Pakistan’s Counter-hegemonic strategies and the reform of the Indus Waters Treaty

Executive Summary

The populations dependent upon the Indus River basin are enduring increasing water insecurity. Ideally, the Pakistani and Indian governments should cooperate to achieve effective transboundary water management of the resource. The obstruction of this goal has led to suboptimal outcomes, producing a loser/loser matrix in the long-term. However, as the hegemonised power, it is Pakistan that is more grievously afflicted. This paper seeks to examine the realist principles that dictate the regional water governance and increasing water resource nationalism. A historical analysis will also be provided to contextualise the dynamics of current disputes. The enmity between the two nations, and the hydro- hegemon status of India, hinder the ability of Pakistan to fully exercise their right to the Indus waters. This is creating a multitude of compounding issues that confront the Pakistani government. The paper at hand seeks to provide the establishment of the Islamic Republic with policy recommendations that they can pursue as the hegemonised state, in order to maximise their security of the Indus River basin.

Introduction

The mounting freshwater crisis in the Himalayan region has intensified the deep-seated animosity between Pakistan and India. The two historic South Asian rivals are experiencing sharp growths in population, as well as facing increasing challenges associated with climate change. The combination of these two issues is causing a growing disparity between water availability and water needs, which in turn, consequently diminishes the water security in the region. Unfortunately, both states are heavily restricted economically, making them less equipped to overcome the social challenges that stem from this insecurity. (Homer-Dixon, 1994) Researchers, including Thomas Homer-Dixon, believe that water scarcity indirectly provokes conflict, as it inflicts deleterious effects upon other factors that are likely to cause war. These consequences include a reduction in food production, an increase in poverty and disease, and a greater flow of migration, all of which serve to undermine the governments capacity to rule the state. (Homer-Dixon, 1994) These issues increase the inter- state tensions, making the region more vulnerable to conflict over resources. Ideally, it is best to cultivate a system of cooperation between India and Pakistan, in order to overcome the transnational issue of water. This includes “(transparently) exchanging data regarding inflows and outflows” from respective hydroelectric projects as a means of developing trust. (Ahmad, 2012) Hydro-hegemon theorists claim that shared water governance is the ideal objective for hegemonised states. (Zeitoun, 2005) However, the mechanisms of an anarchic world system have made this process difficult, and the growing secrecy and competition over water projects and water allocation have led to increasing mistrust and hostility between Pakistan and India. As Robert Wirsing observes, this competition for water resources is building a zero-sum atmosphere, and has encouraged states to engage in state-centric power politics, rather than to cooperate. (Wirsing, 2013: 13) This paper seeks to recommend narrow, achievable policy proposals that Pakistan may employ as the hegemonised power, following a critical analysis of water governance in the subcontinent.

Hydro-hegemony and counter-hegemonic alternatives

The paper will analyse the Indus River basin disputes through the framework of hydro-hegemony. Therefore, the term “hydro-hegemony” must be critically examined.

Hydro-hegemony is “hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies such as resource capture, integration and containment”. (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 438) Here, hegemony refers to “how groups with power can maintain their pole position (control), other than through mere repression”. (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 438) The degree to which hydro-hegemony is realised is determined by relative power, river basin position, and the potential to exploit water. (Zeitoun, 2005) India significantly outweighs Pakistan in terms of relative material power and is the upper riparian, and has a pronounced capacity to exploit its river flows. Therefore, India is regarded as the hydro- hegemon, and Pakistan, the hegemonised state. Another critical component of hegemony is discourse. The degree of hydro-hegemony is reflected in the riparian state’s ability to successfully “impose a discourse, preserve its interest and impede changes to a convenient status-quo”. (Menga, 2015: 11) Hegemonised states, on the other hand, have a limited capacity to maximise their interests. This said, there is a list of ways that non-hegemons can undermine the hydro-hegemon:

1. Campaign on the international platform

• Doing so will facilitate the transformation of the global discourse, and increase knowledge about
  political asymmetry.
• Gaining the support of major bodies to preside over talks as a third party can pressure the hydro- hegemon to hold talks, and make fairer concessions.

