5% (Bakker, 2017). Today this prospect seems excessively optimistic considering the growth data of the the British GDP released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the 17th of April 2018. The Fund projects that British GDP will increase by 1.6% in 2018 and by 1.5% in 2019-20. These figures diverge from the 1.8 and 1.9 points of increase in 2017 and 2016, respectively (Source IMF, 2018). Britain’s uncertain economic and financial future after the withdrawal renders unlikely the argument of some Brexit supporters that leaving the Union could give the UK a chance to restate and boost its role in the world, free from ties with Brussels.

The UK’s attempt to lean on the Alliance to support and boost its international strategic outlook, restrained until Brexit by a more continental strategic approach of the EU in the opinions of Brexit supporters, has to deal with U.S. President Donald Trump’s future engagement in European security, with the balance of power inside NATO, and with future EU-NATO cooperation. If the U.S. continues to prioritise continental security, then the UK's role as interlocutor between the two organisations may be diminished. In such a scenario, the US may prefer the EU, or better EU members like France and Germany, as representatives of European interests. Even if the British role in NATO will be diminished by a more active France and Germany, the UK nevertheless needs the Alliance as a security provider and a reliable relationship with the NATO leading power, the U.S. The UK, on the other hand, could try to counter its potential loss of influence by strengthening its relationship with the US. Such a move though could diminish the trust between the UK and the EU during the Brexit negotiations, thus also endangering their cooperation inside NATO. This would be even more detrimental than a diminished role in the Alliance.

Stronger cooperation between the EU and NATO is a priority for the UK. Both organisations expressed this sentiment in their Joint Declaration (EU-NATO 2016) and in the NATO Statement on its implementation (NATO, 2016). The UK should encourage this course of action for two key reasons. The EU’s operations and missions more often than not influence areas and address issues which fall outside of NATO responsibilities: such as migration, energy security, and countering human trafficking. Nevertheless, the results of EU missions also positively affect non-EU NATO members, including the UK. On the other hand, given the unstable nature of Washington’s future engagement in Europe, the only way the UK could try to strengthen its position and protect its interest is from a leading position in NATO and with a strong relationship with the EU. This though will be feasible only if London abides by its spending commitments. As NATO states that “strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union is increasingly essential for the security of our nations and the Euro-Atlantic area” (NATO, 2016a), so too the UK is interested in strong cooperation between NATO and the EU. London is willing to work for this stronger partnership as the ‘Foreign policy, defence and development - a future partnership paper’ states (HM Government, 2017: 19): “the UK will continue to champion and drive forward greater cooperation between the EU and NATO, in accordance with the Joint Declaration and Implementation Plan. Given the range of defence and security challenges faced by Europe, it becomes ever more important that the EU and NATO work successfully together”. A future security agreement between NATO and the EU could be fundamental for meaningful data and document sharing. Finally, the UK could use its ‘security surplus' to lead stronger synchronization between the two bodies on its areas of expertise, cyber security and capabilities (Giegerich, and Mölling, 2018).

What future partnership for the EU and the UK?