2. Increase internal water governance efficiencies

• This helps alleviate some of the domestic pressures for water security, thereby increasing the establishment’s bargaining power during talks with other governments.

 3. Create issue linkage

• Associating bad transboundary water governance with other issues helps increase the non-hegemons bargaining power. Such concerns include migration, food, political asymmetry, political insecurity, extremism.

4. International law
• The support of winning an international court ruling will help legitimise the non-hegemon’s claim. However, a loss will obviously have the opposite effect.

5. Resistance
• This can manifest in the form of instability and unrest. However, this measure must be conducted in an astute manner, as it may also produce the unintended consequence of undermining the stability of the non-hegemonic establishment.

These methods will have maximum effect, if employed simultaneously, and through coordination.

The legacy of the partition in 1947 on the Indus waters treaty

The partition of the British Indian Empire in 1947 split the state into two, and along the Indus River. It was a painful process, due to the animosity between the two competing nationalist movements and was exacerbated by the inadequate policies of the British. This was largely caused by the ambiguity concerning border demarcation, and led to the mass migration of fifteen million people and the deaths of over one million more. (Dalrymple, 2015) Even today, the violent nature of the partition continues to undermine cooperation and harmony between the two South Asian states.

As a result of the partition, the water system of the Indus River basin, which had worked in unity during colonial times, was separated by newly drawn national boundaries. Moreover, as Robert Wirsing states, the “fresh international boundary severed major irrigation headworks on the Indian side from the canal infrastructure and irrigated lands on the Pakistan side”. (Wirsing et al, 2013: 47) The disunion of the water system inclined each state to maximise its water security, often at the expense of the other. This created a competitive norm that contrasted the regional accord that characterised colonial rule. During the British Raj, the political interests, including those of water institutions, were conducted in the interest of the whole subcontinent. Consequently, the partition compelled Pakistan and India to manage their newly acquired institutions, and assimilate them into a hostile post- colonial setting.

Sensible strategies in the region

It is important for Pakistan to appreciate the significance of the region’s water insecurity, and the urgency to act. Its population has more than tripled in the fifty years between 1960 and 2010, growing from 45.5 million to 173.1 million. (Worldometers.info, 2016) Furthermore, the World Population Data Sheet has projected this figure to reach 363 million in 2050. (Prb.org, 2016) India is also facing sharp population growths, with experts predicting it to be the most populous country in 2050, with a populace of 1.656 billion. (Prb.org, 2016) This obviously has an adverse impact on the water security in the region, as it places further strain on the water resources. Table 1.1 illustrates that the total renewable"freshwater per capita of Pakistan is 1,378m , compared to and the 1,545m" of India. As indicated by Table 1.2, both states suffer from water stress. Climate change and depreciating water infrastructure are both compounding the impact the demography has on water security. As Wirsing claims, the deteriorating level of water security in both Pakistan and India is engendering a zero-sum mentality, which encourages resource nationalism. (Wirsing, 2013: 208) This consequently amplifies the chances of conflict, and with both nations holding large nuclear stockpiles (as shown in Table 1.3), it is imperative to create sensible policies that prevent the eventuality of war.

Water security and the reform of Pakistan’s strategies

Although the land partition of British India was in 1947, it took thirteen more years to formally agree on a water partition. With significant support from the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty (henceforth IWT) was signed in 1960. It granted Pakistan the exclusive use of the three western rivers, Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960) India was given the exclusive use of the three eastern rivers, Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej, before they enter the Pakistani border. (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960) Effectively, this allocated 80% of the Indus to Pakistan, and 20% to India. (Chellaney, 2011: 77) This was based on historical uses of the Indus River, and Pakistan’s particular dependence on it for water. (Chellaney, 2011: 78) Figure 1 illustrates how Pakistan is solely dependent on the Indus River. However, although the Indus River is mostly within its borders, it originates and flows downstream from India.