The main notion that drives Brexit negotiations on security and defence matters is the realistic need the EU and the UK both have of each other. Indeed, the EU, a non-military alliance, with soft-power skills, needs UK capabilities and expertise to carry out its missions. Meanwhile, the UK needs to pursue its interest in those scenarios where NATO does not take action. The British Paper on the future partnership released in September 2017 did not offer a realistic and detailed solution for their future partnership, other than to highlight the will to cooperate and the UK’s value in terms of capabilities. After trying to use the British ‘security surplus’ as a bargaining chip for better conditions for the Brexit deal on trade and failing when the EU strongly condemned it, the UK’s official line shifted to “a future relationship that is deeper than any current third country partnership and that reflects our shared interests, values and the importance of a strong and prosperous Europe. This future partnership should be unprecedented in its breadth, taking in cooperation on foreign policy, defence and security, and development, and in the degree of engagement that we envisage” (HM Government, 2017: 18). Europeans reacted positively to British will and London’s commitment to cooperation. Brussels was less keen on the proposed option of a new ad-hoc partnership deal for the UK. The demands from other non-EU members to improve or enlarge their cooperation would put the EU in a tight spot, especially if those demands came from Turkey. The more realistic approach to this understandable stance would be to focus on bilateral agreements while accepting either case-by-case cooperation or a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU. Those are the two options offered to non-EU countries willing to participate in EU missions and operations (Bakker, 2017). Indeed, alternative multilateral cooperation frameworks, such as the Lancaster House Treaties, the UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) could allow to channel British interest inside the EU: the UK would have its interests considered by EU member states. The envisaged efforts towards a London-Berlin partnership (HM Government, 2017) could also result in a stronger British influence. Meanwhile, these options would allow May’s government to respect the decision-making autonomy of the EU. The UK needs reliable counterparts and consultative mechanisms for crisis situations, which were both provided by the EU. Now this assurance could be found through bilateral deals with the major powers. Although they could be hindered by a renewed Paris-Berlin axis, by French President Emmanuel Macron’s commitment to the EU, and Eastern EU members doubts regarding the UK’s interest in their security. The latter flared after British officials tried to use troop deployments in Estonia and Poland (about 1,000) as a means to bargain a better Brexit deal (Besch, 2016).

In her speech at the 2018 Munich Security Conference, May highlighted three main areas where the UK wants its cooperation with the EU to continue and strengthen: sanctions, defence Research and Development (R&D), and EU databases and mechanisms today employed against organized crime, terrorism, and in cyber-security (such as the Schengen Information System, Europol, European Arrest Warrant. It would be costly to renegotiate bilateral deals with every country on data sharing). If there is a mutual interest in continuing to work together on sanctions, because they will be more effective, and because the EU relies on UK intelligence, the legal rules concerning the role of the European Court of Justice and the EU privacy laws on data sharing will hinder the prospect of any deal on the other two issues (Mortera-Martinez, 2017). These soft-skills areas of competence of the EU are the reason why the UK ultimately will remain dependent on the EU as a security partner. Indeed, the EU acts wherever NATO has little or no responsibilities, plus the UK is largely dependent on EU research funds. The EU is the source of a quarter of all public funds for research in the UK. The UK spends 1.63% of its GDP on research, compared to 2.85% in Germany. Nevertheless, the UK ranks first in the European Research Council by grants obtained (Black, Hall, Cox, Kepe, and Silfversten, 2017; Rand). In addition, British interest in border security, migration, energy security, anti-piracy, anti-human trafficking, and security sector reform will be better protected if the UK cooperates with EU missions and operations and offsets the loss of its decision-making role in the EU by highlighting its objectives in alternative cooperation frameworks whose members have a role in the EU. If bilateral agreements with EU member states could allow the UK to have its interest channeled in EU missions since its partners would share some of its security and strategic priorities, an effort to strengthen EU and NATO cooperation in its areas of expertise could balance a not-special partnership deal with the EU.

Conclusion:

The level of ambition envisioned by May after triggering Article 50, that of a “Global Britain”, needs to be underpinned by a strong international role and stable cooperation in the security and defence fields. Future cooperation with the EU and the UK’s role in NATO are fundamental to protect the UK’s national interests in Europe and beyond. Given the EU’s reluctance to give the UK a decision-making role in its missions, even if ad hoc, and the Trump administration’s fleeting consideration of NATO, the UK needs to build alternative defence and security cooperation frameworks, like JEF, based on British expertise, with major EU actors so as to have an indirect seat at the European decision-making table. The UK then should work towards stable cooperation with the EU, since it leads missions which affect British national interests, like terrorism, migration and security sector reform, and for a strong EU-NATO cooperation and synchronization where the UK could claim a leading role based on its ‘security surplus’, even if it will always depend on the EU as a security partner.