“The policy makers that created the IWT could not have predicted the enormity of today’s freshwater crisis in the region”

Therefore, its important to appreciate its significance to Pakistan, and to sympathise with its entitled attitude. The IWT was designed as a permanent agreement between the two nations. (Wirsing, 2013: 94) However, the policy makers that created the IWT could not have predicted the enormity of today’s freshwater crisis in the region. When the treaty was signed, the region had an abundance of water. (Chellaney, 2011: 81) Now, with both nations enduring water stress, and subsequently food shortages, the IWT is under immense strain to main regional accord. As Wirsing describes, “its authors could not have foreseen the demographic, political, developmental, hydrological, and climatic changes that are now placing massive pressures on its provisions”. (Wirsing, 2013: 62) However, despite its increasing anachronism, it should be highlighted that it has succeeded its purpose of preventing water-conflict and has survived for over fifty years. It has also maintained cooperation despite three wars. Therefore, while policy makers should rightly seek alternatives to the current proposal, it should fully appreciate its relative success. They should try to ameliorate the system rather than dissolve the IWT, as it would create a dangerous precedent.

The baglihar and Kishanganga disputes: Lessons for Pakistan

•The Balighar Dispute
The increasing anachronism of the IWT, and its growing inability to provide solutions that accommodate modern hydrological technology, was flagrantly exposed by the Baglihar dispute.

The disagreement reignited hostile tensions between Pakistan and India, and threatened to lead the two countries into a war over water security. The Baglihar Dam is a hydroelectric power project designed by India, in the hope of alleviating the country’s water and food shortages. However, it is a “run of the river dam”, and requires “pondage”, thereby giving India the ability to hold and to release water according to its interests. (Ahmad, 2012) This is obviously alarming to Pakistan, as it would “destabilise its water supplies particularly in a period of hostility or during dry years”. (Ahmad, 2012) Consequently, Pakistan filed a complaint to the World Bank in 2003, petitioning for an independent expert, as per their right under the IWT. (Waterpowermagazine.com, 2016) The move forced India to seek bilateral talks with Pakistan, and under the terms of the Islamic republic. In 2005, the World Bank appointed Professor Raymond Lafitte to be the neutral expert to making a ruling over the dispute. In 2007, the civil engineer, ruled in favour of India. He cited that although the Baglihar Dam could control the water discharge of the Chenab River, India was within its rights to construct it as it adhered to modern technological requirements. (Wirsing, 2013: 94) This effectively prioritised India’s right to realise its hydrological potential over Pakistan’s right to water security, especially during times of war. Pakistan was explicably upset with the ruling, claiming that it effectively transformed the purpose of the IWT “from conflict prevention [...] to dam sustainability”. (Wirsing, 2013: 94)

•The Kishanganga Dispute
The Kishanganga Dispute reiterates many of the issues ruptured by the Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Project. As figure 2 shows above, the Kishanganga Dam is also an Indian hydroelectric power project in Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan was upset with its design, as it intended to divert the tributaries of the Kishanganga River (Neelum River in Pakistan) into the Jhelum River basin. In 2010, the Islamic republic contested the construction on the basis that it violated the IWT, and this time appealed the issue to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (henceforth CoA), of The Hague. This is because, like the Baglihar Dam, the Kishanganga hydroelectric power project has the potential to seriously debilitate Pakistan’s water security during times of conflict. The CoA ruled, in February 2013, announced a partial award. Although India did not fulfil their objective of a full diversion, it was allowed to “maintain a minimum flow of water in the river”. (Khan, 2013) This again legitimised the prioritisation of India’s right to divert waters for hydroelectric power over Pakistan’s right to water security.

The main lesson derived from the Baglihar and Kishanganga disputes is that there is an establishing trend that favours India’s right to realise its hydroelectric power potential over Pakistan’s right to protect its water security. It is a norm that is being legitimised by international law, through prestigious international organisations and actors. Consequently, Pakistani officials have become increasingly frustrated, and the IWT is under growing strain. They are understandably upset with policy makers that disregard their legitimate security concerns. Therefore, the Pakistani government should negotiate for a clause in the IWT that requires a political analyst to co-arbitrate future disputes. This would allow the political and security implications of hydroelectric power projects to be more comprehensively considered in international court rulings. Furthermore, analysing such projects politically is in the original spirit of the IWT, which was created to prevent water-conflict. It is therefore also India’s responsibility to accommodate such concerns, even if it prevents them from realising their projects. However, as the disputes have shown, the hydro-hegemon is concerned with its own national interests more than those of the region. As a result, its interests have to be appealed to. India can be convinced to add a political analyst to preside over rulings if extremist elements in Pakistan, due to the region’s water insecurity, creates a credible threat to their security. Less radically, India can be persuaded if it is successfully argued that such a proposal is in the interest of both nations, as it encourages long-term stability and co- operation.

Another issue that the disputes expose is that the IWT is increasingly anachronistic, and is unable to provide solutions that accommodate modern hydrological technology. As previously emphasised, the stability afforded by the IWT should not be regarded lightly. It is for this reason that the IWT should be updated with new protocols, rather than abandoned. The IWT should be adapted to politically solve water issues, given the current developments in water technology. Failure to confront this issue early may intensify existing frustrations and lead to a serious conflict in the future.

Towards a new approach in Pakistan’s negotiating position

•Discourse
Hegemonised riparian states can use discourse to effectively renegotiate existing power structures. This is because creating international symbols and associations, which alter global perceptions, can influence legal proceedings. However, downstream nations are disadvantaged by their position. As Wirsing notes, “the upper riparian has the advantage of having the capacity to ‘create facts’ (i.e. design a dam that does not entirely conform to the provisions of the IWT) that the lower riparian country may have very limited ability to resist”. (Wirsing et al, 2013: 94-95) The Baglihar and Kishanganga disputes exemplify this. Therefore, Pakistan must find discursive alternatives that circumvent this issue.

Pakistan needs to create a sanctioned discourse ­ the “discourse heard above the others” ­ that marries the Indus River basin with the sovereignty of its state. (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 448) Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner state that “a full understanding of an issue... may be as much guided by popular beliefs ­ accurate or inaccurate ­ as guided by science-based knowledge”. (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 448) For example, Egypt maintains its bargaining power by promoting the rhetoric that “the survival of Egypt is based on the Nile”, and by emphasising the river’s historical importance to Ancient Egypt. (Takele, 2005) It produces an understanding that projects the perception that Egypt is unable to use alternatives that are available to its upstream neighbours. Similarly, should the Pakistani government invest in such knowledge construction, it can reinforce the idea that the country is wholly dependent on the Indus River, and downplay the possibility of alternative solutions. This would provide the Islamic republic with more political manoeuvrability, and alter the understanding of equitable sharing of water. By promoting their diminutive relative wealth and greater water insecurity, they could encourage a norm that protects their water rights over India’s rights to capitalise on its hydroelectric power capacities. However, Pakistan should not engage in subversive behaviour through political unrest, given the nation’s issues with extremism. Should the establishment succeed in creating a narrative that becomes the internationally sanctioned discourse, Pakistan would increase its bargaining power with India.

•Honest retrospection
In order to achieve the best available outcome, Pakistan must appreciate that there are limits to even the most successful counter-hegemonic strategies. For instance, the government largely squanders the water that they are allocated by the IWT, due to mismanagement. (Chellaney, 2011: 226) Simply bargaining for concessions with India will not solve all of Pakistan’s water scarcity issues. Of course, it is also necessary to maximise any potential bargains with India, but Pakistan’s best assurance for water security is to protect the flow of the Indus within its own borders. Importantly, improving its own water governance will augment its bargaining power, as it will not be driven into concession by desperation. Shahid Ahmad concurs by stating that “by taking a serious stance on improving water supplies internally, Pakistan will be able to engage in a meaningful exchange with India”. (Ahmad, 2012: 6) Therefore, it is important for Pakistan to develop its water governance within its own borders, as it will convalesce its water stress and improve its bargaining power with India.

Conclusion

To conclude, Pakistani government must swiftly confront its country’s mounting water insecurity, and do so with narrow goals and policies. Though shared water governance is the ideal goal for long-term stability and cooperation, as well as the best way of sustainably managing the Indus River, it is an unlikely possibility in the near future. India has been able to continually maximised its interests at the expense of Pakistan. It has more relative power, an upper-riparian position, and with the capacity to capture water flows, making it the hydro- hegemon. Therefore, the increasing zero-sum mentality, which is encouraging the nationalism of resources, will benefit India much more than it will Pakistan. The onus is consequently on the hegemonised power to alter the status quo, and to create a dialogue that reduces this approach. The Pakistani government must internationally campaign its country’s rights to the Indus River, and in a way that appeals to the general public. By promoting Pakistan’s growing issues that are associated with its increasing water insecurity, it can create a sanctioned discourse that recognises the Islamic republic’s distressing dependence to the Indus, and consequently, its rights to it.

The impact of having prestigious organisations to support the claims of one side, as an impartial third party, should not be understated. In the 1950s, amidst conflict over Kashmir, India were initially unwilling to negotiate with their neighbour over the governance of the Indus waters. The World Bank thus intervened to mediate the dispute, forcing India to be more sympathetic to Pakistan’s concerns. (Nehru, 1953: 509) However, the Baglihar and Kishanganga disputes demonstrate that Pakistan is losing the support of the international community, and the interests of India are increasingly legitimised through international law. It is therefore necessary for Pakistan to campaign for its interests on an international platform, as it may alter the global discourse, which may help them in future rulings. As aforementioned, it is also important to retain the emphasis of political discourse. The disputes concerning the IWT are increasingly being ruled on the technicalities of dam-sustainability, rather than on the prevention of water-conflict. Reiterating the importance of the IWT as an institutional safeguard against water-conflict will encourage Indian policy makers to consider the political implications of their hydroelectric power projects. Therefore, a political analyst must be co-arbitrate the rulings of neutral third parties in future disputes. The IWT itself must be protected, as it has allowed for cooperative water governance for over fifty years, despite continued conflict and three wars. Policy makers will undermine the sanctity of the IWT and its proposals if they dissolve the treaty. They must therefore extend the treaty to accommodate the prevailing issues, which include the need for a political analyst to co-arbitrate disputes, as well as providing solutions for major hydrological developments.

The future of the transboundary water governance of the Indus River is ominous, but there is still room for some optimism. Pakistan must seek to attain specific objectives and to employ narrow policies, in order to maximise its interests in the region. However, they must appeal in a way that is agreeable to India, as co-operation is vital for the long-term. Co-operation and conflict can occur simultaneously, as exemplified by the survival of the IWT. Therefore, the suggested counter-hegemonic strategies suggested should not be viewed as against the interests of India, but for the interest of the collective region.

Policy recommendations

1. Maintain the stability of the IWT by adding proposals that better accommodate hydrological developments.
2. AddaclauseintheIWTtoensurethatpoliticalanalystsco-arbitratefuturedispute.
3. Internationally campaign for Pakistan’s right to the Indus River. This will be best achieved by emphasising Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus, as well as highlighting the issues associated with the nation’s mounting water insecurity problems. I.e. increasing poverty and hunger.
4. Gain international funding to help develop and maintain Pakistan’s water infrastructures to improve the ability of Pakistan to govern its waters, giving it more bargaining power against India

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